Influx of Sudanese refugees into the eastern provinces maintaining Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes

• Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in the eastern provinces, Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est, which are hosting Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees. The steady influx of refugees and returning migrants is straining livelihoods and intensifying competition for the few available economic opportunities; they have limited access to food and income sources due to their low purchasing power and must rely on food assistance. 
• The influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees into the eastern provinces will increase the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance, despite host households having access to food from their own production during the harvest period in September. FEWS NET estimates that 2.0 to 2.5 million people will need food aid during the lean season from June to August 2024. 
• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are also anticipated in West Sahel, Lac, and the provinces bordering Libya in the Sahara. Insecurity is causing population displacement and disrupting agricultural activities in the Lac Region. In West Sahel and the Sahara, disruptions in the flow of goods from Libya and internal trade due to rising fuel prices are affecting market supplies, leading to a significant increase in food prices in these regions.
• Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes observed in the southern agricultural areas in June will subsequently transition to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) as stocks deplete during the lean season (June to September 2024). However, despite the irregular distribution of the precipitations, average to above-average rainfall are anticipated to support average cereal production for the 2024-2025 agricultural season. 

The influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees into Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est provinces has resulted in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in these provinces. These displaced populations strain livelihoods and drive competition for the few available economic opportunities. This results in low incomes, limiting access to food items as they rely on markets as their source of food. To mitigate food consumption deficits, these refugees mainly rely on food aid. As of late June 2024, the eastern provinces of Chad host over 617,000 Sudanese refugees and nearly 174,000 Chadian returnees, with more than 70 percent of the refugees registered in Ouaddaï Province alone (Figure 1). Due to the high proportion of refugees in the Assoungha, Ouaddaï, and Kimiti departments of Sila, and the pressures these refugees exert on livelihoods, these two departments are in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!). Between September 2024 and January 2025, an improvement in food availability for host households is expected due to the harvest period. This improvement slightly reduces the number of people in need, but the impact of the influx of Sudanese refugees in these eastern provinces will continue to affect livelihoods as well as the prices of basic food products. 

In the Lac Region, the resurgence of civil insecurity due to attacks by non-state armed groups is leading to the displacement of populations and exacerbating the deterioration of livelihoods. IDPs and host households face income erosion due to pressure on available resources and competition for existing employment opportunities. The access of host households and displaced individuals to markets is reduced due to decreased purchasing power amid rising prices of essential food products. 

In southern agricultural areas, due to the depletion of stocks during the lean season, households rely on markets for food while food prices are high. Despite delays in rainfall exacerbated by dry spells in agricultural areas early in the season, average to above-average rainfall is forecasted across the country and average cereal production is expected starting in September. Households will have access to cereal products from their harvests, which will improve food consumption starting in late September. Thus, Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected.

In pastoral and agropastoral regions, the late start to the season has made the lean period especially difficult. Livestock body conditions have worsened considerably because of the scarcity of pasture and water sources. The market value of livestock is falling as pastoralist households face high food prices. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected between June and September 2024 in Kanem and Bahr el Gazel provinces. However, favorable rains starting in July will improve pasture and water sources. Thus, the physical condition of the animals should improve, and their market value should increase. In addition, households also have access to dairy products. However, the improvement in food consumption remains limited due to rising food prices in these traditionally deficit areas and disruptions in the supply of both imported and local products to the markets. Security disruptions at the Libyan border, following the government's reinforcement of military positions, have reduced cross-border trade. This is exacerbated by high transportation costs due to rising fuel prices, which limit the volume of imported food products flowing into the Saharan and Sahelian areas. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist between October 2024 and January 2025. 

Food assistance from partners is primarily directed towards Sudanese refugees in the eastern provinces of the country. Due to the challenges humanitarian organizations face in mobilizing funds—estimated at 18.7 percent of the total 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan in June 2024 (OCHA)—the distribution of emergency food assistance has been irregular in the eastern provinces, and has even stopped in the Lac Province since April 2024. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host households in the Lac Province have not received emergency food assistance. However, since the start of the influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees in April 2023, WFP has distributed food and cash transfers to 541,909 refugees, 110,561 returnees, and 55,939 very poor host households. 

