Food insecurity deteriorates in Chad due to effects of refugee influx and conflict

• Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes will persist in the eastern provinces, Ennedi-Est (Wadi Hawar), Wadi Fira (Dar-Tama and Kobé), Ouaddaï (Assoungha), and Sila (Kimiti) provinces. Refugees will remain largely dependent on food assistance, while host communities will see their consumption deficits worsen due to early depletion of stocks, the increase in food prices, and the decrease in work opportunities, aggravated by the end of income from gathering wild products, and the growing pressure on local resources exerted by the continuous arrival of refugees. A growing number of households could shift to Emergency (IPC Phase 4), but their proportion would remain below 15 percent of the population in these areas.
• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in Lac Province. Attacks by armed terrorist groups (ATGs), movement restrictions, and the deterioration of livelihoods, particularly fishing and livestock rearing, will continue to reduce incomes, disrupt market functioning, and paralyze cross-border trade. These factors will lead to food consumption deficits among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities.
• In Kanem and Barh el-Gazel provinces, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected between June and September 2026. Households' heavy dependence on markets, combined with supply difficulties linked to the increase in transportation costs, will result in high food prices. Consequently, poor households' access to markets will be limited due to a continued deterioration of their main income sources.
• FEWS NET estimates that 2.5 to 2.99 million people will need food assistance, with a peak expected between July and September 2026, at the height of the lean season. Needs will be particularly high among Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees in the eastern provinces, as well as among IDPs in Lac Province.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 20, 2026.

The conflict in Sudan has led to an influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees into the eastern provinces of Chad, particularly in Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi-Est. Since the beginning of the conflict in April 2023 in Sudan, more than 914,607 refugees and 355,903 returnees have arrived in Chad. The refugees are heavily concentrated in the Assoungha department, in Ouaddaï Province. However, since the latest attack on Al-Fasher in October 2025, a new wave of refugees has arrived in the provinces of Wadi Fira and Ennedi-Est, considerably increasing the population in the eastern provinces and placing pressure on the food and income sources of the host population. Refugees are deprived of their livelihoods, have only very limited income sources, and compete with host communities for scarce employment opportunities, both agricultural and non-agricultural. Thus, to meet their food needs, refugees depend largely on food assistance, even as humanitarian actors face growing funding difficulties. The steady influx of refugees sustains a high number of people in need.

Conflict resulting from attacks by terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin, rebels on the borders with Libya and the Central African Republic, and intercommunal conflicts in the Sudanian region are impacting household livelihoods, trade flows, and market functioning. In the Lac region, the persistence of insecurity since 2015 due to attacks by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has led to the abandonment of arable land, population displacement, and a decrease in fishing activities. Although these attacks have become sporadic, the Lac region has recorded more than 219,595 IDPs. In the north along the border with Libya, attacks by security forces of the Front for Change and Concord (FACT) and the Front for Democracy and Justice in Chad (FNDJT) rebels have so far been relatively contained, sporadically disrupting trade flows from Libya. This disruption of cross-border flows affects market supply in deficit areas, particularly in the northern provinces, as well as in Kanem and Barh el-Gazal (BEG). Intercommunal conflicts, including those between farmers and herders, as well as land conflicts, are more frequent in the Sudanian zone and in the Lac region. These violent incidents lead to population displacement, are often deadly, and disrupt market functioning, fishing, and agricultural and livestock production activities. 

Household livelihoods in Chad are primarily dominated by agriculture and livestock rearing. Agricultural production, dominated by cereals and extending from the agriculture-dominant zones in the south to agropastoral zones, is highly sensitive to rainfall variability, particularly droughts and floods. In 2024, heavy rains caused flooding, particularly in Lac, Mandoul, Moyen-Chari, Tandjilé, and Mayo-Kebbi. These floods, which coincided with the crop maturation phase, destroyed more than 418,300 hectares of fields, resulting in a decrease in harvests. However, the 2025/26 agricultural season was marked primarily by poor spatiotemporal rainfall distribution in the Sudanian zone, which disrupted planting and harvest periods in agricultural and agropastoral zones. Typically, in the Sudanian agricultural zone, planting begins around late April through June, with harvesting from September through December, but the 2025 agricultural season experienced delays exceeding 30 days in some provinces of the zone. Although agricultural labor opportunities are the main source of income for poor households during the lean season, in areas of potential conflict, access to fields and sources of food and income could be threatened. In pastoral zones, the lean season typically runs from April to June, at the beginning of the rainy season. The drying of pastures, as well as the depletion of water points, will affect livestock body condition, market values, and milk production, thereby reducing pastoralists' source of food and income during this period.

