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Varied harvest yields and anticipated market disruptions will further expose populations to food insecurity

  • Food Security Outlook
  • West Africa
  • November 2023 - May 2024
Varied harvest yields and anticipated market disruptions will further expose populations to food insecurity

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  • Key Messages
  • Seasonal calendar for a typical year
  • Outlook by country
  • Events that might change the outlook
  • Most likely food security outcomes and areas receiving significant levels of humanitarian assistance
  • Key Messages
    • As of November 2023, the PREGEC estimates the cereal production for the 2023/24 agricultural campaign to be approximately 76.5 million tons: down by 2 percent compared to the previous campaign and up by 3 percent compared to the five-year average. Anticipated reductions in annual production are expected in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Mali, attributed to dry spells experienced during the season, security issues restricting access to cultivable lands, and challenging macroeconomic conditions in Nigeria limiting access to agricultural inputs. 
    • From a pastoral perspective, feeding and watering conditions are generally satisfactory, allowing the livestock to regain a relatively average state of plumpness, thanks to a biomass production near or above-average. However, this production is lower in Niger, in the northeast of the Dosso region, the northern regions of Tahoua and Maradi, and in the Tillabéri region; in Mali, in the regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu; and in Chad throughout the pastoral zone. Transhumance departures are occurring, but numerous pastoral enclaves in the Liptako Gourma area and the Lake Chad basin remain inaccessible due to insecurity and conflicts. In addition to this constraint, pastoral households in these two areas continue to experience livestock plundering by armed groups and have limited access to markets. 
    • The prices of secondary cereals remained stable or decreased from September to October in the Sahel with the onset of the new harvests. The decline in prices of basic commodities has also continued in several coastal countries along the Gulf of Guinea. However, Nigeria's annual inflation has continued to rise due to the removal of fuel subsidies and the persistent depreciation of the Naira. Current prices, surpassing the five-year regional average, are anticipated to persist at this elevated level due to the constrained performance of current production, diminished carryover stocks, sustained demand, trade disruptions, and prevailing security and socio-economic challenges in the region.
    • The majority of areas will remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food insecurity until May 2024 with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) for some. The Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are due to the persistence of insecurity/armed conflicts and the deterioration of livelihoods that are currently affecting the provinces of Kossi, Sourou, Yatenga, Séno, Komondjari, Gourma, Kompienga, Sanmatenga, and the northern provinces of Bam and Namentenga in Burkina Faso; the Ménaka region and the southern part of Gao in Mali; and the Diffa region, the northern part of Tahoua, the northern, western, and southern parts of the Tillaberi region, and the southern part of Maradi in Niger. The crisis extends to the northwest and southwest regions in Cameroon, and the provinces of Lac, Kenem, Barh El Gazel, Tibesti, Ennedi West, Ennedi East, Wadifira, the eastern part of Ouaddaï, and the western part of Sila in Chad. Additionally, LGAs in the states of Sokoto, Zamfara, Kaduna, Katsina, Yobe, Borno, and the extreme north of Adamawa state in Nigeria are affected. This crisis will persist throughout the scenario period and will expand from February to May to include the Tapoa province in the eastern region and the entire province of Bam in Burkina Faso. It will also reach the northern and western parts of the Extreme North region in Cameroon, the provinces of Borkou, the entire Ouaddaï and Sila provinces, and the eastern part of Guera in Chad. Furthermore, it will impact several other LGAs in the states of Sokoto, Niger, Plateau, and Borno in Nigeria.
    • The Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes currently observed in the provinces of Lorum, Soum, Oudalan, and Yagha in Burkina Faso, as well as in the inaccessible LGAs of the northeast states of Nigeria (Abadam, Guzamala, Marte, Bama), will persist until May due to limited household food stocks and restricted access to markets and humanitarian aid. Starting in February, this level of food insecurity will extend to the Séno province in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso. In the Djibo commune of Burkina Faso, under blockade for nearly two years, FEWS NET predicts an emerging risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5). The ongoing conflict, coupled with financial and logistical challenges, is anticipated to result in a more significant reduction than expected in the already minimal food sources for households. 

