Rising prices and erosion of income sources exacerbate food gaps among refugees, returnees, and poor households in the east

• The influx of refugees and returnees continues to put pressure on sources of food and income. There is strong competition for the few existing opportunities. As a result, incomes have decreased, restricting households’ ability to afford essential food items given atypically high prices. Poor households face food consumption deficits, despite developing negative coping strategies and social solidarity practices, including meal sharing. They are mainly dependent on food aid. As a result, poor host households, refugees, and returnees from Assoungha and Kimiti are in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) acute food insecurity. In the absence of food aid, they would be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
• In the other departments of Ouaddai and Sila, as well as the provinces of Wadi Fira and Eastern Ennedi, households are experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. In Lac, depleted household stocks and low incomes due to the deterioration of livelihoods limit access to markets. Host households and internally displaced persons (IDPs) face crisis-level food consumption deficits and are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In the Western Sahel and the Saharan region, atypical increases in food prices due to disruptions in the flow of products imported from Libya are limiting access to markets for poor households. They are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).
• The atypical rise in food prices is due to the fall in market supply driven by local cereal production deficits and high transportation costs. Compared with the five-year average, the price of millet has risen by more than 45 percent. The escalation of fuel prices is a pivotal factor influencing the cost of food products. This rise has not only disrupted internal flows among cereal markets but has also hindered the influx of imported goods, notably from Cameroon—the sole remaining source of inbound supplies. As a result, fuel shortages and rising fuel prices have led to high transportation costs, impacting the supply and price of local and imported food products. 
• Food aid is the main source of nourishment for Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees. The continuing influx of these refugees into the provinces of Ouaddai, Sila, and Wadi Fira is increasing the need for emergency food aid, which will remain high during the lean season. However, current food aid in the form of in-kind and cash transfers is insufficient to cover the number of people in need. What's more, the monthly ration is inadequate and only covers the needs of beneficiaries for a period of two to three weeks. 
• Faced with a severe, early pastoral lean season, most transhumant herders moved into Sudanian localities in search of rainfed crop residues, residual natural pastures, and watering holes. Regular clashes occur in the area. They are linked to the massive presence of transhumant herders in the area since January 2024, whose animals are causing major damage to agricultural fields.

Current Situation

Sociopolitical context: Despite the appointment in early January 2024 of a new government led by a prime minister from the opposition, civil and political protests continue to fuel debates on the national political scene. In addition, the social climate remains marked by the rising cost of living, in particular the incessant fuel shortages that have persisted for several months. On February 13, 2024, the government increased fuel prices, affecting road traffic. This has caused additional volume reductions in food supplies, particularly to deficit areas. 

Security context (politico-military conflicts, intercommunity conflicts, and population movements): The country's security situation is characterized by a precarious calm, punctuated by isolated acts of banditry and outbreaks of farmer-herder conflict. At the end of December, reported cases of theft and kidnapping of farmers' livestock in Donomanga (Tandjilé) led to violent community tensions, resulting in loss of life and material damage, including the burning of huts and markets in Mouroumgouleye (Mandoul). In Lac, some 15 security incidents caused by elements of non-state armed groups (GANE) against fishermen were reported by humanitarian actors.

Major fighting between rebel factions and the government is unlikely to occur until September 2024. Incursions by elements of the Islamic State into West Africa should continue to decline until at least September 2024, remaining at levels below those seen in 2022 and well below the trends seen over the previous five years.

Off-season agricultural campaign: A noticeable drop in planting compared with a normal year is reported in the major berbere, onion, and market garden production basins. Faced with limited access to fuel as a result of price hikes due to shortages, growers have been forced to reduce their acreage, particularly for onions in Ouaddaï. In Mayo Kebbi Est, there are reports of off-season rice crops being abandoned. In addition, the lack of fertilizer and plant protection products is hampering the off-season campaign. Caterpillar attacks on vegetable crops have also been reported, notably in Mangalmé. Berbere crops are at the milky stage in some areas and in the waxy stage in others, such as Moyen Chari. 

