Below average harvests and poor macroeconomy sustain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes

• Despite the ongoing harvest, conflict and flooding are anticipated to maintain high humanitarian assistance needs through May 2025. Food assistance needs are expected to peak at 13.00-13.99 million, with the greatest concern occurring between January and March, following the main season harvest and before the off-season harvest, and again as the lean season begins in May. Of highest concern includes the population in inaccessible areas of North East Nigeria.
• In northern Nigeria, conflict continues to drive displacement, disrupt livelihood and market activities, and constrain access to income and farmland, leading to widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. While most households are benefiting from some seasonal increases in food availability from harvests in October, food production remains below average and most households will remain at least partially market dependent through the harvest period. In inaccessible areas of the North East, households will have limited mobility, poor access to markets, limited harvests, and depleted coping capacity; Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely between November 2024 and May 2025.
• Macroeconomic conditions continue to deteriorate. The Nigerian naira (NGN) continues to depreciate on the open market, exchanging at 1,647 NGN/USD in early October. The retail price of petrol is at an all-time high, selling between 950 to 1,200 NGN/liter, and driving high food and transportation costs. As a result, income-earning opportunities and household purchasing power have deteriorated, reducing food access for millions of households who are market dependent.
• Localized and heavy rainfall has resulted in seasonal flooding in lowland and riverine areas across the country, affecting over 1.2 million people and disrupting the agricultural season across northern Nigeria. Flooding is exacerbating the widespread national cholera outbreak with increases of over 220 percent and 239 percent in the number of suspected cases and deaths, respectively, compared to last year.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 15, 2024.

High humanitarian assistance needs persist into post-harvest period

Nigeria continues to battle economic instability amid escalating conflict across northern Nigeria, agricultural and crude oil production deficits, and persisting increases of staple food prices. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to continue across North East, North West, and North Central Nigeria through May 2025. The conflict in the Northeast, especially in Borno State, has led to depleted food stocks, reduced purchasing power, and restricted food access for internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and households in inaccessible areas (Figure 1). While ongoing harvests will slightly improve food availability in inaccessible local government areas (LGAs) of the North East, driving a short-term improvement to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, harvests are only sufficient to last a month and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to re-emerge in November 2024 and persist through May 2025.

Main season harvests are expected to begin in October, though production will likely be below average due to high levels of flooding, conflict, and high input costs. While access to food will likely seasonally improve in the post-harvest period for households across the country, poor households in conflict affected areas of northern Nigeria will likely deplete stocks atypically early and remain at least partially dependent on the market for their food needs. Given persisting high staple food prices, low incomes, and strained social support systems, atypically high humanitarian food assistance needs will persist through at least May 2025. 

Nigeria’s macroeconomic crisis is also deepening, marked by the depreciation of the Nigerian Naira and rising inflation. Fuel prices have doubled compared to last year, driving up transportation costs and further contributing to the high prices of staple foods. While staple food prices continue to follow some seasonal trends, the combination of low production, high transportation costs, and currency depreciation has maintained significantly above average staple food prices, limiting households’ purchasing power. Poor households, particularly in conflict-affected areas, will continue to struggle to meet basic food needs as food access remains constrained by limited income opportunities and high market prices.

Flooding has further compounded these challenges, particularly in Borno, Benue, and Niger states, where localized heavy rains and the collapse of the Alau Dam. Nationally, flooding has displaced over 1 million people and destroyed over 700,000 hectares of cropland. The flooding has also exacerbated ongoing health crises, particularly a national cholera outbreak, which has seen a 220 percent increase in suspected cases compared to last year. 

Despite some seasonal improvements in food and income access associated with crop and livestock production in October, acute food insecurity is expected to remain severe in northern Nigeria. Households have below-average food stocks from own production, which will result in an anticipated atypically early depletion of household stocks and increased market dependence. Staple food prices also remain atypically high, driven by low food production, high transportation costs, and depreciation of the naira.  Food assistance needs are expected to remain high throughout the projection period, peaking between January and March, following the main harvest and before the off-season harvest in March, and again as the lean season begins in May. A sustained humanitarian response is essential to mitigate more severe outcomes in North East Nigeria and a coordinated and scaled up response is urgently needed in North West and North Central states. 

