Conflicts keep northern and central Mali in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse acute food insecurity outcomes

• From October to May 2026, conflicts will continue to significantly impact the food security situation in the central and northern parts of the country, with areas ranging from Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In Ménaka, the situation is expected to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) by April 2026. The expansion of insecurity by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) toward the west and south of the country—particularly through attempts to block fuel supplies—will disrupt the movement of people and goods, electricity production, and economic activities. At the time of publication of this report, the blockade was intensifying, reflected by rising fuel prices among informal distributors, long lines at gas stations, and shortages. FEWS NET is closely monitoring these developments and will provide an updated analysis in November.
• Although the number of people in need of food assistance decreases during the post-harvest period, these needs will remain atypically high countrywide, especially among populations in conflict-affected areas and internally displaced persons. The number of people in need is expected to rise seasonally from March through May 2026, coinciding with the pastoral lean season.
• Average national cereal availability is expected from October 2025 to May 2026, with cereal production projected to be average to above average. However, localized declines are observed in conflict-affected areas of the center and north, where an early depletion of stocks is anticipated by March, likely leading to an early onset of the lean season in those areas.
• A seasonal improvement in household access to food products is observed, supported by ongoing harvests and the seasonal decline in staple cereal prices. However, for poor households in insecure areas — particularly pastoral zones — access will remain constrained due to market disruptions, which are driving cereal prices well above the five-year average.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 17, 2025.

Insecurity and conflict that have shaken the northern and central regions of Mali since 2012 have spread to other parts of the country. The conflict, which began with separatist demands in the north by rebel groups, worsened with the intensification of armed group operations in the north around 2015. Clashes between the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), JNIM, and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) are ongoing. Although JNIM remains primarily active in the northern and central regions of Mali, its operations have gradually extended to the southern and western zones, notably the regions of Kayes, Nioro du Sahel, Koulikoro, Nara, Kita, Bougouni, Koutiala, Dioila, Ségou, San, and Sikasso, throughout 2025. Furthermore, since August 2023, continued fighting between the FAMa and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)—which replaced the former Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) in December 2024—has led to an escalation of violence in northern Mali. Mali’s sociopolitical context has been marked by two coups d’état in 2020 and 2021, which prompted economic sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) through July 2022. These measures had a significant negative impact on the economy, causing rising prices and reducing household purchasing power. Tensions with ECOWAS culminated in January 2025 with the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, signaling a break from regional integration in favor of the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

The prolonged conflict has had a major impact on agriculture and livestock, the primary sources of livelihood for the Malian population. Agricultural households depend heavily on subsistence farming (millet, sorghum, maize, and rice). In addition to their high vulnerability to weather shocks such as floods and droughts, the ongoing conflict disrupts agricultural production, socioeconomic activities, and both access to and functioning of markets. For pastoralist households, the inability to follow traditional transhumance routes compromises animal health and livestock productivity. Populations in the north depend heavily on trade flows from surplus-producing areas and from abroad to meet the majority of their basic food needs. While most of the population resides in the southern production zones and remains relatively less affected by the conflict, these areas are now facing localized disruptions to markets and trade routes as the conflict gradually expands southward.

These shocks have severely eroded the typical seasonal patterns in northern and central Mali. Persistent insecurity has disrupted agropastoral activities, resulting in reduced agricultural production due to the abandonment of fields. The month of October, when this report was produced, usually marks the harvest season, during which households in the southern, south-central, and western regions typically experience a significant improvement in access to food and income. However, reduced access to local production, disrupted trade flows, and above-average staple food prices will keep humanitarian needs elevated in northern and central Mali well beyond the post-harvest period.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Mali Food Security Outlook: October 2024 – May 2025
• Latest Mali Key Message Update: July-September 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Armed conflicts continue in central and northern Mali and have now expanded toward the west and south (Kayes, Nioro du Sahel, Kita, Nara, Ségou, Dioila, San, Bougouni, Koutiala, Sikasso). Attacks by armed groups against the armed forces, the laying of explosive devices, and the repression of civilian populations have led to forced population displacements. As of December 2024, around 402,167 internally displaced persons were being hosted in towns, camps, or with host families, placing heavy pressure on their already very limited resources. In 2025, JNIM intensified its attacks in the south and west of the country, carrying out assaults against civilians, imposing taxes on populations, and conducting more complex operations targeting security forces. In Kidal and Ménaka, the intensification of military offensives against the FLA and terrorist groups in the border area with Algeria and Niger has caused major disruptions to the movement of people and goods, as well as loss of life, reprisals, and property looting. The FLA’s repressive actions against civilians have caused new waves of displacement, particularly toward Kidal town. According to the social development service, about 1,663 displaced persons were registered recently between December 2024 and August 2025.

