Crisis (IPC Phase 3) extends to Diffa and Maradi following the disruption of food aid

• Insecurity continues to disrupt household livelihoods and market operations in the Tahoua, Tillabéry, Diffa, and Maradi regions following the coup that occurred on July 26, which led to economic and financial sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and certain bilateral and multilateral partners. In the Tahoua and Tillabéry regions, there has been an uptick in violent attacks since the coup, as terrorist groups exploit the military's shift in focus toward national defense in response to the threat of military intervention by ECOWAS. In addition to the insecurity impacting livelihoods, high food prices are eroding household purchasing power, making it difficult for poor and displaced households in the Tahoua, Tillabéry, Diffa, and Maradi regions to access food and meet their dietary needs. Following the coup and economic and financial sanctions, the government has limited financial capacity to implement its food aid program, and continued food aid from the World Food Program (WFP) alone is not enough to cover the needs of the population. As a result of these factors, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity is expected to continue in the Tahoua, Tillabéry, Diffa, and Maradi regions until January 2024. 
• The agricultural season is continuing with good rainfall conducive to the development of crops, most of which are in the growth and reproduction phase. The rainfall situation has also improved in the pastoral zone, facilitating the replenishment of pastures and watering points. As a result, poor pastoral households face Minimal (IPC Phase 1) acute food insecurity outcomes until January 2024. On the other hand, in localized areas of Diffa, Agadez, Tahoua, and Maradi, pasture and watering points remain depleted due to insufficient rainfall. As a result, agricultural production will be down significantly due to failed planting as a result of poor rainfall and abandonment of fields due to insecurity. 
• The security crisis persists in the various hotspots of Tillabéry, Diffa, Tahoua, and Maradi, but Tillabéry remains the most active. Since the coup, security incidents have become more frequent and deadly in the ranks of terrorist groups and even the national armed forces. 

The political situation: Following the coup of July 26, 2023, Niger has been subjected to heavy sanctions by ECOWAS and UEMOA, as well as by certain financial partners (the World Bank, the European Union, and other bilateral partners). These sanctions include the suspension of commercial transactions, including those for foodstuffs, electricity, and pharmaceutical products, as well as the suspension of budgetary and development aid. Among ECOWAS member countries, Nigeria and Benin have closed their borders with Niger. However, the humanitarian funding and activities are not part of the sanctions, and so humanitarian aid continues, even if implementation according to plan is not assured due to a low rate of funding. 

In addition to imposing sanctions, ECOWAS is threatening to intervene militarily against Niger and the new government resulting from the military coup by mobilizing the community's military forces. Negotiations on the release of the former president and the return to normal constitutional order can begin. However, following the official announcement on August 19, 2023, by the new authorities of a three-year transition period, that proposal has so far been rejected by ECOWAS. Civil society, religious, and trade union organizations from the country, the subregion, and the international community are lending their support to the new authorities. They called on ECOWAS to lift the economic and financial embargo, while discouraging the military option, in the hope of resolving the political crisis in Niger by peaceful, diplomatic means. 

On a regional level, this political situation has also prompted solidarity on the part of neighboring countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso, which have lifted restrictions on the export of food products to Niger in response to the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS following the military coups that took place in these countries in 2020 and 2022 respectively. Algeria has also suspended the re-export ban on manufactured goods from the international market, which was imposed following the Ukraine-Russia war. Hundreds of trucks (300 goods trucks according to customs services) carrying foodstuffs and other consumer goods were escorted by Burkina Faso and Niger military personnel to Niamey, arriving in mid-August. 

The security situation: This tense political situation comes on top of an already volatile security situation, with attacks and subsequent forced internal displacement of populations. Since 2015, Niger has faced insecurity fueled by violent extremist organizations in the Tillabéry, Tahoua, and Diffa regions, as well as organized banditry and trafficking, particularly in Maradi and parts of Agadez; this trend has intensified over the past five years (Figure 1). In fact, contrary to the usual situation, terrorist attacks continued despite the onset of the rainy season, which usually hinders the movements of terrorist groups due to the overflowing of rivers. 

Persistent security problems are evident in all conflict-affected areas, but especially in the Tillabéry region, where in July threats and attacks by armed groups displaced more than 2,000 people in the rural commune of Ouro Guéladio in the department of Say. Reported attacks in the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions carried out by Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel (EI Sahel) against civilian populations, security forces, and self-defense militias increased by 7 percent between January and July 2023 compared to the same period last year. However, the number of deaths associated with these incidents fell by 15 percent. 

