Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in the lean season in Ménaka, where more than 60 percent of the population is displaced

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are anticipated in central and northern insecure areas until September. FEWS NET estimates that 1.5 to 2.0 million people will need emergency food aid during the June to August lean season. Although the number of people in need will decrease in the post-harvest period, needs will remain high in the northern part of the country, particularly among IDPs and poor host households. 
• Security incidents will continue to disrupt livelihoods, particularly in the center and north of the country. In Ménaka, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will persist until September, with a proportion of households in inaccessible areas facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes. 
• Poor households' access to markets is lower than normal in the country due to high food prices exceeding the five-year average, the deterioration in livestock-to-cereal terms of trade, and the overall drop in household income. In the insecure areas of the central and northern regions, these price increases are negatively impacting poor households’ access to food, especially in pastoral zones and among IDPs, where households rely on the market for the majority of their food needs.
• The 2024 to 2025 agricultural season is ongoing in the country. Normal to surplus rainfall is expected, and the government's subsidies for agricultural inputs are favorable to overall average cereal production in the country. However, if dry spells disrupt crop growth, an increase in the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will be likely between October and January in the south of the country.

Sustained humanitarian assistance in Ménaka is needed through January 2025

Poor households are facing food insecurity due to persistent insecurity and weather hazards, particularly in the central and northern areas of the country. The level of conflict has remained high throughout 2024. In Ménaka, particularly in southeastern and central parts of the region, intermittent sieges imposed by armed groups in the region have displaced people and disrupted the movement of goods and livestock, the distribution of humanitarian assistance, and the operation of weekly markets since December 2023. During the lean season, where households mainly depend on the market for their food in a context of rising prices and even intermittent shortages, the region will be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), with a small proportion of the population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly in inaccessible areas. From October, seasonal improvement will be observed due to household access to harvests, foraged and animal products, and a seasonal decrease in food prices. However, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist due to the ongoing effects of insecurity on household livelihoods, especially in areas with limited access.

The current agropastoral lean season is proceeding normally in the country, except in the insecure zones of the central and northern regions, where it started one to two months earlier than normal. This has reinforced households' dependence on markets for their food supplies despite rising food prices. Due to malfunctions, market supplies are decreasing seasonally across the country, especially in conflict-affected areas, resulting in significant drops or even stoppages in trade flows and the early depletion of stocks linked to a fall in local production. Although military escorts and government-subsidized sales have partially stabilized supplies in main markets, challenges persist in restoring normalcy.

Poor households' access to markets is reduced compared to average due to the increase in prices of staple food items, particularly in insecure areas where prices exceed the five-year average by 30 to over 60 percent, notably in Ménaka (63 percent). These high price levels and declining livestock-to-cereal terms of trade are reducing poor households' access to food in the context of declining income.

Despite expected seasonal improvements during the post-harvest period from October to January, persistent conflict in northern Mali will continue to undermine livelihoods, keeping food security needs elevated beyond September. Although the government is projecting above-average 2024/25 cereal production, conflict will continue to disrupt agricultural activities in the north of the country, and localized production deficits are likely. 

Ongoing humanitarian assistance by the government and its humanitarian partners aims to alleviate the difficulties of household access to food and to reduce household recourse to negative coping strategies, already observed in the Ménaka regions and the Liptako Gourma area. However, humanitarian access constraints and low funding threaten to reduce the effectiveness of aid distribution in critical areas. In addition, funding for the humanitarian response is one of the lowest since 2012, with only 13 percent of the necessary resources mobilized at the end of May 2024, according to OCHA. In order to meet emergency needs and strengthen the resilience of households affected by the security and food crisis in Mali, a sustained humanitarian response remains imperative. Urgent action is essential to scale up humanitarian funding, improve household access to food, and mitigate the profound impact of conflict and climate variability on millions of people across the country.

Learn more

The analysis presented here is based on the information available as of June 14, 2024. The following links provide additional information: 

Food Security Outlook for Mali, February 2024

Overview of FEWS NET's scenario development methodology 

FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need

FEWS NET's approach to analyzing humanitarian food assistance

Mali has been plagued by insecurity and conflict in the northern and central regions of the country since 2012. The conflict, born of rebel groups’ desire to empower the north, was exacerbated by the increase in operations by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the north of the country around 2015. Fighting between the Islamic State–Sahel Province (ISSP), Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) continues in the country. In addition, persistent fighting between the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) and the FAMa since August 2023 has led to an escalation of violence in northern Mali. In addition, the sociopolitical context of Mali, marked by the coup d’état in 2020, has led to the imposition of economic and financial sanctions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). In January 2024, Mali announced its withdrawal from ECOWAS, marking a significant break with regional cooperation and economic integration efforts. 

