Conflict persists with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in affected areas

• In the Tillabéry and Diffa regions and the northwestern part of the Tahoua Region, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist, with some households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Conflicts related to armed terrorist groups (ATGs), which are extending to Dosso, continue to disrupt agricultural and pastoral production activities as well as supply chains and market functioning. Poor households and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are the most affected. Households affected by repeated flooding starting in June 2026 will also be among the most affected.
• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are anticipated in agricultural, agropastoral, and pastoral areas not affected by conflict, with increasingly high proportions of affected people between June and September 2026. Poor households' cereal stocks will be depleted and they will depend on market purchases for their food. However, poor households' access to food will be limited due to high prices and low purchasing power, which has eroded following the decrease in agricultural labor wages. Nevertheless, in pastoral areas, the improvement in pastoral conditions starting in July 2026 will improve livestock body conditions, productivity, and market value, thereby strengthening access to food and income for herder households.
• FEWS NET estimates that 2.5 to 2.9 million people will need food assistance, with the population in need peaking between July and September 2026. The population of highest concern consists of IDPs and poor households in conflict-affected areas whose food stocks are depleted atypically early.
• Conflict and insecurity related to ATG activities persist, with a trend toward territorial expansion in Dosso. The Tillabéry Region remains the epicenter of tension, with an increase of 23 percent in security incidents between 2024 and 2025. However, incidents have sharply increased by more than 200 percent in Dosso during the same period.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 18, 2026. 

Since 2015, the spread of insecurity in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, has extended to other countries in the Liptako-Gourma region. In Niger, the groups Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) have been conducting attacks in the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions since 2017, and in the Dosso region since 2023, while the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), formerly Boko Haram, is the main perpetrator of attacks in the Diffa region since 2015. Finally, organized bandits who exploit the porous borders between Niger and Nigeria represent the main threat in the Maradi region. The incursions and attacks by these terrorist groups have resulted in significant population displacements, the abandonment of agricultural land, and livestock losses, severely affecting household livelihoods. Moreover, these attacks have disrupted the functioning of and access to markets, hindering food product flows, both internal and cross-border.

Poor rural households depend on livestock and agricultural labor as sources of income and food. Cereal production dominates in agricultural and agropastoral livelihood zones, primarily millet and sorghum. The period from October to December corresponds to the harvest season, during which household stocks are replenished and generally last between four and six months. Food commodity prices decrease seasonally, reducing household dependence on markets. From January to May, households will have access to market garden products. In pastoral zones, households rely on livestock sales as a source of income and on markets for their food. The availability of pasture in October after the rainy season, which improves the physical condition of animals, contributes to increasing livestock market values. Due to structurally low agricultural production, Niger depends on countries in the sub-region, such as Nigeria, as well as other countries, such as Thailand, for the import of certain cereals, particularly rice. Agricultural and pastoral livelihoods are vulnerable to weather shocks, such as seasonal flooding, which disrupt activities, essential services, and access to markets.

Niger's recent political and economic context has been marked by sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) following the July 2023 coup d'état, as well as by the subsequent closure of borders with Nigeria and Benin. These measures limited the import of food products and the export of livestock to Nigeria. Although the lifting of sanctions in February 2024 enabled the resumption of commercial trade with Nigeria, Niger still maintains the closure of its borders with Benin, diverting its commercial trade to a longer and more costly route, via Togo and Burkina Faso. In January 2025, Niger, alongside the two other members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali and Burkina Faso, officially withdrew from ECOWAS.

Learn more

The following links provide additional information:

• Latest Niger Food Security Outlook Report: October 2025 – May 2026
• Latest Niger Key Message Update: January 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Conflicts and insecurity continue to cause material and human damage, due to the persistence of attacks by ATGs in the regions of Tillabéry, Tahoua, Diffa, and Dosso (Figure 1). According to ACLED data, security incidents at the national level increased by 18 percent during the period from January to December 2025, compared to the same period in 2024. The regions of Tillabéry and Dosso recorded increases of 23 and 226 percent, respectively. However, more than half of the security incidents are recorded in the Tillabéry region, due to the persistence of attacks and abuses committed by ATGs. Moreover, the Dosso region recorded 17 percent of cumulative security incidents from January to December 2025, compared to 6 percent during the same period in 2024. These terrorist activities are causing forced displacement of populations in search of safer areas. These forced population displacements result in an increase in food needs and a reduction in income and food sources due to the abandonment of crop fields, as well as competition over local resources and in the labor supply.

