The continued influx of Sudanese refugees maintains Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes in eastern Chad

• FEWS NET estimates that 1.5 to 1.99 million people will need food assistance with needs peaking between February and May 2025, particularly Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees in the eastern provinces of the country, as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Lac Province. Food aid will continue to be available for refugees, but insufficient to cover the food consumption deficits of beneficiaries due to the increasing number of people in need with the ongoing refugee influx. 
• The areas of concern are Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est provinces, where Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees are hosted. Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in these provinces between October and May 2025, with pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The ongoing influx of refugees fleeing the conflict in Sudan, amounting to over 681,444 refugees in October, is putting pressure on livelihoods and increasing the labor supply and competition in a context of scarce agricultural and non-agricultural job opportunities. The food consumption of refugees relies on markets and, most importantly, food assistance, despite insufficient volume and irregular distribution. Furthermore, floods have made it difficult to access certain localities and refugee camps, further impacting the distribution of food aid.
• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are also expected in Lac Province, which is affected by attacks from terrorist groups and floods and is one of the areas of concern. Insecurity, exacerbated by floods, leads to population displacement and disrupts livelihoods and market supply.
• Since July, floods have affected the entire country, destroying 432,000 hectares of crops and killing 70,000 livestock, as well as causing loss of life and significant damage to infrastructure. Indeed, the destruction of crop fields, combined with the reduced area planted due to insecurity in the Lac region, will lead to a 5 percent decrease in cereal production compared to the 2023/24 season and a 9 percent decrease compared to the five-year average. Additionally, the floods have also disrupted the supply to most markets.

The analysis presented here is based on the information available as of October 16, 2024.

The humanitarian refugee crisis arising from the ongoing conflict in Sudan is maintaining Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes in the departments of Assongha (Ouaddaï Province) and Kimiti (Sila Province), and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in other localities in the host provinces of Eastern Chad (Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira, Sila, and Ennedi Est), with pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Livelihoods in the host areas are under significant pressure due to the influx of refugees (over 681,944 Sudanese) and returnees fleeing the hostilities in Sudan (Figure 1). Intense competition between refugees, returnees, and host households for the few job opportunities limits the income levels earned from available activities. Between October 2024 and January 2025, food consumption for host households will improve with the availability of the harvest. However, refugees, whose purchasing power is very limited, will depend on markets and, especially, food aid throughout the entire outlook period. As a result, the ongoing influx of refugees, combined with the anticipated decline in agricultural production, keeps the number of people in need of food aid high.

The expected rain-fed agricultural production, particularly cereal production, is anticipated to decline due to heavy rainfall since July, which has caused flooding across the country, especially in the Lac region, Mandoul, Moyen Chari, Tandjilé, Mayo-Kebbi East, and Batha. Market supply is also affected by the floods, in addition to the high transportation costs, which are a result of the removal of subsidies. The reduction in planted areas due to insecurity (in the Lac region) further impacts production. This will lead to an early depletion of household food stocks starting in February 2025. 

The availability of pastoral resources and the body conditions of livestock have improved in pastoral and agropastoral areas due to generally above-average rainfall. However, despite the improvement in livestock conditions, market disruptions, the relative decrease in demand, and the depreciation of the naira have affected income from livestock sales, and will therefore only cover the food expenditures of herders between October and January 2025, but not non-food expenditures. Thus, herders and agropastoralists in West Sahel (Bahr el Ghazal and Kanem) will be in Stressed (IPC Phase 2). Their food consumption will deteriorate between February and May 2025, particularly during the pastoral lean season, and they will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during this period. 

In the Lac region, floods and civil insecurity are exacerbating the deterioration of livelihoods. The overflow of the lake's inlets during the rainy season forced the displacement of several households, including IDPs, who have been deprived of their livelihoods. These floods have caused additional losses in planted area, which were already reduced due to insecurity. Limited access to markets due to low purchasing power forces host households and displaced persons to employ Crisis-level coping strategies. Households are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes throughout the projection period.

Food aid needs will remain high throughout the outlook period and will further increase after the harvest period in 2025. Furthermore, with the ongoing influx of refugees and returnees in the eastern provinces of the country, there is an urgent need to increase humanitarian assistance.