The prolonged conflict has had an immense impact on livelihoods in Mali. Agriculture and pastoralism are the main means of livelihood for most households. The agricultural sector relies heavily on subsistence agriculture, with staple crops such as millet, sorghum, maize, and rice. Livestock farming is also important as a means of livelihood in the semi-arid and arid regions of the country. However, these livelihoods are highly vulnerable to shocks, including climate variations and ongoing conflict, which disrupt agricultural activities, transhumance routes, and access to markets. For pastoralists, the inability to follow typical transhumance routes disrupts livestock health and productivity. Although the majority of the population is concentrated in the producing areas of the south of the country, relatively unaffected by the conflict, the populations of the north rely heavily on trade flows from these surplus areas for most of their food needs. 

These shocks have severely eroded the typical seasonal variations in northern Mali. Persistent insecurity has disrupted agropastoral activities, leading to a reduction in crop production as a result of field abandonment. The month of June, the current period of this report, typically marks the start of the lean season, which has become longer and more severe in the north of the country. The September to January projection period marks the post-harvest period, when access to food and income typically improves significantly in the south of the country. However, lack of access to own-production, disrupted trade flows, and above-average staple food prices mean that humanitarian assistance needs will be high in northern Mali well beyond the post-harvest period. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Insecurity/conflicts: From January to April 2024, the conflict in Mali spread, in particular due to the actions of JNIM in the regions of Mopti and Ségou. JNIM attacks increased, with 206 incidents and 493 fatalities, a 31 percent increase in incidents and 62 percent in fatalities compared to the beginning of 2023. The violence was concentrated in Bankass, Koro, and Djenné (Mopti) in Bandiagara Cercle and Ségou and Niono (Ségou) in Tominian Cercle, causing significant population displacements. Increasingly, JNIM is trying to impose sieges on cities, such as the partial siege of the city of Timbuktu, in progress since August 2023. In February, JNIM blocked Léré (Timbuktu) and Touara (Ségou) with an extension of attacks to the south and west, increasing violence in the Kayes and Koulikoro regions.

ISSP also intensified attacks, particularly around the Ansongo-Ménaka nature reserve and the Andéramboukane Cercle to maintain their control or influence over all cercles of Ménaka and the regional capital. This control continues to disrupt population movements and humanitarian aid, particularly in Anchawadji, Tessit, Andéramboukane, Inékar, and Ménaka, forcing new population displacements to the cities of Gao, Ménaka, and Ansongo.

Population displacement: Significant displacements of people fleeing persecution by armed groups and escaping conflict areas between the army and armed groups are ongoing, particularly in the regions of Mopti, Ménaka, Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal, as well as in northern Ségou and Koulikoro. The number of displaced persons at the end of May 2024 was estimated at 330,713, according to the IOM population displacement monitoring report. These displaced populations, which represent more than 25 percent of the total population in Mopti and more than 60 percent in Ménaka, exert enormous pressure on the meager resources in host areas. As of April 2024, more than 94,000 Burkinabe refugees (53,800 registered and 40,200 unregistered) are in Mali. 

Economic conditions: Since the end of 2023, Mali has been facing an energy crisis due to technical and financial difficulties. Although the country has established new partnerships to renew its equipment, increase the share of renewable energy, and finance the purchase of fuel, the country's electricity needs remain well above current availability. Frequent power outages have contributed to a significant drop in economic activities related to electricity, leading to the closure of some industrial units and employee layoffs, exacerbating an already precarious economic situation in the country. The decline in employment opportunities and the resulting job losses have significantly reduced household income. Additionally, the high level of overall inflation, which rose from 16.8 percent in April 2023 to 18.6 percent in April 2024, according to the National Institute of Statistics, has contributed to increased living costs.

Agricultural production: Across the country, off-season harvests are concluding, especially for irrigated rice in the central and northern regions. The start of the rainy season in June marks the start of agricultural activities for the main season, which will run from June to September.

• The average to below-average off-season rice harvests currently underway, especially in the regions of Ségou, Mopti, and Tombouctou, are improving rice availability in the country, as well as access and income for farming households in irrigated perimeter zones.
• Agropastoral activities, which start with the onset of rains, provide moderate income and food opportunities for poor households through agricultural labor, except in insecure areas where activity levels are declining due to difficulties in accessing fields. Grain production forecasts for 2024 are estimated at 11.1 million metric tons, representing an increase of 11.2 percent compared to the five-year average and 12.1 percent compared to last year, according to the government's 2024/25 plan for the agricultural season (Ecofin).
• In the insecure areas in the center and north, as well as the northern regions of Ségou and Koulikoro, access to fields is severely disrupted due to persecutions and killings of farmers by armed groups at the start of the agricultural season. The decrease in agricultural activities during this period of crop planting reduces job opportunities for poor households in these areas.

Livestock production: Livestock production of milk, cheese, and butter has seasonally declined in this lean pastoral period, but the decline is much more marked in the Timbuktu, Gao, and Ménaka regions, which constitute the major pastoral zones of the country. In these insecure areas, livestock feed issues due to limited pasture availability have been exacerbated by difficulties in accessing certain grazing areas due to ongoing insecurity, which continues to disrupt livestock movement. The reduction in herd sizes in insecure areas due to thefts, kidnappings, and excessive sales is reducing households' access to animal products and pastoral income for livestock-raising households. 

Agricultural and non-agricultural labor: Construction activities, brickmaking, firewood collection, and petty trade are proceeding normally across the country. In agricultural areas, preparations for the new agricultural season offer average income opportunities to poor households through field cleaning, manure transport, ploughing, and planting. However, economic activities have declined due to the difficult economic situation in the country, reducing job opportunities, particularly in insecure areas (Mopti, Timbuktu, Ménaka, Kidal, and Gao). 

• In these insecure areas, persistent insecurity, significant population displacements, and movement restrictions are severely limiting employment opportunities compared to the average for both agricultural and non-agricultural labor. 

Grain/livestock markets: Dependence on markets is particularly high during this lean season, particularly for poor urban households and those in displacement reception sites and pastoral areas. Supplies have seasonally decreased in most of the country's markets, with the greatest decreases occurring in insecure areas due to significant reductions and even stoppages in trade flows and the early depletion of stocks linked to decreased local production. Organized military escorts and Office of Agricultural Products of Mali (OPAM) sales in northern markets are improving availability; however, availability remains well below average in the markets concerned. Blockades imposed by armed groups on major supply routes in certain northern regions of the country such as Ménaka, Gao, and Tombouctou have somewhat decreased since the beginning of 2024 but continue to significantly disrupt market supply in these areas. This is particularly the case in Ménaka, where supply shortages have been reported in markets outside of Ménaka and Andéramboukane. According to REACH, in areas subject to intermittent blockades by armed groups, prices for basic necessities such as sugar, oil, wheat flour, powdered milk, and fuel have risen by 70 to 100 percent over the past three months in Timbuktu.

Follow this link for more information on price bulletins.

Purchasing power of households: Overall, poor households’ access to markets is reduced compared to the average due to the rise in prices of staple food items, particularly in insecure areas, where prices are more than 30 percent above the five-year average, reaching over 60 percent in Ménaka. Cereal prices have increased due to increased production costs linked to the high cost of agricultural inputs and transportation, higher-than-average demand due to institutional purchases and cereal exports, and localized production decreases in Mali that have reduced supply compared to the average. Except in Koulikoro, Sikasso, Kayes, and Tombouctou where it is less than 10 percent of the five-year average, the increase in the price of the staple cereal compared to the five-year average is 63 percent in Ménaka, 27 percent in Gao, 18 percent in Mopti, and 17 percent in Ségou. These price levels are reducing poor households' access to food in the context of declining incomes due to the weak national economy.

The goat-to-cereals terms of trade remain below the five-year average due to high cereal prices, despite their seasonal improvement compared to last month. Compared to last year and to the five-year average, goat-to-millet terms of trade have decreased in monitored pastoral markets (Figure 2), reducing access to food for livestock-raising households, given high cereal prices due to the drop in supply linked to market access difficulties. 

Follow this link for more information on supply and market outlook.

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

From January to March 2024, monthly food assistance was distributed to 491,474 people, covering 36 percent of targeted beneficiaries, primarily in the form of vouchers across all regions, especially in Tombouctou, Gao, Ménaka, and Mopti, where the distribution rate exceeded 30 percent of the target. This assistance is intended to cover at least 50 percent of needs and will continue until September 2024, mainly for poor households and displaced persons as part of the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) across the country. At the same time, 60,344 people benefited from livelihood support through the distribution of livestock feed, small equipment, and agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers) by the government and its partners. However, humanitarian challenges in insecure areas are limiting access by the most vulnerable populations to these aids, which constitute a primary source of income and food, especially for displaced individuals in accessible areas. Although assistance is ongoing in areas of concern across the country, its impact on food insecurity outcomes is limited by the continuous rise in needs, high rates of new displacements, and challenges in accessing this aid due to insecurity. In addition to the security challenges related to delivering humanitarian assistance, financial constraints also persist. As of the end of May 2024, the national response plan has secured only 13 percent of required funding, representing the lowest funding rate since the onset of the crisis in 2012. This has already compelled humanitarian actors to reduce the quantity and frequency of food assistance.

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Areas of insecurity in the central and northern parts of the country (Ménaka, Gao, Mopti, Kidal, Tombouctou): These regions, all located in the north and center of the country, host the majority of food insecure people due to significant population displacement, poor harvests, and deteriorating security conditions that continue to affect household livelihoods in these areas. 

In Ménaka, households are facing enormous difficulties in accessing food due to significantly decreased incomes and high food prices. As a coping strategy, households are currently resorting to excessive livestock sales, leading to decapitalization as reported by 29.6 percent of households, according to the February 2024 National Survey on Food and Nutritional Security (ENSAN), along with relying on humanitarian assistance, begging, and selling productive assets. The sharp deterioration in livelihoods, staple food prices more than 50 percent higher than the five-year average, and significantly decreased incomes are exacerbating the deterioration in food consumption during the lean season, which is more severe than the average. The situation is more critical for households in inaccessible areas and displaced persons who have no access to humanitarian assistance. As a result, households unable to meet their food needs without resorting to atypical emergency strategies are facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. Despite the mitigation of the blockade's effects in the region, limited access to certain areas and disruptions in supply and humanitarian access have left a small proportion of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes.

In some insecure areas of Gao, Mopti, and Timbuktu, the early depletion of stocks due to last season's drop in agricultural production is increasing households' dependence on markets in the face of high staple food prices and declining incomes. Households are currently experiencing an atypical deterioration in food consumption and are resorting to coping strategies such as reducing food and non-food expenditures, engaging in atypical livestock sales, borrowing, selling assets, and migration. As a result, poor households with highly degraded livelihoods in these areas and who cannot meet their food needs without resorting to negative coping strategies are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

High levels of global acute malnutrition (GAM) support these findings. The seasonal deterioration of GAM during this lean period is more pronounced in insecure areas. In addition to food access difficulties, lack of access to basic social services and nutrition programs contributes to raising the level of acute malnutrition above the average in these areas. The country's GAM prevalence is structurally high (>10 percent) according to WHO standards. Low food diversity, difficulties in accessing the minimum acceptable diet, increased incidences of disease, and the negative impact of continuing food insecurity are the causes these high levels of malnutrition, according to the June 2023 IPC nutrition analysis. According to the Nutrition Sub-Directorate, in the twenty-fifth week of 2024, the cumulative admissions of children suffering from global acute malnutrition was up by 15.4 percent compared to that of 2023 in the same period (151,293 cases compared to 131,031 in 2023).

Urban centers: Poor households in urban centers are experiencing a decline in income due to reduced economic activities, exacerbated by power shortages, which lead to decreased employment opportunities both in industrial units and petty trade. Given decreased incomes and rising food prices, poor households that cannot meet their food needs without resorting to atypical borrowing, selling of goods, local solidarity, and significantly reducing non-food expenditures are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and worse outcomes. 

Northern pastoral areas: Households in the country's pastoral areas in the Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal regions are experiencing major disruptions to normal pastoral activities and trade with the typical markets. Food and pastoral income opportunities are at below-average levels due to the decline in livestock prices due to market access difficulties, the movement of herds far from households, and livestock thefts and losses. As a result of the deterioration of livestock-to-cereal terms of trade due to very high food prices, pastoral households are selling more livestock than average, leading the poorest households to decapitalize. Households are also resorting to atypical migration, borrowing, and reducing both non-food and food expenditures. Those households that cannot meet their food needs without resorting to these Stressed to Crisis level coping strategies are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and worse outcomes.