Since the rise of the non-state armed group (NSAG) Boko Haram in 2009, the North East has been grappling with conflict characterized by violent attacks, kidnappings, and the destruction of property. The emergence of Islamic State West African Provinces (ISWAP) and Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) splinter groups has further destabilized the region, led to mass displacement, and significantly disrupted humanitarian operations. Since 2011, the conflict has expanded into North West and North Central states, where armed banditry and cattle rustling have intensified significantly, further escalating decades-long tensions between farmers and herders, leading to frequent violent clashes, mass abductions, and displacement. Since 2021, unprecedented levels of insecurity has been observed in North West and North Central Nigeria, with record levels of violence persisting through 2024, significantly reducing humanitarian access. 

The macroeconomic crisis continues to deepen. After reaching a record high of 34.19 percent in June 2024, the annual inflation rate eased for two consecutive months to 32.15 August, though with no significant impact on prices. In October 2024, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) increased the price of petrol, which now sells for between 950 and 1,200 NGN per liter. Similarly, the NGN continues to depreciate against other foreign currencies, including the USD, exchanging at 1,657.88 NGN/USD as of October 3, 2024. The combined impact of continued NGN depreciation and increase in petrol price has exacerbated the pressure on poor households' income and expenditure across the country.   

Protracted conflict in the north and multiple shocks, including the macroeconomic crisis, have eroded livelihoods across Nigeria. While livelihoods across Nigeria are diverse and geographically varied, agriculture remains a dominant livelihood for most rural households. Protracted conflict in the north, previously a key area for surplus crop production, has disrupted agriculture and reduced yields. High inflation and economic volatility worsen these issues by making food less affordable as households increasingly depend on the market to meet their food needs. October coincides with the main season harvest across most of the country (Figure 2), and when most households would typically consume food from their own production and earn increased income from crop sales. Increased revenue is also generated from livestock sales, as livestock body conditions typically improve with increased availability of food and water sources. However, years of compounding crises have limited households’ ability to engage in their typical livelihood activities. Insecurity limits market access and the movement of goods, isolating communities and preventing surplus food distribution even during the post-harvest period, while households’ ability to purchase food is reduced due to soaring food prices. These compounding shocks have disrupted the seasonal food availability cycles, leading to high levels of need year-round.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

June 2024 Food Security Outlook

Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 

FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need

Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis

FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section. 

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Conflict:

In the northeastern states, attacks on civilians and Nigerian forces by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) persisted throughout 2024 at levels comparable to those in 2023. Borno State (particularly the LGAs of Bama, Gwoza, Konduga, Kukawa, Marte, Abadan, and Ngala) continued to experience the highest incidence of VEO violence. During the main agricultural season, VEO activities led to above-average fatalities following several large-scale attacks on vulnerable farming communities in Borno, Yobe, and Niger states. These communities had begun returning to their LGAs due to local officials’ efforts to facilitate the return of displaced populations. 

Despite a seasonal decline since August, violence linked to banditry continued to escalate in 2024, particularly in the North West and North Central regions. Over the last year in the North West and North Central regions, incidents targeting civilians increased by 19 percent and civilian fatalities increased by 26 percent. Notable increases in civilian targeting related to banditry/criminal groups were reported in Katsina, Niger, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Kaduna states, while attacks also persisted in Sokoto, Zamfara, and Benue states.  Local self-defense and vigilante groups have been strengthening in Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara with support from local authorities and security forces. 

Attacks, abductions, and social unrest have continued in the South East and South South regions, marked by increased activity from the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and an increase in opportunistic kidnappings since July 2024.

