October harvests bring temporary relief to conflict-affected households

• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to continue until January 2025 in conflict-affected areas of the Far North region, particularly in the Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Mayo-Sava divisions. After January, outcomes will likely deteriorate to Crisis levels (IPC Phase 3) through May due to an atypically rapid depletion of food stocks from the October harvest, high prices, and reduced purchasing power. Households most affected by conflict and flooding are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) throughout this scenario period. Those with severely reduced coping capacity will face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.Households facing flood-related displacements and severe crop and livestock damage, particularly in the Mayo Danay and Diamaré divisions, are expected to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes through the end of the year.
• Area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist in the Northwest and Southwest regions until May 2025. The number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in these regions is expected to rise, reaching its peak during the lean season between March and May. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist for a small proportion of poor households, especially those in the most insecure, remote areas who have faced repeated displacements.
• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected until May 2025 in areas with large refugee populations, especially in Mbéré in Adamawa and Kadey and Lom-et-Djerem in the East region. Very poor households, especially refugee households, will likely face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Host and refugee households ' access to basic food and non-food needs remains limited due to above-average staple food prices and heightened competition for income-earning opportunities. 
• FEWS NET estimates that 1.5-1.99 million people in the country, mainly refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and returnees, will require emergency food assistance between October 2024 and May 2025. Annual assistance needs are anticipated to remain high and peak around May, coinciding with the peak of the lean season in the country’s southern zone.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 15, 2024.

Households affected by conflict and floods in the Far North, Northwest, and Southwest regions and refugee and host households in the East, North, and Adamawa regions urgently need humanitarian assistance. Annual assistance needs are anticipated to peak around May 2025, coinciding with the peak of the lean season in the country’s southern zone. Given currently low funding levels, total assistance needs are expected to continue to outstrip planned assistance levels, with further downscaling of beneficiaries or ration sizes likely.

The impacts of conflict and insecurity on household food availability and access are expected to drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in the Northwest and Southwest regions and parts of the Far North region during the October 2024 to May 2025 scenario period. Sporadic clashes between government forces and non-state armed groups, along with violence against civilians, continue to forcibly displace households, limit household access to land for agricultural production, drive significantly below-average harvests, and disrupt livelihoods. As of August 31, 2024, the number of people living in internal displacement due to conflict and violence had increased to approximately 453,662 in the Far North and 583,113 in the Northwest and Southwest regions, according to UNHCR. Many households have experienced multiple displacements because of the violence and have had to face compounding flood and food price shocks, which has significantly eroded their coping capacities. Once limited household food stocks are exhausted as early as October in the Northwest and Southwest regions and January in the Far North, poor households in these regions are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with a small proportion of very poor households living in the most insecure areas in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The cumulative impact of seasonal flooding continues to challenge the limited coping capacity of conflict-affected households. The Far North region experienced heavy rainfall and severe seasonal flooding from July to September. This led to the flooding of approximately 82,509 hectares of cropland, the loss of 5,278 livestock, and affected about 365,060 people in localized areas as of September 19 (OCHA). The affected areas include the Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Mayo-Sava divisions, which were already impacted by conflict, and divisions not affected by conflict, such as Diamaré and Mayo-Danay. Such flooding has increased the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in the Far North region. In the Mayo-Danay and Diamaré divisions, households most affected by flooding will likely face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity through January 2025 due to flood-related displacements and a decline in production.

Elevated food prices are exacerbating the impact of conflict and challenging limited household purchasing capacity. Although inflationary pressure on staple food prices eased in 2024 compared to recent years, current prices remain historically high. This significantly limits household food access, especially for conflict-affected households that have become atypically market-reliant due to below-average production. With limited opportunities for agricultural labor and other income-earning activities, many conflict-affected households rely heavily on unsustainable negative coping strategies to afford food due to high prices. In addition to high staple food prices, limited job opportunities amid high competition are also severely limiting access to income and food for many urban poor households, refugees, and IDPs who have lost their livelihoods and must purchase most of their food at markets. The cities of Yaoundé and Douala, as well as the refugee-hosting divisions of Kadey and Lom-et-Djerem (East) and Mbere (Adamawa), are experiencing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) area-level outcomes. 