Learn more 

The following links provide additional information: 

• Latest Food Security Outlook June 2024 – January 2025.
• Latest Key Messages Update September 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET's scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET's approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Conflict resulting from attacks by terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin, rebels along the borders with Libya and the Central African Republic, and intercommunal conflicts in the Sudanese region are impacting livelihoods, trade flows, and market operations. In Lac, ongoing insecurity since 2015 caused by attacks from the Islamic State West Africa Province has led to the abandonment of arable land, population displacement, and restrictions on fishing activities in Lake Chad. In the north, sporadic attacks by rebels since 2016, including the Front for Alternance and Concord (FACT) and the Front for National Democracy and Justice in Chad (FNDJT), although managed by security forces, continue to disrupt trade flows from Libya. This disruption of cross-border flows reduces market supplies in deficit areas, especially the northern provinces and the Kanem and Bahr el Gazal regions. Frequent intercommunal conflicts in the Sudanian region disrupt agricultural production activities. These conflicts sometimes lead to population displacements. 

The Sudanese conflict, which began in April 2023, has led to an influx of Sudanese refugees and returning Chadians into the eastern provinces of Chad, particularly Ouaddai, Sila, and Wadi Fira. Since the start of the conflict in Sudan, more than 681,944 refugees and 213,339 returnees have arrived in Chad (UNHCR). The refugees are heavily concentrated in the Assongha department (Ouaddaï Province). As long as the Sudanese conflict continues, the number of refugees and returnees will keep increasing, placing additional pressure on food and income sources. Deprived of their livelihoods and needing to meet their food consumption needs, refugees heavily depend on food aid from humanitarian organizations, which have recently faced increasingly limited funding. The regular influx of these refugees keeps the number of people in need high. 

The livelihoods of households in Chad are mainly dominated by agriculture and livestock. Agricultural and cereal production, which is predominant in both the Sudanian agricultural areas and agropastoral zones, is highly sensitive to rainfall variability, especially droughts and floods. Since the end of July, heavy rains have caused flooding, particularly in the Lac, Mandoul, Moyen-Chari, Tandjilé, and Mayo-Kebbi regions. The floods have coincided with the crop maturation phase and have destroyed more than 432,000 hectares of farmland and compromised the harvests, which are expected to decrease. The period from February to May 2025 coincides with the start of the lean season (Figure 2). Household stocks will deplete quickly due to the expected decline in harvests, leading to increased reliance on markets. In pastoral areas, above-average rainfall improves pastures and replenishes water points, enhancing livestock body conditions and animal market value. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards

Conflict:

In the southern provinces, insecurity arises from attacks by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the Lac region, activities of rebel groups along the Libyan border in the north, and intercommunal conflicts, all of which affect the livelihoods of the population as well as the supply and functioning of markets. Security incidents in the Lac region have slightly increased in 2024 compared to 2023. However, these incidents are mainly related to attacks by the Chadian defense and security forces against the positions of armed terrorist groups from the Islamic State in the West Africa Province. These security disruptions, coupled with floods, have primarily affected agricultural activities, limited the movement of people, fishing activities, and the flow of market supplies in Lac Province. 

In the Sudanian zone, intercommunal conflicts between farmers and herders remain the main security concern. However, the number of conflicts in the first half of 2024 decreased to 26 cases, compared to 37 cases in 2023. Nevertheless, these conflicts have resulted in loss of life, as well as crop destruction, displacement of people, and disruptions to market operations. Intercommunal clashes, particularly in Mandoul in September, severely impact livelihoods. These conflicts are not limited to the south, but also affect agropastoral areas. In August, the conflict between nomadic herders and farmers in the Ouaddaï Province resulted in 37 deaths. 

In the northern border area, the presence of armed rebel groups near the Libyan border keeps government forces on high security alert. The strengthening of defense and security forces' positions against rebel groups continues to disrupt cross-border trade flows and migration flows toward Libya. These security measures affect the supply of markets, not only in the northern provinces but also in other provinces, particularly in Bahr El Ghazal, Kanem, Wadi Fira, and even Ouaddaï. In the gold mining sites of Tibesti, the influx of artisanal miners, mainly from other Sahelian and Saharan provinces, continues due to security restrictions.

Refugee crisis:

The persistence of the Sudanese crisis continues to drive the influx of Sudanese refugees and returning Chadians into the provinces of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est. Chad is hosting more than 681,944 Sudanese refugees and 213,339 returning Chadians as of October 14, 2024 (UNHCR). The Assongha department continues to host the majority of refugees arriving in Chad (Figure 3). The population of Assongha has nearly doubled in one year, as refugees now make up more than 47 percent of the total population of the department. Refugees, deprived of their livelihoods, continue to put pressure on local resources and compete with local households for the few available agricultural and non-agricultural job opportunities. These displaced people have increased the available labor force in the eastern provinces, while job opportunities are very limited, leading to an oversupply of labor and a decrease in income levels. Moreover, the impacts of flooding, including the destruction of crop fields, the loss of livestock swept away by the floods, and damage to road infrastructure, have affected not only the livelihoods of host households but also the delivery of food assistance to the refugee camps. Half of the Goz-Amir refugee camp in Sila has also been flooded (UNHCR).

