Conflict and economic constraints expected to drive expanding lean season Crisis outcomes

• Escalating conflict across northern Nigeria — including a surge in attacks during the September–December 2025 harvest period — significantly reduced main‑season production and accelerated households’ reliance on markets, sustaining Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes across much of the region. In inaccessible areas of the North East, severe movement restrictions, non‑functional markets, and the absence of own-produced food will continue to drive Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through at least September 2026.
• In the North West and North Central states, persistent and expanding conflict continues to drive displacement, disrupt market functioning, and severely limit livelihood activities, resulting in widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. With limited agricultural engagement and constrained income-earning opportunities, households will be unable to mitigate food consumption gaps, leading to an expansion of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes as the lean season intensifies.
• Despite recent macroeconomic improvements — including easing inflation and relative NGN stability — household purchasing power continues to deteriorate due to significantly constrained income-generating opportunities and high non-food expenditures. While staple food prices remain atypically low, persistently high input and fuel costs have depressed farmer revenues and eroded capital, limiting both household food access and the ability to invest in inputs for the upcoming agricultural season.
• FEWS NET estimates between 21-22 million people will be in need of humanitarian assistance through the peak of the June – August lean season, driven by escalating conflict, lower-than-anticipated household food production, and increasingly constrained access to food. Needs will be highest among IDPs and poor households in inaccessible areas of the North East, who continue to face severe movement restrictions, limited market access, and large food consumption gaps.   

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 18, 2026. 

Prolonged and intensifying conflict across northern Nigeria continues to severely undermine food security, as escalating violence, displacement, and restricted humanitarian access disrupt agricultural production, markets, and aid delivery. In the North East, the insurgency led by Boko Haram, the Islamic State West African Provinces (ISWAP), and other splinter factions continues to drive some of the highest levels of violence in more than a decade. Throughout 2025, clashes between Boko Haram and ISWAP intensified, destabilizing communities across Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, contributing to widespread displacement, and further constraining humanitarian operations. By late 2025, an estimated 1.38 million people in Nigeria remained displaced, while persistent attacks, abductions, and restricted mobility in inaccessible areas have resulted in acute food insecurity, particularly where markets remain cut off, and harvests are minimal or absent. 

At the same time, conflict has escalated sharply in the North West and North Central states, where armed banditry, kidnapping, and livestock theft have exacerbated farmer‑herder tensions and violent clashes, with limited humanitarian presence, especially compared to the North East. Violence reached record levels in 2025, with thousands killed and hundreds abducted, severely disrupting farming activities, constraining market access, and displacing rural households. Mass abductions in late 2025 — including more than 400 schoolchildren and community members across Borno, Kaduna, Kebbi, Kwara, and Niger — signal a worsening trend that has heightened regional instability. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) expanded operations across Kebbi, Kogi, Niger, Sokoto, and Zamfara states, are adversely affecting the season’s harvest, as communities in affected areas continue to pay levies and informal harvest taxes in exchange for access to farmlands, particularly in Zamfara and Sokoto. As households contend with declining income-earning opportunities, elevated prices, and eroding livelihoods, food insecurity remains acute, with the persistence of extreme violence throughout 2025 continuing to limit economic activity, livelihoods, and food production.

Despite recent signs of macroeconomic stabilization heading into early 2026, underlying fragilities continue to constrain household food access. Increased oil production and service‑sector growth have eased inflation to 15.5 percent in December 2025, reinforced by the Central Bank of Nigeria’s tight monetary stance, and gradual improvements in domestic refining capacity have also contributed to falling fuel costs, with reductions in petrol prices easing some pressure on foreign exchange demand and helping stabilize the NGN at 1,417 NGN/USD by mid‑January, alongside foreign reserves rising to 45.8 billion USD. Prices of key staples have also begun approaching five‑year average levels, supported by recent harvests and the government’s import waiver policy on maize, rice, and sorghum. However, high fuel prices and elevated costs of general goods and services continue to erode purchasing power, particularly in conflict‑affected areas where transport costs remain above average. As a result, even with relatively stable prices for locally produced staples, poor households’ access to food remains limited due to constrained income and persistently high market‑associated costs.

Livelihoods in Nigeria are highly diverse and closely tied to geography, with most rural households relying on agriculture and others depending on livestock production. In a typical year, the main harvest from October to December follows the July-September lean season, allowing households to consume their own crops and generate income through sales. Seasonal patterns also shape nutrition outcomes, with acute malnutrition typically declining in the post‑harvest period as food availability and health conditions improve, then rising again as households enter the next lean season. Livestock production follows its own seasonal rhythms: births and milk production peak between August and November when rainfall improves water and pasture availability, while livestock sales usually rise during major holidays, including Christmas in December and Tabaski in June/July, and again at the start of the pastoral lean season from March to May, providing essential income for pastoral households.

However, years of overlapping crises have severely curtailed households’ ability to sustain these typical livelihood activities. Protracted conflict in northern Nigeria — once a major surplus‑producing agricultural zone — has disrupted farming practices, reduced yields, and restricted access to fields. Insecurity continues to limit market functioning and the movement of goods, isolating communities and preventing the distribution of surplus food even during post‑harvest months, while persistently high food prices have eroded purchasing power and constrained access to staple foods. Pastoral livelihoods have also been weakened by banditry and farmer‑herder conflict that has reduced herd sizes and disrupted traditional transhumance routes. Meanwhile, inflation and economic volatility have reduced households’ access to food at a time when many households are increasingly dependent on markets. Together, these compounding shocks have undermined the seasonal patterns of food availability that typically support households throughout the year, resulting in sustained, year‑round food insecurity and elevated humanitarian needs across affected regions.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Nigeria Food Security Outlook: October 2025 to May 2026
• Latest Nigeria Key Message Update: January 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Conflict remains elevated countrywide in early 2026, exceeding both last year and the five-year average. Violence remains heavily concentrated in the north, where insurgent groups in the North East and bandit networks in the North West and North Central states have intensified large-scale operations aimed at asserting territorial control. In January, attacks escalated sharply: 42 people were killed and several children abducted in Niger State alongside the killing of nine soldiers in Borno State’s Mobbar local government area (LGA). A late-January attack by Boko Haram killed seven soldiers and abducted 13 others in Borno State; women and children were killed and abducted in Kwara and Niger states; and bandit-herder attacks killed at least 16 people in Benue and an estimated 20 people in Katsina, with additional events recorded in Kebbi, Plateau, and Zamfara. The persistence and geographic expansion of violence continue to drive displacement, significant loss of life, and widespread livelihood disruption as households flee and agricultural activities are increasingly constrained.

The main season harvest, which concluded in December, was significantly below average and lower than last year due to conflict, high input costs, and flooding. Intensified attacks and farmer kidnappings during the October-December harvest period contributed to additional crop losses. Data from the National Agricultural Extension and Research Liaison Services (NAERLS) indicate maize and millet production fell by 11 percent and sorghum by 7 percent across Borno, Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara. In the worst-affected northern states, farmers could not fully harvest their fields due to fear of attacks, while others were forced to pay levies to the bandits to access their farmlands.   

Dry season farming of maize, rice, sorghum, vegetables, and watermelon is underway across northern states, including Jigawa, Kano, and Kebbi; however, activity levels are below average due to persistent conflict and high input costs. Elevated fuel prices — particularly for petrol used to power irrigation pumps — continue to strain purchasing power, limiting already minimal participation not only among poor households but also among middle and better‑off households, who are typically more involved in dry‑season farming.

Despite recent improvements in macroeconomic indicators — including rising foreign reserves, disinflation, and more stable NGN — household welfare has not improved. Prices for goods and services, farm inputs, and transportation remain high, while incomes remain strained, driving very low purchasing power and limiting access to food and essential non‑food items. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, the average transport fare for intracity bus fares rose by 33.12 percent, and intercity fares rose by 14.58 percent in December 2025 compared to the previous year, underscoring the persistently high cost of living.

Income-earning opportunities remain below average countrywide, especially in conflict-affected areas of the North East and North West. Dry-season farming typically provides income for poor households in February, but opportunities are reduced due to atypically low household purchasing power, high input and fuel costs, and persistent insecurity. Non-agricultural labor — including construction, firewood collection, petty trade, and sales — also remains below typical levels as escalating conflict limits mobility and increases labor supply. Although daily wages are similar to last year, household incomes remain insufficient to meet both food and essential non-food needs amid ongoing inflationary pressures. 

Cross-border trade has improved and remains similar to last year, supported by the government’s import waiver on selected food and non-food commodities, although the depreciation of the NGN continues to limit gains. According to FEWS NET key informants, grain exports by local traders to Cameroon, Niger, and Burkina Faso have increased, driven by atypically low domestic staple food prices, as traders seek to prevent capital erosion and maximize profit margins. Similarly, domestic trade activities have remained similar to last year but below average due to the high cost of petrol and diesel and elevated transportation costs.

Markets across most of the country continue to operate typically, except in conflict-affected areas of the North East, North West, and North Central regions, where functionality remains below average (Figures 1 and 2). Markets are generally well-supplied, but stocks have begun to decline following the conclusion of the main season. Both market and household food stock levels are below average; however, market supplies currently remain sufficient to meet household demands.

Staple food prices have moderated compared to previous years and are approaching the five-year average (Figure 3), partially due to the government’s import waiver policy, which has encouraged industrial buyers to shift toward cheaper imported alternatives, reducing pressure on local markets. Ongoing humanitarian funding declines have also lowered the volume of bulk purchases for distribution by humanitarian actors. The recently concluded main season harvest has temporarily increased household food stocks, driving seasonally decreased demand for staple foods and lower prices.

Humanitarian food assistance

Partners continue to provide emergency food assistance to vulnerable populations, particularly IDPs in camps and host communities across conflict‑affected northern states, with the highest concentration of support in the Northeast. Borno State remains the largest recipient; however, overall assistance has declined due to funding constraints. Under the 2026 Humanitarian Need and Response Plan, the food assistance target has been reduced to 2.5 million people, down from 3.6 million in 2025.

According to the Food Security Sector, approximately 1 million people received assistance in December 2025 — 54 percent in Borno — delivered by 14 partners. This represents a steep decline from December 2024, when 1.7 million people were reached by nearly 28 partners. The contraction in humanitarian assistance is limiting food access for many poor and displaced households with few alternative food or income sources, widening consumption gaps and heightening the risk of deteriorating food security outcomes.

Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist across much of the North East, driven by the combined effects of persistent conflict, below‑average 2025/26 food production, and sharply reduced household access to both food and essential non‑food commodities. The region remains among the most severely affected by insecurity: many households were unable to fully harvest their crops during the main season due to fear of attacks, while others were forced to pay levies or surrender part of their small harvests to NSAGs. As a result, most households produced very little, and poor households’ food stocks typically last only one month, after which they increasingly rely on wild foods — including leaves, desert dates, and wild tubers — to cope with the early depletion of stocks.

In inaccessible areas of the North East, conditions are significantly worse. Households in these locations face severe movement restrictions, no meaningful access to markets, and no ability to cultivate, leaving them almost entirely dependent on negative coping strategies, such as wild food collection, bartering, and begging. These households continue to face large and persistent food consumption gaps and remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

IDPs in camps and host communities in the North East continue to receive intermittent humanitarian food assistance, which is mitigating food deficits and supporting Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes among those reached. However, most displaced households have lost key livelihood assets and face restricted mobility, intense labor competition, and extremely limited income‑earning opportunities. For these households, humanitarian assistance remains a critical, and in some cases the only, source of food access.

In the North West and North Central, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing. Banditry, kidnapping, and communal violence remain widespread and increasingly unpredictable, undermining livelihoods, restricting access to fields, and disrupting markets. Continued attacks on rural communities and along major trade routes have further constrained household mobility and limited the flow of goods into local markets. Following a poor 2025/26 harvest, household food stocks are already minimal, and engagement in dry‑season activities remains limited due to insecurity and high input and fuel costs that make irrigation and production unaffordable for many farmers. As households rely heavily on market purchases despite significantly reduced income levels, their ability to meet food needs remains well below typical levels, and many are resorting to negative coping strategies such as reducing meal frequency or selling remaining assets. In contrast, households in less conflict‑affected pockets retain better access to farmland and produced relatively more, enabling them to maintain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes due to lower reliance on markets and slightly stronger livelihood options.

In the south, households benefiting from the concluded main‑season harvest and ongoing dry‑season cultivation continue to meet most of their food needs from own production, supporting Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes across much of the region. However, non‑farming households and those heavily dependent on markets — particularly the urban poor facing reduced purchasing power — are experiencing difficulty accessing sufficient food and are experiencing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

• Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain similar to last year throughout the outlook period, as weak revenue performance continues despite new tax laws aimed at boosting fiscal inflows. The economy is projected to maintain moderate growth (4.2-4.5 percent, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria and International Monetary Fund), highlighting improving macroeconomic stability as reforms advance. Inflation is expected to remain elevated, but will likely ease under the tight monetary policy stance. The NGN will likely remain broadly stable, supported by portfolio inflows and ongoing exchange rate-unification efforts. However, demand for foreign currency will likely exceed last year, limiting NGN appreciation through at least September, especially as early spending ahead of the 2027 elections adds pressure.
• Rainfall is expected to start on time (February/March in southern areas and May/June in northern regions). According to forecasts from the FEWS NET Agroclimatology Team and partners, rainfall in bimodal zones — including southern Nigeria — is likely to be average to above average between March and May while northern and central states are expected to face a severe dry spell lasting up to 21 days between June and August (Nigerian Meteorological Agency).
• Main season cultivation is anticipated to begin on time, with land preparation beginning in February/March in the south and April/May in the north. However, conflict, reduced access to inputs, and labor shortages will likely result in below-average planted area in surplus-producing northern zones. Southern states with lower conflict exposure are expected to maintain similar cultivation levels to last year but remain below average overall.
• Cross-border trade imports are expected to be above average throughout the outlook period due to the government’s import waiver policy. Exports, particularly informal, are expected to be above last year’s levels and approach average through September, as local traders channel more goods to neighboring countries to offset income losses from atypically low domestic food prices. Livestock trade, particularly imports, is also expected to be above average given below average production due to ongoing conflict.
• Domestic trade flows— particularly the movement of staples from surplus areas in the north to deficit areas in the south — are expected to remain below average due to persistent conflict and below-average production.  Trade disruptions will continue in conflict-affected areas of the North East, North West, and North Central states, while goods will continue to move more freely in the less-affected southern areas. Market supplies are expected to decline through the lean season, with only a marginal improvement in April and May as off-season harvests become available. More substantial relief is anticipated around September when early main season harvests enter markets.
• Pastoral resources and water availability generally remain average, though they will decline seasonally during the March–May lean season. Livestock body conditions will stay favorable through September, but areas affected by conflict will continue facing limited pasture and water access, prompting herders to move in search of alternative grazing areas.
• Prices of locally produced staple foods are expected to be slightly above last year but below average through at least September, driven largely by ongoing import waivers and related measures that continue to suppress staple food prices. Seasonal price increases are expected to begin in January/February, peak with the June-September lean season, then decline slightly with the main season harvest start in late September. Cross-border demand will remain above average, while trader restocking and household demand will remain at average levels. Institutional purchases, however, are expected to be below average as many bulk‑buying companies now rely on imported commodities due to the import waiver policy, reducing domestic market demand, and further compounded by declining humanitarian funding.
• Livestock movements from northern to North Central and southern states beginning in March/April are anticipated to remain below average due to persistent insecurity. Pastoralists who migrated are expected to return to their homesteads in June with the start of the rainy season. Livestock movement in conflict-affected areas of the north, including Zamfara, Sokoto, and Katsina, is unlikely due to ongoing insecurity.
• Livestock prices will remain similar to last year but above average due to high feed costs and reduced herd sizes. Livestock supply from neighboring countries will stay below average, discouraged by the lower value of the NGN against the CFA. Prices will rise seasonally around June/July due to demand during the Tabaski holiday.
• Remittances will likely remain above average through September as the NGN continues to weaken against foreign currencies. Below-average domestic remittances are anticipated throughout the outlook period due to persistent macroeconomic pressures. High prices and limited income will continue to reduce the disposable income of better-off households, limiting their capacity to provide remittance support.

Humanitarian food assistance

The government is expected to continue providing some support to households in communities across the country, including the North West. While FEWS NET has no confirmed information on planned assistance in the North West and North Central, humanitarian food assistance will likely continue in conflict‑affected states, including Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara; however, assistance is expected to remain limited and at levels similar to last year. Similarly, in the North East, humanitarian partners will continue to assist displaced populations at a lower level compared to last year and the average, in line with the reduced targeting under the 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan. As a result, many poor and displaced households — particularly newly displaced populations — will receive little or no assistance, leaving them increasingly vulnerable to food consumption gaps during the lean season. The reduced volume and coverage of assistance will limit its mitigating impact on area‑level outcomes, particularly in locations where conflict and restrictions on movement continue to severely constrain market access and livelihood opportunities.

Households in inaccessible areas of the North East — which have severely restricted movement, limited mobility, no access to farmland, no remaining food stocks, non‑functional markets, and little to no opportunity for livelihood activities or income generation — will remain heavily dependent on wild food collection, bartering, and begging to survive through September. These households are unable to rebuild food reserves or generate cash to purchase food, which renders them dependent on wild food gathering, bartering, and begging, all of which provide only minimal and unreliable amounts of food. As a result, these households will face sustained poor food consumption and persistently inadequate dietary diversity, contributing to ongoing deterioration in nutrition and increasing acute malnutrition, particularly during the rainy season when disease prevalence rises. Although the rains beginning in June may briefly increase the availability of some wild foods, this seasonal improvement will be far too limited to compensate for prolonged livelihood disruptions and chronic market inaccessibility. Consequently, households will continue to face large, unaddressed food deficits for the full duration of the period, leading to sustained Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through at least September.

Households in garrison towns and other relatively accessible areas who are able to engage in dry‑season cultivation will experience only short‑term relief from food gaps, as harvests are expected to provide at most approximately one month of food. Following the early depletion of these limited stocks, poor households will again rely heavily on markets at a time when staple food prices remain elevated through April and May, before experiencing only a brief and modest price reduction driven by the small influx of dry‑season harvests. Prices will subsequently rise to their seasonal peak during the June–September lean season, further constraining purchasing power for households whose livelihoods have been eroded by years of conflict. Income‑earning opportunities will remain limited throughout the period due to high competition and an oversupply of labor as increasing numbers of families migrate into urban centers seeking safety and work. As a result, households will depend on low‑paying and unreliable activities — such as petty trade, casual labor, and firewood sales — to generate minimal income, while others will be compelled to resort to begging or rely more heavily on wild foods to manage widening consumption gaps. Given these persistent economic pressures, early stock depletion, and high food prices throughout the lean season, these households are expected to face sustained Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, likely exacerbated by the early onset of the lean season.

IDPs are expected to remain within camps and will continue to depend heavily on humanitarian assistance to meet their basic food needs through May. Ongoing distributions are helping to mitigate more severe consumption deficits, and IDPs receiving regular, sustained food assistance are likely to face Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes during this period. However, humanitarian coverage will remain strained due to persistent funding shortfalls, a growing caseload of newly displaced households fleeing ongoing attacks, and generally poor living conditions that increase needs across camps. As a result, a significant proportion of IDPs will receive only partial rations, intermittent distributions, or no assistance at all, leaving many households to rely on markets or other external sources to fill food gaps. Given limited income‑earning opportunities within camps and surrounding areas — as well as elevated staple food prices that will remain high through the lean season — income generated by IDPs will be insufficient to cover both essential food and non‑food needs. Consequently, households not consistently reached by humanitarian support will continue to face widening consumption gaps and will likely experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes through September 2026.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist across the most conflict‑affected areas of the North West and North Central states, where continued insecurity has severely disrupted normal livelihood activities. Many displaced households and poor residents have been unable to participate in dry‑season cultivation due to restricted access to farmland, fear of attack, and repeated displacement, leaving them with little to no production to rely on during the projection period. As a result, these households will depend heavily on markets for food, even though income‑earning opportunities remain highly constrained by insecurity, reduced labor demand, and weakened local economies. Rising staple food prices during the lean season will further erode purchasing power, limiting households’ ability to acquire sufficient food. Some will attempt to supplement their diets with wild foods, but despite modest seasonal increases in availability with the onset of rains, these resources will remain insufficient to meaningfully close consumption gaps. The start of main‑season cultivation in June will offer additional, though still limited, agricultural labor opportunities; however, these short‑term income sources will not be adequate to fully offset the combined effects of low earnings, high food prices, and limited access to own‑production. As a result, most poor and displaced households in these conflict‑affected zones are expected to continue facing food consumption gaps consistent with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes throughout the outlook period.

Households in the south and other areas less affected by conflict will continue to engage freely in farming and a wider range of livelihood activities throughout the projection period. In these relatively secure zones, most households are expected to experience Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes, supported by access to food from their own stocks following the main‑season harvest, which will be further supplemented by the dry‑season harvest, improving food availability and access through May. However, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are anticipated between June and September, particularly among market‑dependent households, as staple food prices seasonally increase during the lean season when household demand rises and market reliance intensifies. Households with limited reserves, those whose income opportunities are insufficient to keep pace with rising prices, and populations affected by localized flooding — expected in some areas during the rainy season — will be especially vulnerable to food access constraints.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Rainy season is below average

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A below-average 2026 rainy season in Nigeria would undermine agricultural production across much of the country. Poor or erratically distributed rainfall would delay planting, reduce germination rates, and limit soil moisture, resulting in below-average yields for staple crops such as maize, millet, rice, and sorghum. Pastoral conditions would also deteriorate, with reduced pasture and water availability leading to early transhumance, livestock body condition losses, and lower market value for animals. For many poor households, agricultural labor opportunities would contract as planting and weeding activities decline, reducing seasonal income at a time when market reliance is typically increasing. In conflict-affected areas — particularly in the North East and North West — restricted access to fields combined with poor rainfall would further depress production and disrupt already fragile market supplies. As local food availability falls and staple prices remain high or rise further, household purchasing power would weaken. As a result, areas currently Stressed (IPC Phase 2) could shift into Crisis (IPC Phase 3), and the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes would likely increase, especially among displaced populations and households with limited livelihood options.

Rainy season is above average, resulting in floods

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Above-average rainfall and associated flooding between February and September would likely disrupt agricultural activities and worsen acute food insecurity in the short term across flood-prone regions of Nigeria. Excessive rainfall could delay land preparation and planting, cause waterlogging of fields, and lead to crop losses during germination and early vegetative stages—particularly for maize, rice, sorghum, and vegetables. Riverine and flash flooding would also damage standing crops, erode soils, and inundate farmland, reducing overall production for the main season. Livelihoods would be further affected as households lose cultivated land, stored food, agricultural inputs, and, in some cases, small livestock. Prolonged flooding could restrict market access, disrupt commodity flows, and elevate transportation costs, contributing to localized price spikes. Income-earning opportunities — especially agricultural labor, fishing, and petty trade — would decline as communities face displacement and limited access to fields and waterways. As households experience reduced food availability, lower income, and increased reliance on markets amid high prices, more areas currently Stressed (IPC Phase 2) could deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with flood-affected households and displaced populations most at risk.

Northern Nigeria

Conflict intensifies in northern Nigeria

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An escalation of conflict across northern Nigeria — particularly in the North East, North West, and North Central states — would significantly worsen acute food insecurity outcomes through widespread displacement, restricted mobility, and reduced access to fields, markets, and income‑generating activities. Intensified attacks by insurgents and bandits would further limit access to farmland during land preparation, planting, and harvest periods, resulting in below‑average main season production. Increased insecurity along key trade corridors would disrupt market flows, elevate transportation costs, and contribute to higher staple food prices, particularly in already‑isolated areas. Livelihoods would be further eroded as households lose assets, face reduced agricultural labor opportunities, and experience constrained access to pastoral resources due to cattle rustling, restricted movement, and heightened farmer‑herder tensions. Humanitarian access — already challenged in many northern LGAs — would likely deteriorate, reducing the reach and regularity of assistance. As conflict incidents intensify and expand geographically, more households would likely shift from Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3), while the proportion facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes — particularly in the North East and other inaccessible areas — would likely increase.

Conflict in the North West — including insurgency, kidnapping, banditry, and cattle rustling — continues to severely disrupt agriculture, food production, and rural livelihoods. Once a key agricultural hub, the states of Sokoto, Katsina, and Zamfara now face major declines in production as widespread displacement, land abandonment, market disruptions, the armed occupation of farmlands, and restrictive government countermeasures significantly limit farming activities. According to the 2022/2023 National Agricultural Sample Survey by the National Bureau of Statistics, the North West — including Sokoto, Katsina, and Zamfara — accounted for 25.76 percent of all agricultural households in Nigeria and cultivated 27.6 percent of the country’s total plots, with Sokoto, Katsina, and Zamfara cultivating approximately 2.4 million, 2.2 million, and 1.9 million plots, respectively. These states have historically contributed substantially to national production of key staples such as millet, sorghum, and maize and support predominantly rural populations dependent on rainfed agriculture. However, NSAGs — often blending with jihadist factions, foreign fighters, and cross‑border criminal networks — have increasingly disrupted agricultural activities through attacks, abductions, and community‑level extortion that reinforce territorial control. By 2024, the North West had become one of Nigeria’s most violent regions, recording 1,380 violent incidents and attacks across approximately 70 LGAs in a single year.

Conflict restricts access to land and limits cultivation by displacing farming households and restricting movement to agricultural areas. As insecurity spreads through rural communities, many farmers are forced to migrate to garrison towns and other relatively secure settlements in search of safety. This displacement often prevents households from accessing distant fields, resulting in significantly reduced cultivated area during the main rainy season. In some locations, NSAGs impose informal taxes on farmers seeking to access or harvest their fields. These payments further discourage cultivation and increase production costs for households already facing heightened vulnerability, ultimately constraining overall agricultural production.

In the North West, persistent attacks and the ongoing threat of violence have forced many farming households to abandon rural communities and their farmlands. Displacement remains widespread across the region, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reporting approximately 666,821 IDPs across Sokoto, Katsina, and Zamfara states as of October 2025. Fear of attacks has led to the desertion of entire settlements; for example, 28 communities were abandoned in Isa LGA of Sokoto in January 2026 following threats by armed groups. The large‑scale abandonment of rural settlements and agricultural land — particularly during critical phases of the farming calendar — has significantly reduced cultivated area and contributed to declining production levels across affected LGAs.

Conflict also disrupts agricultural labor availability and reduces investment in farming activities, further undermining productivity across the North West. Displacement removes working‑age farmers from rural production zones, while youth migration to safer areas reduces household labor capacity. Insecure conditions additionally discourage seasonal laborers from traveling to high‑risk locations for farm work, resulting in delayed land preparation and planting, reduced weeding, and ultimately lower yields. Bandit and insurgent groups also impose levies on farmers and forcibly recruit young men and women to work on their farms, and resisting can result in severe punishment or, in some cases, mass killings. At the same time, widespread insecurity discourages households from investing in fertilizer, improved seeds, or other inputs. Farmers facing uncertain land access or risk of crop theft often opt to cultivate smaller areas or plant lower‑input crops, further reducing productivity per hectare.

Conflict also significantly disrupts access to agricultural inputs, extension services, and market systems that are essential for sustaining production. Movement restrictions and insecurity along transport routes hinder the delivery of critical inputs — such as fertilizer and seeds — to rural areas and limit the mobility of agricultural extension agents, reducing farmers’ access to improved agronomic practices, seed‑distribution programs, and pest‑management support. Insecurity along rural roads and market corridors further disrupts the movement of both inputs and harvested crops, as traders and suppliers avoid high‑risk areas due to threats of attacks or abductions. According to the 2025 Agricultural Performance Survey (APS), the price of NPK fertilizer in the North West rose by 23 percent between 2024 and 2025 — one of the sharpest increases in the country — reflecting these disruptions. Similar constraints hinder the marketing of harvested crops: farmers struggle to transport produce to markets, while insecure village storage increases the risk of theft or looting. These conditions contribute to post‑harvest losses, force early distress sales, and weaken incentives to produce marketable surpluses.

Collectively, the disruptions to land access, labor availability, agricultural investment, and input supply have contributed to sustained declines in staple crop production across the North West. Production of key staples in Sokoto, Katsina, and Zamfara has consistently fallen since 2021, reflecting both shrinking cultivated area and reduced agricultural productivity. Compared with the five‑year average, staple food production in 2025 declined by 23–27 percent across these states and by 7–12 percent relative to 2024, underscoring the cumulative impact of prolonged insecurity on agricultural output.

Declining agricultural production in the North West is likely contributing to reduced local food availability and increasing reliance on markets for food access among rural households. Lower levels of own‑production mean that household food stocks are depleted earlier than normal, driving earlier and greater dependence on market purchases during the lean season. At the same time, reduced staple crop production in the region’s major agricultural states is likely tightening market supply and exerting upward pressure on staple food prices in both local and regional markets. Production declines in the North West also reduce the supply of staples to the south and other deficit‑production zones, contributing to greater reliance on imports to fill supply gaps. Beyond food availability, reduced production undermines rural livelihoods and income generation, affecting the majority of households that depend on agriculture for both subsistence and cash earnings. Key questions remain regarding whether staple food prices in Sokoto, Katsina, and Zamfara are rising faster than in more stable regions of Nigeria, and whether rural households in these conflict‑affected states are becoming increasingly dependent on market purchases rather than own‑production to meet their staple food needs.

Humanitarian food assistance remains essential for mitigating the most severe food insecurity outcomes in Nigeria. In the North East states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, humanitarian partners continue to provide food assistance to conflict‑affected and displaced households residing in both IDP camps and host communities. However, rising humanitarian needs coupled with persistent funding shortfalls have contributed to a gradual decline in assistance coverage. Between October and December 2025, humanitarian actors reached approximately 1 million people per month across the North East, well below the 2.8 million people targeted, due to limited funding.