    Seasonal calendar for a typical year
    West Africa Seasonal Calendar

    Source: FEWS NET

    Outlook by country

    Burkina Faso

    • High levels of conflict in the northern and eastern regions of Burkina Faso, marked by the blockade of entire communes by non-state armed groups, remain a catalyst for an ongoing humanitarian emergency. Several areas of the Sahel region are facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, and information provided by key informants strongly suggests that the population facing extreme hunger, indicating Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), is increasing in the Soum, Oudalan, and Yagha provinces. The areas of greatest concern include the communes of Djibo and Arbinda (Soum), Markoye (Oudalan), and Sebba (Yagha), which have been under blockade for over a year and are subject to strict restrictions on population movement. In these areas, anecdotal reports indicate that numerous households resort to begging and jeopardize their lives to gather wild foods, despite the threats posed by armed groups. Visible signs of acute malnutrition are evident among the population.

    • The number of communes under blockade has doubled since last year to around 30, notably in the Sahel, North, Center-North, East, Boucle du Mouhoun, and Center-East regions. The populations experience extremely limited access to food and sources of income, requiring military escorts for local market supplies. Additionally, food aid must be predominantly delivered by air at irregular intervals due to insecurity and insufficient funding. In some communes, current harvests will last less than three months for households, and markets have not been supplied for three to six months. The food aid deliveries reached only 178,000 people monthly between July and September, which is 29 percent of the population estimated to be in need by FEWS NET.

    • From October to May, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will gradually extend to the north and east of Burkina Faso. The pastoral lean season, in particular, will start atpyically early in the north. Forecast estimates indicate that the 2023 national cereal harvest will be below the five-year average, due to a reduction in the area planted as a result of insecurity, lower yields resulting from difficulties in accessing fertilizers, and long rainfall breaks in July and September. Drought conditions also had an impact on livestock production, resulting in a shortage of forage and below-average water reservoir filling, particularly in the north. In addition, insecurity and export restrictions on cereals and cowpeas will continue to limit cross-border and internal trade flows to the structurally deficit areas of the north. Staple food prices will be above average throughout the period, and blockaded regions are likely to see record price levels continue.

    • In the most likely scenario, the combination of harvest stocks, wild foods, occasional market deliveries, and irregular food assistance will keep Djibo in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) until May. However, FEWS NET believes that a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) will persist in Djibo. If conflict, financial or logistical factors lead to an even greater than expected reduction in already minimal household food sources, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is likely to occur. Ultimately, donors, the government, and humanitarian partners must take steps to increase food aid deliveries and guarantee full humanitarian access in order to limit loss of life. FEWS NET is closely monitoring the risk of a similar deterioration in other areas subject to prolonged blockades, including Arbinda (Soum), Markoye (Oudalan), and Sebba (Yagha).

    To learn more, see the October to May 2024 Burkina Faso Food Security Outlook.


    • In the Northwest and Southwest regions, ongoing local Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist throughout the scenario period, with the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes expected to increase through the peak of the lean season in May/June. Recent conflict intensifications in September and October further disrupted sources of food and income, with households unable to safely leave their homes for several weeks. Many households in these regions are expected to depend on markets atypically early and for longer due to the rapid depletion of their stocks. As the lean season approaches, increasing and above-average staple food prices will severely limit access to food for many, leading to more significant gaps in food consumption and negative coping strategies such as a reduction in meal frequency and an increased reliance on debt. Due to deteriorated livelihoods, the worst-affected households are expected to resort to selling any remaining productive assets or begging to get cash, and a small portion of the population is likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

    • The food security outcomes in the departments of Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Sava, and Mayo-Tsanaga in the Extreme North region have improved from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Stressed (IPC Phase 2), supported by households' better access to their own sorghum, maize, and legume productions during the ongoing dry cereal harvest activities. However, due to insecurity, agricultural and livestock production is below average, resulting in low household-level food availability and income. Many households are resorting to unsustainable coping mechanisms such as borrowing and selling remaining productive assets to pay for essential non-food expenses such as school fees or medical care. Some refugees and people who have been displaced by conflicts and floods have reported not being able to grow any food or access humanitarian food assistance. As a result, they are likely to continue facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, and a small proportion are likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