At the same time, the number of Burkinabè refugees continues to rise, currently reaching 165,000 people. Between April and August 2025, 51,000 new refugees were registered in the Koro district, nearly three-quarters of whom were from Burkina Faso, living in makeshift or temporary shelters.

Localized declines in cereal production in certain grain-producing areas are expected due to rainfall deficits that caused replanting, heavy flooding, limited access to fertilizers, and insecurity. These factors have caused below average household cereal stocks and agricultural income in the regions of Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Ménaka, and the northern parts of Ségou and Nara.

In the insecure areas of central and northern Mali, disruptions to transhumance are reducing access to animal products and veterinary services for livestock. Unusual herd concentrations, losses due to theft, and distress sales are worsening livestock conditions and reducing herd sizes.

Insecurity has also led to the disruption of markets in the central and northern regions, limiting the supply of goods (Figure 1). Attempts to block main supply routes by armed groups — the FLA in Kidal since July, and JNIM and ISGS in Ménaka, Gao, and Tombouctou since last year — are ongoing and involve robberies, burning of vehicles, illegal taxation, and even killings. In Kidal, these clashes have reduced trade with Algeria and Niger, the main sources of food supplies, causing shortages and price increases of more than 90 percent for some products. The rise in prices, deterioration in livestock-to-cereal terms of trade (well below the five-year average), and the decline in economic activity have all reduced household incomes and market access in these regions.

Since September 2025, JNIM has been attempting to impose a blockade on fuel imports by attacking key supply routes leading to major coastal ports, resulting in severe fuel shortages and rising fuel prices in informal markets. Tanker fires, killings of drivers, and cautious behavior by importers have significantly reduced the availability of petroleum products across the country, pushing companies such as Shell and Star to scale down their operations. Although official fuel prices at gas stations are regulated and controlled by the government, significant price increases have been observed among informal fuel resellers, including in urban areas. These developments are disrupting the movement of people, electricity production, and economic activities such as transportation, which is vital for the circulation of goods and people, as well as agricultural activities that rely on fuel, such as crop threshing. Fuel shortages are most severe in the southern and central regions, particularly in Koutiala, Ségou, Mopti, and San, where fuel convoys are likely to be escorted by the army. As of October, the impacts on harvests, markets, and food access remain limited due to existing stock availability, but the situation could worsen depending on the duration of the blockade and the organization of military escorts.

Humanitarian food assistance

A seasonal decline in humanitarian assistance coincides with the end of the agropastoral lean season, but support continues under the rapid response mechanism for displaced and refugee populations. Humanitarian assistance has provided in kind, cash, and vouchers/coupons within the framework of the National Response Plan for the June–September 2025 lean period across the country, particularly in insecure areas of the central and northern regions. However, limited financial mobilization—with only 7 percent allocated to food assistance—and humanitarian access challenges have reduced the overall coverage level of people in need. By the end of September 2025, according to the Food Security Cluster, monthly food assistance from January to August 2025 reached 821,952 people (including displaced persons, refugees, and host communities), representing 56 percent of the targeted 1,470,144 beneficiaries. In priority districts such as Kidal, Ménaka, Gao, Bourem, and Ansongo, food assistance reached 71 percent of targeted beneficiaries by the end of August 2025. Nevertheless, the seasonal reduction in assistance starting in October, which will be directed mainly to displaced populations, will reach less than 25 percent of the population in these areas.