Agricultural areas in the south: Despite above-average cereal prices, average availability of agricultural production from last season, the normal supply of markets, and the availability of typical income-generating activities, even if there are reductions in opportunities, mean that poor households can access food without great difficulty during this lean period. Average agricultural labor opportunities, income from migration, and livestock sales provide near-average incomes for households to meet their food needs. As a result, the current Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected to continue until January 2025.

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions 

• Despite normal to above-normal rainfall forecasts, longer-than-average dry spells could lead to water deficits, particularly in the Sahelian belt. According to historical data, the impact of dry spells on production levels depends on their duration and timing during the growing season. Although cereal production is currently expected to be average, FEWS NET will continue to monitor seasonal progress and the potential impact of dry spells over the coming months.
• Real GDP growth is expected to slow to 3.8 percent in 2024 from 4.4 percent in 2023 due to severe electricity blackouts, a decline in gold production, and uncertainty surrounding the postponement of elections and the ECOWAS exit (IMF).
• Risks of flooding and submersion are expected to be high during the wet season, particularly in low-lying areas, which could lead to reduced cultivable land, crop and forage losses, and infrastructure damage (PRESASS).

Subnational assumptions for central and northern areas impacted by the conflict

•  Conflict levels will persist in the northern part of the country. ISSP attacks against the civilian populations of Gao and Ménaka are expected to remain at their current level until January 2025. The same applies to JNIM, which will continue its southward expansion in order to extend its influence over historically peaceful areas, leading to continuous violence in Koulikoro (Nara, Banamba, Dioila, Kangaba), Sikasso (Koutiala), and Kayes (Diéma, Kita).
• Decreases in production compared to the average are expected in insecure areas, where a reduction in cultivated areas due to insecurity will be observed.
• Significant disruptions in flows, including supply route blockades, will continue to cause supply shortages outside of district capitals. These supply difficulties will be exacerbated by access difficulties due to climatic conditions. At times, military escorts will facilitate the supply to affected markets, but at a significantly below-average level.
• Prices above the five-year average for staple foods will persist because of difficulties in supplying markets due to insecurity.
• Huge disruptions in the animal transhumance movement will lead to a drop in productivity and animal health.

Subnational assumptions for the country's urban centers

• Household incomes will decrease due to reduced economic activity levels exacerbated by a challenging national economic situation, compounded by electricity shortages leading to the closure of some industrial units and cessation of certain activities.

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumption

Monthly food and non-food assistance, primarily in the form of vouchers and cash transfers from the government and humanitarian partners, will intensify from June to September 2024, targeting 1,555,294 people across the country. These food assistance programs will cover less than 50 percent of the needs for 67 percent of beneficiaries and more than 50 percent of caloric needs for 33 percent of beneficiaries, particularly in the regions of Gao, Ménaka, and Kidal. The low level of funding, estimated at 13 percent of the amount required as of the end of May 2024, and constraints on humanitarian access, particularly in the Gao and Ménaka regions, will negatively affect the impact of the assistance.

Subnational assumption for areas hosting IDPs

The volatility of the security situation, leading to continuous displacement of populations, exceeds the capacity of humanitarian partners to adequately assist displaced households, particularly in areas where humanitarian access remains a challenge.

The omission of some households in need from food assistance will negatively impact the integration of displaced persons into the socioeconomic fabric of host communities, hindering community cohesion necessary for the well-being of displaced individuals before their eventual return. 

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

Ménaka Region: Ongoing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist until September 2024 due to significant challenges in households' access to food, stemming from sharp income declines or shortages, high food prices, and difficulties in accessing humanitarian aid. These factors will likely contribute to a substantial food consumption gap. Households will intensify their use of atypical coping strategies, such as reducing the number of meals, depending on humanitarian assistance, and resorting to begging. Remittances from migrants and humanitarian assistance available from June to September will enable households to access food but at levels significantly lower than average, especially in areas with limited access.

From October onwards, modest availability of agricultural produce, access to foraged products, increased availability of animal products due to the return of transhumant herds, and seasonal decreases in food prices will contribute to improving households' access to food. Seasonal improvement in food consumption will reduce the use of negative coping strategies. Thus, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to improve to Crisis (IPC Phase 3). However, due to the significant level of degradation of livelihoods, the significant decline in economic activities, and constraints on the movement of people, the ability of poor households to meet their food needs will remain significantly limited. The use of strategies such as reducing the number and size of meals and selling assets will persist until January 2025.

Regions of Mopti, Timbuktu, and Gao (districts of Koro, Bankass, Douentza, Rharous, Ansongo, Gao): Difficulties in households' access to food due to early depletion of stocks and high food prices in an economic environment disrupted by the security situation are leading to a deterioration compared to the average. Poor households then resort atypically to migration, borrowing in kind or in cash from relatives/friends and merchants, selling assets, reducing non-food expenses, and opting for the cheapest foods. As a result, poor households in these areas are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity, which will continue until September 2024.

From October, food consumption will seasonally improve due to average availability of households’ own-harvest, in-kind payments for agricultural activities, and seasonal decrease in food prices. Consequently, despite the difficult economic situation, income insecurity, soaring food prices, and difficulties in accessing basic social services, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) from October to January 2025.

Northern pastoral areas: Households in the pastoral zones of the Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal regions will continue to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and worse outcomes until January 2025 due to the ongoing impacts of insecurity on pastoral and commercial activities. Indeed, the huge dysfunction of markets, access to which remains a challenge for populations highly dependent on markets, will continue to reduce the ability of pastoralist households to access food. The deterioration in the livestock-to-cereal terms of trade due to very high food prices will force poor households to continue relying on Stressed to Crisis coping strategies to meet their food needs. The seasonal improvement in the availability of milk and dairy products (cheese, butter) from their own herds or through local solidarity mechanisms that provide animal products and foraged goods from July to January 2025 will slightly improve food access, especially in Taoudenit, where Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected from October.

Southern agricultural zones: Average income and food access due to agricultural labor activities, income from migration, and livestock sales will enable households to meet their food needs without significant difficulties. Household access to food will seasonally improve with the availability of green legume harvests (cowpeas, peanuts), maize, and fonio in September and the main harvests from October to January 2025, which will cause a seasonal decrease in cereal prices. As a result, the current Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected to continue until January 2025.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Event: Poor distribution of rainfall

Probable impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Poor distribution of rainfall over time and space could lead to very long dry spells during the current agricultural season. Additionally, heavy rainfall expected in July and August could cause flooding in low-lying areas, resulting in damage to property, equipment, crops, livestock, and infrastructure. The regions heavily affected by drought or floods will experience a significant decline in their agropastoral production (cereals, milk, and dairy products), thereby reducing food availability for households (both agricultural and pastoral). Rising food prices and the resulting drop in income will reduce poor households' access to food. While Minimal (IPC Phase 1) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will be maintained from October to January (harvest period), the number of people facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) or worse outcomes will be higher, especially in urban and pastoral areas heavily reliant on markets.

Areas of insecurity in the north

Event: Exacerbation of insecurity

Probable impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Worsening insecurity in the central and northern regions of the country will further disrupt the economic situation in those areas, leading to further deterioration of already severely affected livelihoods. This will restrict access to markets, basic social services, and humanitarian assistance. Households' inability to adequately meet their food needs will increase the number of people in need. Thus, it is likely that the ongoing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity will persist beyond September (a period of seasonal improvement), with a higher proportion of households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes in the Ménaka region.

Event: Increased food assistance

Probable impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Regions heavily affected by conflict may experience improved access to food, which will likely alleviate food consumption deficits among beneficiaries. The reduction in the number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes or worse could potentially lead to a transition from Emergency (IPC Phase 4) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3), or from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!).

Event: Improvement in supply flows from the northern part of the country and market operations

Potential impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Northern regions heavily depend on the southern part of the country for their food supply (cereals) and for selling their livestock. A satisfactory recovery in trade flows will improve market operations and activities. The decrease in food prices and the resumption of certain economic activities will improve households' access to food, thereby reducing the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in these areas.

ML01 (Nomadism and trans-Saharan trade), ML02 (Northern livestock), and ML04 (Livestock, millet, and remittances, Ménaka Region) livelihood zones (Figure 6)

Reason for choosing this area: Persistent insecurity in the northern regions continues to negatively impact households' access to their typical sources of food and income. The situation is more pronounced in the Ménaka region due to the increase in security incidents, which have forced more than 50 percent of the population to move to safer areas. Huge disruptions to trade flows are causing supply disruptions and atypical increases in food prices in an environment of significant declines in incomes. Additionally, the severe deterioration of livelihoods, humanitarian access challenges, and forced displacement have led to excessive livestock sales leading to decapitalization, selling of equipment and production assets, resorting to begging, dependence on aid, and significant reduction in the size and number of meals among households in the region, especially in inaccessible areas. FEWS NET has selected this area of concern for this report to illustrate the medium- and long-term impacts of insecurity and conflict since 2020 in the northern part of the country.