Flooding:

The heavy rains since early July have caused flooding across all provinces of Chad, particularly affecting the provinces of Lac, Mandoul, Moyen Chari, Tandjilé, Mayo-Kebbi Est, and Batha. More than 1,941,869 people have been affected, and over 432,000 hectares of cropland have been destroyed. In addition, more than 70,000 head of livestock have been killed (OCHA). The ongoing floods and the destruction of crop fields have impacted agricultural production, which is in the maturation and harvesting phase. In the south, and in agricultural and agropastoral areas such as Lac, harvesting and preparations for the cold off-season campaign have been disrupted by floodwaters. Crop yields have decreased, and delays in transplanting the sorghum seedlings for the lowland season are reported in most areas. In addition, road infrastructure has also been damaged, particularly the destruction of several bridges in the southern part of the country. The rising water levels in the ouadis hinder access to various communities and refugee camps. By the end of September, the total rainfall was above average compared to the last 30 years, with a widespread increase in the water levels of the Logone and Chari rivers (Figure 4). 

Agricultural production: 

Despite the late onset of rainfall in the Sudanian and Sahelian zones, with dry spells in some areas, the total rainfall in 2024 was above average and marked by floods affecting all 25 provinces of the country. Crops have been affected, and preparations for the off-season campaign have been delayed due to the floods. According to Chad's Meteorological Service, during the second 10-day period of September rainfall totals in Logone Oriental and Mandoul ranged from 1,000 to 1,200 mm, with some areas in the far south receiving between 1,200 and 1,400 mm. In Logone Occidental, Tandjilé, and Salamat, rainfall was estimated to range from 800 to 1,000 mm. The Sahelian belt received between 100 and 500 mm of rain. In the Lac Province, significant losses of agricultural land have been reported. The areas of farmland have been reduced due to the heavy flooding, particularly the agricultural perimeters of dune lands cultivated by small-scale producers. In Salamat and the Sahelo-Saharan belt, losses of farmland due to flooding have also been reported. 

The floods have destroyed more than 432,800 hectares of crops, leading to a decrease in agricultural production (OCHA). Thus, the expected cereal production for 2024/25 is likely to fall within the lower range of the latest estimates by the Directorate of Agricultural Planning and Statistics at PREGEC, around 2.5 million metric tons. This would represent a further annual decrease of 5 percent compared to the previous 2023/24 season and a 9 percent decline compared to the five-year average. In the non-flooded areas, as of September, the crops are at different phenological stages. The cereals, sesame, and peanuts are at the stages of flowering, maturation, and harvest, respectively. Furthermore, the income generated from selling their own agricultural products will not yield much for poor and very poor households, as their production will mainly be reserved for self-consumption, with little left for sale.    

Livestock production:

After a prolonged pastoral lean season caused by the delayed onset of the rainy season, heavy rainfall has improved pastoral conditions. The pastures are well-developed, and the water points are replenished, which has improved the feed quality and body condition of livestock. An excess of biomass has been observed in the agropastoral and transhumance areas, due to an excellent level of grass cover promoted by the above-average rainfall (ACF). A good availability of dairy products, including butter, has been reported in these areas. In addition, vaccination campaigns against contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) and peste des petits ruminants (PPR) have been carried out by the Ministry of Livestock, helping to maintain a stable zoonotic situation. However, the difficulty in supplying domestic markets, limited by flooding, high transportation costs, and the depreciation of the naira, has contributed to a decline in export demand to Nigeria, particularly for goats and large ruminants. Despite the improvement in livestock body conditions, animal prices have not improved and remain lower than last year and the five-year average. The transhumance cycle is almost typical and favorable conditions in their areas of origin have allowed households to access pastoral resources in these areas.  