Kidal and Ménaka in the north: In the Ménaka and Kidal regions, the severe deterioration of livelihoods caused by the conflict’s impact on economic activities continues to limit the poor households’ ability to meet their food and non-food needs. Seasonal improvement in food consumption remains very limited due to decreased availability of dairy products, high prices of staple foods, deteriorating livestock-to-cereal terms of trade, and sharp declines in harvests and wild products in the Ménaka region. As a result, poor households are resorting to atypical coping strategies such as excessive livestock sales, selling productive assets, reducing meal quantities, and relying on local solidarity to ease food access difficulties. The large food consumption gaps, particularly pronounced in the pastoral areas of Ménaka, reflect a difficult food security situation, especially for poor and displaced households who represent a high proportion (more than 20 percent) of the population. These consumption deficits will significantly affect the already critical nutritional situation in both regions. According to the September 2024 SMART survey, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) prevalence rates are above 15 percent, likely leading to increased mortality rates above the area’s average. Consequently, poor households unable to meet their food needs without resorting to atypical measures—such as sharp reductions in non-food and food expenditures, excessive livestock sales, selling assets, or displacement—are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. The situation is even more severe for displaced persons and a large proportion of very poor households, who are likely facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions.

Insecure areas of Gao, Mopti, Taoudenni, and Tombouctou: A seasonal improvement in food security is observed due to the availability of harvests and animal products—though below normal for a typical year—along with lower cereal prices, improved livestock-to-cereal terms of trade, in-kind payments, and charitable donations (zakat), marking the end of the agropastoral lean season. However, this improvement is less pronounced than usual because of low agricultural production linked to weather shocks, restricted access to fields, and limited access to wild foods due to insecurity. Furthermore, deteriorating livelihoods and persistently high prices continue to constrain poor households’ access to food. These households, forced to rely on migration, borrowing, or additional labor, are experiencing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity. Displaced households, mainly dependent on sharply reduced food assistance, and refugees—particularly in the Bandiagara region, where they account for less than 20 percent of the population—are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Despite seasonal improvements in food consumption, the nutritional situation remains concerning, reflecting the results of the September 2024 SMART survey, which recorded serious Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM >10 percent) levels: 19.3 percent in Gao, 9.4 percent in Mopti, 9.7 percent in Taoudenni, and 12 percent in Tombouctou. This deterioration stems from limited food access, dysfunctional health systems, reduced humanitarian funding, and access constraints for assistance operations.

Southern agricultural zones, particularly Ségou, San, Sikasso, Bougouni, Koutiala, Dioila, Kayes, and Koulikoro: Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected to continue due to improved food consumption linked to average household production and declining cereal prices, which ease food access difficulties. In addition, regular income sources from agricultural and non-agricultural labor and the sale of agricultural products allow households to access food without major difficulty, resulting in a nutritional situation similar to that of a typical year.

Urban centers: The decline in purchasing power in urban areas, amid a difficult economic context marked by disrupted economic activities, reduced employment opportunities, and food inflation of 6.5 percent in October 2025, continues to negatively affect poor households’ access to food. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity or worse will persist among poor households who are increasingly forced to rely on borrowing (in-kind or cash), selling assets, engaging in local solidarity, and reducing non-food expenses. Poor households affected by flooding, who struggle to meet their food needs and reconstitute their assets after losses, need assistance to avoid resorting to more severe coping strategies and an abnormal deterioration in food consumption.