    • Food insecurity at the Stressed (IPC Phase 2) level is expected to persist in the divisions of Mbere (Adamawa) and Kadey and Lom et Djerem (East), where a considerable number of refugees from the Central African Republic is putting pressure on local market supplies and resources. Increased competition for natural resources, especially arable land, grazing areas, and income opportunities will maintain incomes below typical levels, further restraining household purchasing power. While the prices of basic food commodities seasonally increase during the scenario period and remain above average due to the rising national fuel and transportation costs, some of the most vulnerable households will not be able to mitigate their consumption gaps and are likely to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

    • It is expected that Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist throughout the scenario period in the urban areas of Yaoundé and Douala. Poor urban households mostly rely on food purchases from markets to meet their consumption needs. Due to higher prices of food staples and essential non-food items, these households will continue to struggle to meet their minimum daily caloric needs. As a result, they are forced to buy less preferred or cheaper food items and reduce their meal portions.

    • In areas unaffected by conflicts or insecurity, food insecurity is expected to remain Minimal (IPC Phase 1) until May 2024. Throughout the scenario period, households in these areas will continue to engage in typical livelihood activities and maintain near-normal food consumption levels without resorting to unsustainable strategies to access food or income. The average levels of own production during the 2023/24 season are expected to support food access, while income obtained from crop sales and agricultural labor will facilitate the purchase of imported staples and basic non-food items. Based on historical precipitation trends during El Niño events in Cameroon, the current strong El Niño phenomenon is not expected to have a significant impact on acute food insecurity throughout the country.

    To learn more, see the October to May 2024 Cameroon Food Security Outlook.


    • Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity are expected in the north and center of the country in late 2023 and early 2024. The Ménaka, Kidal, and Ansongo circle regions are the areas of greatest concern. Conflict and declining income are the main determinants of acute food insecurity during this outcome period. However, the seasonal improvement in livestock production, ongoing harvests, and lower prices for staple cereals are helping to ensure satisfactory food availability and household access to food in relation to the lean season from April to September 2023. The pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of Liptako Gourma improve from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Stressed (IPC Phase 2), while the conflict-affected Ménaka region moves from Emergency (IPC Phase 4) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3). The food security situation is expected to remain relatively stable until April 2024, the start of the next lean season.

    • There has been a surge in conflicts between armed groups and the military in the Ménaka, Gao, Timbuktu, and Mopti regions, resulting in significant disruption to trade flows and the persecution of civilians, impacting the security situation. The continuing displacement of populations, the deterioration in livelihoods due to lack of opportunities for economic activities, the theft/looting of goods, etc., are all factors that further expose poor households to food insecurity. While insecurity has increased significantly in central and northern Mali, the most severe impacts are expected in Ménaka, where population movements remain limited and market supplies are severely disrupted. Conflict dynamics in central and northern Mali are quite volatile, and there is a risk that conflict levels and the resulting impacts on market functioning and local livelihoods could worsen beyond current forecasts. If this happens, it is likely that levels of food insecurity will deteriorate further than FEWS NET has predicted.

    • There has been a surge in conflicts between armed groups and the military in the Ménaka, Gao, Timbuktu, and Mopti regions, resulting in significant disruption to trade flows and the persecution of civilians, impacting the security situation. The continuing displacement of populations, the deterioration in livelihoods due to lack of opportunities for economic activities, the theft/looting of goods, etc., are all factors that further expose poor households to food insecurity. While insecurity has increased significantly in central and northern Mali, the most severe impacts are expected in Ménaka, where population movements remain limited and market supplies are severely disrupted. Conflict dynamics in central and northern Mali are quite volatile, and there is a risk that conflict levels and the resulting impacts on market functioning and local livelihoods could worsen beyond current forecasts. If this happens, it is likely that levels of food insecurity will deteriorate further than FEWS NET has predicted.

    To learn more, see the October to May 2024 Mali Food Security Outlook.