Most rural households in Cameroon have agropastoral livelihoods, though there are some pastoral communities in northern Cameroon. Livestock production is concentrated in the northern and Adamawa areas, with some activity in the west and northwest. The rainy season from March to November in the country’s southern zone and June to September in the northern zone dictates seasonal crop and livestock production patterns. In a typical year, poor households primarily meet their food and income needs through farming by consuming most of their production and selling the surplus at markets. Households rely heavily on temporary agricultural labor opportunities to earn additional income for food and non-food purchases. Poultry, firewood, charcoal, and fish sales are minor sources of income during the year. By contrast, pastoral households typically buy most of their staple grains using income from livestock (mainly small ruminants) and animal product sales and consume milk and meat from their herds.

Conflict is the main driver of acute food insecurity in Cameroon, with two ongoing conflicts in the country. Since 2013, Boko Haram, a terrorist group founded in Nigeria, and subsequently its offshoot, ISWAP, have launched attacks in the Far North region, inflicting widespread destruction on communities. Meanwhile, the Anglophone Crisis stemming from the rise of armed separatist groups in the Northwest and Southwest regions has resulted in significant violence since late 2016. 

Both conflicts severely disrupt agricultural and pastoral activities vital for rural livelihoods. In conflict zones, the area cultivated has dropped 30-40 percent below pre-conflict levels due to restricted field access and farm abandonment, leading to diminished agricultural labor demand and poor harvests. Due to below-normal supplies, staple food prices trend moderately to significantly above pre-conflict years. Also, the seasonal decline in food prices typical during the harvest and post-harvest is minimal to nonexistent. Ongoing conflict and insecurity restrict market access and operations, resulting in fewer open days and trade flows, negatively impacting supplies and rural incomes. Households face significantly reduced purchasing power for staple grains due to reduced incomes from crop and livestock sales caused by reduced harvested stocks and herd sizes, disrupted market functioning, and historically high cereal prices. During successive years of conflict, many households have been repeatedly internally displaced and have a greatly reduced capacity to cope with additional shocks and recover their livelihoods. 

Acute food insecurity in the country is compounded by seasonal floods in the northern zone, high inflation with rising fuel prices, and the presence of over 350,000 refugees from the Central African Republic. These refugees compete for limited labor opportunities and put pressure on staple food prices in host communities in the East, Adamawa, and North regions. Additionally, in urban areas, notably Yaoundé and Douala, where households rely on purchasing food at markets to meet their consumption needs year-round, high prices of essential food and non-food items limit the purchasing power of poor urban households.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Food Security Outlook for Cameroon
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section. 

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Conflict and insecurity: 

The Northwest, Southwest, and Far North regions continue to experience armed conflict and insecurity, resulting in disrupted livelihoods, population displacement, loss of life, and damage to assets. In the Northwest and Southwest regions, fighting between the Anglophone separatists and the Cameroon Armed Forces continues in its eighth year. Data collected by ACLED suggest the number of conflict incidents and fatalities reported during the first three quarters of 2024  declined compared to some periods in 2022 and 2023. From January 1 to August 16, 2024, there were 1258 incidents of armed clashes, attacks, abductions/forced disappearances, and 680 fatalities, a 23 percent decrease in incidents and a 23 percent decrease in fatalities compared to the same period in 2023. However, tensions escalated between May and August in Bamenda, the capital of the Northwest region, following resistance from some drivers and the military to comply with a directive from one of the separatist groups that required taxi drivers to repaint their vehicles white and blue. Separatist forces have also increased efforts to extort civilians and generate revenue, leading to more kidnappings. Also, OCHA has reported an increase in attacks on schools and health facilities in these regions, with 34 schools being attacked between January 1, 2024, and August 2024. The Mezam and Bui divisions of the Northwest region and the Meme and Fako divisions in the Southwest recorded the highest number of conflict events from January to August 2024, likely due to a relatively higher presence of separatists and military forces. Additionally, remote areas in divisions like Lebialem in the Southwest and Momo and Menchum remain highly insecure.

In the Far North region, the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) has intensified military counter-insurgency operations and violent attacks against civilians in the Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari divisions. Most of these incidents occurred in the Kolofata and Mora districts of the Mayo Sava division and the Mokolo, Koza, and Mayo Moskota districts in the Mayo Tsanaga division. These incidents mainly involved armed clashes between ISWAP and military positions, as well as incursions, looting, and abductions in villages. Data collected by ACLED shows that from January to August 2024, there were 902 incidents and 598 associated fatalities, nearly double the number of incidents and triple the number of fatalities compared to the same period in 2023. However, heavy rains and flooding during the ongoing rainy season have made most earth roads impassable, hindering the movement and activities of ISWAP forces. 