Learn more

The analysis presented here is based on the information available as of June 2024. The following links provide additional information: 

• Latest Food Security Outlook February - September 2024
• Latest Key Messages Update April 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET's scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET's approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Conflict resulting from attacks by terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin, rebels along the borders with Libya and the Central African Republic, and intercommunal conflicts in the Sudanese region are impacting livelihoods, trade flows, and market operations. In Lac, ongoing insecurity since 2015 caused by attacks from the Islamic State West Africa Province has led to the abandonment of arable land, population displacement, and restrictions on fishing activities in Lake Chad. In the north, sporadic attacks by rebels since 2016, including the Front for Alternance and Concord (FACT) and the Front for National Democracy and Justice in Chad (FNDJT), although managed by security forces, continue to disrupt trade flows from Libya. This disruption of cross-border flows reduces market supplies in deficit areas, especially the northern provinces and the Kanem and Bahr el Gazal regions. Frequent intercommunal conflicts in the Sudanian region disrupt agricultural production activities. These conflicts sometimes lead to population displacements. 

The Sudanese conflict, which began in April 2023, has led to an influx of Sudanese refugees and returning Chadians into the eastern provinces of Chad, particularly Ouaddai, Sila, and Wadi Fira. Since the start of the conflict in Sudan, more than 617,000 refugees and 174,000 returnees have arrived in Chad. As long as the Sudanese conflict continues, the number of refugees and returnees will keep increasing, placing additional pressure on food and income sources. Deprived of their livelihoods and needing to meet their food consumption needs, refugees heavily depend on food aid from humanitarian organizations, which have recently faced increasingly limited funding. The regular influx of these refugees keeps the number of people in need high. 

The livelihoods of households in Chad are mainly dominated by agriculture and livestock. Agricultural and cereal production, which is predominant in both the Sudanian agricultural areas and agropastoral zones, is highly sensitive to rainfall variability, especially droughts and floods. Intercommunal conflict in the south and armed groups in the Lac Region also impacts these areas. The start of the outlook period in June coincides with the lean season when household stocks have been depleted and staple food prices are high. Trader stocks are also decreasing, and there is a high demand for food imports to supply the markets. Starting in September, household food consumption will improve as they gain access to the new harvest. In pastoral areas, July marks the end of the pastoral lean season. With the regeneration of pastures and the replenishment of water sources, livestock conditions will improve, as will their market value. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision-makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision-makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section. 

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition 

Key hazards 

Conflict: The conflict and insecurity in the Lac Region, caused by attacks from armed groups along the northern borders, rebel activities, and intercommunal conflicts in the Moyen Chari and Logone Oriental provinces, disrupt livelihoods and market operations. The resurgence of attacks by non-state armed groups in Lac and security restrictions prevent deep-water fishing and limit catch volumes. Productive activities and internal flows are disrupted by ongoing insecurity, particularly in the departments of Fouli, Kaya, and Mamdi. Additionally, in the Sahara (Borkou, Ennedi Ouest, Tibesti provinces), security restrictions related to artisanal gold panning have reduced the operation of this activity. The strengthening of the positions of the defense and security forces since August 2023, aimed at preventing rebel incursions, continues to disrupt the livelihoods of households in the area. Poor households in the Sahel (Bahr El Ghazel, Kanem, Wadi Fira, and Ouaddaï) are also affected by the impacts of security measures in the northern provinces. In the Sudanian zone, the Moyen Chari and Logone Oriental provinces are facing intercommunal conflicts between farmers and herders as of March 2024. These conflicts have resulted in the loss of life and several agricultural products, the displacement of people, and the destruction of property. The resurgence of these community conflicts is a threat, particularly at a time when agricultural activities are commencing. 

Refugee crisis: The influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees due to the persistence of the Sudanese crisis continues to compromise the livelihoods of households in Sudan's border areas. According to UNHCR, the eastern provinces of Chad continue to host Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees since the start of the conflict in Sudan (Figure 3). More than 70 percent of the refugees are in Ouaddaï Province, most of whom are concentrated in the Assoungha departments and Kimiti (Sila Province), but other provinces, such as Wadi Fira and Ennedi Est, also host refugees. Refugees and returnees are placing constant pressure on resources which are insufficient to meet the needs of the population due to competition between host households and displaced populations (refugees and returnees). 