Food markets: Market supplies of food products are down compared with a normal year. The decrease in internal flows between cereal markets follows the high transportation costs induced by recurrent fuel shortages. The increase in fuel prices decided by the government in mid-February 2024 has thus exacerbated transportation cost increases. This is further aggravated by the government's withdrawal of subsidies to the petroleum sector. Decreases in incoming flow volumes from Cameroon are being observed. These decreases are linked to fuel price increases by the Cameroonian government in early January 2024. As a result, food imports passing through Cameroon via the port of Douala are decreasing. The supply of manufactured and imported products also shows an additional decrease due to disruptions in incoming flows from Libya, linked to the unstable security situation at the borders. This is also exacerbated by the cessation of incoming flows from Sudan. Thus, significant atypical price increases compared to the five-year average are observed in most cereal markets due to sustained demand pressure on local cereals. These increases are more pronounced in the Sahel region, particularly in areas hosting Sudanese refugees and returnees. In these localities and around Lake Chad, the upward trend in prices continues due to households' exclusive reliance on the market resulting from decreased local production and early depletion of stocks. In Bol, there is an observed increase in maize prices on the market, with a rise of 25 percent and 65 percent, respectively, compared to last year and the five-year average (Figure 1).

Pastoral situation and livestock movements: An early pastoral lean season is observed in pastoral and agropastoral areas due to the depletion of pastures, as seen in Batha. From December 2023 to the end of January 2024, nutritional supplementation consisting of peanut cake and maize bran was provided to pastoralists in the Lac province. This intervention was funded with support from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It covers 600 pastoralist households. In the Western Sahel (Barh El Ghazel and Kanem), livestock are resorting to feeding on the foliage of thorny bushes, thus creating an aerial pasture. The complete drying up of water points forces pastoralists to travel long distances, often more than 10 km, in search of drinking water. In Lac, there has been a massive return of pastoralists to island communities and to the southern part of the province since early January 2024. A significant concentration of pastoralists in the Sudanese zone is reported. This has resulted in pastoral overloading, leading to a deterioration of the pastoral situation in these areas of the Moyen Chari and Logone Basin, despite the availability of crop residues. Livestock body conditions are significantly deteriorating, especially in transhumance areas. Isolated outbreaks of soil-borne diseases are reported in the Sahel (Barh El Ghazel, Hadjer Lamis, and Kanem) as well as in the southern area of Moyen Chari. These primarily include ovine rinderpest (PPR), contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP), and symptomatic anthrax. Cases of poultry epidemics such as coccidiosis and Newcastle disease are reported. Vaccination campaigns are underway with the support of technical and financial partners such as the World Bank and the ICRC.

Livestock markets: A general decrease in supply is observed in most livestock markets in agropastoral and transhumance areas. Market supplies are reduced due to poor pastoral conditions. Many pastoralists have been forced to seek refuge in agricultural areas equipped with crop residues and watering points for livestock. The cessation of cross-border trade with Sudan continues to slow down the functioning of livestock markets in the hosting provinces in the East (Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira, Sila). The distance traveled by pastoralists to destinations around the lake region and localities intended for Lac has further strengthened the decrease in supply in the markets of Bol, thus promoting the increase in prices of small ruminants in the markets (Figure 2). A rising trend compared to the five-year average is thus observed in the Bol market. The continued depreciation of the Nigerian naira has led to a drop in export demand. In Batha, an intensification of sales aimed at generating income to access cereal markets contributes to keeping prices low.

Terms of trade: The terms of trade between livestock and cereals are unfavorable to pastoralists despite the increase in the price of sheep observed on the Bol market. This is driven by unusually high cereal prices due to stock depletion and the cessation of assistance, which reinforce dependence on markets. As a result, the livelihoods of livestock farmers are significantly deteriorating (Figure 3).

Household and institutional stocks: In the Sahelian zone, an early depletion of household cereal stocks has been reported since January due to deficient harvests from the previous rainy season. Households in these areas are dependent on markets for their supply. In the Sudanese provinces, significant declines in stocks are observed. Many households have had to harvest flood recession crops, notably early-stage berbere and immature berbere heads, to meet their food needs due to the lack of stocks. These strategies are reported in Moyen Chari and Mayo Kebbi. The replenishment of institutional stocks by the Office National de Sécurité Alimentaire (ONASA) is underway. According to ONASA services, forecasts are estimated at 100,000 metric tons for all species combined, a gap of 41,646.81 metric tons.

Livelihoods: An erosion of most sources of income is observed in most areas of the country. This results in significant decreases in income from main sources, both in the Sahelian zone (livestock sales, seasonal migration, handicrafts, gathering products) and in the Sudanese zone (agricultural product sales). The closure of Sudanese borders continues to limit income from transboundary migration due to the ongoing security crisis. Security risks at the borders and the ban on activities related to artisanal gold mining in Tibesti are eroding the livelihoods of very poor and poor households in the Sahelian belt. Indeed, the regular influx of people from the interior of the country deprives them of an important source of income. In the Sahel, there is a significant pressure exerted by very poor and poor households on wild products, foraging, and handicrafts, among others. This pressure follows the early depletion of cereal stocks, forcing these households to intensify their collection in order to generate income and thus access food markets. The income derived from the sale of wild products is marginal. There is an intensification of seasonal migration towards urban centers. However, job opportunities in destination areas are scarce due to the greatly slowed economic context in recent years following the oil crisis. The income from migration is significantly lower than in a normal year. IDPs, households hosting them in the Lac region, and very poor and poor households in the Sahel region mainly rely on the solidarity of wealthier households, while other households depend on markets for their food. Market garden produce and the first fruits of off-season crops do boost the food consumption of very poor and poor households in certain localities in the southern zone, but only to a limited extent.

