Escalating conflict, below-average harvests sustaining Crisis (IPC 3) in the north

• In northern Nigeria, conflict continues to drive displacement, disrupt livelihood and market activities, and constrain access to income and farmland, leading to widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. While most households are experiencing seasonal improvements in food availability due to the ongoing October harvest, overall production remains below average. As a result, most households will remain at least partially market dependent for food throughout the harvest period. In inaccessible areas of the North East, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to persist between November 2025 and May 2026 as households face severely limited mobility, poor market access, and minimal to no harvests.
• Despite the ongoing harvest, escalating levels of conflict are anticipated to sustain high humanitarian needs through May 2026. Since early 2025, intensifying violence across the northern areas of Nigeria has continued to restrict households' access to farmland and food sources while also limiting their ability to earn income. While food assistance needs will seasonally decrease in October with the beginning of the harvest, between 14.0-15.0 million people will be in need of humanitarian assistance between October 2025 and May 2026. Needs will begin to seasonally increase as early as March with the onset of the pastoral lean season before peaking in May 2026 with the onset of the agricultural lean season. The population of highest concern includes poor and displaced households in inaccessible areas of the northeast.
• Despite the improvement in recorded macroeconomic conditions and an atypical decrease in staple food prices compared to the previous year and five-year average, prices remain marginally above average. Persistently high transportation costs, limited income-earning opportunities, and a continued increase in the overall cost of general goods and services have driven above-average prices. These factors have continued to strain households’ expenditures and further limited access to food.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 17, 2025. 

Prolonged conflict across the northern regions of Nigeria has severely undermined food security, as violence, displacement, and restricted humanitarian access continue to disrupt agricultural activities, market systems, and assistance delivery. The North East Region of Nigeria has been grappling with ongoing conflict characterized by violent attacks, kidnappings, and the destruction of property since the rise of the non-state armed group (NSAG) Boko Haram in 2009. The emergence of Islamic State West African Provinces (ISWAP) and additional Boko Haram splinter groups has further destabilized the region, leading to mass displacement and significantly disrupted humanitarian operations. Since 2011, conflict has expanded into the North West and North Central states, where armed banditry and livestock theft have intensified significantly, further escalating decades-long farmer-herder tensions, which have led to frequent violent clashes, mass abductions, and the limited presence of humanitarian actors, especially compared to the North East. Beginning in 2021, insecurity has further increased dramatically in North West and North Central, with record levels of violence persisting through 2025, limiting economic activities, livelihoods, and food production. 

Despite signs of macroeconomic recovery in 2025, macroeconomic fragility remains a key driver of acute food insecurity in Nigeria. Persistently high inflation, elevated fuel prices, and a weak NGN continue to erode household purchasing. Inflation reached approximately 18 percent in September 2025 — the lowest since May 2022 — due to a relative stabilization of the NGN and lower prices of key staples; however, diesel and petrol prices remain approximately 30 percent higher than the previous year, and the persistently weak NGN continues to limit import capacity and contribute to high domestic prices. Staple food prices remain above average, though are easing following the government’s implementation of an import waiver on food commodities in addition to reduced demand by traders and households due to households’ low purchasing power and the seasonal release of stocks by traders.

Livelihoods in Nigeria are diverse and vary geographically. Agriculture remains a dominant livelihood for most rural households, while others engage in livestock livelihood activities. In a typical year, the main season harvest (October-December) follows the end of the lean season (July-September), during which time households typically consume food from their own production and earn additional income from crop sales. Trends in acute malnutrition follow seasonal fluctuations in food availability, typically decreasing during the post-harvest period due to improved food access and seasonal decreases in disease prevalence, before increasing again with the lean seasons. Livestock births and milk production run August to November, benefiting from increased water and pasture availability driven by the rainy season (April-October). Livestock sales typically peak around the major holidays, which fall in December and around the start of the pastoral lean season (March-May), providing income for livestock-owning households. 