Learn more

The following links provide additional information:

• Latest Chad Food Security Outlook Report: October 2025 – May 2026
• Latest Chad Key Message Update: January 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

• Since April 2023, the eastern provinces of Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira, Sila, and Ennedi-Est have continued to receive a massive influx of refugees fleeing violence in Darfur. As of February 22, 2026, 914,607 Sudanese refugees have arrived in Chad. Refugees currently make up a significant proportion of the population, representing 32 percent of the population in Kimiti, 56 percent in Assoungha, 57 percent in Kobé, and 63 percent in Wadi Hawar. Since the attack on Al-Fasher in October 2025, new waves of refugees have been arriving primarily in Ennedi-Est and Wadi Fira. However, the recent deterioration of security along the Sudan-Chad border led to the decision by the Chadian government to close the border on February 23, 2026. Arriving without resources, refugees depend heavily on local markets and food assistance, increasing pressure on the livelihoods of host communities. This increased competition, particularly for daily wage labor, has caused wages to decrease from 3,000 to 1,500 FCFA. The increase in food demand is also causing atypical price increases, limiting food access for host households.
• According to ACLED, 143 violent events, caused by various actors, took place in 2025, resulting in the deaths of 354 people. These incidents, distributed throughout the country (Figure 1), notably led to displacements of more than 220,000 people in Lac Province, where incidents were due to ATG activities. The country continues to face persistent insecurity across all its borders, illustrated, for example, by a drone attack reported by Médecins Sans Frontières on February 15, 2026 near Adré. This violence causes forced displacement, disrupts livelihoods, impedes cross-border flows, and disrupts markets, with shortages and atypical increases in prices.
• Overall, food supply is below that of a typical year due to droughts, which have reduced production, particularly in the Sudanian zone, despite contributions from off-season crops and imports. Supply is increasingly low in insecure areas along the country's borders, particularly in the east (Sudanese border) and around Lake Chad, further impacted by high fuel prices and the increase in transportation costs. Indeed, imported products, particularly rice, are less available than in 2025, particularly in the eastern provinces, due to insecurity at the borders, the increase in fuel prices, and disruptions in logistics networks.
• In general, local cereal prices continued to decrease countrywide by 22 percent compared to January 2025 and by 4 percent compared to the five-year average for millet. However, increases of 2-13 percent are seen in markets in drought-affected provinces (Moyen-Chari, Logone Oriental, Guéra, and Salamat), and by 30 percent in eastern provinces, where strong demand linked to the massive influx of refugees is exerting additional pressure. The price of imported rice, the second most consumed cereal, is recording a countrywide increase of 72 percent compared to the five-year average, with peaks reaching 155 percent in the eastern provinces. In the markets of Moyen-Chari, Mandoul, Logone Oriental and Occidental, Tandjilé, and Mayo-Kebbi Est and Ouest, imported rice prices are already 1 to 27 percent higher than the atypical high levels of January 2025.
• The annual inflation rate of -2.6 percent in December 2025 reflected the culmination of the general decrease in prices over the year, marking a continuous disinflation. It continued to decrease negatively in January 2026, reaching - 2.6 percent. This trend temporarily improves purchasing power, especially in urban areas. However, the decline in cereal prices, the driving factor of this decrease in disinflation during the harvest period, suggests an overall decrease in agricultural incomes.
• Poor household incomes are deteriorating progressively, as they depend on markets during the lean season. The sale of cereals and cash crops, the main source of income for poor households, is below average following poor production of groundnuts, sesame, and cowpeas, combined with a decline in millet prices during the harvest. This has forced households to sell more to cover their non-food expenses and repay their debts. As a result, they have not replenished their typical stocks, which depleted early in Logone Oriental, Mandoul, and Guéra, where dry spells were particularly severe during the 2025 season. In pastoral areas, incomes are generally trending upward due to livestock prices that are higher than average, due to strong demand from traders exporting to neighboring countries, and demand from gold mining areas.

Humanitarian food assistance

• In 2025, the financing of humanitarian activities was marked by a significant decrease, with the 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan funded at only 29.9 percent compared to 57 percent in 2024. Furthermore, as of December 31, 2025, the UNHCR reported that only 35 percent (170.7 million USD) of the 701.21 million USD required to respond to the Sudan crisis had been obtained, severely limiting the capacity of humanitarian actors to provide essential assistance in eastern Chad.
• It is in this context that WFP plans to concentrate food assistance on new refugees, then gradually extend it to local populations. In the eastern part of the country, food distributions are scheduled every two months, although rations are reduced due to funding constraints.

Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are observed in departments of the eastern provinces heavily affected by the influx of refugees, Assoungha (Ouaddaï), Kimiti (Sila), Wadi Hawar (Ennedi-Est), as well as Dar Tama and Kobé (Wadi Fira). The decrease in cereal production and cash crops led to early depletion of poor households' food stocks as of January 2026. Off-season crops did not significantly improve food availability due to the early drying up of ponds, pushing households to depend more on markets.

In the context of strong pressure on livelihoods and work opportunities, income from agricultural and non-agricultural labor, as well as from the sale of gathered products, remains insufficient for host communities. Faced with the decrease in their purchasing power, these households adopt coping strategies such as consuming less expensive foods or borrowing food. 

Refugees, who represent a significant proportion of the population in these departments, do not have the capacity to build stocks and depend almost entirely on the market and food assistance. Faced with particularly high prices (47 to 155 percent above average for imported rice in January), they are reducing the number of meals, consuming less preferred foods, and rapidly depleting their resources. Despite ongoing assistance, significant consumption deficits persist. With continued arrivals of refugees and the saturation of humanitarian capacities, a growing proportion of households could shift into Emergency (IPC Phase 4), although this share remains estimated at less than 15 percent of the affected population.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are observed in the other departments of Ouaddaï, Wadi-Fira, Sila, and Ennedi-Est provinces, where the presence of refugees is nonexistent or limited. The seasonal improvements observed in February, related to new harvests and off-season crops, were short-lived. Household stocks have since depleted, resulting in food consumption deficits among poor households despite income from agricultural labor and the sale of gathered products.

In Lac Province, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in the Fouli and Kaya departments, which face limited access due to conflict. Sporadic attacks by armed groups and security restrictions reduce access to agricultural and fishing areas and lead to population displacement. Rainy season production recorded deficits, while weak biomass has degraded pastoral conditions. Household incomes for host populations and IDPs are decreasing due to the deterioration of livelihoods, the slowdown of markets, and the near-halt of cross-border trade with Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. Thus, market purchases provide only small quantities of food, resulting in consumption deficits, despite the use of coping strategies, including consumption of less expensive foods, reduced number of meals, and borrowing food. However, in the more secure departments of Wayi and of Mamdi, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are observed. Food availability has improved due to the off-season production of various vegetables and second season maize, made possible by the receding waters in the lowlands of Lake Chad. However, persistent insecurity continues to limit income-generating activities, particularly fishing, restricting the capacity of households to cover their non-food expenses.

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing in the northern provinces (Borkou, Ennedi-Ouest, and Tibesti), where households are largely dependent on markets for food consumption. Households benefit from cross-border trade, cash transfers from migration to Libya, and work in gold mining sites. With the improvement in the security situation at the border with Libya and around the gold mining sites, income from these activities is increasing, as is the flow of food imports from Libya. However, internal flows are low. Consequently, food prices remain high, exacerbated by the high cost of fuel, limiting household access to food. Food consumption is adequate, although persistent difficulties remain in covering non-food needs.