    • Harvests are underway and improving food availability, but Crisis (IPC Phase 3) persists in the regions of Tillabery, Tahoua, Diffa, and Maradi as a result of conflict and insecurity, the effects of which combined with rising food prices are causing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes among some groups of poor households who lack the human capital to sell labor. Population displacement and the abandonment of crop fields and/or income-generating activities as a result of terrorist attacks have led to a drop in agricultural production and the purchasing power of poor households. The disruption of markets and cross-border food flows caused by conflict has led to significant price increases. The security situation has also deteriorated further since the coup d'état, prompting the new authorities to launch major combined military operations and take measures to ban the movement of people, limiting humanitarian action in areas affected by insecurity.

    • The socio-political situation following the coup d'état of July 26, 2023 has not changed significantly, given the continued suspension of trade and financial relations and the closure of borders imposed by ECOWAS and UEMOA, with the support of development partners. In fact, cross-border flows are decreasing in intensity, leading to a consequent reduction in the availability of foodstuffs and sanitary products. This follows the closure of borders with Nigeria and Benin, the countries imposing sanctions, upon which Niger relies for the import and export of various products. The support provided by technical and financial partners in the implementation of sanctions concerns development aid, the suspension of which leads to a reduction in the financial resources of the government and humanitarian organizations for implementing response plans to food insecurity and a decline in economic opportunities. These measures could persist during the first period of the scenario, from October 2023 to January 2024, and could be lifted between February and May 2024 following the outcome of probable negotiations between the new authorities and regional and international institutions. This will help to rehabilitate cross-border flow circuits and volumes, with support from development partners.

    • As a result of agro-climatic hazards combined with pest attacks and reductions in acreage due to insecurity, agricultural and fodder production is estimated to be lower than last year and the five-year average. Grain and fodder deficits will mean that food supplies will only be sufficient for three to four months' consumption at most, food and livestock prices will rise significantly, and the body condition and market value of animals will deteriorate, leading to a significant reduction in food access for poor households, who will be forced to adopt negative coping strategies.

    To learn more, see the October to May 2024 Niger Food Security Outlook.


    • The main season harvests are underway throughout the country, seasonally improving food availability and access for millions of households starting in October. However, the cumulative effects of increased levels of violence and abductions targeting civilians, against the backdrop of prolonged drought periods during the agricultural season in the north, moderate floods in coastal areas, and the escalation of the macroeconomic crisis, have had a negative impact on agricultural production. Cereal production in the surplus areas of the north is expected to be lower than last year and the average. This is likely to limit the extent of seasonal improvements in food access, resulting in atypically high prices for basic food items and supporting high food assistance needs in the northeast and northwest.

    • In the northeast, internal conflicts between insurgent groups, high levels of abductions, and an increase in crime continue to displace households towards garrison towns and restrict access to cultivated lands during the planting season. Even though most households benefit from the increased harvest availability, the size of the plots is small, and the majority of households will remain partially reliant on purchases to meet their food needs during the harvest period. However, limited income-generating opportunities and a deterioration in purchasing power restrict financial access to food, leading to consumption gaps and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. In inaccessible areas, especially in the LGA of Bama, Marte, Guzamala, and Abadam, households will experience limited mobility, low access to functional markets, limited or non-existent harvests, and depleted coping capacity. They are likely to face an Emergency (IPC Phase 4) situation until May 2024.

    • Despite high food assistance needs, humanitarian presence remains limited in the northwest and central-north regions. Banditry and ransom kidnappings have increased from June to September, disrupting livelihoods, limiting mobility, and causing population displacement in the worst-affected areas. While households engaged in cultivation will experience a temporary improvement in food access with the seasonal harvests from October to December, most poor households were unable to cultivate due to low income opportunities. Market disruptions and high prices have been exacerbated by the decline in cross-border trade activities with the Republic of Niger. Households affected by the conflict are experiencing deficits in food consumption and are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) until May 2024. A subset of households most affected by the conflict, unable to engage in cultivation, will rely on wild foods, bartering, and begging to access food and is likely facing an Emergency (IPC Phase 4) situation.