According to UNHCR, as of August 31, 2024, the number of people living in internal displacement due to conflict and violence had increased to approximately 453,662 in the Far North and 583,113 in the Northwest and Southwest regions. In the most affected areas, households are being displaced multiple times following different episodes of attacks.

Macroeconomic situation: 

Although Cameroon's macroeconomy has seen some improvements since 2023, favored by increased domestic gas production and higher world commodity prices, the African Development Bank reports that challenges such as conflict in some parts of the country and climate change-related shocks continue limiting economic growth. Global supply chain constraints stemming from the war between Russia and Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East are also contributing to these challenges. According to the National Institute of Statistics (INS), Cameroon’s annual inflation generally fell in 2024, averaging 5.1 percent in August, down from 7 percent in August 2023. However, the current inflation rate remains twice the rate recorded in 2021 and well above the 3 percent threshold set by the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). Over the past twelve months, sustained high inflation rates have been driven primarily by a food price inflation of 6.5 percent and a 13.9 percent increase in transportation costs. High inflation and fuel price increases in neighboring Nigeria continue to compound inflationary pressures in Cameroon, most notably in regions along the international border.

Weather shocks: 

Recent flooding in the Far North region is compounding acute food insecurity, particularly in areas already affected by protracted conflict and insecurity. Since July 2024, the region has experienced torrential rainfall and severe seasonal flooding, causing considerable damage in several localities, particularly in the Diamaré, Logone and Chari, Mayo-Danay, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Mayo Sava. According to OCHA, as of September 19, 2024, 365,060 people have been affected, around 5,278 livestock lost, and 82,509 hectares of agricultural land destroyed. An estimated 155,000 people have been internally displaced as of 25 September. According to FAO’s Data in Emergencies (DIEM) flood monitoring analysis from August 1 and September 15, this year's flooding has had a greater impact on flood extent and flooded cropland compared to 2023. 

In the North and Adamawa regions, a prolonged dry spell and below-average rainfall in July and August negatively impacted crop development at the vegetative and flowering stages. Dry conditions also increased the prevalence of fall armyworm infestations on cereal fields compared to previous years. The most affected areas include the Bénoué, Faro, and Mayo Louti divisions in the North and the Faro-et-Deo and Vina divisions in the Adamawa region. End-of-season assessments led by the Ministry of Agriculture have not been conducted yet.

Crop production: 

In the unimodal and bimodal areas of the country’s southern zone, a favorable March-June rainfall season supported an overall average cropland area planted and the normal growth and development of the main crops. However, conflict and insecurity continue to limit access to farmlands in the Northwest, Southwest, and parts of the Far North regions, maintaining cropland areas planted significantly below pre-conflict levels. Due to supply constraints, farmers in these conflict areas face higher agricultural input prices. 

In the Northwest and Southwest regions, while there has been a slight increase in main cereal and legume harvests compared to the 2023 season due to the increased involvement of returnees in farming activities in their original settlements, agricultural activities continue to be limited by widespread insecurity, and movement and work restrictions on "ghost town" and lockdown days. Field information suggests that armed groups collecting illegal taxes from farmers have discouraged agricultural activities in some rural areas. Additionally, due to complex procedures and insufficient subsidy rates, many poor households in these areas are unable to benefit from the government's fertilizer subsidy program. Furthermore, movement restrictions and insecurity have delayed the delivery of subsidized fertilizers to most rural areas. Although no assessments have been conducted, production estimates for the main cereals (maize, rice) for the 2024 crop year point to a 30-40 percent decrease compared to pre-conflict levels, similar to recent years. Due to limited harvests, stocks from the July-September harvests at the household and market levels are lower than usual and depleting prematurely. 

In the unimodal Far North region, torrential rainfall and severe seasonal flooding inundated farms across the Diamaré, Logone and Chari, Mayo-Danay, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Mayo Sava divisions in August and September. According to FAO’s Data in Emergencies (DIEM) flood monitoring analysis, close to 91,123 hectares of cropland were flooded as of September 15, 2024. The ongoing harvesting of sorghum, maize, rice, and legumes has been constrained in some areas as flooding has prevented access to crop fields. Field information also suggests crop damage and reduced grain quality in flooded fields. In the Logone and Chari, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Mayo Sava divisions, armed insurgency and widespread insecurity continue to limit crop production despite the above-average July-August rainfall. Rising insecurity has resulted in population displacement, limiting cropping cultivated in these areas. 

In the unimodal North and Adamawa regions, despite the normal cropping area being planted in May and June, the prolonged dry spell and below-average rainfall in July and August, critical periods for main-season crop development, caused moisture stress and wilting in some standing crops. Dry conditions have resulted in below-average cereal harvests in localized areas in Bénoué, Faro, and Mayo Louti divisions in the North and Faro-et-Deo and Vina divisions in the Adamawa region.

Livestock production: 

The favorable rainfall from April to September has improved pasture and water conditions across the country, supporting normal livestock physical conditions, productivity, and reproductivity. However, livestock production continues to face challenges in conflict areas related to livestock raids and killings by armed groups, household displacements, and limited veterinary services. Although very poor households typically own very few animals, mostly small ruminants, those affected by conflict face further reduced herd sizes. In addition, close to 5,278 heads of livestock have been lost to recent flooding in the Far North region.  Reduced herd sizes have resulted in limited milk availability, an essential food and income source for pastoral and agropastoral households.

Off-own-farm sources of income: 

Poor households in the northern zone are benefiting from a seasonal boost in agricultural labor incomes following an increase in demand for harvesting labor. However, agricultural labor opportunities remain reduced in conflict areas due to reduced total cropland area planted, limiting critical seasonal income for poor households. Additionally, agricultural wage rates across most conflict-affected areas have decreased to close to 50-70 percent below pre-conflict levels, particularly in remote areas, due to the decreased financial capacity of better-off households to pay for labor. Information from the field indicates that lower daily wage rates are prevalent in communities with a high population of internally displaced persons due to competition for limited available labor opportunities. In the southern zone, poor households are benefiting from cocoa and coffee harvesting labor opportunities. However, prolonged insecurity and displacement of households in cocoa and coffee production areas in the Northwest and Southwest regions have impeded government efforts to restore coffee and cocoa production, thereby limiting labor opportunities. Nationwide, seasonal labor migration for typical income-generating activities such as gold panning, off-season agricultural work, sand digging, and construction has been restricted by increased transportation costs, flooding, and insecurity in affected areas.

Market functioning and trade flows:

Markets are operating at near-normal levels in most parts of the country, except in areas affected by conflict, insecurity, and flooding. In September and October, market access and operations across the Northwest and Southwest regions were further disrupted by an uptick in insecurity during a prolonged lockdown imposed by separatists in a boycott of the official school reopening and Unification Day celebrations (Figure 3 and Figure 4). Other factors include the presence of multiple checkpoints operated by the government military and armed groups, frequent roadblocks and attacks, and curfews. In the Far North region, heavy rainfall and flooding from July to September led to periods of access constraints due to impassable roads, temporarily disrupting supplies in some areas. These disruptions have led to decreased trade flows and atypical price trends in these areas. 

Commodity prices: 

In September 2024, the prices of imported products, such as wheat, rice, refined vegetable oil, and fish, maintained a stable trend of slight increase or decline that began earlier in the year. Between January and September, rice prices in the reference markets of Yaoundé and Douala rose only slightly, by about 6-7 percent, while wheat and fish prices declined by an average of 7 percent. The overall stable price trends of imported food prices in the country are likely driven by the ongoing decline in inflation combined with the ongoing strengthening of government price controls, which includes recent cracking down on merchants who defy price regulations. However, FEWS NET price monitoring data shows that prices of all imported food commodities have continued to trend significantly above the previous five-year average throughout 2024. Imported rice prices have not decreased despite Cameroon's import deal with India in October 2023 and the recent lifting of India's export ban in September 2024. In September 2024, imported rice prices in Douala were approximately 13 percent higher than the prices from the previous year and 32 percent above the average prices of the previous five years. In Yaounde, rice prices were close to last year’s levels but about 27 percent higher than the average prices of the past five years. 

Prices of locally harvested cereals (rice, maize, sorghum) remained above last year's and the previous five-year average in most key reference markets in producing areas. High prices of locally harvested foods are driven primarily by limited supply from conflict-affected areas, conflict-related trade flow disruptions, and soaring transport costs. Due to early depleting stocks, households impacted by conflict face increased demand. In September, prices of maize across the Northwest were 10-18 percent higher than last year and significantly above the five-year average. In the Far North region, prices of cereals began to decline seasonally around September due to the availability of newly harvested crops. However, prices of sorghum and maize in 2024 were nearly three times higher than 2023 levels in all monitored markets. Key drivers of high food prices in the Far North region include conflict-related production decline and supply disruptions compounded by strong export demand from Nigeria despite the official ban on cereal outflows.