Nutritional situation: The nutritional situation remains a concern at the national level. In the absence of a recent nutritional survey, IPC AMN analyses conducted in December 2023 on the basis of historical data from SMART surveys over the past five years indicate a deterioration in the nutritional situation in the majority of the country's provinces and departments. The provinces of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, Ennedi Ouest, and Ennedi Est and the departments of Kaya and Fouli are in IPC AMN Phase 4 for the period from January to May 2024. In addition, according to an August to September 2023 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) study of children aged 6 to 59 months in refugee camps, the nutritional situation is worrying. The results of this study show that the rates of global acute malnutrition (GAM) based on upper arm circumference (MUAC) or bilateral edema were 5.5 percent in Toumtouma, 11.3 percent in Ourang, and 11.6 percent in Arkoum. The rates of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) in these localities were 2.3 percent in Toumtouma, 4.8 percent in Ourang, and 4.6 percent in Arkoum. According to UNICEF data, despite the high number of children admitted for treatment of acute malnutrition in the eastern provinces, admissions have decreased from August to December 2023 compared to 2022. This decrease is attributed to the end of the malaria season, the reduction in comorbidities, food aid, and the harvest period. 

Humanitarian situation: The security crisis in Sudan since April 2023 continues to generate regular influxes of populations to Chad. As of February 16, 2024, more than 554,270 Sudanese refugees and 144,000 Chadian returnees have been hosted in Chad (UNHCR). Nearly 382,000 of them are located in Ouaddaï, notably in the Assoungha department. Primarily dependent on humanitarian assistance and, to a lesser extent, on the solidarity of local households, these refugees and returnees are exposed to low mobilization of food aid These financing difficulties, coupled with the continuous flow of new arrivals, limit their already precarious food consumption. Faced with significant discrepancies in consumption, these households resort to negative coping strategies, including the sale of personal belongings. The intensification of begging by large numbers of them is a widespread strategy. In Dajabal and Zabout, in the Sila region, there are regular sales of materials used to build shelters in search of income. Physical labor by pregnant and breastfeeding women is widespread in single-parent households. In Lac, the cessation of comprehensive humanitarian aid to IDPs and host households, combined with production shortfalls, has made these households even more food insecure.

Current Food Security Outcomes

In the departments of Assoungha and Kimiti, two of the main refugee-hosting departments in eastern Chad, Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees, who account for 44.30 percent and 15.61 percent of the population, respectively, are experiencing major disparities in food consumption. Income from firewood and straw sales, brickmaking, and petty trading is very low and is not sufficient to cover their food needs in the context of high staple food prices. Food aid is their main source of nourishment. This deterioration in their food situation is further exacerbated by the regular influx of newcomers. At transit sites, there is a strong dependence on newcomers, who are largely dependent on the support of former refugees and returnees. Food aid cannot cover the needs of refugees for more than three weeks. The food received from each month's distribution cycle is used up within 15 to 20 days of receipt. Refugees practice solidarity to compensate for the insufficient food supply, sharing the small quantities of food they receive from assistance or purchases. As a result, increasing numbers of refugees are resorting to negative coping strategies. These include a massive increase in begging and the sale of personal goods, including kitchen utensils, clothes, and even the materials used to build shelters. Refugee households are currently facing Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes. In the absence of food aid, they would be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In addition, some households are resorting to emergency coping strategies because of the large consumption deficits they face and are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Faced with early depletion of cereal stocks, indigenous households in the other host departments of Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira, and Sila are facing consumption gaps. They are unable to satisfy their consumption needs without resorting to crisis strategies, due to the erosion of most sources of income, exacerbated by strong competition among themselves and refugees and returnees. These departments are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). IDPs and host households in Lac continue to face consumption shortfalls following the depletion of host household stocks. The sharp deterioration in livelihoods, particularly the erosion of the main sources of income induced by this deterioration, limits these households' access to cereal markets. In addition, disruptions to the flow of imported food products from Libya are reducing food volumes on the markets of Tibesti, Borkou, Sahel Ouest (BEG, Kanem), and part of Hadjer Lamis (Dagana). This is leading to atypical price increases that limit market access for very poor and poor households in these areas. Accessible food volumes are well below consumption needs. Households in these areas face food consumption deficits and cannot meet their food needs without resorting to crisis-coping strategies. As a result, they face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. In the southern provinces, significant drops in household stocks, coupled with low income levels, are reducing minimum adequate food consumption. These households face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

Assumptions 

The most likely scenario from February to September 2024 is based on the following national-level assumptions:

2023 to 2024 off-season and 2024 to 2025 rainy season: In the off-season, access to the fuel needed to irrigate agricultural perimeters is limited. Recurrent fuel shortages and accompanying price hikes, including the increase in the price per liter at the pump decided by the government on February 13, 2024, will further limit access to fuel, reducing the planted areas and yields. Off-season production is expected to be significantly lower than in a normal year. The 2024 to 2025 rainy season will get off to a normal start, with average to above-average rainfall.

Pastoral situation:As a result of the scarcity of pastoral resources (drying up of pastures and watering places), the pastoral lean season will start earlier, in February 2024. This will affect livestock body conditions, despite the use of aerial grazing (thorny foliage). The return of transhumant herders to their home areas in the Sahel will likely be delayed by more than a month compared with a normal year, due to the severity of the pastoral lean season in the Sahelian home areas.

Merchant, household, and institutional cereal stocks: Merchant stocks are expected to be low during the scenario period due to production shortfalls at the national level. Given the government's decision to increase prices at the pump, high transportation costs induced by fuel price hikes will reinforce these low levels. Due to early and complete depletion of stocks in the Sahel and significant decline in stocks in the Sudan zone, poor households in these areas are more dependent than usual on markets. Actual institutional purchasing volumes could be lower than the forecasted 100,000 metric tons. This would be the result of budgetary constraints linked to other priority government expenditures, notably the elections scheduled for 2024. 

Conflicts between farmers and herders and between communities: Violence is expected to peak at the beginning and end of the rainy season from May to November 2024. The peak will be reached in May 2024. The level of violence will be determined by the displacement of herders across agricultural areas. Overall, violence is expected to reach levels higher than those seen in 2023 and similar to those seen in 2022, with most events concentrated in Mandoul, Guéra, Logone Oriental, Logone Occidental, and Mayo-Kebbi.  Cattle rustling and ongoing tensions between farmers and herders are likely to lead to clashes in Niellim and Kyabé (Moyen-Chari) during the winter and harvest seasons. 

Security context (politico-military conflicts, Lac, subregional situation): Significant fighting between rebel factions and the government is unlikely until September 2024. If rebel groups are carrying out localized operations in northern Chad, these should be quickly contained by Chadian security forces. In Lac, attacks by elements of the Islamic State in West Africa (EIAO) are said to be limited to isolated incursions. The strengthening of government security measures would reduce the intensity of skirmishes to levels below those of 2022, and well below the trends observed over the last five years. The continuing conflict in neighboring Sudan will continue to cause an influx of refugees and returnees to eastern Chad. Although unlikely during the period covered by the report, cross-border clashes between Central African and Chadian forces remain a possibility. Fighting is unlikely to be limited to sporadic cross-border skirmishes, although such operations do have an impact on the civilian population, disrupting agricultural activities and leading to population displacement.

Livelihood trends: The persistence of the Sudanese crisis is likely to continue to erode the East Zone's main sources of income (non-agricultural labor, domestic work, petty trade, self-employment, etc.), due to the heavy pressure of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees on the few existing opportunities. Low daily wages, down by over 40 percent, would reduce household labor income levels due to oversupply of labor. In the east of the country, revenues from the main sources are expected to remain lower than in a normal year due to the prolonged closure of the borders with Sudan, which is slowing down the economy in the area. In the western Sahel, most incomes of very poor and poor households will be lower than in a normal year throughout the scenario period due to the deterioration of the main sources (sale of livestock, migration, remittances from migrant workers). Income from remittances from permanent and seasonal migrant workers will be limited by the poor security situation at the borders. Other sources of income, such as gold panning, have been considerably reduced by the government's ban on artisanal mining.