Also, since the July 26 coup d'état by the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), a slight increase in attacks on Nigerien security forces has been reported in the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions. For example, on August 15, 2023, at least 17 Niger soldiers were killed in a JNIM ambush between Boni and Torodi (Tillabéry region). This escalation of violence targeting military positions suggests that terrorist groups are taking advantage of the reduced vigilance and increased attention paid to national security, following the threat of military intervention announced by foreign forces. 

Markets and prices: Markets and cross-border trade are operating below normal levels, as the closure of borders in the wake of ECOWAS sanctions has made official trade channels less active. However, cross-border trade continues, thanks to the interdependence of the economies of neighboring countries, the lifting of exit bans on food products by the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, porous borders, and the existence of informal trading circuits between Niger, Nigeria, and Benin. Admittedly, the intensity of food flows has decreased, as Nigeria and Benin in particular are the main sources of food products imported into Niger, and the closure of borders with these countries has significantly disrupted cross-border trade. Market supplies continue to be below average but are managing to meet consumer demand. According to traders, cross-border flows between Niger and Nigeria no longer take place through official channels with large trucks, but through informal flows using all types of means of transport, from pick-up vehicles to carts and motorcycles. In all cases, the quantities of products transported are lower than before the closure. Average local cereal prices were stable until June but began to rise in early July as stocks were depleted and consumer demand increased during this lean period. The scale of the increase became larger and more abrupt at the end of July and beginning of August for imported rice following the military coup, which had the immediate effect of traders holding back stocks and setting prices 15 to 17 percent higher in the weeks following the coup than in previous weeks (Figure 3). However, the political event did not influence the price of millet due to the existence of sufficient stocks (Figure 2).

In livestock markets, exports have also fallen due to the closure of borders, including those with Nigeria, which is the main destination for animals exported by wealthy households, rather than poor households, whose animals are sold on local markets. Livestock prices are lower than the five-year average due to lower demand following the absence of export buyers. The terms of trade in August 2023 are around 90 kg of millet for a billy goat, compared with an estimated 100 kg for a billy goat in July 2023.

Rainy season and crop production: The good rainfall recorded since April (Figure 4) means that cumulative rainfall at the beginning of August was higher than the average for the last ten years. The heavy rainfall led to flooding affecting 88,000 people, according to the Ministry of Humanitarian Action, mainly in the regions of Tahoua, Maradi, Zinder, and Tillabéry, where almost 60 percent of the total population was affected. The impact of the floods on crops was slight, according to the Technical Services for Agriculture, but they did result in the loss of livelihoods, notably over 3,000 head of cows, almost 8,000 houses, and around 4 tonnes of food products. Also, according to the statistics department of the Ministry of Agriculture, 192 farming villages are without seedlings, including 125 villages in the Agadez region due to the poor flow of koris on which the agricultural system in this zone depends, 40 villages in the Tillabéry region due to insecurity, which has forced people to abandon their villages, and 27 villages in the Diffa region due to insecurity and rainfall deficits. The development of existing crops in agricultural and agropastoral zones is proceeding normally, and the good weather conditions currently favorable to cereal and cash crops mean that average to above-average harvest prospects can be expected overall, with, however, zero production in zones where there has been no planting or planting has been aborted due to insecurity or low rainfall, and mediocre production due to the effects of dry spells on crop development and yields. With farming activities, poor households find local seasonal employment opportunities that generate income. 

In the pastoral zone, the herbaceous cover is regenerating and watering holes are gradually filling up due to rainfall in July and August. The body conditions of animals are improving, and milk production is picking up, boosting the incomes of pastoral households. However, vegetation cover is still mediocre and below the average of the last 10 years in the pastoral zone of Diffa, Zinder, and Maradi (Figure 5). 

Household income sources: Poor households mainly have access to seasonal sources of income, such as temporary employment on off-season farms, self-employment (selling hay, firewood, or charcoal) and poultry sales. The price of daily agricultural labor for poor households rose from 2,500 to 3,000 FCFA, compared with 1,500 to 2,000 FCFA on average over the five-year period, due to increased demand for labor as the agricultural season progressed. 

Food assistance operations: Food aid operations by the government and the WFP were launched in early July 2023 and are planned for a target of 3.3 million people, including 1.5 million by the government, 1.1 million by the WFP, and 700,000 by NGOs. The financial resources acquired have not enabled the WFP to implement its humanitarian response plan in line with the initial objectives, so the humanitarian aid provided is reaching the target but with reduced rations. Full rations were distributed to the entire target population by the government in July, but it is unable to carry out the August distributions due to the depletion of stocks and the lack of financial resources, which normally come from the budgetary aid suspended following the military coup. 

In August 2023, poor and displaced households in the Tillabéry and Tahoua Nord regions face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity. Poor and displaced households in the Diffa and Sud Maradi regions also face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes because, like those in Tillabéry and Tahoua, they have no food stocks and no income, their purchasing power is low due to very high prices, and they have no access to food and humanitarian aid due to the reduced intervention capacity of the WFP and of the government following the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and other development partners after the coup. Poor households located in flood-affected areas will also be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In the rest of the country, food availability is low, and poor households are unable to cover expenses other than food. The availability of pasture and watering points has improved in the pastoral zone, boosting the body conditions and market value of animals and livestock-to-cereal terms of trade. As a result, these households face Minimal (IPC Phase 1) acute food insecurity.

The assumptions in the June 2023 to January 2024 Food Security Outlook report remain unchanged, with the exception of the updated assumptions below:

• Tensions between Niger and ECOWAS will remain high until the end of 2023, oscillating between periods of fragmentary overtures or compromises and diplomatic confrontations marred by threats of military intervention and new sanctions. Regional and international negotiations with the CNSP will begin, focusing on the transition timetable and the safe release of the deposed president, and agreements will be reached that will enable the lifting of sanctions.
• Terrorist attacks are expected to continue and even intensify in the short term, particularly in the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions. This is partly due to the fact that the new authorities are likely to focus on national defense operations due to threats of military intervention by ECOWAS.
• The closure of borders with Nigeria and Benin, combined with the impact of heightened insecurity on borders and trade routes with Burkina, will result in below-average cross-border flows of food and pharmaceutical and therapeutic products in the short term until sanctions are lifted. However, continued trade with Burkina Faso, Mali, Algeria, Chad, and Libya, coupled with above-average local agricultural production, will mitigate the impact of sanctions on flows and supplies in the medium term. The most significant impact of sanctions and insecurity on trade and markets will be the rise in prices linked to the disruption of supply flows, increased transportation costs, and speculation by traders on market uncertainties. 
• Food aid will be low because the government will not be able to purchase sufficient volumes to implement its response plan, and imports from countries like Nigeria and Benin will not be possible. The WFP will continue to implement its humanitarian plan using available stocks, which are insufficient to cover the entire target for the period from September 2023 to January 2024.

From September 2023 to January 2024, poor and displaced households in the Tillabéry and Tahoua Nord regions will likely face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity. Poor and displaced households in the Diffa and Sud Maradi regions are also expected to fall into Crisis (IPC Phase 3) because, like those in Tillabéry and Tahoua, they will have no income or food stocks from harvests due to the insecurity disrupting their activities, market prices will be very high, and they will have no access to food and humanitarian aid due to the lack of food stocks and financial resources faced by the government and the WFP. Poor households located in flood-affected areas will also be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In the regions of Tillabéry and Tahoua, some poor and displaced households will face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, and the nutritional situation of children will be severely degraded due to prolonged Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity characterized by significant food deficits, while sanctions will prevent the supply of therapeutic inputs to centers caring for malnourished children, resulting in deaths among severely malnourished children.

In the rest of the country, food supplies will likely improve due to the availability of harvests that will provide access to food for the majority of households, including the poor, in all agricultural, agropastoral, and pastoral livelihood zones that are free from conflict and insecurity. Pastoral conditions will be restored to optimum levels, as grazing will be available and the watercourses sufficiently replenished. Food security conditions will be more favorable for improving household food consumption, livestock body conditions, livestock-to-cereal terms of trade, and milk production and sales. Farming and livestock-raising households will be able to earn average incomes that will enable them to meet their food and non-food needs. As a result, they will face Minimal (IPC Phase 1) acute food insecurity.

Possible events over the next eight months that could change the most likely scenario