Conflict and high food prices are driving persisting Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist across the Northwest and Southwest regions through at least May 2026. The number of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected to rise, peaking during the southern lean season (March-May 2026). A small proportion of households, particularly those in highly insecure and remote areas with severely eroded coping capacities, will continue to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.
• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to continue through January 2026 in the Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari divisions of the Far North Region. From February to May, outcomes are expected to deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3). A small proportion of households, particularly those with severely diminished coping capacities, will likely continue to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.
• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to continue through at least May 2026 in Mberé (Adamawa), Kadey (East), and Lom-et-Djerem (East) divisions, which host large numbers of refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR). Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist among a small proportion of households, particularly refugees.
• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through at least May 2026 in the urban centers of Yaoundé and Douala. These cities host a significant concentration of very poor households, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) whohave lost livelihood assets due to displacement and have limited access to income-earning opportunities.
• FEWS NET estimates that 1.5-1.99 million people in the country, including refugees, IDPs, and other conflict-affected households, will require emergency food assistance between October 2025 and May 2026. Assistance needs will continue to rise, peaking between March and May, coinciding with the lean season in the country’s southern zone. However, the delivery of humanitarian food assistance across the country remains critically constrained by persistent funding gaps and ongoing uncertainties.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 17, 2025. 

Most rural households across Cameroon have agropastoral livelihoods, though there are some pastoral communities in northern Cameroon. Livestock production is concentrated in the North, Far North, and Adamawa regions, with some activity in the West and Northwest. The rainy season in the southern zone (March to November) and the northern zone (June to September) dictates seasonal crop and livestock production patterns. In a typical year, poor households primarily meet their food and income needs through farming by consuming most of their own production and selling the surplus at markets. Agropastoral households rely heavily on temporary agricultural labor opportunities to earn additional income for food and non-food purchases, while poultry, firewood, charcoal, and fish sales provide minor sources of income during the year. Pastoral households typically buy most of their staple grains using income from livestock (mainly small ruminants) and animal product sales and consume milk and meat from their herds.

Conflict is the main driver of acute food insecurity in Cameroon, with two ongoing conflicts in the country. Since 2013, Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), both offshoots of Boko Haram, have launched attacks in the Far North Region, inflicting widespread violence and instability on communities. Meanwhile, continued fighting in the Northwest and Southwest regions involving Anglophone separatist groups has resulted in significant violence since late 2016. 

Both conflicts have severely disrupted agricultural and pastoral activities that are vital for rural livelihoods. In conflict-affected areas, the agricultural area cultivated has dropped 20-40 percent below pre-conflict levels due to restricted access to fields and the abandonment of farms. This reduction has led to diminished demand for agricultural labor and poor harvests. As a result of below-typical supplies, staple food prices have trended moderately to significantly above pre-conflict years. Moreover, the seasonal decline in food prices during the harvest and post-harvest periods has been minimal to nonexistent. Compounding these challenges, ongoing conflict and insecurity have restricted market access and operations, resulting in fewer open trading days and constrained trade flows, all of which further strain supply chains and rural incomes. Consequently, households face significantly reduced purchasing power for staple grains due to reduced incomes from crop and livestock sales caused by reduced harvested stocks and herd sizes, disrupted market functioning, and high cereal prices. Over successive years of conflict, many households have been repeatedly internally displaced and therefore have a greatly reduced capacity to cope with additional shocks and recover their livelihoods. 

Acute food insecurity in the country is compounded by seasonal floods in the northern zone, high inflation, rising fuel prices, and the presence of more than 350,000 refugees from the Central African Republic, primarily located in Cameroon’s East Region. These refugees compete for limited labor opportunities and drive increased pressure on staple food prices in host communities in the East, Adamawa, and North regions. Additionally, in urban areas, notably Yaoundé and Douala, where households rely on market-purchased foods to meet their year-round consumption needs, high pricesof essential food and non-food items limit the purchasing power of poor urban households.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Cameroon Food Security Outlook: October 2024 to May 2025
• Latest Cameroon Key Message Update: September 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

In the Far North Region, ISWAP has intensified attackson both the Cameroon Armed Forces (FAC) and civilian populations since early 2025, particularly across Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari. ISWAP has also increased financial extortion of civilians through a surge in kidnappings for ransom. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), this surge in extremist activity is the result of intensified Nigerian military efforts, which have forced ISWAP fighters to retreat into Cameroonian territory. Districts such as Mora, Kolofata, Hilé Alifa, Waza, Logone Birni, Darak, Makary, Koza, and Mokolo have faced repeated attacks, often targeting the same communities. The conflict has severely disrupted agriculture, with widespread displacement and insecurity preventing cultivation and harvests during the 2025 season. Cultivated land in conflict zones is estimated to be 30-40 percent below pre-conflict levels. Additionally, delayed and below-average rainfall in June and July in Logone-et-Chari and Mayo-Sava hampered planting and grain development. Prices of key staple foods in conflict zones remain significantly above pre-conflict levels, driven by persistent supply disruptions, high household demand due to poor harvests, impaired market functionality, and elevated transportation costs. In September, the cost of key cereals, notably sorghum and maize, in Kousseri, Mokolo, and Mora districts was nearly double that of September 2023 and well above the five-year average. However, improved supply during the September-October harvest period has helped stabilize prices to some extent. This seasonal price moderation has also been supported by a decline in Nigerian wholesale purchases, largely influenced by the depreciation of the NGN. In pastoral communities, extremist groups continue to abduct herders and raid livestock. Although livestock conditions improved seasonally, prices remain below average due to restricted market and trade route functionality.   

In the Northwest and Southwest regions, clashes between Anglophone separatists and FAC have declined year-on-year through 2025. However, violence remains high in 2025, as both regions experience persisting frequent attacks on civilians and increased kidnappings (used by separatist groups to generate revenue and penalize opponents and defectors). Lockdowns beyond the regular Monday “ghost town” are common, often violent, and economically disruptive. A six-week lockdown in September and October, aimed at boycotting the October 12 presidential election, led to widespread market closures, movement restrictions, and insecurity. Widespread violence against civilians has forced many households to abandon their farms. In rural zones, separatist groups continue to impose illegal agricultural levies, further discouraging farmers from cultivating. Cultivated land during the 2025 main season was approximately 20-30 percent below pre-conflict levels in both regions, leading to below-average harvests. Some recovery occurred where displaced farmers returned, but many urban-displaced households and those in insecure zones harvested little or nothing. Following consecutive poor harvests, staple food prices remain well above pre-conflict and five-year averages in both regions. Although prices briefly stabilized in July and August, lockdowns in September and October further disrupted supply chains (Figure 1), causing sharp weekend price spikes when markets reopened. In September, yellow maize prices in Bamenda, Limbe, and Buea rose by 10-20 percent, averaging 20 percent higher than the previous year. Prices for fish, eggs, and chicken nearly doubled due to supply disruptions from the Littoral and Western regions and fresh vegetables were largely absent from urban markets, contributing to acute food insecurity in the regions.

In non-conflict-affected regions, food prices remain elevated due to reduced supplies from conflict areas and high transport costs. Official petrol and diesel prices remain 15-20 percent above the five-year average, with rural areas facing even steeper costs due to added delivery expenses. The price of illegally imported Nigerian fuel, widely used across northern and coastal towns, remains significantly elevated compared to last year’s level due to rising fuel costs in Nigeria. Prices for imported staples (such as rice, vegetable oil, and wheat flour) have been relatively stable but about 10 percent higher than in 2023 and 50-70 percent above the five-year average due to reduced imports stemming from high shipping costs. In urban centers like Yaoundé and Douala, where households rely heavily on markets and rural supply chains, food prices remain elevated compared to other non-conflict regions. During September and October, the availability of fresh produce declined sharply, largely due to lockdowns in the Northwest and Southwest regions. During this period, supply disruptions triggered temporary surges in food prices across all markets in the urban centers. Panic buying in the days leading up to the October 12 presidential election triggered a further surge in prices and caused shortages of certain products due to heightened demand. Meanwhile, in the divisions of Mberé (Adamawa), Kadey (East), and Lom-et-Djerem (East), food prices in host communities have been exacerbated by the presence of the large populations of refugees from CAR, many of whom do not have any arable land for cultivation or remaining livestock for sale. In these refugee-hosting communities, the cost of essential staples such as maize and cassava consistently exceeds the five-year average. 

Humanitarian food assistance

In 2025, WFP, in collaboration with its implementing partners, continued delivering humanitarian food assistance across Cameroon; however, levels are insufficient to meet actual needs, largely due to chronic funding shortfalls. Refugee rations have been cut by half since 2023, and incomplete food baskets have been distributed (WFP). Grant terminations and a sharp decline in donor funding have prompted a further scale-down of humanitarian operations in 2025. In August 2025, WFP assisted nearly 115,000 individuals, including refugees, IDPs, and other vulnerable groups across the Adamawa, East, Far North, and Northwest regions, which represents less than 25 percent of the total population at the district or divisional level. Beyond funding limitations, the distribution of food in highly insecure and remote areas presents significant challenges due to insecurity and restricted access.

In October, area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in the Northwest and Southwest regions. Many households have already depleted their own-produced food stocks, four to five months earlier than in a typical, conflict-free year. This rapid depletion was fueled mainly by conflict-related disruptions to agricultural production and below-average harvests and was accelerated by early crop sales prompted by widespread fears of market instability amid election-related insecurity and lockdowns. As a result, households have become increasingly dependent on market purchases for staple grains. However, market access remains severely constrained by soaring food prices, declining incomes, and restricted mobility exacerbated by the September-October separatist-imposed lockdown, making it difficult for many households to purchase food to meet daily needs. A growing number of households are reportedly engaging in negative coping strategies such as purchasing food on credit, reducing portion sizes, or skipping meals. In highly insecure and remote areas (particularly in Donga-Mantung, Momo, Bui, Lebialem, and Menchum divisions), households facing consecutive seasons of little or no harvests, repeated forced displacements, and prolonged lack of access to essential health and nutrition services are experiencing significantly eroded coping capacity and wide food consumption gaps. A small proportion of these households are likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. 

In the Far North Region, area-level outcomes for Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari improved from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in October. The September-October main harvest has provided conflict-affected households with access to own-produced staple foods, helping to alleviate food consumption gaps at the household level. Nevertheless, below-average agricultural and pastoral production, combined with frequent insurgent violence, has continued to undermine income generation and limit households’ ability to afford essential non-food needs such as education and healthcare. Some households, especially the displaced, continue to face severe food consumption gaps and are employing negative coping strategies due to poor harvests and elevated food prices. A small proportion of households with severely eroded coping capacity face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

Communities hosting refugees from CAR, notably Mberé (Adamawa), Kadey (East), and Lom-et-Djerem (East), continue to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. The presence of a significant number of refugees has greatly increased demand for basic goods, inflating prices even during the post-harvest season, when food is typically more abundant. The intensified competition for scarce resources and limited job opportunities has further driven reduced household incomes. Access to safe drinking water remains critically low among refugee households, exacerbated by poor hygiene and sanitation conditions. Negative coping strategies, such as skipping meals and removing children from school, remain high among refugee populations.

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist in Yaoundé and Douala as soaring staple food prices continue to undermine food access for poor urban households, particularly refugees and IDPs, who depend heavily on market purchases to meet their daily food needs. Intense competition for jobs and income-earning opportunities in these cities has further constrained household earnings. As a result, many poor urban households have reduced both the size and frequency of their meals, while cutting back on essential non-food expenditures. 

• In the Northwest and Southwest regions, fighting between the Anglophone separatists and FAC and associated violence against civilians is expected to continue through May 2026, albeit at a lower intensity compared to 2023 and 2024 levels. This reduction stems from several factors, including limited popular support, disunity among separatist factions, greater capability of government forces, recruitment challenges, and disarmament efforts. Conversely, local separatist factions will likely continue and increasingly turn towards banditry and kidnapping for ransom, due in part to poor economic conditions and the continued decrease in the level of organization and coordination within armed groups. Ongoing political tensions are likely to persist and or escalate in the coming month, potentially triggering renewed clashes.
• In the Far North, ISWAP is expected to launch an increasing number of counterattacks against the FAC and continue committing acts of violence against civilians through May 2026, particularly in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari. Despite ongoing efforts by government forces to curb the Islamist insurgency, persistent challenges in resource allocation and operational capacity will likely hinder their ability to effectively contain ISWAP’s activities. In line with regional trends across the Greater Lake Chad basin, conflict incidents are projected to remain elevated and continue to increase, surpassing levels recorded between 2022 and 2024. Moreover, ISWAP militants are poised to exploit any post-election civil unrest, using it as a strategic opportunity to launch further assaults on FAC positions.
• In conflict-affected areas, off-season harvests in the southern zone (December) and the northern zone (February-March) are expected to be below average, primarily due to restricted access to farmland. Although the rainy season generally improves soil moisture conditions, field reports indicate that access to river valleys and floodplains (key locations for intensive irrigation during off-season farming) remains severely constrained by widespread insecurity. In the Logone floodplains, relatively lower flooding compared to last year will likely lead to earlier water recession, offering a timely window for planting dry-season sorghum. However, persistent Islamist attacks in the region are likely to continue to jeopardize agricultural activities.
• Agricultural labor opportunities are expected to remain atypically low during the peak tilling and planting months of January to April in the Northwest and Southwest regions, and during the onset of main season activities in May in the Far North. Conflict-related restrictions to farm access, coupled with the reduced hiring capacity of better-off households, are expected to significantly limit area planted. Off-own-farm income-earning activities, including petty trade, construction, bricklaying, and charcoal and firewood sales, will also be constrained due to widespread insecurity, including enforced lockdowns, ghost towns, market curfews, and movement restrictions.
• Food commodity prices countrywide are expected to remain well above 2023 levels and the five-year average, driven by persistently high transportation costs, ongoing conflict-related supply chain disruptions, and strong illicit export demand despite government-imposed bans. However, prices are projected to stabilize closer to 2025 levels, aligning with the International Monetary Fund’s forecasts for continued easing of inflation. The anticipated increase in fuel prices beginning in early 2026, following further reductions in government subsidies in 2025, is likely to escalate transport costs and hinder the movement of goods and people across the country.
• Livestock body conditions and market values are expected to remain favorable through December, driven by continued access to quality pasture. However, along with reduced herd sizes, livestock prices are expected to remain below average in conflict-affected areas, largely due to persistent disruptions in trade flows and market functionality. Additionally, the anticipated increase in local market supply following declining export demand from Nigeria due to the NGN depreciation against the XAF will likely place further downward pressure on livestock prices in pastoral areas.

Humanitarian food assistance

• WFP is expected to continue providing humanitarian food assistance across the country through May 2026. FEWS NET was unable to obtain distribution targets for the projection period; however, based on critically reduced levels of funding and the most recent trends in assistance delivery, FEWS NET anticipates a further decline in assistance levels. In addition to funding shortfalls, humanitarian operations will continue to face major access constraints, particularly in remote and highly insecure regions.

Area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are projected to persist across the Northwest and Southwest regions through at least May 2026. The number of households experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes is expected to rise steadily, peaking around May to June, in alignment with the annual lean season. By January, many households are expected to exhaust their food stocks from the 2025 harvest and become increasingly market dependent. As food prices surge and reach their peak between March and May, more households will likely struggle to afford basic food items due to limited income, despite engaging in intensified off-own-farm labor and benefiting from the peak agricultural season. In rural areas, families are expected to increase their consumption of wild vegetables, mushrooms, and fish. However, these seasonal wild food sources are typically insufficient to meet the growing nutritional needs during the lean season. Acute malnutrition is expected to increase among households with severe declines in food consumption, compounded by critical gaps in essential health services, including vitamin A supplementation, deworming, and routine immunizations. In the highly insecure and remote areas (particularly in the divisions of Donga-Mantung, Momo, Bui, Lebialem, and Menchum), where compounded shocks (including little or no harvests and repeated displacements) have severely eroded households’ coping capacities, food consumption gaps will likely widen through the lean season. Across these regions, a small but increasing number of households are expected to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes during the lean season.

In the Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari divisions, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through January 2026, before deteriorating to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from February through May. Household food stocks from the September-November main harvest will offer only limited support for consumption between October 2025 and January 2026. Due to below-average harvests, many households will likely exhaust own-produced food stocks rapidly. Given low contributions from the February-March off-season harvest, household food stocks are expected to be critically low by February, forcing near-complete market dependence for basic grains. Inadequate incomes from both agricultural and off-own-farm sources will severely constrain financial access to food amid seasonally high prices. Elevated cereal prices, combined with low earnings from livestock sales, will suppress cereal-to-livestock terms of trade for pastoral households. As a result, many households are expected to face widening food consumption gaps and adopt coping strategies amid projected area-level Crisis (IPC Phase) outcomes.Additionally, a small number of conflict-affected households with exhausted coping capacities are likely to continue experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes throughout the projection period.

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are projected through May 2026 in the divisions of Mberé (Adamawa), Kadey (East), and Lom-et-Djerem (East), which host a significant refugee population from CAR. As the March-May lean season approaches, increased market dependence, combined with persistently high food prices, will further erode household purchasing power. This will further undermine household food access, with outcomes for some households, particularly very poor refugees, expected to deteriorate into Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during this period.

The cities of Yaoundé and Douala are expected to remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through at least May 2026, primarily driven by persistently high and escalating food prices, and compounded by limited purchasing power among large populations of refugees and IDPs amid significant barriers to income-earning opportunities. As the lean season progresses, staple food prices are projected to rise even further, increasingly limiting the food purchases necessary to meet daily food needs. As a result, a growing number of households are likely to experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, with very poor households likely to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes during the lean season.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Persistence and/or escalation of political and ethnic tensions following Cameroon’s October 2025 presidential elections and the regional elections in November. 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A persistence or escalation of political and ethnic tensions beyond levels considered in FEWS NET’s most-likely scenario could trigger widespread social unrest, jeopardizing livelihoods and the country’s economic stability. Such escalation may lead to market closures, disruptions in agricultural and livestock production, and breakdowns in supply chains, diminishing access to income-earning opportunities, and driving food prices above projected levels. The number of people experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes in conflict-affected areas and urban poor populations experiencing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes would increase. Heightened insecurity could further constrain the already limited humanitarian assistance across the country.