• Volatile insecurity—now extending toward the west and south of the country—will continue between October 2025 and May 2026. The number of incidents is expected to remain at or above 2024 levels due to the new tactics of armed groups using kamikaze and surveillance drones, the agitation of the FLA in Kidal, and the spread of conflict zones by JNIM in the regions of Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Bougouni, San, Koutiala, Kita, Dioila, and Ségou, in response to intensified military offensives. Population displacements resulting from attacks and persecution of civilians by armed groups will continue, particularly in the central and northern regions.
• As of mid-October, available information suggests that the fuel blockade imposed by JNIM is likely to be short-lived and of limited severity. Economic disruptions—including in the agricultural sector—should be mitigated by military interventions, notably through fuel convoy escorts and relaxed restrictions on jerrycan fuel purchases. However, uncertainty remains given the rapidly evolving situation.
• Localized declines in agricultural production are expected in insecure areas of the central and northern regions due to uneven rainfall distribution, flooding, limited field access, and unusual population displacements that reduced cultivated areas. However, overall cereal production is expected to be average to above average countrywide, with a 9.6 percent increase over the five-year average, according to the Planning and Statistics Unit of the Rural Development Sector (CPS-SDR), ensuring adequate food availability.
• Although livestock production will remain average to above average this year due to favorable grazing and water conditions, a seasonal decline will begin around March 2026 in the central and northern regions. The reduction in herd sizes, caused by theft, abductions, and distress livestock sales, will lead to a more severe pastoral lean season than usual. In these areas, transhumance disruptions will result in localized feeding difficulties, further reducing animal production.
• Average to above-average off-season crop production—including market gardening and cereals—is expected between October 2025 and March 2026, supported by adequate water availability, which will allow for an expansion of cultivated areas.
• Although seasonal price declines have begun with the release of harvests and stocks in production zones, national cereal prices are expected to remain similar to or above the five-year average due to low carryover stocks, high production costs, and limited access to some production areas. However, in insecure regions—particularly Gao, Kidal, and Ménaka (see Figure 2)—reduced or disrupted supply chains linked to insecurity will keep food prices above to well above the five-year average.
• The Malian economy is expected to remain resilient, despite challenges from electricity shortages, insecurity, and weather shocks, given the contribution of the mining sector. Economic growth is projected at 5 percent in 2025, up from 4.7 percent in 2024, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Inflation, which stood at 4.8 percent in July 2025, is expected to reach 5.2 percent by May 2026. However, political and security risks, combined with tighter financing conditions, will continue to heighten fiscal and debt vulnerabilities, keeping the economy fragile.
• Remittances and transfers from migrant workers and laborers are expected to remain near average, driven by mass migration of working-age individuals, particularly from insecure regions, to neighboring countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Niger, and Algeria. Despite the high number of departures, difficult economic conditions in host countries and urban centers will limit income levels to average earnings.

Humanitarian food assistance

• Humanitarian assistance for displaced populations will continue under the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), even with the seasonal reduction in assistance expected between October 2025 and January 2026 due to improved household food access from harvests. The usual resumption of food and non-food assistance for the new year will begin in January and intensify from March onward, coinciding with the pastoral lean season, particularly in the pastoral zones of central and northern Mali. However, given the unprecedented funding crisis, FEWS NET expects that during the pre-lean season period (March to May 2026), both the number of beneficiaries and the volume of assistance provided will be lower than in 2025.

In the northern regions of the country, particularly in Ménaka and Kidal, poor households are facing severe difficulties in accessing food due to the persistence of insecurity, which has significantly reduced food and income sources. These challenges are exacerbated by very high food prices, limited access to wild products and animal production (milk, butter, cheese), and a significant decline in harvests in the southern part of the Ménaka region. To survive, these households are resorting to extreme coping strategies, including reducing the number and quality of meals, atypical livestock sales, begging, and reliance on humanitarian assistance. The large food consumption gaps compared with a typical year are causing a premature deterioration of the nutritional situation during this period. Consequently, ongoing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through March 2026. Poor displaced households dependent on humanitarian assistance will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse.

From April to May 2026, coinciding with the pastoral lean season, household food access will deteriorate sharply due to a more pronounced seasonal decline in animal production, staple food prices well above the five-year average, and a significant deterioration in livestock-to-cereal terms of trade. The continued deterioration in food consumption and limited access to basic social services will further worsen the already critical nutritional situation. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will persist through May 2026 in Kidal, although a portion of the population will fall into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions. In the Ménaka region, which has remained in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) with severely degraded food consumption and livelihoods, and a large, displaced population, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in April 2026.

In the insecure areas of Gao, Mopti, and Tombouctou, particularly in the districts of Koro, Bandiagara, Bankass, Douentza, Gourma Rharous, Ansongo, and Gao, the below-average ongoing harvests, together with the average availability of animal products and the seasonal decline in cereal prices, will improve household food access from October 2025 to January 2026, thereby reducing reliance on atypical coping strategies. However, the severe deterioration of livelihoods due to the disruption of socioeconomic activities will prevent poor households from adequately meeting their food and non-food needs. Consequently, these poor households—who are resorting to atypical increases in labor activities, migration, and reductions in non-food expenditures—will experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes from October 2025 to April 2026.

Starting in May 2026, the early onset of the agropastoral lean season, caused by the premature depletion of household stocks, will lead to a high dependence on markets, with declining incomes and prices above the five-year average. Poor households will increasingly resort to negative coping strategies, such as reducing the quantity and quality of food, borrowing in-kind or cash from the community and traders, atypical sales of livestock and assets, and cutting non-food expenditures. Consequently, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity among these poor households will deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during the pre-lean season in May 2026.

The situation of poor displaced households is particularly critical, with an October 2024 report indicating that a significant number in Gao, Tombouctou, and Mopti lack income and are dependent on humanitarian assistance. Limited employment opportunities and restricted market access are worsening their already precarious conditions, leading to deteriorating food consumption and Critical acute malnutrition (above 15 percent), as reported in the IPC Acute Malnutrition Analysis of September 2024. These households, already facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse, are in urgent need of assistance to prevent a further deterioration of their food security situation.

In the southern agricultural zones, food consumption will experience its typical seasonal improvement due to an overall average availability of household agricultural production even with localized declines, along with in-kind payments, animal products, and the seasonal decrease in food prices. Consequently, the ongoing Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes in the agricultural regions of Ségou, Sikasso, Koulikoro, and Kayes are expected to continue through May 2026. Usual income sources from the sale of agricultural products, livestock, labor, petty trade, and migration will enable poor households to access markets without major difficulties from October 2025 to May 2026.

In urban centers, despite an improvement in food conditions linked to the seasonal decline in staple cereal prices, poor households will remain in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity through May 2026. Due to rising food prices, limited income opportunities, and low purchasing power, these households will atypically resort to borrowing in-kind or cash, selling assets and equipment, increasing reliance on local solidarity, and significantly reducing non-food and in some cases, food expenditures. The same will apply to households affected by flooding across the country, who continue to struggle to both meet their food needs and restore lost or damaged assets.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

The persistence of fuel supply problems in the country

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The terrorist group JNIM continues to attack convoys transporting petroleum products, even those escorted by the army, with the aim of blocking the country’s main supply routes. This war of attrition strategy undermines the sustainability of the escorts and leads to fuel shortages within the country. Although transportation prices remain stable for the main companies, the fuel shortage is expected to cause an increase in transportation costs and in the prices of basic goods. It will also limit the ability to carry out certain agricultural activities such as threshing, shelling, and irrigation for off-season crops. If the fuel blockade continues, it is expected to lead to a more significant rise in fuel prices, which will affect the economy through higher transportation costs, followed by a sharper increase in the prices of essential goods, and even the suspension of certain economic activities. This will further limit poor households’ access to food, as their ability to meet food and non-food needs worsens. It will also reduce the mobility of people and goods, thereby increasing the number of people in need (IPC Phase 3 or worse). This situation could lead to a shift from Minimal (IPC Phase 1) to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in the areas north of Ségou, San, and Mopti, which are already weakened by insecurity and conflict, in the coming months. Other areas south of these regions will see an increase in the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) without a change in overall phase, as these are major agricultural production zones where activities may slow down due to fuel shortages but could continue manually.

The intensification of conflicts beyond what is currently observed will continue to erode households’ livelihoods.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If the conflict in Kidal and Ménaka intensifies beyond what is anticipated in the most likely scenario, households’ already limited access to income and food sources would be further undermined by restricted physical access to market supplies and economic activities due to clashes between the FAMa and armed groups in Kidal and Ménaka, as well as by the resulting population displacements. The resulting decline in income and the difficulties in humanitarian access would further reduce assistance to people in need, particularly displaced persons who depend on it. The severe deterioration of livelihoods through atypical livestock sales, thefts/looting of herds, and the cessation of vital economic activities such as petty trade and handicrafts would heighten households’ exposure to food insecurity. In this scenario, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in Kidal would worsen to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) starting in April. The number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in Ménaka—with a small proportion in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)—would also increase throughout the projection period.

The armed conflict along Mali’s borders with Algeria and Niger has had severe impacts on food security in the regions of Kidal and Ménaka. Populations have experienced a significant deterioration in their livelihoods, particularly affecting their usual sources of income and food. The trend in the number of security incidents in both regions over the year is illustrated in Figure 3.

The Kidal region remains a stronghold for FLA rebels and JNIM. The FLA, occasionally supported by JNIM, has engaged in sometimes deadly clashes with the army—such as in July 2025, during an ambush on a FAMa convoy on the Kidal–Anefis road. These clashes occur in this strategic area bordering Algeria in June 2025 in a context of heightened tension due to a major military redeployment supported by Russian partners from Africa Corps. The placement of explosive devices, attacks on FAMa positions, and ambushes by the FLA continue despite intensified bombings of FLA and JNIM bases. The use of kamikaze drones by the FLA and JNIM marks a significant shift in their tactics against the FAMa. Reprisals by the FLA against Imghad communities—seen as pro-government—caused forced displacements and deaths in August 2025. Despite a decrease in JNIM-related incidents in the region, their attempts to impose blockades through sporadic attacks on main routes and against military and supply convoys persist.

The Ménaka region is caught in a prolonged conflict characterized by clashes and retaliatory actions between the ISGS, local armed groups, and the FAMa. Armed blockades, attacks on civilians, and looting have severely disrupted trade and humanitarian access, forcing thousands of people to flee and abandon their livelihoods. In 2025, the FAMa, supported by Nigerien Defense and Security Forces (FDS), were able to limit ISGS advances in Ménaka. ISGS attacks against civilians, security forces, and pro-government armed groups continued around the Ansongo–Ménaka nature reserve and in the Andéramboukane district as part of efforts to consolidate its presence in the region. Despite a decrease in the intensity of clashes with the FAMa and their AES allies, ISGS has resorted to large-scale killings of civilians as collective punishment to deter communities from cooperating with the Malian state—similar to the FLA’s actions in Kidal. Frequent army airstrikes targeting suspicious vehicles have reduced physical access to the area and disrupted transhumance routes, economic activities, and humanitarian access. ISGS has maintained a de facto blockade of Ménaka, limiting trade flows and humanitarian assistance to the area, thereby worsening an already alarming humanitarian situation.

These incidents have disrupted the movement of people and goods, hindered economic activity, and caused massive population displacements—including major economic actors—in Kidal and Ménaka. Both regions have little to no agricultural production and are therefore highly dependent on markets for food security. In the pastoral zones of Ménaka and Kidal, disruptions to cross-border trade with Algeria and Niger have led to a sharp decline in the supply of food and manufactured goods, with recurring shortages in markets, particularly of wheat flour and semolina. According to key informants, a reduction of more than half of the volume of imported goods has been observed in Ménaka, and an even greater decline in Kidal. Limited imports from Gao via irregular military convoys have not been sufficient to offset the shortfall. This has restricted commercial activity and kept prices significantly higher than last year—sometimes double the five-year average—greatly reducing poor households’ access to food.

The sharp rise in prices compared to the five-year average has significantly reduced poor households’ access to food in an environment where income-generating opportunities such as transportation, brokerage, manual labor, and petty trade have been drastically reduced. Livestock herd sizes have fallen by 20-30 percent, according to key data collected, due to thefts, looting, and excessive sales. This has reduced the availability of animal products (milk, butter, and cheese), which are key components of household diets in both regions.

The departure of major economic actors, which began in 2023 and intensified following the resumption of hostilities in May/June 2025, along with market dysfunction, has sharply reduced local employment opportunities. Limitations to physical access to livestock markets—households’ main source of income—have forced them to sell animals at prices well below the five-year average. The resulting decline in pastoral income for poor households, combined with very high staple food prices, has led to atypical sales, causing further asset depletion among already depleted households.

Restricted physical access to certain areas has reduced humanitarian assistance to households in need outside the towns of Kidal, Ménaka, and Andéramboukane. The humanitarian assistance provided so far has proven insufficient given the scale of needs and the persistence of significant food deficits. Reduced funding for programs and access challenges will continue to lower the level of assistance available to people in need.

The security situation has contributed to the degradation of livelihoods, coping strategies, and food consumption more severely in Ménaka than in Kidal due to Ménaka’s already precarious situation. For the past two years, Ménaka has had a much higher proportion of displaced people and inaccessible areas, especially along the border with Niger, where markets are almost nonfunctional. However, some poor households in Kidal have resorted to extreme coping strategies—reducing the number and quality of meals, engaging in atypical livestock sales, begging, and relying on humanitarian assistance—due to the significant deterioration of their usual sources of income and food.