    • Economic conditions have deteriorated significantly in Nigeria. The value of the Nigerian Naira (NGN) is rapidly declining in the open market, reaching a record low of 1,200 NGN/USD at exchange bureaus in late October. Inflation reached 26.8 percent in September 2023, the highest since 2005. Foreign reserves continue to decline, and national oil production remains well below the OPEC+ daily quota. The prices of both imported and domestic goods remain atypically high due to elevated transportation costs associated with the rise in fuel prices following the removal of fuel subsidies. In September, in the Maiduguri LGA, the prices of maize and millet were over 100 percent higher than in September 2022. As a result of these factors, household purchasing power has declined, leading to reduced access to food for millions of households that rely on purchases for their sustenance.

    To learn more, see the October to May 2024 Nigeria Food Security Outlook.


    • In the East, the deterioration in livelihoods, triggered by both the influx of refugees and inadequate rainfall, has resulted in a corresponding deterioration in food consumption among refugees, returnees, and host households. In the Lac Region, declines in production coupled with the erosion of income sources due to the security context linked to non-state armed groups are limiting access to food for displaced and host households. In Tibesti and the two provinces of Ennedi Est and Ennedi Ouest, the decline in inflows, exacerbated by border insecurity with Libya and the suspension of inflows from Sudan caused by the Sudan crisis, persists in creating consumption disparities due to restricted access to markets. Despite the crisis adaptation strategies developed by refugees, returnees, IDPs, and host households in these areas, these households still have food consumption deficits and are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In the rest of the country, the admittedly low contribution of rainfed crops improves the food consumption of very poor and poor households, which are facing in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. 

    • Disturbances in the rainy season led to declines in yields in many parts of the country. In the Sahel, the presence of Chadian refugees and returnees in agricultural areas reduced them during the season. Long dry spells and rainfall shortfalls have resulted in losses of cultivated areas in Ouaddaï and Sila. As a result, the current harvests are lower than in a normal year.

    • In the Sahel, below-average rainfall during the season has resulted in limited pasture availability. In the Sahel's home areas, semi-temporary ponds have been dry since late September, atypically early. This has prompted transhumant herders to depart early for the Sudanian Zone, beginning in early September 2023, anticipating a shortage of pastoral resources. In Lac, an early return of pastoralists to the islands has been observed, prompted by the low availability of grazing land. 

    • The massive influx of refugees into the three provinces of Ouaddaï, Sila, and Wadi Fira is causing food insecurity in native households. In Adré, the number of refugees and returnees is around four times greater than the local population and has put pressure on livelihoods, which have been severely degraded.  The need for food aid is increasing rapidly. However, FEWS NET does not have sufficient data on food aid, the monthly numbers of beneficiaries, the content of rations, or the amount of cash transfers to assess aid coverage. The situation is very volatile and could change in the coming months. FEWS NET continues to closely monitor the food consumption of refugees, returnees, and host households. 

    To learn more, see the October to May 2024 Chad Food Security Outlook.

    Countries monitored remotely1


    • With the arrival of green sorghum, millet, and maize harvests in October in rainfed and agropastoral areas, most households are facing Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. However, certain localities in the southeast remain in a situation of acute food insecurity with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes due to the production deficit of the Djéri crop and biomass production shortfalls (Figure 1). Furthermore, poor households in the peri-urban areas of Nouakchott and Nouadhibou continue to experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. Their employment opportunities remain low, and the markets they rely on continue to maintain high prices.

    • Mauritania continues to host a large number of Malian refugees. As of July 2023, 85,942 refugees were registered by the UNHCR in the Mbera camp and its surroundings in the southeast of the country. These refugees are highly dependent on humanitarian aid. In previous reports, the WFP expressed concerns about a possible interruption of distributions in October if additional funds were not secured. However, more recent provisional updates from WFP have confirmed that new funding has been secured to maintain distributions at current levels until 2024. As a result, the population remains in Stress! (IPC Phase 2!).

    • The pastoral situation is generally favorable in the southern border strip with Mali and in the wilayas of Guidimakha and Gorgol, as well as in the northern part of Tagant and Trarza (Figure 2). On the other hand, there is limited or no grazing in certain parts of the central, northern, and eastern regions of the country. Numerous cases of bush fires have been reported in Guidimaka and Hodh El Chargui (Bassiknou), diminishing the forage potential in these areas. This situation, combined with the high concentration of livestock and overgrazing, will lead to early internal transhumance.

    • Markets for staple foodstuffs are fairly well supplied with imported products, although prices remain high compared with the five-year average. On the other hand, the supply of local produce (sorghum, millet, etc.) is overall lower than normal. Product prices, currently at their highest seasonal level ever, will remain above average in November before beginning an upward trend in December 2023 and continuing until May 2024. At some livestock markets, the supply of sheep and goats is relatively high due to the typical destocking practices of farmers. The large quantities of sheep and goats at these markets have led to a drop in prices. However, in other markets, prices remained stable, and overall terms of trade were generally favorable for livestock farmers.

    To learn more, see the October to May 2024 Mauritania Remote Monitoring Report.

    Central African Republic

    • In terms of security, despite the drop in the number of incidents in the country, the situation remains volatile in certain regions, notably in the prefectures of Haute-Kotto, Haut Mbomou, Vakaga, and Ouham, where the latest clashes between rebel groups and government forces continue to claim many civilian victims. Poor households in these areas are finding it difficult to develop their typical livelihood strategies, including gathering wild foods, handicrafts, hunting, selling game and gathering products. They face food consumption deficits exacerbated by high food prices, exposing them to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.
    • Harvesting of maize, groundnut, and beans has concluded in nearly all regions. However, the ongoing harvest of sorghum, millet, cassava, and rainfed rice is projected to be average or above average due to the favorable rainfall experienced during the winter season. Furthermore, the expansion of agricultural land due to decreased insecurity levels, notably in the southern, central, and western regions of the country, has facilitated the return of several thousand IDPs to their respective places of origin. Noteworthy returns have been observed in the prefectures of Ouham-Pendé, Ombella M'Poko, and Ouaka.
    • Despite the maize, groundnut and manioc harvests, commodity prices remained high. A comparison of August prices with the five-year average reveals substantial increases in the prices of basic foodstuffs. The increase in prices is most pronounced in the areas most affected by the conflict. Cassava prices rose by 98 percent in Birao, 99 percent in Bangassou, 130 percent in Zemio, and 131 percent in Obo. In the case of maize, strong increases have been seen particularly on the Yaloke (81 percent), Carnot (86 percent), Boda (118 percent), and Bossemptele (140 percent) markets. As for rice, increases were seen in almost all markets, with the largest increases reported in Bouca (82 percent), Bozoum (91 percent), Bria (102 percent), Paoua (192 percent), Obo (108 percent), and Zemio (153 percent).
    • The lean season, when food stocks will run low in the south of the country starting in April, will force households to turn to the market for their food. However, high prices will force poor households to develop their typical coping strategies, in particular resorting to gathering, hunting, and fishing activities to achieve Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. They will be able to meet their minimum kilocalorie requirements, but will likely have difficulty meeting their essential non-food needs.

    To learn more, see the October to May 2024 Central African Republic Remote Monitoring Report.


    Events that might change the outlook
    Table 1
    Possible events over the next six months that could change the most-likely scenario
    AreaEventImpact on food security outcomes

    •    Central and northern Mali; northeast, north-central, and northwest Nigeria; Lake Chad basin; Liptako-Gourma Region; Tibesti Region; Central African Republic; Northwest and Southwest Cameroon


    Worsening civil insecurity/armed conflicts

    •    Increase in the number of IDPs and refugees 
    •    Severe disruption of trade flows and atypical price fluctuations
    •    Very low supply to local markets 
    •    Severe deterioration in household livelihoods
    •    Reduced humanitarian access to areas for assistance
    •    Significant deterioration in the level of household consumption
    •    Disruption of transhumance movements and inaccessibility of pastoral areas

    Most likely food security outcomes and areas receiving significant levels of humanitarian assistance

    Recommended citation: FEWS NET. West Africa Food Security Outlook November 2023 - May 2024: Varied harvest yields and anticipated market disruptions will further expose populations to food insecurity, 2023.


    With remote monitoring, an analyst usually works from a nearby regional office, relying on a network of data partners. Compared to the countries above where FEWS NET has a local office, reports on countries monitored remotely may be less detailed. 

    To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. Learn more here.

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