Borno State remains the epicenter of the crisis and continues to record the largest number of people receiving assistance, accounting for approximately 54 percent of beneficiaries reached between October and December 2025, compared with only an estimated 1 percent in Adamawa. Despite increasing needs, food assistance delivered through February 2026 has continued to significantly mitigate the severity of food consumption deficits among IDPs. Yet, ongoing funding constraints, compounded by access challenges and continued displacement, remain major barriers to sustaining and scaling assistance. According to the Humanitarian Need Response Plan, approximately 2.5 million people have been targeted for assistance in 2026 — compared to 3.6 million in 2025 and 4.4 million in 2024 — reflecting an overall reduction in planned coverage.

Humanitarian food assistance is expected to continue through September 2026, though at reduced levels relative to previous years, and will remain critical in helping households mitigate food consumption gaps. At the same time, the Borno State government’s ongoing efforts to close IDP camps and resettle displaced households will likely lead to the withdrawal of some humanitarian actors in alignment with state resettlement policies, further constraining assistance delivery.

To inform the February to September 2026 Nigeria Food Security Outlook (FSO), FEWS NET conducted a Household Economy Analysis (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA), assessing how access to food and cash income will be affected by ongoing and anticipated shocks. HEA OA is one of six direct food consumption outcome indicators on the IPC Acute Food Insecurity reference table and is used in FEWS NET’s convergence of evidence approach. It is the only outcome indicator that provides evidence of future outcomes. FEWS NET considers two main factors to assess the reliability of HEA OA results as direct evidence of food consumption:  

• Likely accuracy of the problem specifications, which is largely dependent on the availability of credible information to estimate or make inferences about key sources of food and income.
• Relevance of the baseline to current livelihoods, which is often — but not always — tied to the age of the baseline.  

FEWS NET assesses that the information available for developing problem specifications for the Lake Chad Basin: Masakwa Flood-Recession Sorghum and Wheat Livelihood Zone (NG09) in Bama LGA, Nigeria was substantial. The reference year for the baseline of the Lake Chad Basin: Masakwa Flood-Recession Sorghum and Wheat Livelihood Zone (NG09), Nigeria is September 2021 to August 2022, and FEWS NET assesses the current relevance of the baseline as high. Based on these factors, FEWS NET has high confidence that the results of the HEA OA accurately represent the size of food consumption deficits experienced by the population group of analysis. 

Problem specifications: The table below provides a broad overview of the quantity and price problem specifications (PS) behind the HEA OA. A PS translates a shock into food security consequences at the household level through a quantitative assumption on the quantity and price of key food and cash income sources during the projection period relative to levels documented in the reference year. While the OA assigns a point estimate to each key food and cash income source (e.g., maize, wheat, rice), the annex summarizes these point estimates into broader categories (e.g., main staple grains) and approximate ranges for the purpose of a high-level summary.    

Results: Following the PS table, there are two sets of OA results presented. Annual results are presented in graphs with three bars. The first (left) bar shows the relative importance of different food and cash income sources in the reference year (a typical year). The second (middle) bar shows the sources of food and cash income available in the year of analysis, after incorporating the impact of shocks and household coping capacity. This is compared against two thresholds shown in the third bar: the Survival Threshold and the Livelihoods Protection Threshold. Seasonal results are presented in a graph with multiple bars showing month-by-month results for the consumption year. This is where FEWS NET derives results that inform the projections of acute food insecurity outcomes over the eight-month period of the FSO. The Survival Threshold represents the costs of covering minimum food needs (2,100 kilocalories per person per day) and other essential survival items (e.g., soap, salt, kerosene for cooking, and water for consumption, etc.). The Livelihoods Protection Threshold represents the cost of the Survival Threshold plus the cost of maintaining livelihoods (e.g., commodities and services such as productive inputs, health, and education). 

Population group: OA is typically conducted across three to four wealth groups which are the population groups of analysis, i.e., Very Poor (VP), Poor (P), Middle (M) and Better Off (BO) households. 

Description of scenario(s):  

FEWS NET conducted a region-wide OA for 12 livelihood zones of North East Nigeria. For illustrative purposes, FEWS NET selected the results of the Lake Chad Basin: Masakwa Flood-Recession Sorghum and Wheat Livelihood Zone (NG09), Bama LGA, to be presented in this annex. As an input to the FSO analysis, FEWS NET conducted the OA based on the most likely scenario, and the PS and results for this scenario are summarized below. 

Problem specifications: 

Results: