Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes expected in northern Mali in the post-harvest period

• The persistence of security incidents will continue to disrupt the livelihoods of households, particularly in the central and northern parts of the country. Ménaka remains the highest-priority area, where Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to deteriorate into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) starting in April, with a continued proportion of households in inaccessible areas facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).
• Although the number of people in need of food aid will decrease during the post-harvest period, the need for humanitarian food assistance will remain high in the country, particularly for populations in conflict zones, IDPs, and those in inaccessible areas of Ménaka. Needs will begin to increase seasonally at the start of 2025, continuing until the end of the projection period, when between 500,000 and 749,999 people will require humanitarian food assistance in April- May 2025.
• Overall, average to below-average cereal production will result in a moderate availability of cereals in the country starting in October. However, the overall decline in production in the farming areas due to floods and field abandonment linked to insecurity will lead to early depletion of household stocks and an unusual decline in cereal availability in markets after the post-harvest period.
• Although harvests are low in some areas, households' access to food and income will seasonally improve in October due to ongoing harvests and the decrease in cereal prices. In conflict-affected areas in the center and north, access to food remains below normal due to significantly higher prices and the deterioration of the livestock-to-cereals terms of trade. 

The analysis presented here is based on information available as of October 15, 2024.

Humanitarian food assistance remains necessary in the northern part of the country during the post-harvest period

In addition to insecurity, significant damage from floods has weakened the livelihoods of households in the affected areas. As of October 20, 2024, 703 cases of flooding have been recorded, affecting more than 351,221 people, with 86 fatalities and 154 injuries. Significant material damage has been reported, particularly to housing, socioeconomic infrastructure, and livestock. Crop area losses are estimated at around 544,172 hectares (FAO), or 8.6 percent of the total area, which will reduce food availability and lead to price increases in the markets. All regions are affected, particularly those of Ségou, Bamako, Gao, Mopti, Koulikoro, and Bandiagara. 

Households in areas affected by insecurity remain unusually dependent on the markets. The rise in prices of basic goods continues, with prices exceeding the average by more than 40 percent, and even more than 100 percent in Ménaka. These high price levels and declining livestock/cereal terms of trade are reducing poor households' access to food in a context of declining income.

Despite the seasonal improvement during the post-harvest period from October to January, the population in need of food assistance will remain high beyond the post-harvest period. In agropastoral areas, household stocks are expected to be depleted earlier than usual due to low cereal production and ongoing insecurity. Off-season crops, such as vegetable production, will partially compensate for the food shortage, but households will increasingly have to rely on the market amid high prices, especially between February and May. In Ménaka, households facing difficulties accessing food will increasingly resort to strategies such as reducing the number and size of meals, selling productive assets, relying on social solidarity, and begging. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) starting in April 2024.

Humanitarian assistance provided by the government and its humanitarian partners focuses primarily on support for displaced persons through the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) and delayed lean season assistance. However, humanitarian access constraints and the low mobilization of funding threaten to reduce the effectiveness of aid distribution in critical areas. In order to meet emergency needs and strengthen the resilience of households affected by the security and food crisis in Mali, a sustained humanitarian response remains imperative. Urgent action is essential to scale up humanitarian funding, improve household access to food, and mitigate the profound impact of conflict and climate variability on millions of people across the country.

Mali has been plagued by insecurity and conflict in the northern and central regions of the country since 2012. The conflict, stemming from the desire for autonomy in the north by rebel groups, was exacerbated by the increase in operations by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the northern part of the country around 2015. The fighting between the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) continues. In addition, persistent fighting between the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) group and FAMa since August 2023 has led to an escalation of violence in northern Mali. The sociopolitical context of Mali, marked by a coup in 2020, led to the imposition of economic and financial sanctions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) until July 2022, which slowed the economy and contributed to the rise in food and fuel prices. The ability of households to purchase food has decreased across the country. In January 2024, Mali's decision to withdraw from ECOWAS marked a significant break with regional cooperation and economic integration efforts, raising lingering questions about the impact of this decision on the country's economy.

The prolonged conflict has had an immense impact on livelihoods in Mali. Agriculture and pastoralism are the main means of livelihood for the majority of the population. The agricultural sector relies heavily on subsistence agriculture, with staple crops such as millet, sorghum, maize, and rice. Livestock is also a crucial livelihood in the northern and central regions of the country. However, these livelihoods are highly vulnerable to shocks, including climate variations and the ongoing conflict, which disrupt agricultural and socioeconomic activities, livestock migration routes, and access to markets. For pastoral households, the inability to follow typical transhumance routes disrupts livestock health (vaccination) and productivity. Although the majority of the population is concentrated in the southern production areas of the country, which are relatively spared from the conflict, populations in the north are heavily dependent on trade flows from these surplus areas and abroad for the majority of their basic food needs. 

These shocks have severely eroded the typical seasonal variations in northern Mali. Persistent insecurity has disrupted agropastoral activities, leading to a reduction in crop production as a result of field abandonment. The month of October, the current period of this report, typically marks the harvest season, during which a significant improvement in access to food and income is observed in the southern, central-southern, and western regions of the country. However, the lack of access to local production, disruption of trade flows, and above-average prices of basic foodstuffs will keep humanitarian needs high in northern Mali well beyond the post-harvest period. 

Learn more 

The following links provide additional information: 

• Latest Food Security Outlook 
• Overview of FEWS NET scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of IPC and IPC-compatible analysis

FEWS NET's approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section. 

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Insecurity: 

Security incidents continue in the country, with an expansion to the west and south in the regions of Nioro, Yélimané, Nara, and Sikasso, where attacks attributed to JNIM targeted security forces' positions in Yélimané and Nioro in August 2024. Civilians were also targeted through thefts, killings, and livestock abductions. EIGS continues to place explosives on roadways and abductions, primarily in the regions of Gao and Ménaka. At the end of July 2024, the Battle of Tinzawatène involved not only the CSP-SDA, but also groups from JNIM and EIGS, who took advantage of the attack to escalate tensions across the country. According to ACLED, the number of incidents increased by 10 percent and fatalities by 22 percent from August 2023 to August 2024 compared to the same period the previous year. Displacements of populations fleeing persecution by armed groups continue in the northern and central regions of the country, extending into the regions of Ségou and San. According to the latest estimates at the end of May 2024, 330,713 persons have been displaced. However, displacements have continued, particularly in the Liptako Gourma, Kidal, and Ségou regions. According to OCHA, an estimated 122,992 refugees from Burkina Faso arrived by the end of September 2024. 

Flooding: 

Heavy rainfall from July to October 2024 caused significant flooding across nearly all regions of the country, prompting the government to declare a national state of disaster on August 23, 2024. According to the disaster management committee, 2024, 703 cases of flooding were recorded between the beginning of the rainy season and October 20, affecting 351,221 displaced persons, with 86 fatalities and 154 injuries. Significant material damage has also been reported, particularly to homes, socioeconomic infrastructure, livestock, and agricultural land. Additionally, the overflow of ponds and the historic high floods on the rivers (Niger, Bani, Sénégal) continue to submerge cultivated areas, primarily the flood-recession rice fields in the river valleys from Ségou to Gao, passing through Mopti and Tombouctou, as well as at the border with Senegal. According to the FAO's Sahel and Central Africa Flood Monitoring System, approximately 544,172 hectares of crops—more than double the area in 2023 (Figure 3), or 8.6 percent of the total cultivated land—were flooded in Mali as of September 30, 2024. Emergency assistance has been provided by the government and its partners in the form of food, non-food items, cash, and shelter. The Ségou region is the most affected, with 47 percent of those impacted, particularly in the Bla district.

Current economic conditions: 

The electricity crisis, resulting from the energy production deficit since 2022 and ongoing to this day, continues to reduce the level of economic activity in the country, leading to a significant decline in economic operations, the closure of certain industrial units, and the laying off of staff. The rise in unemployment, stemming from an economy struggling to recover from the impacts of the security crisis, ECOWAS sanctions, and reduced development aid, significantly affects the purchasing power of households. Mali's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth declined from 4.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 4.2 percent in the first quarter of 2024 and further decreased to 3.8 percent in the second quarter of 2024. Overall inflation in September 2024 stands at 5.5 percent, while food inflation is at 6.6 percent, down from 8.5 percent in August 2024. This reduction, however, still limits households' ability to access food, particularly for the poorest.

Agricultural production: 

According to the Planning and Statistics Unit of the Rural Development Sector (CPS/SDR), the most likely estimate for cereal production, based on August conditions, is 10,520,525 metric tons. This represents a 5 percent increase compared to last year and a 6 percent increase compared to the average of the last five years. This estimate, based on August conditions, does not take into account the significant loss of cultivated areas due to the flooding that continued in September and October, nor the impact of these floods on crop yields in the affected areas. According to FEWS NET, the expected production would be closer to the lower estimate of 9,965,088 metric tons, due to challenges in planting crops at the beginning of the season, difficult access to agricultural inputs, losses of cultivated areas from flooding (particularly for rice), and field abandonment due to insecurity, including in key production basins (such as the inter-river areas of Ségou and San and the Seno). Additionally, difficulties in maintaining fields due to excessive rainfall have also contributed to the decline in expected production.

• Average to below-average yields for flood-recession crops are underway in the ponds and lakes of the regions of Tombouctou and Mopti, which is improving access to food and income for households in these areas. Elsewhere, the first green harvests of legumes (groundnuts, cowpeas) and maize are becoming increasingly available, providing both income and food for farming households. However, due to the flooding that caused significant losses in cultivated areas in certain localities, particularly in the regions of Ségou, Mopti, and Koulikoro, the availability of food in the affected areas has been reduced compared to the average.
• In the areas of insecurity in the center and north of the country, as well as in the northern parts of the regions of Ségou, San, and Koulikoro, population displacement, difficulties in accessing fields, and the abandonment of fields due to attacks and persecution by armed groups have severely disrupted agropastoral activities. This has led to a reduction in both income and food production from these activities compared to the average. 

Animal production: 

Milk production has seasonally improved across the country due to the restoration of favorable livestock conditions. This has resulted in average access for households to animal products (milk, butter, cheese). However, due to thefts, abductions, and excessive sales, herd sizes in insecurity-affected areas have decreased by 20 to more than 30 percent, according to the SAP, and this has reduced the availability of these products. This negatively impacts both the food security and the pastoral income of herding households. Herds are concentrated in the usual rainy season grazing areas, except in the insecurity-affected zones of Tombouctou, Gao, and Ménaka, where major disruptions in access to certain pastures are being observed. This has led to unusual concentrations of livestock in the reception areas.

Income outside of self-produced agriculture: 

Labor opportunities are declining due to the difficult economic situation in the country and are limited to construction, agricultural labor, straw sales, transportation, market brokering, and small-scale trades. As for agricultural work, which provides income and food opportunities for poor households in agricultural areas, the loss of cultivated land due to flooding and the abandonment of fields have reduced agricultural employment opportunities.

• In the insecurity-affected areas of Mopti, Tombouctou, Ménaka, Kidal, Gao, Ségou, San, and Nara, a moderate to significant decline in employment opportunities has been observed due to the persistence of security incidents, population displacement, and the reduction or cessation of economic activities. This has led to below-average income from this source.

Cereal and livestock markets:

The market is the main source of food for poor urban households and pastoral households. Following the intensification of military offensives, intermittent blockades imposed since August 2023 by armed groups continue to cause disruptions, reducing the regular supply of markets in insecurity-affected areas. The seasonal increase in the supply of foodstuffs on the markets is increasingly being observed due to the ongoing harvests. Sales by the Office of Agricultural Products of Mali (OPAM) from May to June, totaling over 1,500 metric tons of rice, took place on markets in the northern regions of the country and continue with the aim of improving food availability on the markets and alleviating households' access difficulties for this staple. 

• In the regions of Kidal and Ménaka, which rely on Algeria for over 50 to 80 percent of their food, non-food items, and livestock, the intensification of military offensives in the Kidal region near the Algerian border continues to severely disrupt trade flows to the regions of Kidal, Gao, and Ménaka. Supply shortages are sometimes reported in markets outside the towns of Ménaka and Andéramboukane.
• The significant deterioration of roads, more pronounced this year due to the heavy, torrential rainfall, has contributed to reducing trade flows on many routes and has driven up transportation costs. This, in turn, supports high prices during this early harvest period.
• Follow this link for more information on supply and market outlook. 

Household purchasing power: 

The price of basic foodstuffs has risen by more than 35 percent above the average in all regions, except for Koulikoro (30 percent) and Kayes (29 percent). At the same time, incomes have declined overall due to the difficult economic situation that has reduced the level of economic activities. As a result, households’ face limited access to markets, particularly in insecurity-affected areas, where prices are more than 40 percent above the five-year average and even over 100 percent higher in Ménaka. The terms of trade between goats and cereals remain below the five-year average in markets in pastoral areas, primarily due to the high prices of cereals. This reduces herding households' access to food from markets. The dysfunction of markets due to difficulties in physical access resulting from insecurity and weather constraints during the rainy season has driven up the prices of basic commodities, particularly in the central and northern regions of the country. 

• A retention of cereals at the producer level is being observed in production areas due to the uncertain outlook for the ongoing agricultural season, linked to flood damage and field abandonment, which will result in decreased production, particularly for rice. This situation, along with the continuation of institutional purchases during the lean season, has contributed to keeping prices above the average across all markets.
• Click here for more details on prices in key markets. 

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

The monthly food assistance under the National Response Plan (PNR) from January to June 2024 reached 754,291 people, or 48.4 percent of the targeted beneficiaries (1,555,294), primarily in the form of vouchers across all regions, particularly in those of Tombouctou, Gao, Ménaka, and Mopti, where the implementation rate exceeds 30 percent of the people in need. At the same time, 97,686 people received livelihood support through the distribution of livestock feed, small equipment, and agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers) from the government and its partners. However, the persistence of constraints on humanitarian access and the mobilization of funds is leading humanitarian agencies to reduce the volume and even the number of beneficiaries receiving assistance, which is a primary source of income and food for recipient households, particularly in the conflict zones of the central and northern regions of the country. Additionally, food assistance typically declines with the end of the lean season distributions. By the end of September 2024, the national response plan had received only 38 percent of the required funding for the food security component (OCHA). Additionally, emergency assistance in food and non-food items from the government and its partners is ongoing for the victims of floods, estimated at over 350,000 people as of October 20, 2024. 

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Areas of insecurity in the central and northern regions of the country: 

In the Ménaka region, despite the seasonal improvement in food consumption due to the availability of agricultural production and animal products, which remain low compared to the average, households continue to resort to crisis and emergency coping strategies such as selling the last female animals, productive assets, and begging to access food. According to the July 2024 Data in Emergencies Monitoring (DIEM), 38.4 percent of households have resorted to these coping strategies. According to the February 2024 National Survey on Food and Nutrition Security (ENSAN), begging was a significant coping strategy for 23.8 percent of households in the region during the post-harvest period; this figure is likely to be similar or even higher now, given ongoing difficulties and reduced humanitarian assistance. The decline in income for more than 60.7 percent of households, according to the July 2024 DIEM, continues due to a lack of income opportunities. In addition, prices of basic foodstuffs, particularly cereals, have increased by over 104 percent compared to the average, while the terms of trade between livestock and cereals have significant deteriorated by 51 percent. These factors continue to severely limit access to food for poor households, especially in areas with limited access and for displaced households, which account for over 50 percent of the population. As a result, households unable to meet their food needs without resorting to atypical crisis and emergency coping strategies face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food security outcomes. The nutritional situation remains very critical, according to WHO standards (GAM >15 percent), with a global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence of 22.2 percent, including 6.8 percent severe acute malnutrition (SAM; Figure 4). This is likely to result in an increase in mortality rates above the average for the region.

In the insecurity-affected areas of Gao, Mopti, Kidal, and Tombouctou, household food consumption is expected to improve due to the availability of self-harvested crops, although low compared to the average, and animal products, the seasonal decline in the prices of basic cereals, the improvement in the terms of trade between livestock and cereals, products from in-kind compensation during harvest work, and donations/zakat. According to the September 2024 REACH Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) survey, households in the regions of Tombouctou (26 percent) and Gao (26 percent) were the most affected by severe food access issues. Despite the improvement in household access to food, the severe degradation of livelihoods and the high prices of foodstuffs will continue to limit access to food for poor households. As a result, these households, unable to adequately meet their food and non-food needs without resorting to an atypical intensification of labor activities, migration, or borrowing, face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food insecurity. Moreover, the nutritional situation remains critical, even alarming, for displaced households, with a GAM prevalence of over 15 percent. According to the September 2024 SMART survey, the GAM prevalence is 19.3 percent, with a SAM rate of 3.6 percent, in the Gao region; 16.1 percent, with 4.7 percent SAM, in the Kidal region; and 9.4 percent, with 1.5 percent SAM in the Mopti region (Preliminary SMART report of September 2024). In these insecurity-affected areas of the central and northern regions of the country, despite the seasonal improvement in food consumption, the persistence of difficulties in accessing food, poor hygiene, and the dysfunction of socio-health structures continue to keep the level of global acute malnutrition above the average for the period, which remains structurally high (>10 percent) according to WHO standards.

Displaced households in the Gao region, estimated at 41,991 people (11,697 households) in May 2024, are in a concerning situation due to limited humanitarian assistance, the high prices of basic foodstuffs, and the difficulties in socioeconomic integration in host cities, which are experiencing a decline in job opportunities. Food aid is the main source of food supply in the community for 73 percent of households, followed by loans/credit (67 percent), donations from host families (49 percent), and purchases (28 percent), according to the sectoral assessment report of the IDP sites in the Gao district in July 2024. The significant deterioration in household food consumption, with 83 percent having poor or limited food consumption, has led 68 percent of households to resort to severe coping strategies, according to the same report. The prevalence of global acute malnutrition at the site is 30.1 percent, with 11 percent in severe form, according to the rapid SMART survey of June 2024. This indicates a very concerning situation that requires appropriate intervention to prevent an increase in mortality at these IDP sites.

Northern pastoral areas: 

Major disruptions in the normal course of pastoral activities and trade (commerce), which are the main sources of supply for pastoral households, are causing difficulties in accessing food. As a result of poor livestock sales, thefts and looting by armed groups, and the sharp deterioration in the terms of trade between livestock and cereals due to increased food prices, pastoral incomes have decreased, leading households to increase their reliance on coping strategies such as borrowing, unusual livestock sales, moving herds away from households, and thefts/losses of livestock, as well as migration. This puts them in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food insecurity or worse.

Urban centers:

The difficult economic situation, marked by a 6.6 percent inflation in food costs in September 2024 and the reduction in employment opportunities, continues to constrain purchasing power in urban areas, negatively affecting poor households' access to food. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes or worse will persist for poor households, driving them to rely on coping strategies such as borrowing more than usual, both in kind and cash, selling assets to local solidarity networks, and significantly reducing non-food expenditures. Poor households affected by the floods, struggling to meet their food needs and cope with the costs of rebuilding damaged or lost assets, find themselves in need of assistance to prevent an unusual deterioration in their food consumption.

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions 

• Insecurity will persist in the northern and central regions and may even intensify in the regions of Tombouctou, Kidal, and Ménaka, potentially spreading to the western part of the country and the regions of Ségou and San during the projection period. Population movements in search of safer areas will continue, along with restrictions on the movement of people and goods and on humanitarian assistance, particularly in the regions of Ménaka and Kidal due to clashes between the military and armed groups.
• A decrease in agricultural production compared to the average is likely across the country, including in the production basins. 
• Off-season vegetable and medium-to-above-average cereal production are expected to continue until March, thanks to good water availability in ponds, lakes, and dams. In the irrigated areas, an average rice production is expected starting from May/June, while production prospects appear to be average to good for the flood-recession crops in the regions of Tombouctou, Kayes, and Mopti, given the good water reservoir levels.
• The trend of cereal prices being higher than the five-year average will persist due to the expected decrease in cereal production, low carryover stock levels, and above-average demand.
• Average livestock production is expected in the country, thanks to average to above-average availability of pasture, particularly in pastoral areas, as well as the good water reservoir levels. 
• However, in areas of insecurity, due to disruptions in livestock movements that limit access to certain grazing areas, feeding difficulties are likely in areas with unusual concentrations of livestock. This, in addition to a reduction in herd sizes, will lower production levels below the average.
• The trend of livestock prices being generally higher than average will continue due to favorable breeding conditions, satisfactory animal body conditions, and reduced supply in the markets. However, in certain insecure areas, prices will drop below the average from October to May 2025 due to difficulties in accessing markets, while supply will increase due to decreased demand. 

Subnational assumptions for central and northern areas impacted by the conflict

• Security incidents will continue at a level similar to that of 2023 due to the intensification of military offensives and joint operations between the three states of the Sahel States Alliance (AES), which have reduced the operational capabilities of armed groups. Attacks by the Islamic State in the Sahel against civilians in Gao and Ménaka are expected to remain at their current level until May 2025 for the same reasons. As for JNIM, its intention to reconquer and expand its area of influence to the west and south of the country will lead to violence and persecution of the civilian population in the regions of Tombouctou, Mopti, San, Koulikoro, and Kayes (Diéma, Yélimané).
• A decrease in agricultural production will be observed at the producer level due to the reduction in cultivated areas following the abandonment of fields due to insecurity and medium-to-significant losses of land caused by flooding. 
• Market supply difficulties for basic goods will persist, especially in the far north (Kidal, Ménaka), due to the recurrence of attacks and intermittent blockages by armed groups. The fluidity of trade flows is favorable for areas in the valley from October to January due to the high river flooding. Occasional organized military escorts will facilitate the supply of the affected markets, but supply will remain significantly below the average.

• Prices of basic foodstuffs will continue to be higher than the five-year average due to market supply difficulties linked to insecurity and the decline in production (Figure 5).
• The continuation of cattle thefts and abductions and significant disruptions in livestock movements will lead to a decline in animal production.

Subnational assumptions for urban centers 

• The effects of a challenging national economic situation, exacerbated by electricity shortages and a 5.5 percent increase in the household consumer price index compared to 2023, according to INSTAT, will lead to a reduction in economic activities and a continued decline in household purchasing power.
• The difficult economic situation, worsened by the energy crisis, will reduce job opportunities as industrial units close and small businesses are disrupted across the country, particularly in urban centers.

Humanitarian food assistance 

National assumption

• The usual decrease in humanitarian assistance from the government and its partners will be observed from October to January, due to the seasonal improvement in household access given the availability of new harvests and the seasonal drop in basic cereal prices. During this period, food assistance will continue for displaced persons through the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) and for emergency needs, primarily in areas of insecurity and for victims of flooding. Planning for humanitarian assistance in 2025 is not yet available; however, based on historical trends, food and non-food assistance will likely resume in March, in line with the pastoral lean season and pre-lean season agricultural period.

Subnational assumption for areas hosting IDPs

• Due to financial difficulties during this usual period of seasonal reduction in assistance, humanitarian agencies will have limited capacity to provide assistance, while the continued displacement of populations will increase the number of people needing assistance. This will prevent adequate support for displaced households under the RRM, particularly in areas where humanitarian access remains a challenge.

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.

Northern pastoral areas: 

Ménaka Region: Ongoing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will continue until March 2024, despite the seasonal improvement in household access to food due to the availability of agricultural production (although very low compared to the average), wild produce, and animal products and the seasonal decrease in food prices. Poor households continue to face significant difficulties in meeting their food needs, particularly in areas with limited access, due to the severe degradation of livelihoods and the persistence of security disruptions with the ongoing displacement of people.

From March to May, the seasonal increase in the prices of basic goods, which will be higher than average due to difficulties in accessing the area in an environment of significant income reduction, will exacerbate households' difficulties in accessing food. Households facing difficulties in accessing food will intensify their use of coping strategies, such as reducing the number and size of meals, selling productive assets, relying on social solidarity, and resorting to begging. The significant deterioration in food consumption, along with difficulties in humanitarian access and access to basic social services during this period, will increase the prevalence of acute global malnutrition, which is already very high in the area (GAM >15 percent). As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity will deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes starting in April 2024. A small proportion of households in inaccessible areas, unable to move to access food, will face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). 

Areas of insecurity in the central and northern regions of the country: 

Regions of Mopti, Tombouctou, and Gao (districts of Koro, Bandiagara, Bankass, Douentza, Rharous, Ansongo, Gao): The average availability of own-harvests, in-kind payments from agricultural activities, access to animal products, and the seasonal decrease in food prices will mitigate food access difficulties, contributing to the seasonal improvement in food consumption, which will continue until April. However, poor households in these areas will experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food insecurity from October 2024 to April 2025, facing severely reduced livelihoods and unable to adequately meet their non-food needs without resorting to an atypical intensification of labor activities, migration, and reductions in non-food expenditures.

Due to reduced agricultural production and above-average food prices, food stocks are expected to be depleted early, starting from April/May, reducing poor households' access to food. Food consumption will then experience its seasonal deterioration, but to a more pronounced degree than in a normal year. Households will then resort to reducing the volume and quality of food, atypically borrowing in kind or in cash from relatives, friends, and traders, selling livestock, goods, or equipment, and cutting non-food expenditures. As a result, poor households in the Liptako Gourma region are expected to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food insecurity, particularly in the districts of Bankass, Koro, Douentza, and Gourma Rharous, which will experience an early lean season in a challenging economic context and deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) starting in May 2024.

Urban centers:

The decline in purchasing power in urban areas due to the challenging economic situation will continue to negatively affect poor households' access to food. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food insecurity or worse will persist for poor households forced to resort to more in-kind and cash borrowing, selling assets, local solidarity, and significantly reducing non-food expenditures through the projection period. Poor households affected by the floods are struggling to meet their food needs and cope with the costs of rebuilding damaged or lost assets. These households find themselves in need of assistance to prevent an unusual deterioration in their food consumption.

Agricultural areas in the south:

Households in these areas are expected to have average access to food and, consequently, an improvement in their food consumption due to the availability of own production, even if low in some areas, in-kind and cash payments earned from harvest work, animal products (milk, butter, cheese), and the seasonal decrease in food prices. The usual income from the sale of agricultural products, livestock, regular labor activities, and small-scale trade will enable the poor to access the markets without major difficulties. As a result, the ongoing Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes will likely continue until May 2025.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

The lack of an agreement with ECOWAS countries would complicate the country's economic situation. 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Despite the country's continued membership in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the lack of an agreement and non-compliance with UEMOA rules by ECOWAS countries will result in higher trade flow costs across various corridors. This will contribute to further increases in the prices of already high imported foodstuffs. The increase in the prices of staple foods above the average will exacerbate the difficulties poor households face in accessing food in an unfavorable economic context marked by an overall decline in income. This will primarily affect poor households, especially those in urban areas and conflict zones. The use of atypical strategies such as borrowing and reducing non-food and even food expenditures will increase the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

The return to constitutional order will help improve the country's economic situation.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The organization of elections, which will mark the return to constitutional order, will revive economic cooperation between Mali and its partners. The improvement in public finances resulting from this will strengthen the economic fabric through the revival of economic activities, thereby increasing household incomes and the government's capacity to assist the population. As a result, declining household access to food will reduce the number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes or worse.

Areas of insecurity in the center and north

An exacerbation of insecurity linked to the intensification of military operations against armed groups.

Probable impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The likely intensification of clashes due to territorial reconquest efforts between the army and armed groups, as well as between the armed groups themselves in the central and northern regions of the country, will further erode livelihoods and continue to hinder households' access to basic social services and humanitarian assistance, particularly in areas with limited access. Thus, despite the seasonal improvement from October to January 2025, food insecurity at the Crisis (IPC Phase 3) level will persist, with a higher proportion of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the Ménaka region.

The improvement of food aid coverage will be beneficial for households in need outside of the harvest period.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The improvement of humanitarian coverage, limited by funding challenges and the difficulty of accessing conflict zones, will significantly help reduce food consumption gaps and the use of negative coping strategies for households in need. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse food insecurity could drop to a lower level, from Emergency (IPC Phase 4) to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) or from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!).

The areas of livelihood ML01 (Nomadism and trans-Saharan trade), ML02 (Northern livestock), and ML04 (Livestock, millet, and remittances), Ménaka Region (Figure 6)

Reason for choosing this area: Persistent insecurity in the northern regions continues to negatively impact households' abilities to access their usual sources of food and income. The situation is more pronounced in the Ménaka region due to the increase in security incidents, which have forced more than 50 percent of the population to move to safer areas. Huge disruptions to trade flows are causing supply disruptions and atypical rises in food prices in an environment of significant declines in incomes. Moreover, the severe degradation of livelihoods and the difficulties in humanitarian access lead to the use of coping strategies such as forced displacement, excessive sale of livestock resulting in asset depletion, sale of household and productive goods, begging, dependency on aid, and a significant reduction in the volume and frequency of meals by households in the region, particularly in inaccessible areas. FEWS NET has selected this area of concern for this report to illustrate the medium- and long-term impacts of the 2020-2024 insecurity/conflict in the northern part of the country.

The escalation of clashes between FAMas and armed groups for control of the Tinzawatène border area, along with other attacks in the Ménaka region involving landmines and intermittent blockades, are negatively impacting economic activities, supplies, and the population through displacement. Helped by its allies in the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group (GATIA) in the Tinzawatene area, the army aims to reconquer the armed groups of the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA), the JNIM, and the Islamic State of the Sahel (IS-Sahel), generating hotbeds of tension in the area. 

Caught between clashes, civilians are forced to flee to the towns of Ménaka and Andéramboukane, where they are more likely to access humanitarian assistance, which is less disrupted than in other areas of the region. Others seek refuge across the border in Algeria and Niger. According to the population displacement tracking report, the number of displaced individuals by the end of September 2024 is estimated at 59,479 people, representing just over 60 percent of the region's population.

Food consumption is expected to improve seasonally starting in October, but this improvement will be very limited. This is due to the seasonal drop in food prices linked to the cereal harvests, the availability of animal products (milk, butter, cheese, meat), and, although significantly below the average, the availability of locally produced harvests and wild produce. Indeed, the significant population displacement and difficulties in accessing fields have greatly reduced the arable land available around the areas of concentration in the municipalities of Ménaka and Andéramboukane.

Market supply remains a challenge due to the ongoing conflicts, which are significantly disrupting trade flows with the usual supply sources from Algeria, Niger, and the Gao region. The significant reduction in supply and the payment of illegal fees to armed groups have contributed to driving up food prices, which are now well above the five-year average. The price of the main staple food has nearly doubled (+104 percent), reducing the terms of trade between livestock and cereals by 51 percent. This significantly limits households' access to food in an environment marked by a sharp decline in income opportunities.

Humanitarian assistance in the form of food and non-food items continues to be provided by the government and humanitarian agencies. However, restricted humanitarian access and limited funding mobilization are constraining the scope of operations aimed at assisting households in need, both at the regional level and particularly for displaced populations and those in inaccessible areas outside the towns of Ménaka and Andéramboukane. 

Food consumption, despite seasonal improvements, will remain significantly below average and much more degraded for displaced households and those in inaccessible areas. The Crisis Hunger Index for 52.4 percent of households, according to the July 2024 DIEM, is not expected to significantly change. In these areas, the seasonal improvement linked to the harvests, the availability of animal products, and the decrease in prices have improved the situation from Emergency (IPC Phase 4) to a current Crisis (IPC Phase 3) situation. However, the continued reliance on crisis-to-emergency coping strategies will persist and will, in turn, lead to an early deterioration of outcomes to an Emergency (IPC Phase 4) situation as early as April 2025. According to the September 2024 SMART survey, the nutritional situation is alarming, with a critical GAM prevalence exceeding 15 percent (GAM at 22.2 percent) due to food insecurity (both in terms of quantity and quality), the prevalence of diseases, and limited access to healthcare services. The SAM prevalence of 6.8 percent, according to the same survey, is likely to increase infant mortality rates above the average in the absence of adequate care and intervention.