Sources of off-own-farm income: 

Most sources of income have declined due to the floods and limited employment opportunities. Agricultural labor remains the main source of income for very poor and poor households. The impact of the floods on the availability of agricultural work opportunities, particularly harvesting activities, varies depending on the damage observed in each locality and province. In the agricultural and agropastoral areas where floods have affected a large number of people, particularly in Lac, Mandoul, Moyen-Chari, Tandjilé, and Mayo-Kebbi, work opportunities are decreasing due to flooded fields. The seasonal supply of agricultural labor is higher than in a normal year, resulting in a decrease in wages. In the refugee-hosting provinces in the eastern part of the country, the oversupply of labor and competition for the few available opportunities will lead to a decrease in wages, from 750-800 CFA compared to an average of 1,500 CFA in a normal year. 

Income from the sale of firewood and other forest products is very limited due to the floods, which restrict access to collection sites. Similarly, the difficulty of accessing major cities due to the floods temporarily limits the income generated from the sale of charcoal. The continued destruction of the environment and competition among very poor households relying on these income sources also contribute to further impoverishment. 

In the Sahel, income from the sale of small ruminants is below average despite the improvement in livestock body conditions, particularly for livestock exports due to the depreciation of the naira and disruptions in trade flows to Nigeria caused by security issues. 

Market supply:

The flow of supplies to the markets at the beginning of the harvest season is still low due to disruptions in access roads caused by the floods and high transportation costs. However, as the waters recede and the harvest progresses, the volume of local products supplied to the markets will increase seasonally, particularly in agricultural and agropastoral areas. In the eastern part of the country, in the areas hosting Sudanese refugees, the supply of food products in the markets remains below normal levels. In the food-deficit areas of the Sahel, the supply of food products remains low due to the floods and the increase in fuel prices. In addition, security disruptions along the border with Libya are also slowing down the supply of manufactured and imported food products that feed the markets in Kanem, Bahr El Gazal, Batha, and Ouaddaï. In Lac, insecurity continues to disrupt trade flows and market operations, reducing the availability of food products in the markets. Due to high demand for food products, cereal prices remain elevated compared to the five-year average (Figure 5). In Bahr El Ghazal, the price of millet has increased by 146 percent compared to the five-year average, and by 97 percent in Hadjer Lamis, while sorghum prices have risen by 95 percent in Mandoul and 120 percent in Guéra. However, with the availability of harvests, prices on most markets in the country are expected to decrease seasonally but generally remain above the five-year average.

For livestock markets, the supply of animals to local markets is average due to limited movement of the animals caused by the floods and weak local demand. Moreover, the sharp rise in cereal prices on the markets has worsened the Terms of Trade compared to last year and the five-year average. They remain unfavorable to livestock farmers (Figure 6). For exports to Nigeria, the main destination for Chadian livestock, the persistence of insecurity along the border with Niger and Nigeria has led to the use of the corridor passing through Cameroon. The high cost of this long detour and the depreciation of the Nigerian naira have led to a decrease in export demand for livestock, resulting in lower income for livestock farmers. 

Household purchasing power: 

During the harvest period, the self-consumption of harvested products is the main source of food for poor and very poor households. However, due to the limited quantity available, the market remains an important source of food, particularly for very poor households. In agricultural and agropastoral areas where floods have destroyed crop fields, opportunities for hiring labor are limited, resulting in lower incomes. Intensification of other sources of income has been largely affected by oversupply and pressure on scarce resources (collection and sale of faggots, gathering of wild produce). In the Sahara, cross-border trade and migration, the main sources of income, are affected by the impact of security measures, as is income from artisanal gold panning. In the Sahel region, a predominantly agropastoral and pastoral zone, income from livestock sales remains moderate due to the depreciation of the Nigerian naira and the relative drop in demand for livestock exports. The low incomes of poor and very poor households in the face of still-high food prices, and of livestock-raising households whose terms of trade are at their disadvantage, illustrate their very limited purchasing capacity. 

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

The continuing influx of Sudanese refugees due to the Sudanese crisis and the impact of the floods have increased the need for food aid. The floods, affecting all 23 provinces of Chad, affected more than 1,941,869 people and led to 576 deaths. The number of people affected by the floods, coupled with the continuing influx of Sudanese refugees into the country's eastern provinces, has maintained high food assistance needs in a context where funding for humanitarian aid has not been able to keep up. As of October 1, emergency funding received by humanitarian organizations to cope with the impact of the floods was only 16 percent of what was needed (OCHA).

The floods have also impacted the distribution of food aid to refugee camps. Rising water levels, making roads impassable, led to the suspension of food aid distribution in the Dougui, Alacha, and Arkoum camps in September. In addition, insufficient funding for humanitarian operations, coupled with road access difficulties caused by flooding, led to protests from refugees at the Milé camps, following a three-month interruption in humanitarian assistance (June to August), and Touloum, in August 2024. According to the partial food assistance data available, around 27 percent of the population receives food aid in the form of subsistence and/or cash transfers in Assongha. Similarly, according to key informants, a large proportion of the population continues to receive food aid in Kimiti. Food aid coverage in the provinces of Wadi Fira and Ennedi-Est is below 10 percent. 

