Skip to main content

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in conflict areas

  • Food Security Outlook
  • Niger
  • June 2024 - January 2025
Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in conflict areas

Download the Report

  • Key Messages
  • Analysis in brief
  • Food security context
  • Current food security conditions in June 2024
  • Analysis of key food and income sources
  • Humanitarian food assistance
  • Current food insecurity outcomes in June 2024
  • Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through January 2025
  • Projected outcomes of acute food insecurity from June 2024 to January 2025
  • Events that could alter the projected outcomes of acute food insecurity
  • Key Messages
    • Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in some areas of Niger from June 2024 to January 2025. Affected populations include poor households and displaced populations impacted by conflict and insecurity in the regions of Tillabéry, northwest Tahoua, Diffa, and southwest Maradi. Households forcibly displaced by the security crisis face loss of their food and income sources, while market disruptions, very high food prices, and floods are further limiting access to food and income. 
    • Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will dominate in agricultural and agropastoral areas in the north, center, and southwest of the country from June until September 2024. Poor households are facing depletion of cereal stocks and very high food prices. They also face dry spells and floods decreasing the demand for labor. From October 2024 to January 2025, increased agricultural employment opportunities due to the harvests are expected to improve access to food and income. 
    • In pastoral areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes observed in June 2024 are expected to transition to Minimal (IPC Phase 1) between late July 2024 and January 2025. In June 2024, pastoral households are experiencing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes due to very high food prices, while livestock prices are decreasing due to fodder deficits and delayed rainfall onset in pastoral areas. However, livestock body conditions, market value, and milk production are expected to improve from July 2024 to January 2025 due to increased access to pastures and water.
    • The level of food assistance will be low between June 2024 and January 2025 due to insufficient funding and restrictions on travel without military escorts in insecure areas. The population in need is estimated to be between 2.5 to 3 million people until January 2025.

    Learn more

    The analysis presented here is based on the information available as of June 2024. The following links provide additional information: 

    Analysis in brief

    Conflict, the primary factor driving food insecurity in Niger, is leading to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in the regions of Tillabéry, Tahoua, Diffa, and Maradi. These outcomes are expected to persist from June 2024 until January 2025, with some very poor households even facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. The conflicts have caused population displacements and abandonment of arable land, as well as disruptions in the supply and functioning of markets. Food stocks are expected to be depleted three months earlier than usual, while households face rising food prices, low or non-existent incomes, and limited livelihoods due to insecurity, resulting in food consumption deficits. 

    Humanitarian access is hampered by security incidents and violence as well as ongoing insecurity response measures. Even though households in the Diffa and Maradi regions benefited from assistance reaching over 30 percent of the population until April 2024, government security measures have restricted movements of people in these areas, including humanitarian actors, preventing the delivery of food aid to all affected regions.

    The lifting of sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) did not have the expected effects on the resumption of economic activities and the return to normalcy of cross-border trade. Due to security measures, Niger is maintaining the closure of the border with Benin. However, with the opening of the border with Nigeria, cross-border trade has resumed, although it remains below the pre-July 2023 coup level due to reduced availability of food and the weakness of the naira/XAF exchange rate. 

    In agricultural and agropastoral zones, household stocks were depleted three months earlier than normal due to the cereal deficit in the 2023/2024 farming season, caused by rainfall deficits and insecurity. Off-season crops provided some food during the dry season, but households remained primarily dependent on the market, where food prices far exceed their purchasing power. Given optimistic forecasts predicting near-average harvests of staple cereals starting in October, food access, crop sales, and agricultural labor income are expected to improve, mitigating food insecurity outcomes. Households are expected to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes from June to September 2024. However, between October 2024 and January 2025, Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected, given improved food availability due to the harvests and increased purchasing power of households. 

    In most pastoral areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected. The impact of last year's fodder deficits, combined with water and fodder shortages from previous years, has resulted in a maximum level of Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in June/July 2024, reducing livestock-related income. Favorable rains are expected to seasonally improve livestock body conditions, market value, and milk production from July until January 2025. The demand for animals during the end-of-year festivities and the resumption of cross-border trade with Nigeria will drive up livestock prices. Thus, food and income from milk production and livestock sales should be sufficient to enable most households to cover their basic food needs as the season progresses. 

    Food security context

    The increasing power of violent extremist organizations in Mali has spread to neighboring countries in the Liptako-Gourma region since 2015. Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State–Sahel Province (ISSP) are the two main extremist groups involved in the attacks in Niger, particularly in the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions. Although Boko Haram, which has transformed into the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), is the main perpetrator of attacks in the Diffa region, organized bandits from the northwestern states of Nigeria are the main threat in the Maradi region. Incursions and attacks by these armed groups, targeting security force posts and villages in these regions, have led to massive population displacements, abandonment of farmlands, and livestock losses, severely impacting household livelihoods. Furthermore, these attacks have affected market operations and access, disrupting internal and cross-border food flows. However, the attacks in these regions vary according to the season, with a decrease during the rainy season due to floods that limit the movements of these armed groups. 

    Figure 1. Geographical distribution of violent events
    Évènements violents janvier 2024 à mai 2024

    Source: ACLED (January 2023–May 2024)

    Poor households in rural areas depend on livestock and agricultural work as a source of income and food. Cereal production, mainly millet and sorghum, is predominant in agricultural livelihood zones as well as in agropastoral areas. However, low agricultural production is attributed to climate variability and risks, infrequent availability of agricultural inputs, and the impacts of conflicts. The period from June to September coincides with the lean season, when own food stocks are depleted and households depend on markets for food access amid high prices. Beginning in October, households will have access to crops, with stocks that normally last about four to six months. In pastoral areas, households depend on livestock sales as a source of income and rely on markets for their food supply. During the pastoral lean season that started in April, depletion of fodder resources and drying up of water points have deteriorated livestock body conditions and market values. Starting in July, Improved availability of pastures is expected to improve the market value of livestock. Due to low agricultural production, Niger also depends on the import of some grains, especially rice. However, the economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS following the July 2023 coup d'état and the subsequent closure of the borders between Niger, Nigeria, and Benin have impacted the import of food products and the export of livestock to Nigeria. The lifting of sanctions in February 2024 allowed trade exchanges with Nigeria to resume, but Niger still maintains the closure of its borders with Benin. 

    The macroeconomic context: Niger's economic growth resumed in 2022 after the economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 to 2021. However, economic sanctions in 2023 negatively impacted the macroeconomic situation resulting from the decline in GDP to 1.4 percent. Niger experienced a moderate increase in the annual average inflation rate to 3.7 percent in 2023 compared to 2022. However, the inflation rate was below 3 percent during the first half of 2023, beginning to rise in July and reaching a peak of 7.8 percent in September 2023, where it remains.

    Figure 2. Seasonal calendar for a typical year
    calendrier saisonnier

    Source: FEWS NET

    Current food security conditions in June 2024

    Early warning of acute food insecurity requires future outcomes to be predicted months in advance in order to give decision makers enough time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive forecasts are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet the needs of decision-makers by developing a "most likely" scenario of the future. The starting point for the development of scenarios is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section. 

    The key principles of the scenario development process of FEWS NET include applying the disaster risk reduction framework and using a livelihoods-based approach to assess outcomes of acute food insecurity. A household's risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought), but also on the household's vulnerability to these hazards (for example, the household's level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and its adaptive capacity (which takes into account both the households' ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that undermine future resilience). To assess these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong fundamental understanding of local livelihoods, which are the ways in which a household meets its basic needs. The scenario development process of FEWS NET also takes into account the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF's Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the analytical framework of the Integrated Phase Classification of Food Security (IPC).

    Key hazards 

    Conflict: Persistent insecurity and terrorist attacks in the regions of Tillabéry, Tahoua, Maradi, and Diffa are disrupting market functioning and household income-generating activities and causing population displacements. The main actors in these terrorist activities are the JNIM and ISSP and community militias in the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions, armed bandits in the Maradi region, and ISWAP in the Diffa region. Despite increased purchases of military equipment and improved combat efficiency of the security forces, violent incidents have continued in all conflict-affected areas, totaling an estimated 210 cases from January to May 2024, nearly equivalent to the same period last year. Conflict is increasingly expanding southward in the Dosso region, where fatalities and population displacements continue to be recorded (Figure 3), with an estimated 707 deaths in 2024 compared to 342 deaths in 2023. According to the UNHCR, an estimated 870,828 people have been displaced due to the security crisis as of April 2024, including 407,430 internally displaced persons, an increase of 12 percent compared to April 2023. The majority of the displaced people, about 75 percent, are in the Diffa and Tillabéry regions, with 38 percent and 37 percent, respectively, compared to 20 percent in Tahoua and 5 percent in Maradi. 

    Figure 3. Trends in the number of security incident cases
    Évolutions de nombres des cas d'incidents sécuritaires

    Source: ACLED

    Agroclimatic situation: This year is marked by planting losses in many parts of the country. Following dry spells of 10 to 25 days, losses were recorded in 234 villages in the Dosso region and 89 villages in the Tillabéry region. Strong sandstorms for one to two days also caused losses in the Dungass department, Zinder region, and in the Bankilaré department, Tillabéry region. Cumulative planting losses due to low rainfall levels caused delays of ten to twenty days in the start of the season compared to the median from 1991 to 2020 in several agricultural areas (Figure 4). Nevertheless, as of June 20, 2024, rainfall amounts in the majority of agricultural areas made it possible to plant, on average, in 71 percent of farming villages, almost at the same level as in June 2023. The lowest rates of agricultural villages without planting were recorded in the regions of Dosso, Maradi, and Zinder, with 7, 14, and 18 percent, respectively.

    Figure 4. Anomalies in seasonal onset as of June 20, 2024
    Installation de la saison

    Source: USGS Regional

    Sociopolitical situation: Despite the lifting of the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), including the closure of the borders with Niger following the coup d'état of July 26, 2023, the sociopolitical situation is still tense. The border with Benin remains closed, and measures remain in place prohibiting the movement of people in insecure areas without military escort, including movements for the distribution of food aid.

    Macroeconomic situation: Inflation remains very high at 7.2 percent in May 2024, compared to 2.5 percent in May 2023, mainly due to food inflation. This is fueled by the tension in sociopolitical relations with Benin, resulting in the continued closure of the border, in turn leading to a disruption in the import and export of food and animal products. The most affected imported food products are maize and rice, for which Niger usually depends on the Benin corridor for more than 50 percent of its supply.

    Analysis of key food and income sources

    Agricultural production: June marks the end of off-season crops and the start of the rainy season. Harvests of off-season crops have been completed and are estimated to be below average due to the low availability of water for irrigation following last year's rainfall deficit. High prices of agricultural inputs, particularly fertilizers, have not allowed optimal use of such fertilizers, leading to reduced yields and production, resulting in decreased access to food and income from off-season crops.

    Rainfed agricultural production is currently in progress due to the significant rainfall amounts recorded in all agricultural regions of the country, enabling planting to proceed. The planting completion rates are estimated to be similar to those of last year. The stages of vegetative development of crops, mainly millet, vary from first emergence to growth. 

    Animal production: In pastoral areas, rainfall has generally been low, not yet allowing the regeneration of fodder and the replenishment of water points for the watering of animals. The situation has become more difficult because, with the onset of the rainy season in the agricultural south, livestock are forced to return to the north, where grazing and water conditions are poor. However, certain localities in the pastoral area of the Tahoua region received heavy rainfall in June, resulting in the death of hundreds of small ruminants and a few large ruminants. Livestock body conditions were poor to fair during this peak period of the lean season in pastoral areas due to a long period of poor nutrition caused by cumulative forage deficits. As a result, the area faced a sharp decline in the production of milk and milk products until June 2024. As a result, milk availability and consumption have fallen significantly, especially among poor households.

    Animal production: In pastoral areas, rainfall has generally been low, not yet allowing the regeneration of fodder and the replenishment of water points for the watering of animals. The situation has become more difficult because, with the onset of the rainy season in the agricultural south, livestock are forced to return to the north, where grazing and water conditions are poor. However, certain localities in the pastoral area of the Tahoua region received heavy rainfall in June, resulting in the death of hundreds of small ruminants and a few large ruminants. Livestock body conditions were poor to fair during this peak period of the lean season in pastoral areas due to a long period of poor nutrition caused by cumulative forage deficits. As a result, the area faced a sharp decline in the production of milk and milk products until June 2024. As a result, milk availability and consumption have fallen significantly, especially among poor households.

    Main food sources: As a result of a recorded cereal deficit, household cereal stocks were depleted three months earlier than average for most poor households. Payment in kind for preparation and planting work has also significantly decreased due to the low level of food stocks held by well-off households. Consequently, the main sources of food are purchases from markets and points of sale of cereals at subsidized prices. 

    Main sources of off-farm income include the sale of agricultural labor for field preparation and planting, earnings from migration and seasonal migration, the sale of wood and straw, and the sale of water, ropes, and mats at weekly markets. 

    Income from the sale of straw/agricultural residues for animal feed increased by 15 to 30 percent in pastoral areas, not only due to the scarcity of products following the low rainfall last season but also, and above all, due to high demand for animal feed due to decreased fodder production. 

    Given the agricultural season, the sale of agricultural labor is the most important income source, with planting and ploughing offering the main local employment opportunities. In insecure areas, the demand for agricultural labor is greatly reduced, and agricultural employment incomes are diminished due to decreased cultivated areas resulting from the abandoning of fields following terrorist attacks. In secure areas, the demand for agricultural labor is moderate, but these areas also host displaced persons who constitute additional labor, thereby increasing supply relative to demand. 

    Income from migration and seasonal migration has significantly declined due to economic problems in urban centers of the country and in host countries, especially Nigeria, and reduced port activities in Benin, the main source of seasonal employment opportunities, due to the effects of the continued border closure. 

    In pastoral areas, due to the lean season, income from the sale of animals has not provided sufficient food compared to last year and the five-year average (Figure 5). 

    Figure 5. Comparison of national average terms of trade for goat/millet
    Termes de l'échange

    Source: SIMA and SIMB

    Market supplies and food prices: Local supplies to markets are reduced due to lower local production and low carry-over stocks. In addition, trade flows are disrupted due to insecurity, the closure of the border with Benin, and the economic and monetary problems in Nigeria. Market supplies are at a significantly lower than normal level, especially for maize. Periods of market shortages have occurred due to the low supply in Nigeria as well as the closure of the border with Benin, where most maize imports come. Food shortages have increased, especially in markets located in insecure areas, where agricultural production has been poor and the flow of goods is hampered by insecurity along trade routes (Figure 6). 

    Food prices have reached levels significantly above their five-year average. Indeed, average prices have increased by 42, 36, 34, and 29 percent compared with the five-year average for maize, imported rice, sorghum, and millet, respectively. Due to conflict, price increases are more pronounced in the markets of Banibangou, Abala, and Bankilaré in the Tillabéry region and Tillia in the Tahoua region, where they exceed the five-year average by 48 to 55 percent.

    Figure 6. Flow and functioning of markets
    Fonctionnement des marchés

    Source: FEWS NET

    Household purchasing capacity: The combined effects of lower incomes and rising food prices have resulted in low purchasing power for poor households and especially displaced people, who have lost their livelihoods and have few local employment opportunities. In pastoral areas, the fodder deficit has resulted in poor livestock body conditions, leading to reduced milk production and dairy products. Households' sources of income do not provide them with sufficient income for the purchase of consumer products and the protection of their livelihoods.

    Nutritional situation: In the first quarter of 2024, 64,654 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM) were admitted to health facilities for treatment, representing 15 percent of the annual target of 436,348 children. The decrease in flows following the continued closure of the border with Benin also concerns health and nutritional products, which has led to a reduction in the availability of inputs for the nutritional care of children and pregnant women. By mid-March, 33 percent of health centers had stockouts of therapeutic inputs, and severe acute malnutrition management services were disrupted. Thus, even though the situation of admissions in the centers indicates a downward trend in cases of malnourished children, the reasons behind this are not clear. This could probably be due to the malfunctioning of screening operations and limited access to the health service as a result of the impact of insecurity on the health system.

    Humanitarian food assistance

    Humanitarian food assistance—defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or vouchers) —can play a key role in mitigating the severity of the consequences of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET analysts always integrate available food assistance information, albeit that food assistance information is highly variable across geographic areas and over time. According to IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is "significant" (defined as at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric needs through food assistance); see the appendix of the report. In addition, FEWS NET is conducting a more in-depth analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET's guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET's broader analysis, as appropriate.

    The National Household Food Insecurity Response Plan is developed jointly with humanitarian partners and plans to assist about three million people. However, the government's financial constraints and movement restrictions for humanitarian organizations in insecure areas without military escorts limit the implementation of this plan to very small geographic areas. At most, 8 percent of the population is receiving assistance, including in the Diffa and Maradi regions, where 31 percent of the population regularly received food distributions that covered 25 percent or more of energy needs until April 2024.

    Current food insecurity outcomes in June 2024

    Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses to what extent households are likely to meet their minimum calorie needs. This analysis aligns evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household food consumption and livelihood changes; FEWS NET also takes into account available evidence at regional level on nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the symbol !“ ⁠to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

    In areas unaffected by conflicts and civil insecurity: Household stocks are exhausted, but food is available in markets. Poor households have purchasing power through income earned from agricultural labor and from selling firewood, straw for livestock feed, water, ropes, and mats. Despite high prices, poor households manage to access sufficient quantities of food. However, incomes are falling and do not allow for non-food expenses. Thus, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food insecurity outcomes generally persist in these areas. There are even small proportions (5 to 9 percent) of households that face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. These poor households, located in areas where there is no insecurity, do not have diversified sources of income; the amounts received are not sufficient to access quantities of food equivalent to 2,100 kilocalories per day per person, and they therefore resort to crisis coping strategies, including begging. 

    In the conflict-affected areas of Tillabéry, northern Tahoua, Diffa, and southern Maradi, poor households lack cereal stocks. Food items are scarce and expensive in markets, and opportunities to earn income are very limited. Households do not have access to enough food to cover their minimum caloric needs and are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes despite the use of crisis coping strategies. Poor and displaced households in remote areas, far from urban areas, lack opportunities for daily income and access to adequate food sources, resorting to reducing the number of meals eaten per day or going for whole days without eating. These households, which represent 8 to 10 percent of the population, are facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. 

    Food assistance plans are inconsistent in terms of geographic and demographic coverage. This situation significantly impacts household food security because, with the requirement for military escorts and associated operational costs, food distribution operations do not reach poor and displaced populations in remote areas. 

    In pastoral areas, pastures and water points are in poor condition. Combined with the cumulative effects of years of fodder deficit, this is resulting in a loss of body weight in animals, whose milk production and market value have decreased sharply compared to average. As a result, poor households have very low access to food and income and are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. However, some poor households, representing 8 to 10 percent of the population, are engaged in coping strategies such as sales of reproductive animals to have the necessary income for the purchase of consumer products. These poor households are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. 

    Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through January 2025

    The next step in FEWS NET's scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect changes in household diets and incomes over the projection period, as well as factors that could affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the "most likely" scenario. The sequence of formulating assumptions is crucial; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations regarding weather conditions) should be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations regarding agricultural or livestock production). The assumptionsunderlying this analysis and the main sources of evidence used to develop these assumptions are listed below; these lists are not exhaustive.

    National assumptions 


    • Delay in the onset of the rainy season and breaks in rainfall: Above-average cumulative rainfall is expected from June to August and July to September 2024 in the agricultural belts of Niger. Nevertheless, the start dates of the agricultural season are estimated to be late to average, with average to long dry spells at the start of the season and average to higher flows. This irregular temporal and spatial distribution of rainfall could disrupt the development of crops and fodder plants, leading to planting losses, crop losses, and declines in agricultural and fodder yields.
    • The combined effects of agroclimatic and security shocks will lead to a decline in agricultural and fodder production, especially in areas affected by conflicts and insecurity, as well as in areas affected by floods. 
    • Floods: Above-average cumulative rainfall and generally excess runoff predicted in the majority of river basins indicate high risks of flooding, which could lead to crop losses, damaged property, and potential loss of human and animal lives. The affected basins include the Niger River basin for the regions of Tillabéry, Dosso, and Niamey, major watercourses in the regions of Maradi and Zinder, and the Komadougou Yobé River in the Diffa region.

    Conflict and insecurity:

    • Overall, the activity of terrorist groups is expected to reflect past seasonal trends, with an increase in attacks until the peak of the 2024 rainy season in July, followed by a relative decrease in August due to the increasing natural constraints on movement associated with flooding.  
    • In addition to the restriction on movement without military escort in insecure areas, the Nigerien authorities will take additional measures that will hinder the operations of certain humanitarian, development, and human rights organizations in Niger.

    Sociopolitical and economic environment:

    • Sociopolitical tensions will persist between Niger and Benin and between Niger and regional and international organizations. These tensions will continue to disrupt trade relations, particularly with Benin, whose port is used for the import or transit of food and non-food and nutritional products. These tensions will then significantly limit the flow of foodstuffs and material goods, affecting market supplies and also hindering the financing of humanitarian and development plans. 
    • Although port activities offer the greatest source of employment opportunities for Nigerien migrants, migratory labor to Benin and income earned from this employment source will decrease as a result of tensions in this sector.
    • Inflation is expected to decline to 3.5 percent in 2024 following the lifting of sanctions and the moderation in food prices following the resumption of large-scale imports. 

    Markets and prices:

    • The continued closure of the border will continue to lead to a halt in trade between Niger and Benin, particularly imports. Niger depends on this corridor for more than 50 percent of food products, especially maize, fruits, and vegetables, as well as for its exports of animals and cash crops, especially onions. This situation will significantly hamper the supply of food products on Niger's markets and will contribute to keeping the prices of these products at high levels. Prices are indeed expected to rise above those of last year and the five-year average, especially in July and August and in conflict zones, before beginning a downward trend starting in September, although remaining higher than the five-year average (Figure 7). 
    • Following the continued depreciation of the Nigerian naira, the reversal of livestock flows from Nigeria to Niger's markets will continue and will lead to an oversupply of livestock and a downward trend in animal prices. 
    Figure 7. Millet price projection in Guidan Roumdji (XOF/kg)
    Projection des prix du mil

    Source: SIMA

    Subnational assumptions for the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions

    • In the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions, attacks by EI Sahel and JNIM are expected to continue to increase slightly until at least January 2025, especially in the Tillabéry region, where terrorist groups will try to extend their areas of influence to new areas not yet affected, and to the Dosso region bordering Benin. However, these attacks will decrease in July, August, and September due to rainfall and the poor state of the roads.

    Subnational assumptions for the Diffa region

    • In the Diffa region, the number of terrorist attacks is expected to increase slightly above current low levels until January 2025, with sporadic attacks by Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad (JAS) and ISWAP in the Diffa and Bosso departments. However, levels of violence are expected to remain well below those seen from 2019 to 2020. 

    Subnational assumptions for the Maradi region

    • In the Maradi region, security incidents involving bandits are expected to continue at higher than seasonal levels. According to seasonal trends and due to ongoing ISWAP attacks in the neighboring states of Sokoto and Kaduna in Nigeria, incidents are expected to increase after the 2024 rainy season.

    Humanitarian food assistance

    National assumption  

    • The development and implementation of the National Food Insecurity Response Plan are joint activities between the government and humanitarian organizations allowing the majority of populations to cover at least 25 percent of their energy needs. Due to reductions in financial support and movement restrictions for humanitarian organizations in insecure areas, the distribution of assistance will have very limited geographic coverage, and the number of people who will benefit will be significantly reduced. 

    Subnational assumptions for the Tillabéry, Tahoua, Maradi, and Diffa regions

    • The security measures taken by the authorities, particularly the travel ban in insecure areas, will continue to be an additional obstacle in conducting humanitarian food assistance distribution operations.
    • Food assistance will be irregular, with very limited geographic coverage, and insufficient to meet the population's energy needs. 
    Table 1
    Main sources of data integrated by FEWS NET analysts in the development of the above assumptions 
    Main sources of information 
    PRESASS Special Seasonal Forecast Bulletin 2024UNHCR Niger-Map population of Concern-May 2024The World Bank in Niger, Niger-Overview
    FEWS NET Rapid assessment in the Maradi regionACLED Conflict Alert System 

    Projected outcomes of acute food insecurity from June 2024 to January 2025

    By using the key assumptions underlying the "most likely" scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes with a reasonable level of confidence by assessing the evolution of households' ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET aligns expectations regarding the likely trajectory of household food consumption and livelihood changes with the nutritional status and mortality rates at the zonal level. FEWS NET then classifies the outcomes of acute food insecurity. Finally, FEWS NET uses the symbol "!“ ⁠to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned food assistance—and likely to be funded and delivered.

    In agricultural and agropastoral areas unaffected by conflict and civil insecurity

    From June to September 2024, poor households will be without stocks and will resort to markets where food is available but at prices twice the five-year seasonal average. These prices are explained by the combined effects of the lean season and significantly above-average supply costs due to the now much longer import routes. Agricultural activities, dominated by crop maintenance work, offer below-average daily income opportunities but still allow for the purchase of consumer goods. Some of these households are also located along waterways that overflow, flooding crop fields and homes and causing other damage to movable and immovable property, leading to displacement and expenses for resettlement in safe areas. As a result, these areas face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, but households affected by the floods (representing 8 to 12 percent of the population of these areas) will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

    From October 2024 to January 2025, poor households will have food and income from new harvests lasting three to four months, without food deficits or livelihood protection issues; these areas will transition to Minimal (IPC Phase 1). However, households affected by the floods will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), while some of them who will succeed in diversifying their sources of income will transition to Stressed (IPC Phase 2). 

    In the conflict-affected areas of Tillabéry, North Tahoua, Diffa, and South Maradi: 

    From June 2024 to January 2025, poor households will not have cereal stocks due to lack of cultivated fields, and their purchasing power will be severely limited by prices twice as high as the five-year seasonal average. They will earn low incomes from the sale of agricultural labor, and some will even be affected by property losses as a result of the floods. Food insecurity at Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels will broadly affect most poor households in these areas. Poor and also flooded households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will account for less than 20 percent of the population in these areas. The food assistance already planned will not reduce the food deficit, since funding for the food insecurity response plan will be very reduced, and security constraints will limit access to targeted areas and populations.

    In pastoral areas: Feeding and watering conditions for animals are expected to improve from late July until January 2025, promoting good livestock body conditions, increased milk production, and enhanced market value of livestock. This will result in improved access to food and income for households, enabling them to meet their food needs without resorting to atypical animal sales. They will be in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) from the end of July until January 2025. 

    Events that could alter the projected outcomes of acute food insecurity

    Although FEWS NET projections focus on the "most likely" scenario, this scenario is based on a series of assumptions. The level of confidence in these assumptions varies and there is still some degree of uncertainty in long-term forecasts, meaning that food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security outcomes may evolve differently from what was initially predicted. FEWS NET publishes monthly updates of its projections, but policymakers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may be different than expected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET's scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly alter projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurring.


    Event: significantly lower-than-expected rainfall and prolonged dry periods during critical growth stages of crops

    Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Agricultural and pastoral production will decline, minimizing any improvements in food and income access and agricultural employment opportunities. This will result in limited availability of pastures and water for animals, leading to poor body conditions and mediocre milk production from June to January 2025. It is likely that food prices will increase more than anticipated due to a significant decrease in market supplies resulting from speculation and a sharp decline in local supply. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, expected in June to September 2024 among poor populations in agricultural and agropastoral areas without conflict and insecurity, will continue until January 2025, with higher proportions of poor households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In pastoral areas, food security outcomes will not improve from July to January 2025, and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) will persist during this period, with proportions of 15 to 18 percent of these poor households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

    Event: improved funding for the humanitarian food response plan and reduced security measures limiting access to populations in need of assistance. 

    Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The government and humanitarian partners' food response plan will likely be funded and executed at a higher level than currently, and areas hosting poor and displaced persons will be more accessible, at least in the regions of Diffa and Maradi. More than 25 percent of the populations of these regions will regularly receive complete rations covering their daily food needs throughout the scenario period, and household food security will transition from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!). 

    Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Niger Food Security Outlook June 2024 - January 2025: Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in conflict areas, 2024.

    To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. Learn more here.

    Get the latest food security updates in your inbox Sign up for emails

    The information provided on this Website is not official U.S. Government information and does not represent the views or positions of the U.S. Agency for International Development or the U.S. Government.

    Jump back to top