In September, official petrol and diesel prices remained stable at 33-40 percent above 2022 levels but were higher in rural areas due to additional delivery costs. The prices of illegally imported Nigerian fuel, commonly consumed in most northern and coastal towns in Cameroon, remain significantly higher than 2023 levels following fuel price hikes in Nigeria. High fuel prices have led to increased transportation and food costs, further constraining purchasing power for poor and conflict-affected households with already limited incomes. Follow this link for more information on prices in key reference markets.  

Household purchasing capacity: 

Above-average food and non-food prices have kept purchasing power below normal for most poor households nationwide. The situation is direr amongst urban refugees and IDPs facing livelihood asset loss and low employment opportunities. In most northern areas, the livestock-to-cereal terms of trade (TOT) have decreased compared to last year and the five-year average (Figure 5). Decreasing TOT are driven primarily by atypically high seasonal cereal prices, along with below-average livestock prices due to the impact of conflict and the depreciation of the Naira, as Nigeria is a major destination for livestock exports. In conflict areas facing reduced labor demand, lower labor wages, and increasing cereal prices, the labor-to-cereal terms of trade (TOT) are significantly below the five-year average. 

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

In August, WFP reported providing emergency food assistance and livelihood support to approximately 60,300 internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees, and vulnerable host populations. The assistance included distributing food, cash, and vouchers. Close to 25,420 individuals received livelihood support. Over 16,200 children aged 6-23 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls (PBW/G) received 51.4 mt of specialized nutritious foods. However, the total assistance needs remain significantly higher than the planned levels due to funding shortfalls. Also, there is an ongoing scaling down of beneficiaries, with many recipients receiving only partial rations. In some areas, households with high assistance needs are unlikely to receive any assistance. Rising transportation and food costs and insecurity-related challenges negatively impact the country's humanitarian operations. Due to flooding, nutrition screening could not be conducted in some health districts in the affected localities in the Far North region (WFP). FEWS NET has been unable to access disaggregated statistics of recent food distributions at the zonal and divisional levels but estimates that current food assistance is unlikely to reach up to 25 percent of the total population at the divisional or regional level. Additionally, assistance is more concentrated in urban areas than in remote areas, where the need for assistance is likely also critical.

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Far North region: 

Area-level Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are likely ongoing in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari, given seasonal improvements in household food consumption linked to the start of dry harvesting. However,  escalating insurgent attacks and persisting insecurity in these areas have maintained below-average production and driven below-average food stock and income levels. This has been further compounded by flood-related crop and livestock losses in affected areas. Despite the arrival of main season harvests, the combined impacts of conflict, flooding, and elevated food prices are likely driving Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes among some households. Many are likely to engage in negative coping strategies, such as selling remaining assets to mitigate their consumption gaps. A small proportion of worst-affected households with severely eroded household coping capacity are likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. While increased food diversity and milk production have positively impacted the nutrition status of children under five, acute malnutrition levels likely remain high among some refugees and internally displaced households who have lost their production assets to conflict and do not have any harvested stocks or milk supplies. Moreover, the above-average rainfall and flooding in the area have led to seasonal increases in waterborne diseases and malaria, particularly among households facing water shortages, poor hygiene, sanitation conditions, and limited access to health and nutrition services. 

Households in more secure divisions of the Far North, like Mayo Danay and Diamaré, suffering from flood-related crop losses, currently have below-average food stock levels and incomes from crop sales. Some who are still displaced to other villages have limited or no access to food from their own production. Many poor households can only afford minimally adequate food consumption and are likely struggling to meet their basic non-food needs, spending savings and borrowing money to afford food purchases. While area-level outcomes for these divisions will likely remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), some households are likely experiencing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, especially those facing the greatest flooding impacts. 