In Lac, emergency food assistance operations for IDPs and the host community were scaled back due to funding difficulties. Available data from the first half of 2024 showed that only 8.5 percent of the population received emergency food aid. 

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est provinces: 

The influx of Sudanese refugees and returning Chadians, deprived of their means of livelihood in these four provinces, continues to put pressure on harvest work opportunities and is exacerbated by the impacts of flooding. Due to the surplus of labor, competition for the few agricultural and non-agricultural job opportunities can only generate meager incomes. Despite the beginning of the harvest period, refugees have no agricultural production and rely on the markets for their food source. However, the prices of basic food products are still atypically high due to the limited supply in the markets at the beginning of the harvest season, along with difficulties caused by floods and the rising cost of transportation. Thus, refugees' access to food is limited, leading to food consumption deficits despite the use of negative coping strategies. However, refugees' dependence on food aid reduces their consumption deficits. In Assongha, food aid covers 27 percent of the population. In Sila, particularly in Kimiti, according to key informants, despite the difficulties in delivering assistance, a high proportion of refugees continue to benefit from cash transfers. As a result, Assongha and Kimiti are in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!). The other departments of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est, where households cannot meet their food consumption needs without resorting to Crisis-level coping strategies, are experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Furthermore, certain categories of households, estimated to be less than 15 percent of the population in these areas, are resorting to Emergency-level coping strategies and are experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. 

Host households have access to harvests that allow them to improve their food consumption and meet their energy needs, but not their non-food expenditures, particularly in the departments of Ouara (Ouaddaï) and Biltine (Wadi Fira). These two departments are Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

Lac: 

The floods have affected more than 277,409 people and caused population displacement. This exacerbates the vulnerability of IDPs, who are forced into further movements. These floods have caused significant degradation, and sometimes even the loss, of the livelihoods of IDPs and host households, particularly affecting agricultural areas and livestock. These floods have also impacted access to various areas, slowing down market supplies, which IDPs, host households, and those affected by the disaster depend on. Thus, the impact of the conflicts and floods on their livelihoods limits their income. Faced with the atypical increases in prices, these households experience consumption deficits despite resorting to negative coping strategies. Furthermore, in the absence of recent nutritional data, SMART surveys conducted between May and July 2023 in the localities of Liwa, Bagasola, and Bol showed a deterioration in the nutritional situation, indicative of a Critical outcomes. The prevalences of acute malnutrition were very high and high, respectively: 19.3 percent, 15.7 percent, and 12.4 percent. As a result, poor host households and IDPs are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

Bahr el Ghazal and Kanem:

These departments are in deficit, and poor and very poor households depend on the markets. Harvests are underway in the producing areas, and market supplies with local products are still low, limited by the impact of floods on the condition of the roads. Furthermore, the decrease in supply from Libya is driving up food prices. However, these floods have improved pastoral conditions, fostering good physical condition in livestock and enhancing their market value. Despite the low export demand to Nigeria and the increase of market food prices, income from livestock sales allows households to cover their food expenditures. However, they cannot meet their non-food needs without resorting to negative coping strategies. They are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

Northern provinces (Borkou, Ennedi Ouest, Tibesti):

Households in these provinces are largely dependent on the markets for their food consumption. Cross-border trade, money transfers from migration in Libya, and work in gold mining sites are their main sources of income. However, due to security measures at the borders and restrictions on gold mining sites, income from these activities is limited and decreasing. Furthermore, these security measures also affect the flow of imported manufactured food products from Libya that supply the markets in these areas. Internal flows are low due to the impact of floods on crops and the condition of the roads. As a result, food prices are atypically high, limiting households' access to food. Despite resorting to negative coping strategies, such as limiting the number of meals per day, they are facing food consumption deficits and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. 

Sudanian zone:

The harvests from the ongoing rainy season are helping to replenish household stocks, despite the expected decline in agricultural production due to flooding. The food consumption of very poor and poor households is improving with the consumption of their own harvest. Thus, they will be able to meet their food needs without resorting to negative coping strategies, and they are facing Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. 