Agroclimatic conditions: The current rainy season is characterized by delays during the start of the season, which are exacerbated by dry spells in southern agricultural areas. This has affected the start of rainfed agricultural activities

Crop production: The start of the season has been marked by the delayed onset of rainfall in the Sudanian zone, accompanied by prolonged dry spells. Much of the southern agricultural area has below-average rainfall accumulation (Figure 4). This has delayed the start of agricultural activities (land clearing, plowing, planting) until late May or early June, instead of April and May, in the agricultural and agropastoral zones. However, dry spells of 10 to 15 days have been reported in the Logone Basin (Western Logone and Eastern Logone provinces) and Mayo Kebbi. This has led to problems with the initial planting, which could not be carried out in some areas due to financial difficulties in accessing seeds and reducing areas under cultivation; the lack of inputs (seeds, fertilizers) and the absence of agricultural equipment (tractors) has further compounded the situation. Re-planting performed by a few farmers in early June is likely to be affected by delays in the growing cycle.

In the Lac Region, dry sowing of millet on sandy lands, which began in early June, continues in the localities of Ngouri and Liwa. Maize planting on unprepared polder lands managed by small-scale farmers takes place during the first dekad of June 2024. However, the current shortage of fuel is affecting irrigation work and disrupting crop development. The sowing of maize on the prepared polders of Bagasola and Bol by the Lake Development Company (SODELAC) was carried out with the first rains, recorded on June 11. Unlike polders held by small-scale producers, irrigation of those managed by SODELAC continues with diesel made available by contractual suppliers. Initial germination has been observed; the plants are at the two-leaf stage.

In the Bahr Azoum (Am Timan) and Abtouyour (Bitkine) departments, dry sowing of millet and sorghum was carried out in agropastoral areas between late May and early June. The rainfall recorded during the second dekad of the month has allowed for the irrigation of crops which are now at the tillering stage. In the departments of Abdi and Djourouf Al Ahmar, preparatory work for the season began with the onset of the rainy season in early June. 

Animal production: The severe lean season, which started early, continues due to the delayed onset of the rainy season. Livestock body conditions have deteriorated considerably due to the scarcity of pasture and water sources. Access to supplemental feed is heavily restricted due to high prices and limited availability in local markets resulting from reduced imports. 

In the agropastoral zone, livestock body conditions are significantly below normal. Animals are relying on the foliage of shrubs and other thorny plants. In these areas, animals travel an average of 10 km between the few grazing spots and water wells. The rainfall expected around mid-July should promote the improvement of pastures and the initial filling of temporary water bodies. This will help improve pastoral conditions, ensuring better nourishment for the animals.

The return of transhumant herders to their traditional sites has been delayed due to the late onset of the season in the Sudanese region and poor pastoral conditions in the Sahelian zone. Most herders are extending their stay beyond the typical late May/early June timeframe. Herders are delaying their movement towards the Sahelian zones to take advantage of the regrowth of grasses and water sources in the southern part of the country.

Off-own-farm sources of income: Agricultural labor, a key income source for very poor and poor households in the Sudanian zone, is lower than normal this year due to an oversupply of labor. 

Production deficits from the previous season, combined with the return of seasonal migrants from major urban centers, have led to a significant increase in the sale of labor by very poor and poor households. This has resulted in an oversupply of individuals seeking income to acquire inputs (seeds, fertilizers) and access food markets during the lean season. The oversupply impacts income levels: daily wages for planting work currently range from 750 to 1,000 FCFA, compared to an average of 1,500 FCFA in a normal year. 

In the Sahel, incomes from artisanal gold panning are declining due to regular expulsions by defense and security forces. Sales of small ruminants generate very low incomes due to the poor physical condition of the animals and the ongoing depreciation of the Nigerian naira, affecting the value of livestock exported to Nigeria.

In most areas of the country, the pressure on resources (such as collecting straw and firewood) from the increased involvement of very poor and poor households reduces their availability. This pressure, intensified by competition among households seeking income to access markets, also reduces the income generated from these resources.

Decreased opportunities (domestic jobs, public and private construction) in migration destinations within the country, along with deteriorating security conditions in host countries, limit the income derived from migration in the Sahelian region. 

Market supply: The volume of food supplies on most markets is lower than normal due to a 7.2 percent production deficit recorded during the previous season (2023/24) and increased fuel prices resulting from the removal of government subsidies in the oil sector, which has led to higher transportation costs. In the Lac Basin, disruptions to trade flows caused by insecurity are exacerbating the reduction in market supplies (Figure 5). The availability of imported food products (pasta, flour, cooking oil, rice) is significantly below normal levels due to high transportation costs, which reduce the volume of these products flowing into the markets. This results in increased pressure on local cereals, particularly in the Sahelian zone, where cereal deficits are more pronounced compared to other areas in the Sudanian zone. The halt in incoming flows from Sudan has exacerbated the decline in the supply of imported goods in the Sudanese border provinces (Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira). 

In most markets across the country, food prices are rising compared to the five-year average due to significant pressure from reliance on the markets. For example, in May, the price of millet is up by 80 and 85 percent compared to the five-year average in Biltine and Abéché, respectively (Figure 6). Meanwhile, the price of sorghum in Goz Beida in the Dar Sila Region has risen by 78 percent. 

Household purchasing capacity: The erosion of most income sources and increased market reliance limits households' purchasing power. In agricultural areas, income from agricultural labor is expected to decrease significantly due to an oversupply of labor caused by the erosion of other income sources. Despite the intensification of strategies such as collecting and selling firewood, wild products, and crafts during the lean season, the pressure on available resources will yield only minimal income for households due to the small quantities collected. In agropastoral and pastoral areas, weak demand for livestock (especially for export) and the depreciation of the Nigerian naira will continue to limit income for most households. The sale of small ruminants, milk, and butter yields very modest income, lower than normal for this time of year, due to poor livestock body conditions and oversupply during the rainy season.

Nutritional situation: According to IPC AMN data, between June and September 2024, four refugee camps in Wadi Fira and East Ennedi, along with the host population in Iriba (Wadi Fira), were classified as Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4). Twelve refugee camps, primarily located in the departments of Assoungha (Ouaddaï), Kimiti (Sila), and Kaya (Lac), are classified as Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3). The remaining camps are classified as Alert (IPC AMN Phase 2). In refugee-hosting areas, the nutritional situation is largely linked to the continuous arrival of new migrants during this period. These influxes increase the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance and reduce the capacity of humanitarian actors to cover all needs. There is a significant proportion of households not covered by humanitarian assistance that are part of the malnourished population.

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable. 

Food assistance needs are high due to the steady influx of Sudanese refugees into the eastern provinces. The collection of data on the number of beneficiaries and the volumes of food assistance is difficult in these provinces; however, available information from various humanitarian organizations, key informants, and the rapid field assessment leads to the conclusion that these populations are largely dependent on food aid, and that some limited, very poor host households have also received food aid. In May 2024, due to the high concentration of refugees in Assoungha (more than 50 percent of the population) and Kimiti (more than 27 percent of the population), these departments received more food aid than the other provinces. In Assoungha, 29 percent of the total population received food assistance in the form of food or cash transfers. Similarly, in Kimiti, according to qualitative information, a large proportion of the population also received food aid. Refugees in the other departments of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est provinces have also benefited from this food aid. However, the proportion of beneficiaries to the total population is low, at less than 20 percent. In addition, these emergency assistance distribution operations are irregular because of funding difficulties in the face of the ever-increasing numbers of Sudanese refugees. Since the beginning of the emergency period in April 2023 in the eastern provinces, the total number of beneficiaries of food assistance distributed by the WFP is distributed as follows: 541,909 refugees, 110,561 returnees, and 55,939 host populations. In Lac, emergency food aid operations for IDPs were halted in April 2024. 

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Sudanese refugees in Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est provinces are largely dependent on food aid. The influx of refugees and returnees continues to put pressure on the few opportunities for agricultural and non-agricultural work and incomes are also declining. In addition, refugees are facing rising prices for basic foodstuffs. For example, in Adré, the price of millet in May increased by about 52 percent compared to the price in January 2024. As a result, access to food is limited and is driving food consumption deficits. However, due to refugees' dependence on food aid, and to a lesser extent, the solidarity of host households, these consumption gaps are slightly reduced. Due to the amount of food aid received, Assoungha and Kimiti departments are experiencing Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) level outcomes. The other departments Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est provinces are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with pockets of host households and refugees in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

In Lac, the resurgence of insecurity due to attacks since May 2024 is leading to the displacement of populations and the increased deterioration of the livelihoods of displaced individuals and host households. IDPs and host households face an erosion of most income sources due to pressure on available resources and competition for existing employment opportunities. In addition, due to the early depletion of host household stocks since January 2024, they are highly dependent on markets in a context of high food prices. The food situation of displaced and host households has worsened during the lean period. They cannot meet their basic food needs without resorting to negative coping strategies, are facing consumption deficits and are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

In the Western Sahel (Bahr el Gazel and Kanem), food prices are on the rise due to the decline in the inflow of products imported from Libya as a result of reinforced controls on trucks entering Chad. This is exacerbated by high transportation costs and has led to rising food prices. In addition, the sale prices of small ruminants decrease compared to the five-year average, except in Kanem, where prices are slightly above average. Income from seasonal migration and the sale of wild produce is also declining. Given the widespread decline in income from major sources, the purchasing power of very poor and poor households in Bahr El Ghazel and Kanem is declining. This reduces their ability to meet their food needs due to price levels on the cereal markets. In Bahr El Ghazel and Kanem, very poor households face consumption gaps, are adopting negative coping strategies, and are experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. 

In the northern provinces (Borkou, Ennedi Ouest, Tibesti), the volatile security situation in Tibesti is leading to the erosion of the main sources of income (artisanal gold panning, money transfers, migration) of very poor and poor households. The strengthening of government positions since August 2023 to counter rebel movements in the border areas with Libya affect cross-border flows. Despite the intensification of internal cereal flows from the other provinces, local supply is still below normal. Poor and very poor households face consumption deficits due to disruptions to their livelihoods and low income levels that reduce the volumes of food purchased from markets, limiting their food access, and resulting in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. 

In the Sudanian zone, the food consumption of very poor and poor households remains dependent on purchases on the markets, with most households having exhausted their stocks. However, in the rice-growing basin (Tandjilé, Mayo Kebbi), residual stocks from off-season crops provide a fair amount of support for household food consumption. The volumes available can only cover food needs for a short period in June, as part of the harvest is sold on the markets in search of access to financial capital for the start of the new season. Households have minimally adequate food consumption and are experiencing Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes, while the rest of the Sudanian area is in Stressed (IPC Phase 2). 

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions 

• The average to above average rainfall recorded across the country coupled with long dry spells affecting Logone Occidental, the rice-growing basin (Tandjilé, Mayo-Kebbi Est) in Batha-Est, Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira, Sud des deux Ennedi, Lac, and Kanem), as well as an early end to the season, could disrupt agricultural and pastoral activities.
• The intensification of the armed conflict in Sudan, particularly in the El Fasher Region of Greater Darfur, is expected to continue to increase the regular influx of refugees into Chad throughout the analysis period.
• Significant fighting between rebel factions and the government is unlikely until January 2025. Any localized operations conducted by rebel groups in northern Chad should be quickly contained by Chadian security forces.
• In most areas of the country, the trend of increasing prices relative to the five-year average is likely to continue during the rainy season due to pressure on markets. These high price levels would persist in the Sahel and areas hosting Sudanese refugees and Chadian migrants returning to eastern Chad (Figure 7).

• The rise in fuel prices in February 2024, following the lifting of subsidies by the government, will continue to negatively impact transport costs and ultimately the supply and price of basic foodstuffs. During the rainy season, trade flows show a seasonal decline due to the poor state of the road network, which limits traffic. However, the volume of commercial flow would be below average due to high transportation costs resulting from rising fuel prices. 
• Demand for livestock exports to Nigeria remains below normal due to the depreciation of the Nigerian naira and civil insecurity on roads used for transport. However, livestock exports to Nigeria and Cameroon are expected to remain similar to the levels over the past three years.
• Sales of agricultural products during the harvest period would raise agricultural income levels slightly. However, these revenues would remain below normal due to the relatively average production levels expected.

Assumptions for the eastern provinces (Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est)

• The presence of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees in the east of the country would continue to degrade the livelihoods of local populations due to the pressure exerted on the scarce resources available. Competition for access to labor opportunities would lead to low household income levels during the scenario period.
• Increasing demand for land to accommodate a growing population could put pressure on local agropastoral activities in eastern Chad. Isolated conflicts between host populations and Sudanese refugee households may be reported during the analysis period.

Assumptions for the agro-pastoral zone, fishing (Lac Province)

• Sporadic attacks by the Islamic State West Africa Province could be recorded in the Lac Province until the end of the rainy season. However, these attacks are at levels below 2022 and the last five years due to the strengthening of the security system in the province.

Assumptions for the Sudanian zone

• A resurgence of farmer-herder conflicts could be observed at the start of the season, due to the decline in natural resources, leading to competition over access, control, and management. The early return of pastoralists to these localities as early as September would fuel possible clashes between these communities. These conflicts would likely be at levels higher than those in 2023 and similar to 2022. They would be concentrated in Mandoul, Guéra, Logone Oriental, Logone Occidental, and Mayo-Kebbi. Cattle rustling and ongoing tensions between farmers and herders are likely to lead to clashes in Niellim and Kyabé (Moyen-Chari) during the rainy and harvest seasons.

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumption

• Current institutional stocks are estimated at around 10,000 metric tons, according to the Office National de Sécurité Alimentaire (ONASA). Institutional purchases would be made between December 2024 and February 2025 as in a normal year. However, procurement volumes would be lower than actual needs due to budgetary difficulties.

Sub-national assumptions for Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est provinces

• The continuous influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees due to the escalation of the ongoing crisis in Sudan would lead to an increase in humanitarian needs for food and non-food assistance.

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

In the eastern provinces of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi Est the regular influxes of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees will increase additional pressures on the livelihoods of host households in the eastern host areas. In the Assoungha and Kimiti departments, pressure on natural resources (collection of wood and wild products) and competition for employment opportunities (agricultural and non-agricultural labor) would intensify throughout the analysis period. The nutritional status of children and women who are pregnant and breastfeeding would deteriorate due to poor hygienic conditions. The massive use of surface water by new arrivals coupled with food insecurity would contribute to this deterioration. The prevalence of diseases would further increase malnutrition cases in nutritional units during the lean season. These households, which are mainly dependent on food aid, would intensify strategies to compensate for consumption gaps. These coping strategies, which include selling personal possessions, shelter materials, kitchen utensils, and possibly even stealing, would still not allow sufficient access to markets during the lean season. In the departments of Assoungha and Kimiti, food consumption deficits would persist throughout the analysis period, but with food assistance, would remain in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!). The other departments will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), despite the seasonal improvement in consumption of host households who will benefit from the harvests from October 2024 to January 2025.

In Lac, the food consumption gaps of displaced and very poor and poor host households will persist throughout the scenario period from June 2024 to January 2025 due to low food availability. Deprived of their own agricultural land, the displaced persons would depend on agricultural production using the modest spaces of host households developed on uncultivated, unproductive sandy land. Harvest levels are expected to be low due to security disruptions during the rainy season. Pressure on resources and competition for employment opportunities induced by the withdrawal of humanitarian assistance will lead to pronounced drops in income. This will reduce the quantity of food basket due to the low volume of purchases on the markets. Households will continue to experience food consumption gaps and remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) despite the adoption of negative coping strategies.

In West Sahel, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are anticipated in Bahr El Gazel and Kanem provinces between June and September 2024. Very poor and poor households continue to suffer from consumption gaps, despite the availability of dairy products and market purchases of cereals. Quantities purchased would be very small due to the low levels of income derived from the sale of small ruminants during the rainy season. The low availability of imported products will maintain the pressure on cereal markets. Prices are expected to remain above five-year average levels due to high transportation costs exacerbating the effects of pressure on local cereals from late September, despite harvests. From October 2025 to January 2025, food consumption deficits will persist; very poor and poor households will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

In the Sahara, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity will persist throughout the scenario period due to high transport costs that will limit supply volumes in markets. Income levels of poor households would not be able to cope with market price trends and households will not be able to cover their food needs through the limited volumes of food purchased from the markets. 

In southern agricultural areas, household food consumption will be affected by limited food access during the lean season due to low income levels that limit the volumes of purchases at markets. Between June and August 2024, despite the use of wild products and the use of coping strategies, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will occur. The appearance of the first fruits at the end of September, reinforced by crop products between October and November, will support the consumption of very poor and poor households and outcomes will improve to Minimal (IPC Phase 1) between October 2024 and January 2025.

Although FEWS NET projections focus on the "most likely" scenario, this scenario is based on a series of assumptions. The level of confidence in these assumptions varies and there is still some degree of uncertainty in long-term forecasts, meaning that food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security outcomes may evolve differently from what was initially projected. FEWS NET publishes monthly updates of its projections, but policymakers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may be different than expected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET's scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly alter projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurring.

National 

Incursions by rebel groups on the country's northern borders 

Probable impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The security disruption will reduce the volumes of incoming trade flows from Libya. This will lead to further price increases in food markets at a time when the purchasing power of poor households in the northern zone is already low. This situation would increase the number of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). 

Low rainfall coupled with long dry spells 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A disrupted agricultural campaign will reduce food availability from own production in agricultural and agropastoral areas. This will also affect food availability in very poor and poor households. Supply volumes on cereal markets will be lower than in a normal year, while prices will rise atypically between October 2024 and January 2025. Very poor and poor households in Sahelian areas (Bahr El Gazel, Kanem, Wadi Fira) will face consumption deficits because of their very limited access to food markets. The number of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would increase.

Restoration of the distribution of emergency food aid in the Lac Province

Probable impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The restoration of humanitarian operations would relieve the food situation of IDPs and host households affected by the security crisis in Lac. This would maintain relatively stable food consumption and the area would experience Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes. 

TD06, Ouaddai provinces (Assoungha department) and Sila (Kimiti department (Figure 8)

Reason for choosing this area: The Sudanese crisis, which began in April 2023, is having a severe impact on Chad, particularly in the country's eastern provinces which are already affected by shortfalls in agricultural production and a harsh pastoral lean season. In addition to the closure of common borders and its impact on cross-border flows, politico-military violence in Sudan is causing regular influxes of Sudanese refugees and Chadian migrants to Chad. The eastern provinces of Chad host over 607,000 Sudanese refugees and nearly 174,000 returning Chadian migrants. This human presence is exacerbating the deterioration of the livelihoods of local populations.

Sudan crisis and impact on food security: The persistence of the Sudan crisis continues to lead to influxes of people fleeing the violence. At the end of June 2024, UNHCR registered more than 617,000 refugees and 174,000 Chadian returnees to the eastern provinces of the country. Nearly 70 percent of these people have found refuge in the Ouaddai Province. The department of Assoungha is home to the largest transit centers and refugee camps.

Agricultural situation: Agricultural activities are dominated by off-season crops (onions, garlic). Refugees and returnees are mainly employed as workers on vegetable production sites in return for in-kind payments. In the localities around Adré (Assoungha Department) as well as in Dar Sila, recorded vegetable production is well below normal. These low production levels are mainly due to high fuel costs, which have significantly affected irrigation. 

Pastoral situation and livestock movements: The scarcity of pastures and the drying of water sources have pushed livestock further south in Sila Province. At the end of April/beginning of May 2024, some indigenous pastoralists of the Assoungha department crossed the Sudanese borders in search of pasture, despite the security risks related to the politico-military violence taking place in Sudan.

Sources of income: The continued presence of refugees, fueled by regular influxes, puts pressure on hiring opportunities. Competitions between refugees and host households for access to and control over resources are also reported. An oversupply of agricultural labor caused by the presence of refugees and returnees is observed in the vegetable production areas around Adré, Kerfi, Farchana, and Gaga. Income from this activity is minimal due to over-supply in the face of very limited agricultural work in the off-season. Wages range from 350 to 450 FCFA/day (compared to 1,000 FCFA per day on average during a normal year). Rainy season activities have not yet started. 

In Adré, Farchana, and Gaga there has also been an explosion in demand for bricklaying and masonry labor, due to the demand for housing for aid workers and other organizations. However, a massive supply of labor by refugees at brick manufacturing and building construction sites reduces wages. Despite relatively better wage levels, from 2,000 FCFA to 2,500 FCFA on average compared to 3,000 FCFA before the Sudanese crisis, labor over-supply is a constraint limiting hiring opportunities in the area. In the Kimiti department of Sila, the main activities of the refugees are making bricks for the wealthy and selling water from donkeys, especially around markets and in town. However, opportunities are scarce, and the number of employees is very low compared to the Assoungha area. 

Collection and sale of firewood: Given the pressure exerted on the quantities available and the competition between refugees and local populations on collection, the low volumes of firewood collected only contribute very limited revenues and at below-normal levels.

Food markets: The halt in incoming flows from Sudan continues to disrupt the functioning of local markets. An atypical intensification of reverse flows towards Sudanese localities in Darfur through informal corridors is regularly observed. These flows mainly concern imported food products that are re-exported to Sudan by Chadians. The Adré market is mainly supplied with imported food products from Libya and Cameroon via N’Djamena. In Sila, the Kerfi market fire in late April and early May has greatly affected supply in the cereal markets of Goz Beida and Adré. Other products such as imported flour and rice and hydrocarbons mainly come from Libya. High transportation costs due to rising fuel prices continue to impact price levels on food markets. For example, in January 2024 in Adré a kilogram of millet sold for 312 FCFA but was 475 to 490 FCFA on average at the end of May 2024, depending on the market days.

Livestock markets: The supply of livestock markets is below normal due to the low availability of animals, mainly in Adré and Goz Beida. This follows the harsh pastoral lean season, which forced pastoralists to move to areas with better pastoral conditions. The cessation of cross-border trade with Sudan has accentuated the low availability of livestock in the area. The Adré market is supplied by the localities of Ouara (Ouaddai Province) and Dar Tama (Wadi Fira Province). This low supply in the face of rising demand, fueled by the influx of people working for humanitarian organizations or looking for work, is driving up prices. Two-year-old sheep cost between 35,000 and 40,000 FCFA, compared with 27,000 to 30,000 FCFA previously. Goats formerly sold at 19,000 FCFA to 22,000 FCFA and are now sold at 22,500 FCFA to 28,000 FCFA. These trends show higher levels compared to the period before the Sudan crisis.

Nutritional situation: According to IPC AMN (May 2024) analyses in the Sudanese refugee camps (Bredjing and Treguine), in the department of Assoungha and the host population of Goz-Beida in eastern Chad, the nutritional situation in these camps will change from Alert (IPC AMN Phase 2) to Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) during the agricultural lean season. The factors behind the deterioration in the nutritional situation include the insufficient food supply in the host areas due to the regular and massive influx of new refugees and migrants. Financial insecurity reinforces the deterioration in the food and nutritional situation of host households. The recurrence of diseases such as ARI and parasitosis, as well as low vaccination coverage, are deteriorating children's nutritional status. The Arkoum and Métché camps in the Assoungha department are classified as Alert (IPC AMN Phase 2). It should be noted that the non-delivery of supplies to health centers and disruptions to the General Food Distribution (GFD) cycle in February and March 2024 stopped malnutrition prevention activities from being carried out in some camps. 

Humanitarian aid: The targeting of beneficiaries for seasonal aid by the WFP is underway. This planning mainly concerns host households. A total of 274,665 people from very poor and poor households in the departments of Kimiti (134,558 people) and Assoungha (140,127 people) should therefore benefit from seasonal assistance. Malnutrition prevention will cover 10,510 children and 7,006 pregnant and breastfeeding women. Refugee assistance is being developed in two main forms: cash transfer and food distribution. Money transfers are more common in the various camps. The monthly amount is 7,000 FCFA/person. However, the money received is used to purchase non-food items and services (soap, mill) as well as food (sugar, meat). These expenses reduce the amounts allocated to food needs. 

Acute food insecurity outcomes: Between June and September, host households and refugees mainly rely on markets for their consumption. However, the atypically high level of basic foodstuff prices limits their access. This results in significant deficits in food consumption. Meal sharing, reducing meal numbers, and prioritizing children over adults are coping strategies developed by most Sudanese refugees to cope with poor access to markets. Sudanese refugees and returnees face consumption deficits due to high food prices and low purchasing power, limiting food access to these displaced populations. Under the pretext of a lack of meals, some young people and adolescents use drugs to quell their hunger. However, food aid is mitigating some deterioration of food insecurity. Thus, the Assoungha and Kimiti departments are in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) while the other departments in Ouaddaï and Sila provinces are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) for the duration of the outlook period. However, after the harvests in September to January 2025, host households will improve their food situation. These households will be Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and thus slightly reduce the number of people in need during this period. Refugees will remain dependent on food aid during this period, despite the irregularities in distributions observed.