Security incidents are continuing in the region and continue to significantly disrupt economic activities and the movement of the population. Attacks continue between the armed groups of the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA), the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA) considered to be allied with the government, JNIM, and ISSP for control of the region. Additionally, there is an increase in military offensives by the FAMa (Malian Armed Forces) and within the joint framework of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), leading to heightened tensions and repression by armed groups against civilian populations perceived as pro-government.

At the end of May 2024, according to the population displacement monitoring report, the number of displaced populations was estimated at 59,479, or just over 60 percent of the region's population. These populations, primarily located in camps or with host families in the towns of Ménaka and Andéramboukane, are in a situation of significant incapacity due to the loss of assets and livelihoods during their flight.

Livestock farming, which is the main source of livelihood for the region's populations, is experiencing a huge deterioration due to the decline in herd size as a result of thefts, kidnappings, and excessive sales to meet household needs. Loss of livestock due to thefts and kidnappings affects 29.5 percent of households, as reported by the February 2024 ENSAN. Additionally, excessive sales of livestock, affecting 51.9 percent of households, have significantly reduced herd sizes, particularly for poor households who have limited livestock numbers. In addition to the reduction in herd sizes, difficulties in accessing traditional grazing areas, coupled with the effects of weather hazards such as drought, which create challenges in feeding livestock, have significantly reduced animal production (milk, butter, cheese, meat) and pastoral incomes. The same applies to agricultural production, which is structurally weak due to displacements away from farming areas and climatic uncertainties.

There continues to be significant market dysfunctionality for both cereals and livestock due to physical access challenges in the area. This has greatly reduced commercial flows from Gao and Ansongo, as well as from Niger and Algeria through Kidal to the region, leading to stock shortages outside the cities of Ménaka and Andéramboukane. Supplies are ensured by traders who agree to pay ransoms to armed groups at checkpoints, which has helped alleviate the effects of the blockade in the area. Military escorts are occasionally organized, but these are in no way able to ensure a sufficient supply to markets, especially those outside of Ménaka that are less accessible. For cereals, the variability of supply flows creates atypical price fluctuations, which can reach 100 percent or more. Regarding livestock, the atypical increase in livestock supply, which remains one of the few sources of income due to reduced economic activities and decreased demand from major buyers from Algeria and Niger, has led to a reduction in livestock prices. In the Ménaka market, staple food prices have increased to more than 60 percent above the five-year average, while livestock-to-cereal terms of trade have decreased by 45 percent. As a result, households face inadequate access to markets, their main source of provisioning, due to low purchasing power.

The weak economy and below-average access to typical sources of income have contributed to increasing the proportion of households that rely on community assistance and aid. According to the February 2024 ENSAN, community assistance and humanitarian donations constitute the main source of income for 32.6 percent of households, with 10.8 percent relying on humanitarian assistance through cash transfers. Major constraints such as lack of employment opportunities, lack of cash to invest or buy stock, absence of markets, and insecurity in the area continue to limit or even halt income opportunities for households. This leads households to atypically intensify the use of negative coping strategies such as the decapitalization of livestock, begging, and dependence on aid.

Humanitarian aid in the form of food and non-food items from humanitarian agencies is continuing to reach households in need, particularly those displaced in the main host cities, as part of the Rapid Response Mechanism. These monthly food assistance efforts, in the form of cash, vouchers, and in-kind support, are more significant during the lean season from June to September and will be less prevalent from October to January, primarily targeting displaced households. Government-subsidized cereal sales are conducted to alleviate households' difficulties in accessing food. Humanitarian access difficulties and low financial mobilization hinder the proper implementation of these humanitarian operations, especially in the inaccessible areas outside the cities of Ménaka and Andéramboukane.

Continued major disruptions to economic activities and population displacements are causing a significant degradation of households' livelihoods, with below-average incomes and soaring food prices contributing to a significant deterioration in household food consumption. Thus, households unable to meet their food needs without resorting to Crisis or Emergency coping strategies find themselves in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity, with a small proportion of the population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly in inaccessible areas. From October, an improvement to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes is expected due to the seasonal improvement in food access, linked to albeit modest availability of agricultural production, foraged products, and animal products, and a decrease in food prices. However, the ability of poor households to meet their food needs will remain significantly limited.