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions 

• According to the joint forecasts from the USGS and NOAA made during the mid-season, dry spells of varying length are expected toward the end of the season in agricultural areas. 
• Decreases in rainfall production could be reported in agricultural areas, particularly in the Sudanian zone and around Lac, due to the impacts of flooding during the season. Thus, household food stocks will deplete quickly (by January 2025), compared to April-May in a typical year.
• The off-season agricultural campaign will be affected by the low availability of nurseries due to the heavy rainfall during the season, which hindered their development. This will be worsened by the delayed retreat of floodwaters, which will restrict planting, even though moisture levels are favorable. Off-season production would be significantly lower than in a normal year.
• Despite these constraints, the economic outlook will remain favorable due to the oil sector, with a projected GDP growth of 5.2 percent in 2024 and 5.3 percent in 2025 (AfDB). Inflation could decrease in the coming months, although it is likely to remain above the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) target of 3 percent. However, the volatility of global oil prices in the context of geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East and around the Black Sea, insecurity within the country and the region, and recent agroclimatic incidents are the main risks weighing on the economic outlook. 
• Fuel price increases, following the removal of subsidies, would sustain the rise in transportation costs and impact both people's mobility and the transport of goods.
• Income from most sources will likely decline due to reduced production, as well as competition among households for the collection of wild produce, the volumes of which would also decrease. 
• A slight seasonal decline in food prices will likely be observed between October and the end of November, coinciding with the harvest. However, prices will likely remain higher than the five-year average and last year due to demand pressure resulting from low availability (Figure 7). Localized price trends exceeding the average by 50 percent or more could be reported in some Sahelian markets, and in West Sahel as early as November 2024.
• On most livestock markets, supply will likely be relatively higher than in a normal year due to the halt in exports to Sudan and transportation costs affecting the decline in exports to Nigeria and Cameroon. The depreciation of the Nigerian naira, coupled with insecurity along export routes to Nigeria, will likely sustain weak local demand. 
• Despite the good condition of the livestock, income from the sale of small ruminants will likely be lower than in a normal year due to oversupply in the market during the first period of the scenario. However, despite occasional price increases during festive periods (end-of-year holidays and Ramadan), sales revenues will likely remain lower, despite intense buying activity.

Assumptions for the eastern provinces (Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est)

• The continuation of the conflict in Sudan, particularly in the Greater Darfur region, is expected to lead to new refugee flows into Chad and further prolong the halt of lawful cross-border trade with Sudan. 
• The livelihoods of populations in host areas will likely continue to deteriorate throughout the scenario period due to the ongoing influx of Sudanese refugees and returning Chadians, which will likely increase pressure on resources and intensify competition for opportunities. 

Assumptions for the agropastoral zone, fishing (Lac Province)

• The incursions by the Islamic State in West Africa are expected to remain at their current level until May 2025, but well below the trends observed during the previous five years (2017–2021). Isolated incursions could be observed but will likely be countered by defense and security forces, whose positions have been strengthened following recent attacks in the province. 
• The contributions from off-season crops will likely not be enough to offset the gaps caused by the low planting areas due to the late withdrawal of waters from arable land, particularly in the lake's inlet areas.

Assumptions for the Sudanian zone

• Isolated clashes between farmers and herders could be observed, or even increase during the harvest season, due to the presence of pastoralists who are tending to settle and whose livestock could invade the cultivated fields. This will be widely observed in the Moyen Chari, Mandoul, Tandjilé, and the two Logone regions.

Humanitarian food assistance 

National assumption

• Despite the ongoing influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian migrants returning from Sudan, and the funding difficulties faced by humanitarian actors, according to historical trends in distribution and information gathered from humanitarian partners, emergency food aid will likely remain available throughout the duration of the outlook. 

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est: 

Between October 2024 and May 2025, the regular influx of refugees and returning migrants will likely continue to exacerbate the deterioration of livelihoods in the host areas. Despite the harvests that will seasonally improve food consumption for host households between October 2024 and January 2025, due to the early depletion of household stocks, they will rely on markets between February and May 2025. However, refugees and returnees will continue to put pressure on the livelihoods of host communities and compete for the few opportunities for agricultural and non-agricultural labor. Thus, due to the oversupply of labor, income from these activities will remain low. Moreover, due to the rise in prices of basic food products, and despite the seasonal price decline during the first period of analysis, access to markets is limited for refugees, and they will depend on food assistance for their sources of food. The volume of food aid will be insufficient relative to needs, but is expected to continue throughout the outlook period despite the funding challenges faced by humanitarian organizations. Thus, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) will persist in the departments of Assongha and Kimiti, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in the other eastern departments and provinces until May 2025. An increasing number of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will be reported until May 2025, though the proportion will remain below 15 percent of the population in these areas.