The floods recorded in 2025 caused damage and impacts persist on the goods and equipment of populations. The flood assessment established on October 20, 2025 by the general directorate of civil protection indicated that 542,975 people were affected by the floods. The most affected regions are Maradi, Zinder, Dosso, Tillabéry and Tahoua. These affected populations benefited from assistance that covered primary needs, particularly food needs, but not the secondary needs necessary for the rehabilitation of lost material goods, including houses. This assistance also did not cover the reconstitution of other areas of productive capital, as livestock capital losses are estimated at 567 livestock (large and small ruminants killed), as well as 23,233 hectares of crop losses.

Several localities in the country are hosting forcibly displaced persons as a result of conflicts and insecurity. In January 2026, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registered 942,941 displaced persons in Niger, including 435,980 refugees and asylum seekers and 460,000 IDPs. The number of IDPs slightly decreased by 9.3 percent compared to the estimated 507,000 IDPs in January 2025. These IDPs are concentrated in the regions of Tillabéry, Diffa and Tahoua, with respective proportions of 48, 32, and 12 percent. IDP presence generates strong competition in access to income and food. The refugees are forcibly displaced persons due to conflicts and originate mainly from Nigeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso (59, 29, and 11 percent, respectively). The presence and continuous influx of displaced persons increase agricultural and non-agricultural labor supply, while the demand for labor remains stable, or even decreases, due to the reduction in cultivated areas.

Agropastoral production is estimated to be generally average, despite cereal and fodder deficits recorded in certain localities. According to the Statistics Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, agricultural production for 2025/26 shows a decrease of 6 percent compared to the final results of 2024 and an increase of 7 percent compared to the five-year average. Production is favorable in the main agricultural areas, particularly the regions of Maradi, Zinder, Dosso, and Tahoua, while it has decreased by 8,000 to 100,000 tons in conflict-affected regions of Tillabéry, Diffa, Niamey, and Agadez, limiting cultivated areas (Tillabéry and Diffa) and structurally deficit-producing zones (Niamey and Agadez). In pastoral zones, the fodder balance indicates a decrease of more than 23 percent compared to last year. This deficit, combined with limited access to certain areas with pastures but subject to conflicts and civil insecurity, is causing an early onset of the lean season in pastoral zones.

Markets are generally well-supplied and prices of agricultural products are 20 to 28 percent lower than the five-year average due to the availability of new harvests, carryover stocks, and the continuation of the export ban on main products, except Burkina Faso and Mali, in effect since 2025. However, in conflict zones and cereal-deficit areas, the reduction in supplies due to the disruption of internal and cross-border flows is exacerbated by high prices of agricultural products in markets.

Poor households' income from agricultural and non-agricultural activities is generally decreasing. Seasonal income-generating activities for poor households consist of the sale of agricultural labor for work on market garden sites and land clearing in crop fields. However, increased competition for these opportunities due to labor oversupply and the decrease in cultivated areas resulting from the persistence of insecurity are driving below-average incomes for poor displaced households.

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian activities under the implementation of the 2025 food and humanitarian response plan ended in December 2025. According to assessments of food insecurity response plans as of December 31, 2025, funding covers only one-third of assistance needs. The process of developing and implementing response plans by the government and its humanitarian partners is underway.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in the Tillabéry region, Diffa, and the northwestern part of the Tahoua region with some households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Conflicts related to ATGs, which are extending to Dosso, have negatively impacted agricultural and pastoral livelihood activities, as well as commercial trade. Following the poor harvests, most households have exhausted their stocks and depend on markets for food purchases. They no longer have income from the sale of crop products, and the income they earn from the sale of labor is insufficient given the high levels of food commodity prices in these areas. Consequently, household food consumption deficits persist, and poor and displaced households continue to face a reduction in ration from three to two meals per day, representing daily consumption below the minimum 2,100 kilocalories per person per day. Households are forced to reduce their health and education expenditures or to borrow food or rely on food assistance, but these coping strategies are insufficient to mitigate the food consumption deficit. The households affected are poor and displaced households who are mainly in the Tillabéry region, followed by the Diffa region and the departments in the northwest of the Tahoua region, with some households located in the Dosso region in small proportions. Households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), which constitute a proportion of less than 15 percent, are poor and displaced households whose food and income sources have completely eroded as a result of the cumulative effects of several years of deprivation caused by insecurity, and who are unable to ensure their food consumption without relying on donations offered by goodwill or through begging.

In the remaining conflict-affected areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are observed. These are all departments of the Dosso region, the departments of Kollo and Filingué in the Tillabéry region, and the department of Goudoumaria in the Diffa region. These areas are affected by volatile security incidents, but have not yet experienced massive population displacements or severely disrupted livelihood activities and market supply chains. However, terrorist acts involve livestock theft, looting of goods, and collection of taxes and levies. In addition to these disruptions to household assets, measures taken by authorities to prohibit the circulation of motorcycles are impacting households, as they serve as a source of income for transporting people and goods. Even though poor households in these areas are not experiencing food deficits, they are nevertheless facing changes in their livelihoods that lead them to reduce certain non-food expenditures.

In agricultural, agropastoral, and pastoral areas not affected by conflict, Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are observed. The 2025/26 agropastoral production in these areas is better than in areas affected by conflict or insecurity, as is access to pastures and water points for livestock. This situation remains stable, with off-season crops contributing to income, food, and available fodder. Even the majority of poor households have food stocks reinforced by purchases made with wages earned from off-season work. These households are able to meet their food and non-food needs without resorting to negative coping strategies.

• Insecurity related to ATG activities will likely continue in existing insecurity hotspots and will expand in the Dosso region between February and September 2026. Attacks by JNIM and ISSP against civilian populations and security forces are expected to continue until at least February 2026, likely at levels similar to those observed in 2025. The Tillabéry region will remain the epicenter of attacks, while Dosso will record the sharpest relative increase in violence. However, in general, terrorist group activity is expected to reflect past seasonal patterns: attacks increase until the peak of the rainy season, then decrease due to movement constraints associated with rainy conditions. Violence related to terrorist activities in the Diffa region is expected to remain at current low levels at least until September 2026, with attacks by Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) occurring sporadically.
• The rainfall recorded during the rainy season allowed for good recharge of the water table, and favorable  dry season agricultural production is expected. Market garden crops are benefiting from good water conditions, likely support favorable market garden production, harvest prospects for recession crops, and  agricultural labor opportunities for poor households.
• Government support to producers, in the form of agricultural input subsidies, particularly for fertilizer, will continue, improving household access. The use of these inputs will contribute to increased yields of market garden and rainfed agricultural production.
• The recorded rainfall amounts favored pasture production and a good level of water point filling, ensuring availability of pasture and water for livestock for a duration at least equal to the average. Consequently, the pastoral lean season should begin on time in April and end in June 2026.
• Precipitation for the next agricultural season will be average to above average in Sahel countries, according to NOAA, likely supporting a favorable agricultural and pastoral season. The season will begin on time and progress under good water conditions that will benefit cereal and cash crops, as well as fodder plants. Good progress in the phenological development of cereal crops is expected. However, insecurity will reduce the area planted by hindering access to fields. The favorable rainfall will also result in good animal body condition and good milk yields from July to September 2026.
• Due to the forecast of excess rainfall, flooding is anticipated between July and September 2026 in regions bordering waterways, particularly those of Agadez, Diffa, Dosso, Maradi, Zinder, Tahoua, and Tillabéry, with damage expected to crops and household assets.
• The continued closure of the border with Benin will continue to constrain commercial trade between Niger and Benin. Imported products, such as maize, rice, fruits, and vegetables, as well as export products, such as livestock, onions, cowpeas, and groundnuts, will be most affected. This situation will continue to hinder the supply of food products on Niger's markets, but food commodity supplies will likely be average, due to good national availability and measures prohibiting the export of cereal products and the use of the Burkina Faso corridor.
• Food and cash crop prices will follow typical seasonal trends, albeit at levels higher than last year due to the decrease in agricultural production, but comparable to the average, due to an improvement in domestic supply and increasingly weak consumer demand (Figure 2).
• Livestock prices will remain average to above average, following the decrease in supply from conflict-affected areas, good body condition, and demand from coastal countries, which will be sustained due to periods of high meat consumption, particularly Ramadan and Tabaski.
• Niger's economy is expected to continue its robust growth in 2026, with real GDP growth projected at around 6.7 percent. This performance is based on recent IMF projections and the increase in hydrocarbon exports, which are boosting revenues and supporting short-term growth. Overall inflation is expected to moderate toward lower levels, driven by decreases in food prices and the stabilization of monetary conditions. The budget deficit is expected to remain under control, although heavy reliance on oil revenues and weather conditions constitutes a risk. Other risks include external financing challenges, volatility in global commodity prices, as well as regional security tensions and global geopolitical tensions.

Humanitarian food assistance

• Food assistance will be irregular and insufficient throughout the projection period due to security measures taken by authorities, notably the maintenance of the ban on movement in insecure areas and the reduction in funding for food assistance and humanitarian plans. The effects of these measures will be more severe in conflict-affected regions where humanitarian actions are critical to household food security.

In the Tillabéry and Diffa regions and the northwest of the Tahoua region, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist through September due to ATG-related conflicts, which result in a decrease in livelihood activities and a disruption of market functioning and supplies in the affected and neighboring areas. The forced displacement of populations due to terrorist acts results not only in a loss of productive assets but also in a disruption of the local economy in host areas.

Between February and May 2026, poor displaced households, as well as those in host areas, will face not only the depletion of cereal stocks but also low purchasing power, leading to a reduction in access to food on markets. The quantities purchased will not meet the required food consumption needs, forcing households to reduce the number of meals to one or two per day. There will be an increase in the proportion of poor households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), not exceeding 15 percent. Households will engage in coping strategies such as begging and migration of members.

From June to September 2026, further deterioration will be observed, following the depletion of cereal stocks, the loss of productive assets resulting from flooding, an increased and prolonged dependence on markets amid peak food prices, and a sharper decrease in income. This will result in a reduction in food access and a limitation of food consumption to one or two meals per day among a higher proportion of poor resident households and displaced households. Poor and displaced households who will no longer have assets and other production equipment due to the persistent effects of flooding will be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in higher proportions than observed from February to May 2026, but will remain below 20 percent.

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in agricultural, agropastoral, and pastoral areas not affected by conflict, with increasingly higher proportions of affected households through June and September 2026. Food conditions will be characterized by the depletion of cereal stocks, high seasonal prices, low agricultural labor wages, low prices for forest products, and flooding due to above-average estimated rainfall. Income will allow households to purchase food and meet their essential food needs, but will be insufficient to meet essential non-food needs. The affected population categories include poor households and some displaced middle-income households, with pockets of poor households at 5 to 10 percent who will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). The increase in food commodity prices, combined with the loss of productive assets resulting from flooding, will lead to food deficits. However, the average to above-average estimated rainfall will favor the establishment of grazing pastures between July and September 2026, improving livestock body condition, productivity, and market value in the pastoral areas not affected by conflict. This will result in strengthened access to food and income for livestock-raising households whose situation will improve to Minimal (IPC Phase 1) between June and September 2026.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a crediblealternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National

Improvement in the security situation

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: With the deployment of the unified force of the Sahel States and the establishment and training of self-defense groups in military techniques, decreases in the intensity and scale of ATG activities could be observed. This would result in fewer attacks on trade routes and markets. Internal and cross-border supply chains will be restored and functional, enabling sufficient and regular market supply. Prices will evolve in accordance with their seasonal trend, and economic opportunities around markets will be restored as sources of additional income for poor households. Thus, food consumption of households in conflict-affected areas will improve significantly.

The Tillabéry region is a hotspot, if not the largest, of violence due to repeated attacks by terrorist groups, primarily ISSP and JNIM. It is the Niger part of Liptako-Gourma where the historical trend shows a decrease in attacks during the rainy season. However, contrary to this trend, these attacks increasingly persist with the same levels of violence regardless of season, due primarily to the increased membership of local individuals within terrorist groups, who have better knowledge of the terrain. Violence targeting civilians and defense security forces continues in 2026 with an upward trend.

The Tillabéry region is one of the regions of Niger that has a high population density, distributed almost equally between urban and rural areas. However, violence is forcing populations to move in search of areas considered safer, such as regional and departmental capitals. This is leading to imbalances in population density, depopulation of affected areas, and overcrowding of secure areas.

Agriculture and livestock are the main livelihood activities. Persistent insecurity is causing a sharp reduction in the area cultivated with millet, sorghum, and cowpea, and therefore a sustained downward trend in agricultural areas and production, especially following the abandonment of cultivated land in areas that account for more than 50 percent of the region's agricultural production. In addition, the effects of violence have affected areas hosting displaced persons, particularly through the sharing of food rations and competition for local employment, which has affected the income and food sources of resident households.

Pastoral land availability and livestock capital are increasingly shrinking due to insecurity, limiting the mobility of herds whose size and composition are decreasing due to theft, looting, and more frequent sales to meet essential expenses. The limitation of animal movements and their concentration in secure areas cause pressure on available forage and early and prolonged depletion of pastoral resources. This precariousness of pastoral conditions leads to a deterioration in animal body conditions, market value, and terms of trade between livestock and food commodities. Consequently, the purchasing power of herder households is weakened despite the sale of more animals to obtain income to meet food and non-food expenses. Conflicts hinder the access of actors and sellers to points of sale and trade routes, just as they have caused the closure or dysfunction of certain markets, causing a reduction in demand and animal prices. Massive sales, combined with theft and looting, lead to a decrease in the number of animals in the area.

Following agricultural and livestock production deficits, dependence on markets for food has sharply increased for poor households, for whom market purchases typically provide 50 percent of food consumed. However, terrorist activities on trade routes have caused widespread disruption of internal and cross-border marketing channels, as well as a sharp reduction in commercial activities and actors in markets (Figure 3). Seasonal incomes are very low due to oversupply caused by competition for opportunities between local poor households and IDPs, which results in a decrease in demand for agricultural labor. The quantities of food that purchasing power allows to acquire are below energy needs. Labor and artisanal product sales activities are intensified but provide low incomes due to their low local demand and absence of external demand. Livestock capital is significantly reduced following massive distress sales to purchase food and thefts by terrorist groups. Some households have had to sell all their livestock and others have had all their livestock stolen.