In the Western Sahel, in northern Kanem and in northern BEG, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing. Food stocks of poor households are depleted, and they depend on markets supplied by southern provinces and flows from Libya, which are weak and irregular due to the decrease in production in the south, the high cost of transportation, and sporadic insecurity along the border with Libya. However, the good market value of livestock and the sale of gathered products such as gum arabic, jujubes, and other non-timber forest products provide substantial income to households. Thus, poor households are able to meet their essential food, but not non-food, needs.

In the Sudanian zone, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing in the departments of Moyen-Chari, Barh Azoum, and Haraze-Manguegné in Salamat, and Tandjilé. Poor households have stocks that allow them to cover their food needs, but income is not sufficient to cover non-food expenses due to poor cash crop production and significantly below-average prices for cereals. Households have sold an above-average quantity to repay their debts.

• The influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees into the eastern provinces will continue throughout the entire projection period. Clashes will persist between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese army near El-Geneina and Adré, in Darfur, without the fighting directly spilling over into Chadian territory. Border communities will experience the consequences of commercial disruptions, but defensive measures will spare them from any direct violence. The livelihoods of populations in host areas will also continue to deteriorate throughout the entire projection period.
• Incursions by ISWAP are expected to remain at their current level through September 2026. This will result in disruptions to market functioning and population displacement. IDPs livelihoods will continue to deteriorate, particularly in the agriculture and fisheries sectors.
• From February to May 2026, conflicts between farmers and herders, as well as intercommunal violence, will remain at their average seasonal level. However, slight increases above average could be observed in the Sudanian zone. These increases stem from the recent rejection of the pastoral code by the Christian community in the south of the country, which aims to define rules for access to pastures and water points, secure territories, and promote coexistence with sedentary farmers. A decrease in these conflicts is expected starting in June 2026, when herders will move their livestock toward the pastoral zones in the north.
• Throughout the projection period, the security situation will continue to be calm and favorable to the development of cross-border flows at the border with Libya, which will improve market supplies in the provinces of Borkou, Tibesti, Ennedi-Ouest, Kanem, BEG, Wadi Fira, Batha, and Ouaddaï. With more imports, flows of processed food products are also increasing, such as pasta, oils, sugar, dates, as well as small-scale trade and livestock sales.
• The creation of a joint force, established on September 27, 2025 in Sarh, will protect the southern border with the Central African Republic. It will stimulate the free movement of people and goods, which will allow families in the south to maintain cross-border ties with less concern, but without significant changes in terms of flow contributions over the outlook period.
• The Chadian economy is expected to experience moderate growth in 2026, with an anticipated recovery following a phase of slowing activities linked to lower oil production and recent agrometeorological shocks. The most recent projections from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program show an upward revision of growth for 2026 of approximately 5.1 percent. Inflation, which had been negative in 2025 due to the decrease in food prices, is expected to gradually return to positive values in 2026. The budget deficit and public debt are expected to remain stable, benefiting from IMF financial support and control of public expenditures.
• Poor households' stocks will be completely depleted by the end of May 2026, given the overall average level and poor distribution of the 2025 rainy season production. The expected decrease in off-season production due to the early water points drying, high fuel costs, and labor costs will also contribute to the depletion of stocks.
• The increase in food commodity prices is expected to continue and become more widespread starting in March 2026, particularly for cereals. It will be more pronounced in markets located in deficit areas of the Sudanian zone, Lac Province, and the eastern provinces, which are experiencing a continuous influx of Sudanese refugees (Figure 2).
• Household income prospects will be below average, with the purchasing power of poor households remaining low throughout the projection period. This is primarily due to the decrease in income from the sale of agricultural products, whose prices have sharply decreased compared to the average. Socioeconomic conditions and social protection mechanisms will continue to be weak, despite the priority given to controlling the wage bill and developing social safety nets in the 2026 national budget, as reported by the IMF.
• The 2026 rainy season is expected to begin on time in April in the Sudanian zone and in June in the Sahelian zone. Average to above-average rainfall is expected in all zones. Given the above-average rainfall projected, there is a high risk of localized flooding in the Sahel between July and September 2026.
• Livestock transhumance to the northern pastoral zone will begin in April as is typical, marking the start of the pastoral lean season. It will end in June with the restoration of vegetation cover and the improvement of pastoral household incomes.

Humanitarian food assistance

• Based on historical distribution trends and information from humanitarian partners, emergency food assistance would continue to be available throughout the projection period. With this in mind, the Government of the Republic of Chad, in partnership with the humanitarian community, launched the 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan and the Refugee Response Plan 2026-2027, with needs amounting to 986.1 million USD, of which 540 million USD is for refugees, an adjusted budget to prioritize targeting those most in need. The plans focus primarily on the most severely affected areas, particularly the east (65.5 percent of the target), Lac Province (13.8 percent), and the southern provinces.

Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are anticipated through September 2026 in departments with high concentrations of refugees: Assoungha (Ouaddaï), Kimiti (Sila), Wadi Hawar (Ennedi-Est), Dar-Tama, and Kobé (Wadi Fira). Without livelihoods, refugees will remain highly dependent on the market, with significantly reduced purchasing power. The continuous increase in prices will force them to draw on their savings, decrease the number of meals, and consume less preferred foods, resulting in persistent consumption deficits and increased dependence on food assistance.

Host households will depend on the market and will face food prices significantly higher than average. Income from work opportunities and sales of gathered products will remain insufficient to cover food needs. Households will resort to various coping strategies, including borrowing food and money and consuming cheaper foods between March and May, then consuming gathered foods from the beginning of the season, as well as a reduction in the number of meals from June to September. A small proportion of households, with larger consumption deficits, could resort to begging and fall into Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through September 2026 in the remaining departments of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi-Est provinces, where the presence of refugees remains low. Poor households will experience total depletion of their own food sources. They will depend on markets, where prices will remain persistently high. Their incomes will decrease with the end of gum arabic harvesting, off-season crop activities, and the onset of the lean season. Households will be forced to reduce the number of meals and will experience food consumption deficits. At the peak of the lean season, between July and September, a small proportion of households could resort to extreme strategies, including begging, and fall into Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

In Lac Province, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist through September in Fouli and Kaya departments, where access is limited. Sporadic attacks by armed groups and security restrictions will reduce access to agricultural and fishing areas while causing population displacement. Already high prices will increase throughout the agricultural lean season. Household incomes of host populations and IDPs will decrease due to the deterioration of livelihoods, the slowdown of markets, and the near-halt of cross-border trade. Thus, market purchases provide only small quantities of food, pushing households to resort to coping strategies, including consuming cheaper foods, reducing the number of meals, and borrowing food.

In the calmer departments of Wayi and Mamdi, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist between February and May 2026. Food availability will improve due to off-season production of maize and various vegetables with the receding waters in Lake Chad. However, persistent insecurity will limit income-generating activities, particularly fishing, restricting the capacity of households to cover their non-food expenditures. Between June and September 2026, these departments will evolve toward Crisis (IPC Phase 3) when maize stocks from the second harvest are depleted and household incomes decrease. Cross-border trade will be at a near standstill, leading to atypical price increases. The decline in purchasing power will result in consumption deficits among IDPs and host communities.

In North Kanem and North Barh el-Gazel, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are anticipated between February and May 2026 as household stocks are depleted. However, the good market value of livestock and the sale of gathered products will provide households with sufficient income for adequate access to food commodities, which is favored by below-average cereal prices. This income will allow for sufficient food consumption but will remain insufficient to cover non-food expenses. Between June and September, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected. Prices will be significantly above average due to increased transportation costs and poor road conditions. Income will decrease following the decline in livestock prices and in sales of gathered products. Thus, food consumption deficits will be observed among poor households.

In the northern provinces of the country, Borkou, Ennedi-Ouest, and Tibesti, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through the projection period. Households depend primarily on the market for their food. The improvement in security conditions at the border with Libya will allow the continuity of cross-border activities. However, the outcomes, in terms of income and its regularity, will remain at a level that will allow households to have minimally adequate food consumption.

In the central provinces and the Sudanian zone, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in Salamat, Moyen Chari, Tandjilé, and Guéra provinces between February and May. Poor households will have some stocks and income to cover food needs, but these will remain insufficient to cover non-food expenditures. Between June and September 2026, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) will reach most provinces following widespread depletion of stocks, the end of off-season production, the scarcity of sales of gathered products and fruits, and the increase in prices. Income from agricultural labor and other residual gathering activities will no longer be sufficient to cover non-food needs, despite resorting to debt.  

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National

Severe atypical flooding during the 2026/27 agricultural season

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Severe atypical flooding would lead to disruption of communication routes and market dysfunction with atypical price increases leading to food consumption gaps in affected areas. Food access for poor households would be further reduced due to low incomes and shortages related to impassable roads. This will lead to increases in the proportion of the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in all provinces, particularly in the eastern provinces and in the Sudanian zone.

Delayed start of the 2026/27 agricultural season

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: This situation will lead to total depletion of poor households’ stocks, atypical livestock mortality, a decrease in income from agricultural production, and an atypical increase in prices. Food access for poor households would be further reduced due to low income levels and shortages following stock retention by traders and wealthy producers. This will lead to increases in the number of populations in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in June-July 2026 in pastoral provinces, in Sahel provinces, and in the Sudanian zone.

Expansion of the Sudan conflict inside Chad

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An expansion of the Sudanese conflict to the eastern part of the country would lead to the suspension of humanitarian operations for security reasons, while waves of new refugees would be increasing. Massive internal displacement of populations toward western and southern Chad would be possible. The current crisis in the east would be transferred to these areas, while the eastern provinces would see their Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) level evolve to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse.

Border provinces with Libya

Resumption of rebel group incursions at the northern borders of the country

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Attacks between rebel groups and government forces would result in security restrictions at the borders between Chad and Libya. This would be followed by a significant decrease in the flow of food products imported from Libya and in the supply of these products on the markets. Food access for poor households would be further reduced due to low income levels. This will lead to increases in the number of populations in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), particularly in Tibesti, Ennedi Ouest and Est, Borkou, Batha, Kanem, and BEG.

Lac Province

Resumption of humanitarian action in Lac

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A resumption of food interventions benefiting IDPs and host households in Lac would reduce the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Their food consumption would be improved and they would move to Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) due to the assistance.

The influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees continues in the provinces of Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira, Ennedi-Est, and Sila. Since the attack on Al-Fasher at the end of October 2025, a new wave of refugees has arrived primarily in Ennedi-Est and Wadi Fira. The number of Sudanese refugees who have arrived in Chad since April 2023 stands at 914,607 as of February 22, 2026. Furthermore, in January 2026, refugees represent more than 56 percent, 32 percent, 57 percent, and 62 percent of the population of Assoungha in Ouaddaï province, Kimiti in Sila, Dar Tama and Kobe in Wadi Fira, and Wadi Hawar in Ennedi-Est, respectively.

Deprived of their livelihoods when they fled to Chad, refugees are heavily dependent on food assistance. Despite the funding challenges faced by humanitarian actors, food assistance for refugees remains available. However, funding difficulties have led WFP to change the approach based on beneficiary status to a new approach based on vulnerability. This approach will be implemented starting in 2026, with an interim period from January to March 2026, which will consist of modifying the frequency of food assistance distribution to every two months. At cross-border entry sites, food and nutritional commodities are prepositioned, particularly in Tiné, Adré, and Oure-Cassoni, to ensure one month of coverage for new arrivals. When refugees are transferred to formal camps, they will generally receive cash transfers and, sometimes, food, like all refugees already settled. During the interim phase, food assistance will be distributed every two months.

Cash transfers amount to 8,000 FCFA (13.66 USD) for a family of six people, allowing coverage of approximately 63 percent of caloric needs. However, with the distribution of January completed and not resuming until March, it will only allow coverage of approximately 30 percent of caloric needs. In January, WFP distributed 6,025 tons of food, in addition to cash transfers. However, the distribution of food reported in January indicated a decrease in the ration distributed, but it still covered 47 percent of caloric needs. Given the funding challenges for humanitarian activities and the implementation of the new distribution approach, a possible decrease in the ration or modification of the distribution, every other month, will result in a decrease in the coverage of energy needs from the food ration distributed to only 30 percent during the projected period. Furthermore, it is certain that these difficulties will result in a decrease in the number of refugees receiving food assistance during the outlook period.