Lac: 

Between October 2024 and May 2025, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in the Lac Province. Civil insecurity, which has led to population displacement, was exacerbated by flooding that not only damaged crop fields and infrastructure but also displaced host households and individuals who had previously been displaced by attacks from NSAGs. The destruction of crops will lead to a decline in harvests, which will prevent households from replenishing their stocks. Households and IDPs will rely on markets for their food sources and will face rising food prices. Due to the decline in income, IDPs and host households will likely experience gaps in food consumption. They will be unable to meet their consumption needs without resorting to negative coping strategies and will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) throughout the outlook period.

Sahel Ouest:

Between October 2024 and January 2025, favorable rainfall will improve pasture and water points for livestock. This will likely improve livestock conditions as well as their market value. However, the increase in supply on the markets, due to reduced export demand to Nigeria and the devaluation of the naira, will not improve livestock sales. Thus, income from sales will support food consumption, but households will not be able to afford essential non-food expenditures, resulting in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. 

Between February and May 2025, access to markets will likely be significantly reduced due to the low purchasing power of very poor and poor households, most of whose income sources have deteriorated. Indeed, this period coincides with the pastoral lean season, during which pasture become scarce and livestock conditions will further deteriorate. Moreover, the volume of domestic cereal flows from other provinces would continue to be impacted by high transportation costs and flooding, as well as the import flow from Libya due to increased security measures at the borders. This will lead to a rise in the prices of basic foodstuffs and these households will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

The Sahara: 

Between October 2024 and May 2025, security conditions at the borders will not improve, affecting trade and cross-border migration, which are key sources of income for households. They will face the erosion of their main sources of income and will continue to have limited access to markets for food products imported from Libya, which form the basis of their food consumption. Furthermore, market supply with local cereals will be limited by the expected decline in harvests from producing areas and the high cost of transportation, leading to an atypical rise in prices. As a result, they will face food consumption deficits, resort to Crisis coping strategies, and remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) throughout the outlook period.

Agricultural areas of the South: 

Between October 2024 and January 2025, the availability of harvests will improve food consumption for most households, resulting in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. 

Between February and May 2025, households in the flooded areas of Mandoul, Mayo Kebbi East, and Chari Baguirmi will only have stocks sufficient to cover their food expenditures, but not non-food expenditures. They will face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, while Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes will persist in the other provinces.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Incursions by rebel groups at the northern borders of the country 

Probable impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Clashes between rebel groups and government forces would lead to security restrictions at the borders between Chad and Libya. This would result in a significant decline in the flow of food products imported from Libya and in the availability of these products on the markets. Food access for very poor and poor households would be further reduced due to low income levels. This will lead to an increase in the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the Western Sahel. In areas hosting refugees and returning migrants, the number of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will increase. 

Lull in hostilities in Sudan

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A halt in fighting in Sudan would limit the number of people fleeing to Chad in search of refuge. This would ease pressure on resources and reduce competition for existing opportunities. A gradual recovery of severely degraded livelihoods would be observed. The number of refugee and returnee households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would decrease.

Strengthening of humanitarian interventions through substantial donor financial support 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Adequate funding from donors to humanitarian actors will strengthen assistance operations for refugees and returning migrants in the eastern part of the country. This will enable the development of response actions benefiting refugee and migrant households, as well as host populations. Humanitarian operations could thus meet the needs of these populations and contain the ongoing waves of new refugees. Household food consumption would improve, and most provinces in the east would experience Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes.

Resumption of humanitarian action in Lac 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A revival of food interventions for IDPs and host households in Lac would reduce the number of populations in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Their food consumption would be improved and they would enter Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes with assistance.

Reason for selecting this area: The Sudanese crisis since April 2023 has severely affected Chad, particularly in the country's eastern provinces, which are already suffering from shortfalls in agricultural production and a harsh pastoral lean season. In addition to the closure of common borders and its impact on cross-border flows, politico-military violence in Sudan is causing waves of regular influxes of Sudanese refugees and Chadian migrants to Chad. Chad's eastern provinces are home to over 681,944 Sudanese refugees and 213,339 Chadian returnees. This IDP/returnee presence is exacerbating the deterioration of the livelihoods of local populations.

Sudanese crisis: 

The ongoing conflicts in Sudan continue to cause significant inflows of new refugees and returning Chadian migrants. As of October 14, 681,944 refugees and 213,339 returning Chadian migrants have been registered, primarily in the three eastern provinces of the country which border Sudan. The Ouaddaï Province is hosting over 476,000 people, the majority of whom are refugees. The refugees are deprived of their means of livelihood, which leaves them in financial precariousness and increasingly market dependent for their food needs. However, the supply of food products in the markets is still low during this early harvest period, exacerbated by the impact of floods on supply. The reduced supply leads to a rise in prices, further limiting refugees' access to food. Recently, the intensification of the conflict in Sudan, particularly the fighting in the border areas adjacent to the Wadi Fira Province, has led to a surge in the influx of refugees. 

Agricultural situation:

The sowing carried out in mid-July, encouraged by the good levels of rainfall recorded in July, is characterized by an expansion of cultivated areas. However, most of the sowings were destroyed by the intense rainfall with excessive accumulations at the end of July, which disrupted maintenance work. In the Assongha department, since the end of August, replanting has had to be carried out following crop losses at the beginning of the season. The floods have caused the destruction of fields and delayed maintenance work on crops that were not destroyed in the eastern provinces. The harvest of rain-fed crops has begun; however, the volumes collected are still low.

Pastoral situation and livestock movements:

The good rainfall has favored an excess of biomass and a significant level of water availability in reservoirs. This good availability of resources improves the condition of the livestock and maintains the herders in the Kimiti and Ouara departments, as well as around Abdi. Thus, the transhumance cycle is expected to be similar to a typical year, compared to the early trends observed in recent years. 

Sources of income: 

A general erosion of income levels is observed due to the combined effects of labor surplus, pressure on resources, and competition for employment opportunities between refugees and host households, particularly visible in Adré due to the continuous influx of refugees. As a result, daily wages have decreased from 1,000 FCFA to 750 FCFA, compared to 2,000 FCFA in a normal year. In Kimiti, the loss of cultivated areas due to flooding has exacerbated the decline in agricultural labor income. 

Sources of food: 

Refugees are largely dependent on humanitarian assistance, while host households rely on their own harvests. However, market purchases and foraging for wild produce are other sources of food, both for host households and refugees. 

Humanitarian assistance: 

The deployment of seasonal assistance for vulnerable host households facing food insecurity during the lean season was planned to start in June. However, in August, poor road access caused by floodwaters hindered the distribution of WFP aid to 274,665 targeted individuals. In addition, the poor condition of the roads caused by the floods also made it difficult for humanitarian organizations to access refugee camps for food assistance distribution, particularly for the camps in Dougui, Alacha, and Arkoum in Ouaddaï, and Zabout and Djabal in Sila. In light of this difficulty, OCHA made a cargo flight available to transport assistance to areas with limited accessibility. 

The limited funding for assistance continues to restrict the volume of aid provided to Sudanese refugees. In general, the food aid consists either of the distribution of food rations, including 7.5 kg of cereals, 3 kg of legumes, 0.25 g of salt, and 1 liter of oil, or a cash transfer of 8,000 FCFA per person per month. Due to the concentration of refugees in the Assongha department, according to partial data collected, approximately 27 percent of the population in this department is receiving food aid. The Kimiti department also receives significant food assistance, according to key informants.

Food insecurity outcomes between October 2024 and January 2025: 

The food availability of host households is expected to be strengthened by harvests and foraged products, thus improving their seasonal food consumption. Refugees will likely continue to experience consumption gaps despite coping strategies such as meal sharing, which reduces the amount of calories consumed, and the sale of personal items. The intensification of begging, along with the pressure on available natural resources, would yield only very limited amounts of food. In response to the erosion of main sources of income due to pressure on the scarce resources available, as well as competition for employment opportunities, refugees will likely employ negative coping strategies. However, the departments of Assongha and Kimiti are in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) due to food aid, and the other departments of Ouaddaï and Sila, as well as the provinces of Wadi Fira and Ennedi Est, are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with pockets of populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). 

Food insecurity outcomes between February and May 2025: 

Host households will likely begin to intensify market purchases due to stock declines for some and exhaustion for others, as well as the low availability of off-season harvests. They also depend on markets for their food sources. Competition from poor and very poor households with refugees for scarce employment opportunities will exacerbate the decline in labor income. Moreover, their food consumption will deteriorate. Furthermore, the situation of the refugees will not improve with the continuous influx of new Sudanese refugees fleeing the conflict. The volume of food aid, on which the refugees depend, willy likely be insufficient but should continue despite the funding difficulties. As a result, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist.