Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes concentrated in insecure areas

• From October 2025 to May 2026 in the regions of Tillabéry, Diffa, and in northwestern Tahoua, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will be observed due to conflict and insecurity. Attacks by terrorist groups continue to force populations to move, abandoning their sources of food and income, including fields of crops, animals, and other livelihood activities. Small proportions of populations face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, particularly poor households affected by flooding and insecurity.
• The number of people in need of food assistance is expected to decrease seasonally from October through the post-harvest period, while remaining above average. Needs will increase starting in February with the depletion of stocks, reaching a peak in May before the agricultural lean season. The population of greatest concern consists of poor and very poor households in insecure areas, displaced persons and flood victims.
• Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes will be observed in the remaining areas between October 2025 and January 2026, due to harvests near the five-year average and stocks from the previous year, which will maintain downward price trends and improve food and income access for agricultural and agropastoral households. Pastoral households also benefit from good food conditions given milk production and the market value of livestock.
• Between February and May 2026, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will be widespread. Food stocks will be depleted, as will pastoral resources, and purchasing power will be reduced to the bare minimum of food given high prices in markets.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 22, 2025.

Since 2015, the spread of insecurity in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, has extended to other countries in the Liptako-Gourma region. In Niger, the groups Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (IS Sahel) have been conducting attacks in the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions since 2017 and in the Dosso region since 2023, while the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), formerly Boko Haram, is the main perpetrator of attacks in the Diffa region since 2015. Finally, organized bandits who exploit the porous borders between Niger and Nigeria represent the main threat in the Maradi region. The incursions and attacks by these terrorist groups have resulted in significant population displacements, the abandonment of agricultural land and livestock losses, severely affecting household livelihoods. In addition, these attacks have disrupted the functioning of and access to markets, hindering internal and cross-border food product flows.

Poor rural households depend on livestock and agricultural labor as food and income sources. Cereal production dominates the agricultural and agropastoral livelihood zones, mainly millet and sorghum. Household stocks are replenished from October to December during the harvest season, and generally last between four and six months. Food prices decrease seasonally, reducing household dependence on markets. From January to May, households will have access to market garden products. In pastoral areas, households rely on livestock sales as an income source and on markets for their food. Pasture availability in October, after the rainy season, which improves the physical condition of animals, contributes to increasing the market value of livestock. Due to structurally weak agricultural production, Niger depends on countries in the sub-region such as Nigeria and other countries such as Thailand for the importation of certain cereals, particularly rice. Agricultural and pastoral livelihoods are vulnerable to weather shocks, such as seasonal flooding, which disrupt activities, essential services, and access to markets.

Niger's recent political and economic context has been marked by sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) following the July 2023 coup d'état, as well as by the subsequent closure of borders with Nigeria and Benin. These measures limited the importation of food products and the exportation of livestock to Nigeria. Although the lifting of sanctions in February 2024 allowed for the resumption of commercial trade with Nigeria, Niger still maintains closed borders with Benin, diverting its commercial trade to a longer and more costly route from Togo and via Burkina Faso. In January 2025, Niger, alongside the two other members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali and Burkina Faso, officially left ECOWAS.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Niger Food Security Outlook: October 2024 – May 2025
• Latest Niger Key Message Update: July - September 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Persistent insecurity continues to disrupt economic activities in several localities across the country where populations are fleeing attacks by terrorist groups. Although the number of incidents remains stable compared to last year, the actions of terrorist groups are extending to new areas and are more deadly in 2025.

JNIM and IS Sahel attacks against civilian populations and security forces are concentrated in the Tillabéry, Tahoua and Dosso regions, with Tillabéry accounting for nearly 60 percent of total security incidents. In the Tillabéry region, terrorist group attacks are more intense and more frequent in departments located in the far northwest. Although absolute figures remain significantly lower than those observed in Tillabéry, the Dosso region recorded a 195 percent increase in security incidents and nearly 600 percent increase in the number of deaths compared to the same period last year.