Flooding: 

The main season was marred by several cases of flooding across the country following localized heavy rainfall and the collapse of the Alau Dam in Borno State. According to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), approximately 201 LGAs across 31 states were affected, and over 1.0 million persons were affected,  673,738 of which were displaced.  While estimates of flooded crop land differ¹, sources agree that flooding in 2024 was worse than 2023, and similar to flooding observed in 2022. According to FAO estimates using satellite imagery, over 1.7 million hectares of land has been flooded as of September 15, including over 700,000 hectares of cropland (Figure 3).  In Borno State, the collapse of the Alau Dam in early September led to significant flooding across Maiduguri, Jere, and Dikwa, destroying farmlands and properties and displacing over 350,000 people (many of whom were already displaced due to conflict). The flooding in Maiduguri metropolitan center was the worst seen in 30 years. Areas along the floodplains and states such as Benue and Niger remain on high alert for flooding as the Niger and Benue rivers approach alarming levels.

The flooding has also exacerbated the widespread cholera outbreak (especially in Borno and Yobe states) that has continued to ravage much of the country. According to the Nigeria Center for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC), as of September 29 a total of 10,837 suspected cases – including 359 deaths (a case fatality rate of 3.3 percent) – have been reported in 36 states, with children under 5 the worst affected. This reflects an approximate 220 percent increase in suspected cases and 239 percent increase in cumulative deaths compared to last year. 

Macroeconomy:

As of October 7, data from the Central Bank of Nigeria indicated that Nigeria’s external reserves have reached a 25-month high of 38.66 billion USD, reflecting significant foreign inflows into the country’s economy. In August 2024, the annual headline inflation eased for the second consecutive month to 32.15 percent. Despite these positive changes, the persisting devaluation of the NGN and steady petrol price increases across the country continue to negatively impact households’ purchasing power. In September 2024 the inflation rate increased once again to 32.70 percent against 32.15 percent in the previous month indicating the fragile economic situation of the country. Despite minor fluctuations in exchange rates, the NGN continues to decline, exchanging for 1,657 NGN/USD as of October 3, compared to 747 NGN/USD at the same time last year. In September, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) increased the price to between 950.22 to 1,019.22 NGN/liter, representing a 65 percent increase compared to September 2023 (Figure 4). 

Crop production: 

During the ongoing harvest period, poor households across the country are engaging in harvests of own-produced food and earning cash and in-kind income through agricultural labor for better-off households through December 2024. The main agricultural season was significantly constrained by persisting conflict in the north and the compounding impacts of flooding, dry spells, and high cost of inputs. According to preliminary production estimates by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, national cereal production will likely range between 24.9- 26.2 million metric tonnes, representing an 11-15 percent decrease in production compared to average. FEWS NET estimates that production will likely be closer to the low end of these estimates, given extensive flooding that impacted crops late into September. 

The ongoing harvest, though below average, will provide income-earning opportunities for poorer households who rely on agricultural labor opportunities from middle and better-off households. Agricultural labor wages have increased compared to last year and the five-year average in response to depreciation, but has not translated to increased household purchasing capacity due to inflationary pressures. 

Livestock production:

Livestock production is a critical livelihood activity in North East and North West areas of the country, where very poor and poor households depend on animal rearing or livestock product sales for 60 to 80 percent of their food and income needs. However, livestock production remains significantly below average due to conflict. Livestock body conditions remain favorable due to ongoing rainfall driving increased pasture and water availability. Livestock demand across the country remains high and substantially above supply, due to conflict and the falling value of the Naira against the neighboring CFA. The above-average increase in livestock prices is expected to further increase leading up to December, when demand peaks with Christmas celebrations.      

Off-own-farm sources of income: 

Households across the country continue to engage in off-own-farm activities to generate income. Most urban poor households continue to rely on unskilled labor, including construction, domestic labor, and petty trading, while rural households continue to rely on firewood sales, petty trading, and construction. Increased rural-to-urban migration persists due to limited options and poorer wages. Following protests in early to mid-2024, the Government of Nigeria increased the minimum wage from 30,000 NGN to 70,000 NGN (Figure 5). These sources remain constrained for households in inaccessible or worst conflict-affected areas of the north.   

Markets supplies and functioning:

Markets continue to operate normally in most parts of the country. With the main harvest underway, households are seasonally less dependent on markets for food and supply has seasonally increased. Domestic commodity flows are generally sustained from surplus-producing areas in the north to the deficit-producing areas of the south. However, in several conflict-affected areas in the north, particularly around Lake Chad and in the far North West, markets continue to face frequent closures due to insecurity. Key supply routes are disrupted, and markets often operate for a minimal number of hours per day (Figure 6). In many inaccessible areas of the Northeast, formal markets are non-functional, with insurgent groups operating small street markets.

Household purchasing capacity for food and non-food items: 

Overall, staple food prices are seasonally decreasing following the start of harvests across most of the country. However, staple food prices remain significantly above average, driven by the continued devaluation of the NGN, which is driving up imported food costs and below-average production of locally produced staples. For example, In August 2024 maize prices in Dawanau market were 93 percent above last year’s prices and 161 percent above the three-year average.  The increase in national minimum wages being outpaced by the staple food prices, and the devaluation of naira. While wages for informal jobs have also followed similar trends, these increases have not translated to increased household purchasing capacity due to inflationary pressures on goods and services (Figure 7). The cereal-to-labor terms of trade (TOT) continue to decline across the monitored markets. In Dawanau market, the maize-to-labor TOT declined by 8 percent compared to last year and 55 percent relative to the five-year average. However, the increase in wages is outpaced by food inflation and devaluation of the NGN.

Although households’ dependence on market purchases seasonally decreased, high prices continue to constrain access to food from the market and constrain most households’ purchasing capacity across the country, particularly for households in conflict-prone areas, who are still atypically market-dependent due to conflict-related disruptions to the farming season. In addition, increased competition for income-earning opportunities has further reduced the purchasing power of poorer households.

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable. 

Humanitarian food assistance is mainly distributed in IDP camps in North East Nigeria, covering three states: Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. The number of targeted beneficiaries in 2024 is lower than last year and continues to decrease due to limited funding and the closure of some IDP camps in Borno State, which has the highest number of IDPs due to conflict. About 1.3 million people received humanitarian food assistance in June 2024 through August through either cash, in-kind, or voucher, and information from field observations and from key informants confirmed that similar levels of humanitarian assistance continued through September. In the North West and North Central areas, partners are also providing some localized assistance to conflict-affected households in makeshift camps and host communities. However, information on the number of beneficiaries and scale of assistance is limited. Information from partners and key informants indicates that this assistance is not well-targeted and is substantially below the anticipated level for the affected communities and populations. 

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

North East Region : 

In the North East, the compounding impacts of prolonged conflict/insurgency, heightened insecurity, deteriorating economic conditions, and seasonal climatic shocks (including flooding and dry spells) continue to drive high levels of acute food insecurity. Very poor households living in inaccessible areas in Abadam, Guzamala, and Marte LGAs are impacted by persisting conflict and displacement. Limited access to farmland, inputs, and income-earning opportunities – compounded by reduced access to markets, looting of stocks, and high staple food prices – constrain food access. While some marginal harvests will improve food access for households in the short term, driving improvements to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, large food consumption gaps will begin to emerge as households deplete their marginal food stocks. The ongoing harvest will slightly increase food availability in other conflict affected parts of North East, where Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in October 2024 for households that are relatively accessible and are able to engage in some level of crop cultivation.  Meanwhile, displaced households residing in IDP camps continue to rely mainly on humanitarian food assistance which is preventing more severe outcomes. These households are facing Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes.

North West and North Central states: 

In the North West and North Central states, the onset of the harvest has seasonally improved food availability and access. However, banditry, kidnapping, and cattle rustling prevented many households from engaging in their normal crop production, which was also impacted by flooding, resulting in reduced harvests. Consequently, households are atypically market-dependent amid high staple food prices. Combined with limited income-earning opportunities in the area and low purchasing power, households are employing livelihood coping strategies such as selling productive assets to access food, eating less preferred food, and reducing meal sizes. Households are facing moderate food consumption gaps and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Very poor households in the worst conflict-affected inaccessible areas have severely limited mobility, are largely unable to harvest their limited crops, and have limited market access. As such, they are mainly reliant on wild food consumption, bartering, and begging. The worst-affected households, representing less than 20 percent of the LGA population, are employing negative coping strategies and are facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

Southern states:

Households in the southern states who face less conflict will benefit from the harvest and increased access to own food stocks and are facing Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. Non-farming households who rely on the market will also benefit from increased market supply and seasonal decreases in market prices; however, given that staple food prices remain atypically high despite the seasonal decline, most of these households are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. 

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions

• National main season production is expected to be below average in 2024 due to persisting conflict in the surplus-producing areas across the north, the high cost of agricultural inputs (including seeds and fertilizers), and flooding and dry spells. ha
• Current levels of flooding will likely positively contribute to off-season production prospects for recessional cultivation and an increase in area planted in the off-season is likely. However, production constraints related to conflict and input costs will persist. Off-season production will be higher than in 2023 but still below average. 
• The macroeconomic crisis is expected to persist throughout the projection period. Currency depreciation and supply shortages are expected to persist, with the combined impact of rising transportation and food costs driving increasing inflation through the projection period. 
• National oil production is expected to remain below the official OPEC allocation of 1.8 million barrels per day, despite an increase in crude oil production in recent months. The domestic price of petrol is expected to be higher throughout the projection period than last year and the average, driven by the global crude oil price and depreciation of the NGN.
• Internal trade flows are anticipated to be below average through the projection period due to increased petrol prices and high transportation costs, in conjunction with persisting insecurity across much of the north. Internal trade flows will seasonally increase during the main season harvest from the surplus-producing areas in the north to deficit-producing areas in the south. 
• Cross-border exports are anticipated to increase through the projection period due to the depreciation of the NGN against the Central African Franc (CFA), particularly for manufactured goods and staples, as traders from neighboring countries can purchase commodities in Nigeria at a relatively cheaper price. However, cross-border imports are anticipated to be below average due to limited foreign exchange and poor value of the NGN. Nigeria is expected to continue to rely on other ocean port trade for wheat, non-filet frozen fish, and cars. Petrol importation is anticipated to decrease significantly following increased national production by the Dangote refinery. 
• Market supply of key staples will seasonally increase between October 2024 and January 2025 with food availability from the main season harvest but will remain significantly below average. Nigerian markets will continue to receive only minimal imports from neighboring countries which will be insufficient to alleviate the persisting domestic supply deficits. The normal supply flow of grains (from north to the south and back for processed goods) will continue but with higher transportation costs. 
• Staple food prices are expected to follow seasonal trends but remain significantly above average through the projection period due to below-average market supply, atypically high market dependence, high transportation costs, and competition for replenishments of stocks between traders and larger institutions, in addition to the global food prices.
• Seasonal livestock migration from the north to the south in March/April is anticipated to remain below average due to the persisting farmer/herder conflict and open grazing bans in North Central and southern states, although enforcement and adherence to grazing bans remain weak. Pastoralists who migrated are expected to return from the central and southern states to their homesteads in June with the start of the rainy season. Livestock movement in Zamfara, Sokoto, and Katsina is unlikely this year due to conflict.
• Cross-border livestock migration from neighboring countries (including Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) for grazing and livestock sales is anticipated to be below average through May 2025 due to conflict and continued devaluation of the NGN against the CFA, making it less profitable for herders to sell livestock in Nigerian markets. 
• Access to pasture and water points in inaccessible and conflict-prone areas of the country is expected to be limited due to fears of attacks. Herders will likely access grazing areas in other locations to maintain livestock health. Water and pasture are expected to be available for longer than normal in flood-affected areas of the north, but will decline seasonally between March and May (the pastoral lean season).
• Livestock body conditions will likely remain favorable across most of the country due to rainfall and pasture availability through early 2025. However, seasonal deterioration in livestock body condition is expected during the pastoral lean season.
• Livestock prices are expected to remain seasonally above average due to reduced herd sizes due to conflict, the depreciation of NGN discouraging foreign traders, and a general increase in the price of goods and services. Livestock prices will increase seasonally during the peak harvest period in November/December as crop farmers will purchase livestock and traders will increase purchases for fattening in anticipation of Ramadan in March/April and Tabaski in mid-June 2025. Livestock-to-cereal terms of trade are expected to remain below average and unfavorable for pastoralists, as livestock prices continue to be outpaced by cereal prices. 
• Main season cultivation will provide below-average agricultural labor opportunities for poor households through December. The compounding impacts of ongoing conflict, high input prices, and deteriorating purchasing power of middle and better-off households are reducing cultivation in the primary producing areas of the north, resulting in reduced labor demand and increased competition for available opportunities. A seasonal increase in agricultural labor demand is expected in April 2025 for 2025/26 land preparation, though demand will remain below-average. 
• Access to off-own-farm labor and self-employment, such as petty trading, construction, and other unskilled labor, is expected to remain below average nationally through the projection period. This will be further exacerbated by the knock-on effect of the macroeconomic crisis across the country, particularly impacting poor households in conflict-affected areas. The supply of labor and petty traders is expected to continue increasing as displacement continues in the northern states through the projection period. An above-average increase in wages is anticipated but will not increase purchasing power due to inflationary pressures.
• Domestic remittances are anticipated to be below both last year and average through June 2025 due to the ongoing poor macroeconomic conditions. High prices and limited income will reduce the disposable income of better-off households, limiting their capacity to provide remittance support across familial networks. Meanwhile, international remittances are expected to be near to above average through the projection period as the NGN weakens against foreign currencies.

Sub-national assumptions for North East Nigeria

• Conflict in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States will likely remain at current levels through May 2025. NSAG activities – such as disruption of routine farming activities, looting of farm produce, and abduction of farmers – are anticipated to continue. Counterinsurgency operations by Nigerian forces are likely to drive VEOs to increasingly raid rural settlements. Attacks on farming communities are likely to intensify, particularly from October 2024 through May 2025, as the insurgents will leverage the harvest to restock food and/or loot farmlands. 
• Population displacements will likely continue at similar levels throughout the projection period.
• Markets in inaccessible areas will likely remain closed through the projection period.  
• Agricultural labor demand will remain limited during the 2025 main season cultivation due to conflict and limited access to agricultural inputs. 
• Despite increased numbers of households cultivating compared to last year, household-level production is likely to remain relatively minimal due to the limited land access, high cost of inputs, low household purchasing power, sustained conflict-related impacts, dry spells, and flooding.

Sub-national assumptions for North West and North Central Nigeria

• Violence and kidnappings associated with banditry and intercommunal tensions have sharply declined since peaking in May 2024, but are likely to increase from October 2024 through at least May 2025, driven by deteriorating economic conditions and the focus of security forces on combatting VEOs. Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Kaduna, Niger, Benue, and Plateau states are expected to remain the most affected areas in the North West and North Central regions.
• Due to the ongoing conflict, livestock movement in Zamfara, Sokoto, and Katsina will be below average throughout the scenario period. Birnin Gwari, market in Kaduna state, as well as Dansadau, Maru and Anka markets in Zamfara state will remain non-functional due to intense bandits attack. 
• Market functioning in worst conflict-affected LGAs will remain disrupted, as the flow of goods remains constrained by insecurity along main routes, illegal checkpoints and taxations.

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumption

• Despite funding constraints, humanitarian food assistance will persist through January  2025, particularly for IDPs in camps in the North East. Detailed information on planned humanitarian assistance is not available for 2025, though historical trends indicate that partners will continue to deliver assistance to IDPs through at least the end of 2024, despite a seasonal decrease in assistance with the main season harvest. Humanitarian assistance plans for 2025 are not yet finalized. 
• While FEWS NET does not have information on planned assistance in the North West and North Central states, humanitarian food assistance will likely continue in conflict-affected states, including Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara; however, assistance is expected to remain limited and at similar levels to last year.

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

North East Region:

Poorer households in inaccessible and conflict-affected areas in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states will continue to face constrained access to humanitarian assistance, farm inputs, income-earning opportunities, and markets in a context of atypically high staple food prices. Harvests remain limited and will not meet households’ minimum food needs, while low purchasing power and conflict-related disruptions will prevent access to food through markets. Anticipated high levels of civilian-targeted attacks and kidnappings will further restrict access to livelihood activities. These households will therefore sustain wide food consumption gaps and will depend on wild food consumption, bartering, and negative coping strategies such as begging, to supplement their food intake. These households are expected to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through May 2025. A small subset of households will likely have exhausted their coping mechanisms entirely and will experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes.

Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through May 2025 across Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states, as persisting insecurity has reduced agricultural engagement, disrupted market systems and other typical livelihood activities.  Most IDPs in camps in urban areas will continue to depend on humanitarian assistance as their primary source of food through January 2025 and face Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes. IDP households are expected to supplement market purchases (which will be constrained due to limited income) through unskilled labor, resource collection and sales, craft sales, and petty trading. In the absence of food assistance, IDPs will face increased food consumption gaps and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes between February and May 2025. IDP households in host communities have limited access to humanitarian food assistance and will rely on minimal, below-average own production supplemented by limited market purchases through January. Households will be able to meet only their minimum food consumption needs and will face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. As the year progresses, households will deplete their minimal food stocks atypically early and become entirely market-dependent in a context of limited income and atypically high staple prices, resulting in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes between February and May 2025.

North West and North Central states:

In the North West and North Central, households in areas less affected by conflict will likely be able to consume their own production and engage in normal livelihood activities through the projection period. As main season harvests deplete, households will engage in dry season cultivation or recessional cropping which will be harvested in April/May 2025. Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected through May 2025, with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes likely in areas affected by dry spells or flooding through the projection period. In areas affected by banditry, kidnapping, and herder/farmer conflict, the increased levels of conflict expected through the dry season will further drive population displacement and constrain access to livelihood activities and market supply. Households will likely have to pay high levies to access cropland through the harvest period until January, and food stocks will likely be targeted for destruction by bandits, negatively impacting food access and availability. Households in the worst conflict-affected areas will be unable to meet their basic food needs with own production and will be atypically market dependent for their food needs amid high market prices. Households will resort to selling household and productive assets, reducing meal sizes and frequency, and experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes through May 2025. IDPs in makeshift camps and informal settlements across the North West have extremely limited access to humanitarian assistance, safe/potable water, nutrition support, or health services and often resort to begging, bartering, and going days without eating. While these households comprise less than 20 percent of the population, they likely have large food consumption gaps and will face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

Bama LGA in Borno State, NG09 livelihood zone (Figure 8)

Reason for selecting this area: Nigeria's conflict has impacted many regions, including the North East, North West, and North Central regions. Similarly, separatist militants have also impacted the South East and South South regions. The conflict in the North East has persisted since 2009, with over 2.0 million people displaced and livelihoods substantially impacted. Bama LGA remains one of the worst conflict-affected LGAs, with some areas that are inaccessible and cut off from humanitarian support. Thus, FEWS NET has selected Bama LGA in Borno State to illustrate the long-term impacts of the NSAG conflict with the highest level of population displacement.

Conflict continues in Bama LGA, where clashes between NSAGs and the military have rendered 10 of the 14 wards inaccessible to humanitarian actors and disrupted food production, livelihoods, and markets. Only Banki, Kasugula, Shehuri-Hausari, and Soye LGAs remain accessible. Very poor households in inaccessible areas such as Yabiri, Goniri, Gulumba, and Gazuwa continue to risk their lives to flee their deteriorating living conditions for the accessible parts of Bama to cultivate a small piece of land, or if not available, engage in other seasonal activities and access humanitarian assistance and income-earning opportunities. According to the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), as of August 2024 there are about 164,000 IDPs in Bama LGA, the majority of which reside Government Senior Secondary School (GSSS) IDP camp in Bama. 

Once a high producing agricultural area, Bama has been significantly impacted by the insurgency, which has limited farming and fishing activities. According to the August 2024 Humanitarian Situation Monitoring (HSM) Report, only about 43 percent of households in inaccessible areas were able to cultivate during the main agricultural season, and poor households typically have less than 0.5 hectares of land. In garrison towns, restrictions on tall-growing crops further restrict agricultural production. In inaccessible areas likely controlled by NSAGs, tall-growing crops are permitted, but households are likely to forfeit a large portion of their harvests to armed groups or fall victim to looting of harvests. Key informants indicate that up to thirty percent of crop yields are taken as zakat by NSAGs, and the remaining stock barely covers more than three months of food. Households resort to burying remaining stocks in the ground to avoid looting by JAS and ISWAP.

In addition to conflict, above average rainfall from July through September resulted in the overflowing of the Yazaram River and the collapse of the Alau Dam, leading to devastating floods throughout Borno State. While estimates on the number of people impacted are not yet available for Bama LGA, over 390,000 people were displaced due to flooding in all of Borno State, with the majority of displacement occurring in Maiduguri following historic levels of flooding due to the collapse of the dam. In addition to displacement, flooding also led to the destruction of infrastructure, damage to farmlands, and the loss of livestock.  

The persisting conflict has negatively impacted market activities. Secondary markets in Bogoshe, Gulumba, Mayinti, Jere, and Bomari are non-functional and have been closed for over five years. However, the August 2024 HSM report indicated that about 33 percent of people from inaccessible areas had access to the market in the last three months, likely through the installation of temporary markets in places such as Timbuktu, Bula Daloye, Abu Asmau, Gazuwa, Nafa, and Cingori within the inaccessible areas controlled by NSAGs. According to FEWS NET key informants, trade activities in these inaccessible areas often occur with street vendors and especially between households via bartering due to lack of income. Commodities such as condiments and non-food items are very limited or not available. Only the garrison towns of Bama and Banki have moderate market activity, and traders are not allowed to supply any food or non-food items to the inaccessible area within Bama LGA for security reasons. Prices of staple grains such as maize, sorghum, and rice remain high despite the main season cultivation. In the Maiduguri market, the retail price of white maize, locally milled rice, and brown sorghum in September 2024 were between 118 and 140 percent above last year’s prices (Figure 9).  

Access to food, income, and labor is extremely constrained in the inaccessible areas. The main source of food is limited own production and gathering of wild food. Very poor households who cannot cultivate depend on wild foraging, agricultural labor, and reports indicate that approximately 8 percent of households engage in begging. Households that cultivate and have inadequate food stocks typically employ food-based coping strategies such as skipping meals, going days without meals, and only allowing children to eat. Agricultural labor is the only source of labor in inaccessible areas, and pay is typically in-kind. Livestock-related activities are no longer pursued due to loss of herds from conflict. Households have poor purchasing power and many no longer own productive assets to sell for income. Households who have exhausted their coping strategies risk their lives to flee to nearby garrison towns to access humanitarian assistance or engage in labor, but migration is difficult and dangerous due to movement restrictions. 

Households in inaccessible areas are engaged in limited crop production due to limited access to land. These households also have restricted income earning opportunities, further limiting the level of crop production in the area. The main harvest has further been affected by the prolonged dry spells during the recent growing season, and flooding. Despite the ongoing harvest many households have limited own food. Similarly, households that are unable to engage in crop production are facing difficulties accessing food due to constrained income opportunities coupled with dysfunctional markets in the areas.  Consequently, many households are facing food consumption gaps and are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during October. However, due to the limited level of crop harvest, most households will resort to foraging, begging, and limited labor work to earn some income. Starting in November, most households in inaccessible areas will have limited stocks and will face wide food consumption gaps and they will be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) through May 2025. A small subset of the population including most vulnerable populations, such as the elderly and incapacitated who are unable to engage in income-earning activities and crop cultivation, will face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes through May 2025.