Years of compounding crises have limited households’ ability to engage in their typical livelihood activities. Protracted conflict in northern Nigeria, which was previously a key area for surplus crop production, has continued to disrupt agricultural activities and decrease yields. Ongoing insecurity limits market access and the movement of goods, isolating communities and preventing surplus food distribution — even during the post-harvest period — while households’ ability to purchase food has been reduced due to persistently high food prices. Pastoral livelihoods have been impacted by farmer-herder conflict, which has led to reduced herd sizes and disrupted typical transhumance routes. High inflation and economic volatility have additionally worsened food access by increasing food prices for households that are increasingly market-dependent to meet their food needs. These compounding shocks have disrupted the seasonal food availability cycles, leading to high levels of need year-round.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Nigeria Key Message Update: September 2025
• FEWS NET’s Nigeria reports
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Violent extremist NSAGs intensified attacks in North East throughout 2025, surpassing 2024 levels. Coordinated assaults targeted civilians and military forces, with the highest concentration of violence in Borno State (especially in Abadam, Bama, Gwoza, Konduga, Kukawa, Marte, and Ngala local government areas [LGAs]). Persistent violence is hindering Borno’s internally displaced persons (IDP) resettlement efforts. Although ISWAP continues to maintain a foothold in and around the Sambisa and Alagarno forests and Lake Chad, operation frequency and intensity decreased with the rainy season and following significant operations by the Nigerian military in June and July. The renewed escalation of violence in North East has led to further, often multiple, displacements. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), nearly 34,000 individuals have been displaced across Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states between January and October 2025.

North West and North Central have experienced increased violence linked to banditry and abductions throughout 2025. Communities continue to pay levies and ransoms to NSAGs; Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Benue, Niger, Plateau, and Taraba states are among the most affected. Attacks by Islamic State Sahel’s Lakurawa faction spread in Kebbi and Sokoto states, as the group continued to establish a foothold along the Niger-Nigeria border. In the second quarter of 2025, violence also escalated in Kwara State’s Kaiama, Barutein, and Borgu LGAs. Attacks, abductions, and social unrest linked to the Indigenous People of Biafra (IBOP) group in South East and South have continued at similar levels to 2024. 

The main rainy season has caused widespread flooding across Nigeria. According to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), flooding that occurred between June and October affected 115 LGAs across 27 states, impacting more than 400,000 people and displacing approximately 129,000. As of September 30, FAO's Data in Emergency (DIEM) indicates that, approximately 761,000 hectares of cropland were flooded across the 10 most affected states, including Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Jigawa, Kebbi, Nasarawa, Niger, Sokoto, Taraba, and Yobe. Although the extent of the flooding countrywide is lower than in 2024, Adamawa, Sokoto, Kebbi, and Niger states have experienced more severe flooding in 2025. The floods have exacerbated public health crises, including a countrywide cholera outbreak, with more than 10,300 cases and 244 deaths recorded as of September 14. 

The main harvest is ongoing, providing income-earning opportunities for very poor households through agricultural labor and the harvest of own-produced crops; however, the season has been significantly constrained by conflict, flooding, and high input costs. FEWS NET estimates overall production will be slightly below last year and moderately below average due to these compounding challenges. Despite increased demand for labor, wage rates — ranging from 13 to 33 percent above last year and the five-year average — have been eroded by inflation, limiting improvements to household purchasing power, according to FEWS NET’s field informants.

Nigeria’s macroeconomic indicators show a tentative recovery in 2025, though improvements have not reached households. The Central Bank of Nigeria reported an improvement in external reserves of approximately 42.4 billion USD as of October 2, the highest since September 2019, indicating significant inflows that were further supported by crude oil production increases to 1.5 million barrels per day in July 2025. Despite inflation easing for five consecutive months, falling from 35 percent in December 2024 to around 18 percent in September 2025, fuel prices remain high (Figure 1), and staple food prices remain above average, although below last year’s levels, following a temporary import waiver on key commodities.  

Livestock production remains below average due to ongoing conflict and livestock theft. Many households now maintain smaller herds or avoid large ruminants altogether. Restrictions on open grazing — especially in southern states — have further limited livestock movement. Countrywide demand for livestock remains high, but supply is constrained by conflict, surging transportation costs, and reduced imports from neighboring countries like Niger due to a weak NGN and high transportation costs. 

Prices remain above average in most markets, driven by below-average production, high transportation costs, and the depreciated NGN against foreign currencies like the USD and CFA. Trade flows from surplus-producing northern areas to deficit-prone southern regions remain generally stable, but markets in conflict-affected areas of the north are frequently disrupted or closed due to insecurity. Flows also remain lower than expected due to below-average production in northern states. In inaccessible areas of North East, formal markets are largely non-functional, though NSAGs are likely operating informal street markets.

Humanitarian food assistance

IDPs in North East — particularly in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe — continue to receive humanitarian food assistance, although the number of targeted beneficiaries reached with assistance continues to decline due to funding constraints. Highest rates of assistance were in Borno, the epicenter of conflict, with an average of nearly 1.1 million people assisted between June and August 2025 through cash, in-kind, or voucher assistance. Information from key informants and ground observations indicate that the majority of IDPs residing in camps primarily depend on humanitarian food assistance as their main source of food and it is needed to prevent consumption gaps across a large proportion of IDPs. In North West and North Central — especially in Benue, Sokoto, Katsina, and Zamfara — humanitarian partners have continued supporting conflict-affected households in informal camps and host communities; however, data on the scale and reach of assistance in these areas remain limited.

In North East, the compounding effects of prolonged conflict, seasonal climatic shocks, and inflation are driving widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Inaccessible areas of Borno State — including Abadam, Bama, Guzamala Kukawa, and Marte LGAs — remain the worst-affected. Most households in these areas have been unable to cultivate or forced to give crops to NSAGs as a “tax.” The ongoing harvest is therefore expected to only marginally ease food consumption gaps in the short term, with many households relying on wild foods, including leaves, dried fruits such as dessert dates, and wild tubers to meet their needs. Large food consumption gaps are expected to emerge as households deplete limited food stocks. In other conflict-affected areas of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, limited access to farmland, agricultural inputs, and income-earning opportunities are sustaining Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, despite some localized seasonal improvements from the harvest. This constrained food availability and access will likely be additionally compounded by reduced access to markets, looted food stocks, and elevated staple food prices.

A small portion of households in the worst conflict-affected and inaccessible areas continue to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. These households face severe mobility restrictions, limited market access, and are largely unable to harvest their crops. As a result, these households must rely on negative coping strategies such as wild food consumption, bartering, and begging to survive. 

Ongoing humanitarian assistance in IDP camps in the North East is preventing more severe outcomes and is mitigating food consumption gaps among displaced households. The majority of displaced households have lost their productive assets, have limited income-earning opportunities amid increased competition for resources, and have limited mobility due to ongoingconflict. Many households have been displaced multiple times, further reducing their ability to engage in agricultural or livestock-rearing activities. Furthermore, persisting high staple food prices have constrained households’ ability to purchase food in markets. These households are currently facing Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes. 

In North West and North Central, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are widespread. Food availability and access are increasing seasonally following the onset of the main season harvest; however, conflict related to banditry and kidnappings is preventing many households from fully participating in their typical farming activities. Flooding is also contributing to reduced harvests, particularly in Adamawa, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, and Taraba states. In conflict-affected areas, most poor households remain heavily market dependent amid above-average staple food prices. This is compounded by limited income-earning opportunities and weakened household purchasing power. As a result, many households are employing coping strategies such as eating less preferred foods, reducing meal sizes, and selling productive assets. Very poor households in the worst conflict-affected and inaccessible areas face severely restricted mobility, limited market access, and are largely unable to harvest their limited crops. In areas less affected by conflict and flooding, households are generally able to engage in farming and income-earning opportunities, though at below-average levels. As a result, these households are able to meet basic food needs and are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. 

In South, most households that engage in farming and have access to their own-produced food face Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. Non-farming households, who rely on market purchases, typically benefit from increased market supply and seasonal decreases in market prices; however, given the above-average staple food prices, most poorer households with limited income are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. 

• Conflict is expected to continue at elevated levels across North East. Disruptions to ongoing farming activities, including looting of crops and abducting farmers, are anticipated to intensify as NSAGs will likely leverage stolen harvest commodities to restock food and cash. Violence and kidnappings associated with banditry and intercommunal tensions in North West and North Central are likely to increase, particularly through December 2025 due to main season harvest activities, deteriorating economic conditions, and the focus of security forces on combating NSAGs.
• Dry season production from January to March is expected to be similar to last year but below average due to conflict and high input costs, despite anticipated government resource support for farmers.
• Cross-border trade is expected to exceed last year's levels, driven by the weak but relatively stable value of the NGN compared to the last two years. However, cross-border trade will remain below the five-year average through May 2026, likely reducing imported livestock and grain stocks. Border markets in North West that are typically supplied by Niger are likely to be most impacted.
• Domestic trade flows of staple foods are expected to remain below average, particularly in conflict-affected areas, due to insecurity and high transportation costs.
• Market supply is expected to be below average across the country following anticipated below-average production.
• Despite an atypical decline in 2025, staple food prices will remain slightly above average and follow seasonal trends.
• Above-average livestock prices are expected through May 2026, peaking seasonally during the holidays in December-January and Eid al-Fitr in April 2026. The supply of livestock will remain significantly below average due to conflict and low imports, driven by the weak NGN.
• Livestock migration from northern to southern Nigeria, which typically begins in February, is expectedto remain atypically low due to conflict, prolonged pasture availability following floods and favorable rainfall, and the ban on open grazing in some South and North Central states.
• International remittances will likely be higher than last year and above average through May 2026, as the NGN remains weak against foreign currencies.

Humanitarian food assistance

According to the April 2025 Re-prioritized Humanitarian Needs Response Plan, approximately 2 million people will continue to be targeted for humanitarian food assistance through the end of 2025. The Food Security Cluster has not yet provided or confirmed its food assistance plans for 2026. In the absence of these plans, projections for the February-May 2026 are in the absence of humanitarian assistance data. 

While FEWS NET does not have information on planned assistance in North West and North Central, humanitarian food assistance will likely continue in conflict-affected states, including Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara, with assistance expected to remain limited and at similar levels to the previous year. However, given the lower humanitarian presence and growing needs in the North West and North Central, humanitarian needs in these areas will continue to outstrip available assistance levels. 

Poor households in the worst-conflict-affected areas of Borno State (Bama, Abadam, Marte, and Guzamala LGAs) are expected to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes from November 2025 through May 2026). These households will continue to face constrained access to humanitarian assistance, income-earning opportunities, farmland, and agricultural inputs amid above-average food prices. Harvests remain limited and insufficient to meet households’ minimum food needs, while low purchasing power and conflict-related disruptions will restrict access to markets. Anticipated high levels of attacks and kidnappings targeting civilians will likely worsen access to livelihoods. As early as November 2025, households are expected to begin depleting their food stocks. As reliance on market purchases grows, seasonal increases in staple food prices will further reduce food access. These households will therefore face wide food consumption gaps and increasingly depend on consuming wild foods, reducing meal size and frequency, and prioritizing feeding children.  

Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through May 2026 across Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states, as persisting insecurity has reduced agricultural engagement, disrupted market systems, and other typical livelihood activities. Households with limited means of production and depleted stock levels, as well as those that are heavily reliant on market purchases for food and have limited income-earning opportunities, will likely face wide food consumption gaps.  

Most IDPs in camps in urban areas will continue to depend on humanitarian assistance as their primary source of food through January 2026 and face Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes. IDP households are expected to supplement market purchases — which will be constrained due to limited income — through unskilled labor, resource collection and sales, craft sales, and petty trading. In the absence of humanitarian assistance distribution plans for 2026, IDPs will likely face increased food consumption gaps and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes between February and May 2026. As the year progresses, IDP households in host communities, with limited access to humanitarian food assistance and minimal own food production, are expected to deplete their minimal food stocks atypically early and become entirely market dependent in the context of limited income and atypically high staple prices, constraining their access to food.

In North West and North Central areas affected by banditry, kidnapping, and farmer-herder conflict, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are anticipated through May 2026, as the increased levels of conflict expected through the dry season will further drive population displacement and constrain access to livelihood activities and market supply. Households will likely have to pay high levies to access cropland through the harvest period until January 2026, and food stocks will likely be targeted by bandits, negatively impacting food availability and access. Households in the worst-conflict-affected areas will be unable to meet their basic food needs with their own production and will be atypically market dependent for their food needs amid high market prices. Households will likely resort to selling household and productive assets and reducing meal size and frequency. IDPs in makeshift camps, host communities, and informal settlements across North West have extremely limited access to humanitarian assistance, safe and potable water, nutrition support, or health services, and often resort to begging, bartering, and going days without eating. While these IDP households comprise less than 20 percent of the population, they are likely to have large food consumption gaps and will likely face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through May 2026. Households in areas less affected by conflict will likely be able to consume their own production and engage in typical livelihood activities through the projection period. As main season harvests deplete, households will engage in dry season cultivation or recessional cropping, which will be harvested April-May 2026. Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected through May 2026, with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes likely in areas affected by flooding through the projection period.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Dry season production is below average

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes:  A below-average dry season in Nigeria would likely worsen acute food insecurity, particularly in northern regions where dry season farming is critical. Reduced rainfall and water availability would limit irrigation, leading to lower yields of key crops. The decline in agricultural output would reduce food availability and strain household food stocks. Livelihoods would also be disrupted, as farmers, herders, and fishers face reduced harvests, poor grazing conditions, and lower catch volumes. Market supply chains could be further impacted by poor road conditions, especially in conflict-affected areas, restricting commodity movement and driving up prices. As local food production declines and prices rise, more households may rely on humanitarian assistance, which could be strained by increased demand and limited access. Consequently, some areas may deteriorate from Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes may increase.

North East, North West, and North Central Nigeria

A substantial improvement in conflict occurs

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A substantial improvement in conflict across Nigeria would likely result in the significant improvement in acute food security outcomes, particularly in the North East, North West, and North Central regions. In the North East, displaced households would regain access to farmlands, irrigation areas, and water bodies, enabling a resumption of food production and reducing reliance on humanitarian food assistance. Improved access for herders and fishers would further boost food availability and dietary diversity. In the North West and North Central, reduced violence and extortion would allow farmers to cultivate freely and access markets, increasing local food supply and easing pressure from elevated food prices. Stabilized border communities and reduced activity from violent extremist groups would support agricultural recovery and market functionality.

Overall, improved security would reduce displacement, ease constraints on livelihoods, and enhance market supply. Increased mobility and access would likely lead to lower food prices, improving food access for poor households. Humanitarian assistance would also expand with greater safety, reaching previously inaccessible areas. As a result, many households currently facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes would likely shift to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

An increase in humanitarian assistance occurs

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An increase in humanitarian assistance would likely improve household food access and income in the North East, particularly in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. With expanded support, poor and very poor households would be better able to meet their minimum food needs, maintain food stocks, and potentially increase purchasing power for non-food essentials. This would reduce reliance on wild foods and negative coping strategies such as skipping meals or reducing meal frequency. As a result, more households would be able to meet their basic needs, leading to a shift from Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!), respectively, in areas receiving assistance.

Additionally, a stronger presence of humanitarian actors and increased food assistance would likely improve conditions for displaced households in IDP camps and urban centers. These households would experience reduced food consumption gaps and could face Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) or Minimal! (IPC Phase 1!) outcomes with sustained support.

Armed conflict in North East Nigeria — primarily concentrated in Borno State and extending into Yobe and Adamawa States — continues to severely impact livelihoods, displace populations, disrupt market systems, and limit local food availability. Since 2009, conflict driven by Boko Haram and ISWAP has caused widespread displacement and economic disruption, with Borno as the NSAG’s epicenter (Figure 3). Humanitarian access remains restricted, leaving many areas partially or fully inaccessible and sustaining high, localized needs.

NSAG actors in the North East continue to target civilians and infrastructure, including schools, markets, health facilities, and transportation routes. Since mid-2025, attacks have intensified in several locations in North East. ISWAP attacked Dumba community in the Lake Chad area and killed at least 40 civilians, mainly farmers and fishers, early this year. In June, there was a reported suicide attack in Borno State’s Konduga fish market, killing at least 12 people. Similarly, in August, NSAG actors scaled up the use of drones, improvised vehicle explosion devices, and improvised explosive devices along some routes, disrupting the movement of people accessing their livelihood activities. In September, Daramajal village in Bama LGA was attacked by suspected insurgents, resulting in the deaths of 60 civilians, abductions, and destruction of 128 houses. In early October, Boko Haram launched an attack and seized the border town of Kirawa, in Borno State’s Gwoza LGA, displacing more than 5,000 people who fled to neighboring Cameroon.

Movement restrictions and insecurity have produced a complex environment and limited civilian and humanitarian access. Several LGA-level routes in Borno, including the Damboa-Maiduguri, Damboa-Chibok, Gamboru Ngala-Rann (Kala Balge), and Dikwa-Marte roads, are only usable during daylight with military escorts, while others, such as Monguno-Marte are effectively closed. A number of LGAs, including Abadam, Guzamala, Kukawa, and Marte, are inaccessible to humanitarian actors and have little or no sustained government presence. Civilian presence in these areas is likely also low and movement in and out is highly restricted. Other LGAs (Bama, Gwoza, Dikwa, Konduga, Kukawa, Monguno, Ngala in Borno; Gujba in Yobe; and Madagali in Adamawa) are partially accessible but with populations and economic activity largely confined to urban centers. These access constraints both limit market supply lines and complicate consistent humanitarian delivery.

The combined effects of violence, chronic displacement, and market disruption have driven repeated market shortages, severely limited pastoral and agricultural incomes, and pushed many households to engage in negative coping strategies including begging and selling productive assets. Market disruption and livestock theft has reduced household purchasing power while commodity prices have increased in isolated markets. Where markets continue to operate, higher transportation and security costs have resulted in higher market prices. Households therefore face reduced access to staple foods amid atypically high market reliance and a decline in the availability of animal-sourced foods produced by pastoralists. These pressures further increase the risk of acute malnutrition. The October 2025 EF SMART survey observed a global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence of 11 percent in Borno State’s Bama, Gwoza, Dikwa, Kala Balge, and Ngala LGAs, while Mobbar and Nganzai LGAs had a GAM prevalence of 12 percent. Overall, the persistence of conflict, restricted access, and limited livelihood recovery capacity are expected to sustain elevated levels of acute food insecurity across much of the North East, with populations in the most inaccessible areas of Borno State facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

In North East Nigeria, humanitarian food assistance has remained a critical lifeline for millions affected by protracted conflict and displacement. Between January and September, food assistance reached 1.8 million people across North East Nigeria; however, the scale of assistance falls short of the 2.8 million people targeted, and only 11 percent of the 352 million USD budget for food security interventions has been secured, severely limiting the reach and consistency of aid delivery.

Borno State, the epicenter of the crisis, remains the highest recipient of food assistance. Between June and August, more than 805,000 people were reached, primarily within IDP camps, with 227,000 people receiving in-kind food aid and 29,000 receiving cash or voucher support. Assistance was distributed across multiple LGAs, including Mobbar, with approximately 84,000 people reached; Ngala, where 87,500 people received aid; and Kala Balge, where more than 26,100 beneficiaries were reached. Other LGAs, including Damboa, Maiduguri, and Mafa, also saw substantial distributions, though coverage varied.

In Yobe State, more than 383,900 people received food assistance: in Nguru, approximately 21,500 people were assisted, while in Yusufari, humanitarian partners reached more than 38,900 individuals. Other LGAs, such as Gujba, Geidam, and Yunusari, also received targeted support, though the scale of assistance remained uneven. Adamawa State saw more limited coverage, with nearly 244,900 people assisted overall. In Michika, for example, only 60 individuals received in-kind food assistance, highlighting the challenges of reaching remote or underserved communities.

While the scale of need continues to outpace available resources, the food assistance delivered through September has likely mitigated the severity of food consumption deficits among IDPs in North East Nigeria, particularly in Borno and Yobe states. Available information from key informants and ground observations suggest that food assistance has helped stabilize food consumption among recipient households and prevented further deterioration to more severe outcomes. However, the persistent funding shortfalls, coupled with access constraints and continued displacement, remains a key limitation to sustaining and expanding assistance coverage.

Humanitarian assistance levels are expected to continue playing an important mitigating role through at least December 2025, particularly in areas where distribution is regular and coverage exceeds 25 percent of the population. Nevertheless, given the absence of confirmed Humanitarian Food Assistance plans for 2026, it is likely that no assistance will be available beyond December. In this context, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes or worse are likely to persist amongst IDPs in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, where needs continue to significantly outpace assistance.