In the Diffa region, ISWAP activities continue but are following a downward trend, allowing improved market functioning and access to fields compared to previous years.

In the Maradi region, insecurity linked to incursions by armed bandit groups manifests through livestock theft and kidnappings for ransom demands, but these incidents are more localized and less frequent than in recent years, allowing improved flows of livestock and food products.

The number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflicts is similar to last year, although the cumulative effects on employment and income opportunities remain significant. In September, UNHCR estimates 938,429 displaced persons in Niger, including 431,464 refugees and asylum seekers and nearly 460,000 IDPs (Figure 1). IDPs are predominantly concentrated in Tillabéry (48 percent), Diffa (32 percent) and Tahoua (12 percent), with most living in spontaneous sites, and their presence creates strong competition for food and income access. Refugees and asylum seekers are 60 percent from Nigeria, 29 percent from Mali and 10 percent from Burkina Faso. These displacements disrupt seasonal income opportunities following a worsening imbalance between supply, which increases with the presence of displaced persons, and labor demand, which remains stable.

Overall production of cereals and cash crops is estimated to be average, according to the Statistics Office in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. Rainfall from July to September was generally average, with cumulative totals above the five-year average in several localities including Zinder, Maradi, Diffa, and western Tillabéry, resulting in flooding of agricultural land, livestock losses and deaths. Moreover, in the regions of Tillabéry, Tahoua, Dosso, and Diffa, long rainfall breaks caused planting delays and crop failures in approximately 20 percent of agricultural villages according to the Statistics Office in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. Breaks in rainfall of 10 to 20 days in September, comparable to an early cessation of rains, compromised vegetative development and crop harvests in late plantings. Despite average overall agricultural production in the country, there are localized deficits from reduced areas planted in certain localities due to field abandonment in agricultural villages in Tillabéry and Diffa.

Ongoing harvests increased access to income for agricultural and agropastoral households through crop sales and agricultural labor. Increased availability explains below average seasonal prices for staple and cash crops. In addition to carryover stocks from the previous season, the government implemented a ban on cereal and cowpea exports, except to Burkina Faso and Mali. The increase in income with the harvest, combined with falling prices, has led to an increase in household purchasing power. The subsidized cereal sales program mobilized 30,000 tons per month, benefiting 300,000 households or 2.1 million beneficiaries with 100 kg per household. For pastoral households, livestock sales constitute the main income source for pastoral households with prices currently above average and livestock-to-cereal terms of trade generally favorable compared to the five-year average for herders. However, poor households in conflict-affected regions face decreased agricultural production, relatively high food prices, and reduced income because of lack of access to their fields and theft of their livestock.

Humanitarian food assistance

The government and its humanitarian partners including WFP have developed a Needs-Based Humanitarian Response Plan (PRHB) to support 2.1 million people, of which 1.1 million are to be assisted by humanitarian partners. Given weak funding, only 347,525 beneficiaries were reached, representing a 70 percent decrease. For the government component, food assistance in the form of targeted free distribution reached 143,000 households, representing 1 million beneficiaries receiving a ration of 100 kg of cereal per household during the months of August and September 2025 except in insecure areas. An emergency plan was developed following the floods and its implementation in August 2025 enabled the distribution of 100 kg of cereals per affected household.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes prevail in the regions of Tillabéry, Diffa, and in the far northwest of Tahoua. In the Tillabéry region, most of the Diffa region, and the northwestern part of the Tahoua region, insecurity deprives populations of their agricultural and agropastoral production on which they depend for their food and income. Thus, poor households do not have access to sufficient food and do not have the income to obtain it. Population displacement caused by insecurity leads to an extension of food insecurity in host areas because in addition to increasing demographic pressure on host household food resources, the presence of displaced persons increases the labor supply and reduces daily income. Thus, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes affect poor displaced and non-displaced persons in insecure areas in most departments in the Tillabéry region and in the departments of Tillia and Tassara in the Tahoua region. Following the combined effects of floods on their agricultural production and their purchasing power for food products, a small proportion of households affected by conflicts are experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. According to key informants, strategies employed by poor and displaced households in these regions to cope with food deficits include the reduction of the number of meals, the sale of productive assets, permanent migration of laborers, the departure of entire households, and begging.

Due to recent conflict developments, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are widespread for poor households in the department of Goudoumaria in Diffa and the department of Tillabéri in Tillabéry. In Tillabéri, insecurity has led to the abandonment of fields, which reduces access to harvests and income. In Goudoumaria, according to key informants, the resumption of activities such as salt production is observed from the decrease in security tension, but households remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) due to prolonged livelihood deterioration.

Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are prevalent in agricultural and agropastoral zones without conflict, with however small proportions of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). The majority of agricultural and agropastoral livelihood zones in the country are experiencing Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes due to ongoing average harvests resulting from an agricultural season with good weather and security conditions. Cereal and cash crops harvests allow households to replenish their stocks, which constitute the main sources of food and income, including poor households who find good opportunities to earn seasonal food resources. Food consumption is adequate with available agricultural products and income from sales of cash crops and agricultural labor.

However, in these areas, a small proportion of poor households affected by floods are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to the destruction of their crops and the deterioration of their livelihoods by floods. These households depend on markets for their food, with reduced available income due to non-food expenditures related to shelter reconstruction. The combined effects of these urgent expenditures lead to reduced purchasing power for food in markets and food consumption deficits. According to the Nutrition Office, the total number of admissions of malnourished children in Intensive Nutritional Recovery Centers (CRENI) and Outpatient Nutritional Recovery Centers for Severe cases (CRENAS) is 555,245 cases for the period from January to August 2025 compared to 322,514 cases for the same period in 2024, representing an increase of 72 percent. The highest number of cases, representing more than 50 percent of admissions of severely malnourished children, are recorded in the Maradi and Zinder regions, the most severely flood-affected areas.

In the Dosso region and the southwest of the Maradi region, conflicts do not cause significant disruption to livelihood activities and therefore do not cause food deficits. Households mostly experience Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes.

Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are also present throughout pastoral areas. The impacts of good water conditions result in good production and availability of pastures and water points. Animals have good body conditions, which promotes good milk production and income for herders who access sufficient food products for their food consumption. 

• Conflicts will continue from October 2025 to May 2026, with an expected intensification of attacks by JNIM and IS Sahel against civilian populations and security forces in the Tillabéry, Tahoua and Dosso regions. The Tillabéry region will remain the epicenter of militant activity, while Dosso will experience the highest relative increases in violence.
• Despite overall average estimated agricultural production, heavy rainfall has caused flooding in the Dosso, Maradi, Zinder, Tahoua and Tillabéry regions, which will lead to a decrease in rice and maize production in lowland areas.
• Niger's economy is expected to experience GDP growth above 6 percent in 2025 and 2026, according to projections by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (BIDC), supported by increased oil production, infrastructure investments, and an agricultural rebound. Inflation is expected to decline to around 4 percent in 2025 and 2026, given better harvests and monetary tightening, while rising oil revenues are expected to help reduce budget and external deficits.
• Nevertheless, oil price volatility, fragile mobilization of non-oil revenues, persistent security pressures, and vulnerability to weather shocks could compromise stability and inclusive growth (World Bank). In addition, tensions will persist in relations with Benin and with other ECOWAS member countries and regional and international organizations, notably the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) and the European Union. These tensions will continue to disrupt trade relations, particularly imports of food, and health and nutritional products, which will nevertheless continue through the port of Lomé.
• The continued closure of the border with Benin will continue to constrain commercial trade between Niger and Benin. Imported products will be most affected, such as maize, rice, fruits, and vegetables as well as export products including livestock, onions, cowpeas, and peanuts. This situation will continue to hinder the food supply in Niger's markets, reducing it compared to average. The persistent depreciation of the naira will maintain livestock and cash crop exports to Nigeria also at reduced levels compared to the average.
• Food and cash crop prices will remain high relative to purchasing power but lower compared to last year and the average (Figure 2) due to improved domestic supply and increasingly weak consumption and export demand. Livestock prices will remain average to above average following good body conditions and demand from coastal countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, and Ghana, which will be sustained due to the appreciation of the cedi in Ghana and periods of high meat consumption including Ramadan and Tabaski.

Humanitarian food assistance

• Food assistance will be irregular and have very limited geographical coverage relative to the caloric needs of populations due to funding constraints and security measures. Security measures implemented by authorities, notably the requirement for military escorts in the Tillabéry, Diffa, Tahoua, Maradi, and Dosso regions, further complicate response plans as they reduce the space for humanitarian actors' movements and increase operational costs. These difficulties will be exacerbated by continually reduced, but ongoing humanitarian funding during the projection period.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist in the regions of Tillabéry, Diffa, and in the extreme northwest of Tahoua. From October 2025 to May 2026, the security situation will continue to disrupt livelihood and market activities in addition to causing continued population displacement. Insecurity has prevented agricultural activities from taking place in certain villages. Populations will therefore face successive agricultural production deficits and will depend on markets in the face of very high prices compared to their purchasing power. Reduced and very poor food consumption will consist of wild harvested foods, which will cause an increase in the number of children suffering from severe malnutrition. These households will face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes and among them a small proportion composed of those who are also affected by the persistent effects of flooding will be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). A higher proportion will be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) starting in February 2026, but this proportion will remain below 20 percent.

Food insecurity will continue to be Minimal (IPC Phase 1) in agricultural and agropastoral areas from October 2025 through January 2026 before evolving to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) from February to May 2026.

From October 2025 to January 2026, cereal stocks that will be supported by off-season agricultural products will ensure household food consumption and will satisfy household caloric intake needs. These households will face Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes.

From February to May 2026, poor households' stocks will be depleted and they will depend on markets for purchasing food products for consumption. Food prices will be in their seasonal upward trend and income from off-season agricultural labor will be sufficient for food purchases, but will not cover expenses related to their livelihoods and they will face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. However, some households, particularly those affected by flooding, will continue to depend on markets where high prices will limit their access to food. To cover their caloric needs, they will resort to reducing the number of meals and meal rations per day. Thus, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist for this small proportion of these poor households affected by flooding.

In the Dosso region and the southwest of the Maradi region, security incidents will produce significant effects on livelihood activities and on commercial flows and activities. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will be observed among poor households in market gardening production areas due to a decline in production and seasonal income resulting from limited access to production sites.

Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes will be widespread in pastoral areas through March 2026 before trending toward Stressed (IPC Phase 2) from April to May 2026. From October 2025 to March 2026, pasture and water points will be sufficiently available, allowing access to pastoral resources for animals whose milk production and market value will enable access to food and income for pastoral households. Households will then have sufficient access to food and income to maintain themselves in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food insecurity. However, poor households in all pastoral areas whose animals depend on the pastoral resources in alternative replenishment areas that have been affected by insecurity will face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. Their purchasing power will be reduced following the decrease in local pastoral resources and the inaccessibility of these alternative replenishment areas, which will deteriorate body conditions, milk production, and pastoral income.

From April to May 2026, local pastoral resources will be depleted and insecurity will restrict herd mobility. This will result in the loss of animal body conditions, scarcity of milk production, and declining income from sales of pastoral products. Prices in food markets will be very high while households depend on markets year-round for their food consumption. The significantly declining purchasing power of poor households will be limited to purchasing food in very reduced quantities compared to food and non-food consumption needs. Their food insecurity will deteriorate to Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

The Tillabéry region is located in western Niger, in the tri-border area shared with Mali and Burkina Faso. It is the scene of escalating violence due to repeated attacks by terrorist groups, primarily IS Sahel and JNIM. While attacks historically followed a seasonal trend, decreasing during the rainy season, they no longer decrease seasonally as demonstrated by increased engagement of local fighters who are increasingly mastering the terrain. Violence against civilians and security defense forces has continued in an upward trend in 2025.

Populations are exposed to multiple risks, including convoy attacks, kidnappings, livestock theft, physical and psychological threats, and looting of businesses by terrorist groups. This violence forces populations to move in search of areas considered safer, such as regional and departmental capitals. Thus, the Tillabéry region has a total of 303,379 people in forced displacement, including 221,717 IDPs, 39,271 refugees coming mainly from Mali and Burkina Faso, and 42,371 asylum seekers (Figure 3).

Agriculture and livestock are the main activities of this livelihood zone. Cereals (millet, sorghum, and rice) and cash crops (cowpea, sesame, and rice) are the most produced. Persistent civil insecurity pushes populations to abandon their fields and irrigated perimeters, which reduces production and income from the sale of agricultural products. The abandonments affected 93 agricultural villages, or 4 percent of the region's agricultural villages, corresponding to 11 percent of the regional area that cultivated millet, sorghum, cowpea, and groundnut according to the Statistics Office in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.

Populations, particularly poor and very poor households, derive their income during this period mainly from the sale of temporary labor, self-employment (brick making and sale of charcoal and wood), sale of livestock, and harvests. These activities, which are the main sources of typical income for poor households, are increasingly less practiced in the area due to growing insecurity that has forced the displacement of, including better-off households who typically create demand for labor and from products from petty trade. In the host areas of Tillabéry, agricultural labor and self-employment income have significantly decreased for displaced and host populations following a sharp rise in labor supply coming from the addition of displaced persons.

Pastoral space is continually shrinking due to insecurity that forces herds to concentrate in the more secure center and south of the region, rather than their usual pastoral areas in the north. This early presence of larger than average size herds will lead to more rapid depletion of pastoral resources in this agropastoral and agricultural belt while the typical pastoral area will remain inaccessible to animals and herders. This will cause deterioration in the physical quality of animals, their productivity, and their market value. The number of animals will also decrease due to theft and looting. Given that the conflict hinders access by actors and sellers to points of sale and trade routes, particularly for Nigerian exporters, the closure of certain markets and the dysfunction of others will lead to a decline in animal prices and a reduction in income for farmers.

Market purchases are the main sources of food for poor households, yet prices are very high given their purchasing power. Their seasonal income is very low due to oversupply caused by competition between local, poor households and IDPs. Their purchasing power does not allow them to fulfill their basic food consumption needs and causes them to purchase less quantity of food. Labor sales and artisanal product activities are intensified but provide low income due to their low local demand and the absence of external demand. Livestock capital is depleted following massive distress sales to buy food, where some households have had to sell all their livestock. Theft by terrorist groups have left others with all their livestock stolen. As an alternative, in these agricultural and agropastoral areas, poor households engage in activities, such as domestic work (grain pounder, houseboy/maid), collection and sale of forest and artisanal products, and begging, to increase income, which nevertheless remains insufficient to cover food expenditure needs.

Poor host households and poor displaced households face significant food consumption deficits by sending household members to beg for food and money. However, food consumption gaps are observed and poor and displaced households in agricultural, agropastoral and pastoral livelihood zones in most departments of the region are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). A small proportion of households reach Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, including those whose laborers have migrated and others who no longer have animals following successive sales and thefts.

Looking ahead, a larger number of poor host households and poor displaced households will continue to face significant food consumption deficits due to lack of own food stocks and low income from labor in the face of food prices largely beyond their financial capacity. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist among most host and displaced households, with a small proportion facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4).