Food markets: The current below-average supply of food products is likely to persist due to low cereal stocks resulting from poor rainfed crop production. Low flow volumes caused by fuel shortages and their impact on transportation costs are exacerbating market supply shortages. In the Sudanian zone, transfers of large volumes of cereals to deficit areas in the Sahel would reduce the volumes available locally. In the East and in the Sahel, the halt in incoming flows from Sudan and the disruption of flows from Libya will likely continue to limit the overall supply of foodstuffs on the markets. Demand for food products is expected to remain on the rise throughout the scenario period, with two peaks: between March and April, during the Ramadan period, and during the lean season in August 2024. These increases would be significant in provinces hosting Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees due to sustained pressure on local cereals and imported products. The low availability of manufactured goods imported from Sudan as a result of the cessation of inward flows would reinforce this sustained pressure, despite alternative flows from Libya. Finally, the re-export of these manufactured products via informal smuggling corridors to Sudanese localities in Darfur would reduce supplies in the host departments, including Assoungha in Ouaddaï. Food prices, particularly cereal prices, would remain higher than the five-year average throughout the scenario period (Figure 4) due to rising demand. Fuel price rises would drive up transportation costs, reinforcing these upward trends.

Livestock markets: The harsh early pastoral lean season observed in the Sahel limits the supply of livestock on markets in the zone due to the massive presence of pastoralists in the Sudanian zone. Supply on the markets of N'Djaména, a transit zone for Cameroon and Nigeria, is close to or slightly above average. Export demand will mainly be directed towards Cameroon and Nigeria and will increase slightly despite the depreciation of the Nigerian naira and high transportation costs. This follows the closure of borders with Sudan, limiting the outflow of livestock to that country. In Lac, livestock prices were up from October to January and are expected to be down on the previous year but will stabilize at the level of the five-year average. In Lac, livestock prices are expected to fluctuate (Figure 5). In May/June, prices are likely to rise occasionally due to the Tabaski Celebration, which will generate strong demand for mutton. Prices are likely to remain below last year's levels and below those of a normal year due to weak export demand coupled with the depreciation of the Nigerian naira.

Nutritional situation: The nutritional situation is likely to remain worrying, despite a slight improvement generally observed between February and May 2024 due to the lower prevalence of water-borne diseases and the seasonal availability of market garden produce and non-timber forest products (NTFPs). The situation could deteriorate further between June and September due to the longer lean season, the seasonal rise in water-borne diseases, and poor hygiene and sanitation conditions, particularly in insecure areas and those hosting refugees.

Humanitarian situation: The persistent conflict in Sudan continues to cause regular influxes of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees into eastern Chad. This is likely to increase assistance needs. The loss of the livelihoods of displaced households will expose them to a greater state of vulnerability. Funding for food aid operations for refugees in the eastern provinces should continue, despite the funding difficulties expressed by humanitarian actors, notably the WFP.

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

Between February and May 2024: In the eastern provinces, rising food prices and competition between refugees, returnees, and host households for scarce opportunities are leading to discrepancies in food consumption among these populations. To cope with these consumption deficits, many households are resorting to negative coping strategies (selling personal belongings, increasing begging, stealing meals). Despite these strategies, they are unable to meet their basic food needs. Host households are providing some very modest support to returnees and refugees to supplement their food intake. The precarious food situation of returnees and refugees is exacerbated by the regular influx of new arrivals with whom they share meals. The departments of Assoungha and Kimiti are in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!). In the absence of food aid, their food consumption would deteriorate further, and they would face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. Some households are intensifying their negative coping strategies, and they are expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Very poor and poor households in the other departments of Ouaddai, Sila, Wadi Fira, Ennedi Ouest, and Ennedi Est are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Low incomes are limiting market access for internally displaced and host households in Lac and very poor and poor households in the East and in the Sahel-Saharan zone (Bahr EL Ghazel, Borkou, Kanem, Tibesti, Ennedi West). Market purchase volumes are likely to be well below normal levels, due to atypical upward trends in food prices compared to the five-year average. Households are likely to face a consumption gap, driven by poor nutritional conditions and a sharp deterioration in their main livelihoods. They are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Most households in the Sudanese zone will have a minimally adequate reduced food intake and will be Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

Between June and September 2024: In addition to seasonal trends, food prices are expected to increase compared with the five-year average. Very poor and poor households in Sahelian areas and in the Sahara (Provinces of Ennedi Ouest, Ennedi Est, Tibesti, Borkou) are expected to continue to face limited food access. They will have consumption gaps and will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Given worsening food insecurity, many households among Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees will be forced to intensify their use of emergency coping strategies, facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. While the number of these households is expected to increase, they will likely remain less than 20 percent of the population. Competition for wild product collection, coupled with competition for scarce employment opportunities (farm labor, domestic work), will intensify. The quantities of wild products collected will be reduced and will not be sufficient to fill consumption gaps. The continuing influx of new refugees and returnees due to the continuing Sudanese crisis will increase the deterioration in food consumption in host areas, which will face severe consumption deficits. Refugee households in Assoungha and Kimiti are expected to remain in Crisis! (Phase 3!) in the presence of humanitarian assistance, while Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist in other departments and provinces hosting refugees from the East.

Events that Might Change the Outlook

Current Situation

Sudan crisis and impacts on food security in Chad: The humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad caused by the security situation in neighboring Sudan continues to impact food security in the host provinces. An estimated 556,410 refugees and 144,015 Chadian returnees have been registered since February 2024 (UNHCR). Daily influxes estimated at nearly 200 people are reported by humanitarian actors. As of late January 2024, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 160,000 individuals are awaiting local registration in impromptu sites along the Sudanese border. These arrivals severely disrupt the livelihoods of indigenous households already facing agricultural production deficits. The competition for employment opportunities and resource pressure with returning refugees is resulting in an erosion of incomes in the departments of Assoungha and Kimiti, as well as across most host areas. Finally, the cessation of trade at the beginning of this crisis is having a significant impact on the local economy in the east of the country, which is largely dependent on cross-border flows with Sudan.

Off-season agricultural campaign: Off-season campaign activities are characterized by a reduction in cultivated areas. These decreases in cultivated areas follow low humidity levels, resulting from the deficient rainfall totals of the 2023 to 2024 season. Irrigation of market gardens using motor pumps is limited by the increases in the price of fuel per liter. In Amleyouna and Adré (Ouaddai Province) and Goz-Beida (Sila Province), crop wilting has forced many producers to abandon market gardening.

Pastoral situation: Pastoralists are all in the southern zone, which are better endowed with pastoral resources (crop residues, water points, etc.) than in Ouaddaï and Sila, where  pasture conditions have deteriorated and temporary ponds have dried up due to the rainfall deficit last winter, leading to a harsh and early pastoral lean period.

Food sources: During this period, market purchases constitute the main food source for households in the area. Most very poor and poor households in the area are entirely dependent on market purchases because of the early depletion of their cereal stocks. However, the volumes of these purchases are very small because of the high prices of agricultural products on the markets. The sharing of meals between households reduces the quantities consumed. This is more pronounced in host households and villages hosting Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees. Humanitarian aid products are a very important source of food that can cover the consumption needs of refugee and returnee households for two to three weeks. Given the growing numbers of Sudanese refugees and the difficulties in financing food aid, the volumes distributed are below the needs of the populations.

Sources of income: The massive presence of Sudanese refugees in search of opportunities has caused a significant erosion in the level of income. This is due to the slowdown in economic activities resulting from the Sudan crisis. Significant decreases in income from manual labor, domestic work, sales of straw, and firewood are observed. For example, the daily income derived from brickmaking amounts to only 500 CFA francs instead of the previous average of 1,500 CFA francs before the arrival of refugees. These decreases are due to the pressure on available resources, which generate only limited income. Agricultural labor in market gardening areas employs only a limited number of people for onion harvests, with incomes much lower than in a normal year. In Adré and Goz Beida, there are reported decreases in income due to an oversupply of labor amid limited opportunities. These decreases represent a more than 60 percent drop compared to a normal year, especially in Goz Beida. Manual labor activities around markets, which previously brought in 3,000 CFA francs per day, currently provide only about 1,500 to 2,000 CFA francs. This decline in income is directly linked to the oversupply of labor coupled with the slowdown in road traffic, particularly the flows from Sudan. Furthermore, there is often a pronounced reliance on negative coping strategies, such as the sale of personal items (pots, clothes, construction materials used in shelter construction), which are widely adopted by refugees and returnees. These strategies are observed in particular in the Djabal, Zabout, and Adré transit camp and are mainly aimed at accessing food and income.

Food markets: Supplies of food products imported from Libya and Cameroon (via N’Djaména) have increased. In addition to these alternative flows, there are internal cereal flows from the country's other provinces (Salamat, Guéra, N’Djaména, and Sudanese provinces). However, these flows are unable to close the gap created by the halt in imports from Sudan. The supply of food products is below that of a normal year due to high transportation costs caused by increased fuel prices and shortages. Some of the alternative flows are also re-exported to Sudanese border towns via informal smuggling channels. The continued stoppage of inward flows of manufactured food products from Sudan is sharply reducing availability in local markets. Faced with a sharp increase in the area's population due to the presence of refugees, returnees, and humanitarian workers, demand has exploded. In the department of Assoungha, the proportion of refugees represents nearly 44 percent of the local population. As a result of the large influx of foreigners seeking employment in the major hosting centers (Adré, Goz Beida, Farchana), food prices are very high and have even doubled for some products. For example, a bag of pasta sells for 1,250 FCFA, compared to 500 FCFA previously. The price of a coro of sorghum (equivalent to 2.5 kg) is currently sold at 400 to 450 FCFA, compared with 300 to 350 FCFA in a normal year. These price levels are further exacerbated by fuel price hikes.

Livestock markets: Market supply is lower than in a normal year due to the relocation of pastoralists further south as a result of poor local pastoral conditions. Indeed, despite this and the transhumance season, the impossibility of transactions with Sudan limits the availability of animals on the markets of this export transit zone. This low level of supply has led to a slight increase in prices for small ruminants compared with the average, despite normal to below-normal demand. The price of a locally bred sheep varies from 23,000 to 25,000 FCFA or even 35,000 FCFA, as compared to 20,000 to 25,000 FCFA in a normal year. Breeds imported from Sudan are sold at between 40,000 and 60,000 FCFA, compared with an average of 30,000 FCFA during a normal year.

Nutritional situation: According to UINICEF data updated on January 15, 187,071 children have been screened for moderate and severe acute malnutrition. Among them, 21,995 cases of moderate acute malnutrition and 12,043 cases of severe acute malnutrition, i.e. 18 percent of those screened, were treated in children aged 6 to 59 months. In addition, 17,077 pregnant women were screened, and 2,365 cases of malnutrition treated. The results of the latest IPC AMN analysis conducted in December 2023 indicate a deterioration in the nutritional situation to Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4 in the provinces of Ouaddaï and Sila between January and May 2024. The regular influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees from Sudan, poor infant and young child feeding practices, and poor hygiene and sanitation conditions have contributed significantly to this deterioration in the nutritional situation. 

Humanitarian situation: According to the humanitarian profile published jointly by the Chadian government (Ministry of Public Health) and the World Health Organization (WHO) at the end of January 2024, the Sudanese crisis is affecting more than 2 million people in eastern Chad. Of this population, 1,115,626 are in need of urgent assistance. As of February 7, 2024, WFP has provided food aid to 633,450 people, including 495,962 new refugees, 87,372 returnees, and 50,116 people from host households (UNHCR). The monthly ration distributed is 12.5 kg per person per month of sorghum, 2.5 kg per person per month of beans, and 1 liter of cooking oil. Cash transfer operations covered 37,601 people with a monthly amount of 7,000 FCFA per person. Humanitarian actors, including the UNHCR, are forecasting an additional 250,000 new arrivals by 2024.

Assumptions

In addition to the national-level assumptions, the following assumptions apply to this area of concern:

Off-season and rainy agricultural seasons: Increases in fuel prices are expected to continue to affect the maintenance of agricultural perimeters during the off-season campaign. The rainy season will likely experience a normal start, with average rainfall. Rain-fed agricultural activities will be characterized by average to slightly above-average planting, driven by the enthusiasm of indigenous households after the deficits of the 2023 to 2024 agricultural campaign as well as by the participation of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees, who may engage in agricultural activities to procure food in addition to the assistance they receive. Finally, the high availability of low-cost labor, reinforced by the oversupply of refugees and returnees offering their workforce, will promote a slight increase in cultivated areas. 

Pastoral situation: The early pastoral lean season since January 2024 will reach its peak between March and June with a longer than normal period. Pastoral conditions will likely improve with the regeneration of vegetation cover and normal replenishment of seasonal ponds. 

Food markets: During the Ramadan period between March and April 2024, atypical price increases compared with the five-year average will also be observed and will precede increases during the winter period when atypical levels will be reported. These trends will follow seasonal slowdowns, the presence of transhumant herders in the area reinforcing demand, as well as continuous influxes of refugees and returnees to the area.

Livestock markets: The downward trend in livestock prices will resume throughout the winter due to the presence of transhumant herders in the area.

Humanitarian aid: Funding for humanitarian aid is expected to continue during the outlook period, thus ensuring the continued distribution of food aid. 

Nutritional situation: In the provinces of Ouaddai and Sila, the nutritional situation is expected to be Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) throughout the analysis period, according to the latest IPC AMN analyses of December 2023. 

Income sources: 

Wage labor: Income from domestic work and brickmaking will see a significant decrease due to oversupply resulting from the high mobilization of refugees and returnees offering their labor. These levels will be maintained throughout the analysis period.

Sale of firewood: Revenues from this activity will remain much lower than in a normal year due to the scarcity of available resources due to pressure on availability, coupled with competition on access and control. Government restrictions in place will further limit the volumes collected. The low seasonal availability during the wintering season will reduce the quantities sold in the face of pressure on collection.

Agricultural labor: Income derived from off-season agricultural work will significantly decrease due to oversupply. The reduction in cultivated areas due to limited access to fuel for irrigation will significantly reduce employment opportunities in market gardening sites between March and May 2024. These low income levels will likely persist during the rainy season due to oversupply. This oversupply will be sustained by competition among refugees, returnees, and host households for employment opportunities, further limiting income levels.

Sale of livestock: Between February and June 2024, the poor physical condition of livestock as a result of the atypical pastoral lean season will affect their market value. Income from these sales will be much lower than in a normal year due to low prices on the markets. The oversupply linked to the presence of transhumant herders in the wintering season, coupled with the cessation of exports to Sudan, will limit income due to low prices in local markets. Finally, the sale of small ruminants will yield very modest incomes for very poor and poor host households.

Begging: Despite its intensification, very marginal incomes will be derived from this activity. These low incomes will be due to high mobilization.

Food sources:

Market purchases: Market purchases are expected to decrease significantly due to the atypical upward price trends caused by the depletion of cereal stocks among indigenous households. Refugees' purchasing volumes will be even more marginal due to constraints on their purchasing power from the erosion of their main income sources, exacerbated by oversupply.

Payment in kind: The volumes of food products received as payment for services in market gardening areas will be very low compared to a normal year. This follows the limited food availability in most host households, coupled with the scarce employment opportunities for Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees between February and May 2024. This situation will persist throughout the analysis period.

Host households' own production: The first harvests of agricultural products will supplement the consumption of host households as well as refugees and returnees hosted by local households between August and September 2024. However, these contributions will remain very low and will not be able to cover consumption needs.

Wild products: The low availability of these products, subject to the pressure on available resources, will limit the volumes collected. Competition for scarce supplies will result in reduced amounts collected by households.

Solidarity: The sharing of meals between host households and refugees and returnees, a cultural practice of solidarity, will decrease during the rainy season due to increased financial precariousness during the lean season, which will lead to reductions in meal sizes.

Aid products: The amount of aid provided will not be able to compensate for consumption gaps due to the increasing number of beneficiaries. The continuous arrival of new refugees and meal-sharing practices contribute to reducing the availability of these products for refugees. 

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

From February to May 2024: Consumption gaps will be observed among very poor and poor households due to early depletion of cereal stocks, leading to early and increased dependence on markets. These households will also face the erosion of their incomes. In the presence of unusually high price increases compared to a typical year, purchase volumes will be significantly limited. Due to lack of income, refugees are expected to resort to begging, as the food received from aid covers their consumption needs for an average of only three weeks. Access to cereal markets is limited. Therefore, the significant dependence on humanitarian aid (food and cash) will prevent the deterioration of their food consumption. Despite this, they will have food consumption deficits. In the departments of Assougha and Kimiti, where there is a high proportion of refugees and returnees, the low incomes earned are insufficient to meet household food needs, despite the adoption of crisis coping strategies. However, the dependence on food aid has prevented the deterioration of their food consumption. These households are in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!). Households classified as very poor and poor, as well as refugees and returnees from the departments of Abdi, Ouara, and Djourouf Al-Ahmar, will experience food consumption gaps due to limited access to food. They will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Furthermore, the intense pressure on scarce resources and competition for opportunities could escalate into conflicts over access to and control of these resources, especially with a new influx of refugees.

From June to September 2024: The heavy reliance of households on markets will be hindered by the unusually high upward trends compared to a normal year. Consumption deficits will be observed due to a reduction in social solidarity practices. This reduction will be driven by the low availability in host households. The increase in begging will represent a negative coping strategy, yielding only minimal, marginal incomes. Competition for opportunities will persist due to the influx of refugees, significantly reducing the incomes generated by various activities. This will result in an oversupply of labor, which will continue to keep household incomes significantly lower compared to a normal year. The intensification of strategies such as increased engagement in domestic work and agricultural labor will not be able to compensate for the income gaps resulting from the erosion of primary income sources. Refugees and returnees will depend on food aid to limit food consumption deficits. The nutritional situation will continue to deteriorate in host areas due to low coverage of food needs and water-borne diseases. The appearance of malaria cases linked to the wintering season and the influx of refugees could exceed the capacity of basic social services. Households in host departments (Assoungha, Kimiti) will face high gaps in food consumption, as well as Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) acute food insecurity outcomes. Very poor households in the other departments of the hosting area of Ouaddai (Abdi, Ouara) and Sila (Djourouf Al Amar) will have consumption deficits and will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). This deterioration in consumption will result from limited food access due to low incomes in the face of atypical price increases compared to a normal year on the cereal markets.