Northwest and Southwest regions: 

An increasing number of poor households in these regions are facing declining acute food insecurity and nutrition outcomes as they deplete main-season cereal stocks amid high cereal prices and limited household purchasing capacity. Many households are likely using negative coping strategies, such as prioritizing buying staple grains over essential non-food items to mitigate their consumption gaps, or are forced to reduce meal portions and frequency. A small share of households in remote areas of Lebialem, Menchum, and Momo, who have been greatly affected by conflict, having been forcibly displaced multiple times, are likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

Refugee hosting communities in East, North, and Adamawa regions:

Households in the Kadey, Lom-et-Djerem (East), Mayo Rey (North), and Mbéré (Adamawa) divisions continue facing challenges in accessing food and income due to the strain on host communities caused by a large presence of Central African Republic refugees. Increased demand for purchased food has significantly increased food prices in host communities, substantially limiting access for poor households. Refugees and host households are also facing high competition for few labor opportunities, constraining access to income. Due to reduced opportunities to cultivate, many are experiencing below-normal stocks from the just-ended main season and have become market-dependent much longer and earlier than usual. Many households are dealing with high food prices by cutting back on education and medical expenses. Some very poor families have had to take their children out of school or reduce the amount and frequency of meals. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) area-level outcomes persist in Kadey, Lom-et-Djerem (East), and Mbéré (Adamawa) divisions, where refugees account for over 20 percent of the total population. In the Mayo Rey division, some host households and refugees are also experiencing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, but the area-level outcome is assessed in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) due to a relatively lower refugee population (about eight percent of the division population).

Urban livelihoods in Yaoundé and Douala:

Poor households in urban areas are experiencing a significant decrease in their ability to buy essential food and non-food items due to historically high and rising prices. In cities like Yaoundé and Douala, where households rely on purchasing food from markets year-round, many urban poor households have been cutting back on meal sizes, frequency, and non-food expenses. Many refugees and internally displaced people living in these cities have lost their sources of income and have very limited opportunities to earn money, making them especially affected by rising food and transportation costs. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) area-level outcomes are assessed for Yaoundé and Douala, with a proportion of very poor, displaced households likely in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most 

likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions:

• The conflict between government forces and separatist fighters in the Northwest and Southwest regions is expected to remain high through May 2025, albeit at lower intensity compared to 2023 and 2022. This is likely due to multiple factors, including greater capability of government forces, limited popular support, and the continued disunity among separatist factions. An uptick in clashes is expected around October, February, and May as military forces escalate counter-operations against measures imposed by separatists to boycott official school reopening and national commemorations. 
• Attacks, violence, looting, and abductions associated with the ISWAP insurgency are expected to persist in the Far North region, primarily in the Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari divisions, with conflict levels expected to remain above those observed in 2021-2023. 
• According to the African Development Bank, Cameroon's economic growth is projected at 4.1 percent in 2024 and 4.4 percent in 2025, up from 3.8 percent in 2023. Inflation is expected to decrease from 7.4 percent in 2023 to 6.3 percent in 2024 and 4.3 percent in 2025. However, this positive growth outlook will be challenged by persisting global supply chain constraints associated with the war between Russia and Ukraine, the conflict in the Middle East, prolonged conflict and insecurity in parts of the country, and climate change-related shocks.
• Food price inflation, which has eased in 2024, is expected to remain high. The highest food prices are anticipated in conflict zones and urban centers, where there is high demand for and reliance on purchased food. Prices of locally produced staple foods are projected to stay above last year’s levels primarily due to production shortages in conflict-affected areas, increased transportation costs nationwide, strong demand for exports, and higher local production costs resulting from elevated prices of agricultural inputs and other raw materials on the international market. 
• The prices of imported food commodities are expected to remain relatively stable, with only slight increases during certain periods such as end-of-year or religious festivities when demand typically rises. Prices of imported staple cereals like rice are projected to stay above last year's prices and the five-year average, mainly due to high global shipping costs. However, these prices will likely remain stable, particularly with the ongoing strengthening of government price controls.

• Off-season maize, vegetable, and rice harvest is expected in the southern zone in November and December and will likely be average in most areas, given a good annual rainfall. In the northern zone, off-season cultivation from December and February will benefit from groundwater recharge due to recent flooding. However, production during the off-season is expected to be lower than average in areas affected by conflict and insecurity and in the worst-flooded areas where waterlogging is likely to pose challenges for cultivation.
• Agricultural labor demand will remain seasonally high in the northern zone through December due to main harvesting and off-season cultivation. From January through April, the demand for labor in the southern zone is expected to increase for land preparation and planting for the 2024 main season. Opportunities and wages from agricultural labor are expected to remain lower than normal in areas affected by conflict and insecurity due to significant reductions in cultivated areas. Seasonal labor force migration inland and to neighboring areas typically peaks between October and February during the main season. The harvesting of rice and sorghum is expected to be hampered by ongoing insecurity and rising transportation costs.

Sub-national assumptions for the northern zone:

• Cereal production from the 2024 main season harvests is anticipated to be 30-40 percent below average in localized areas where conflict and insecurity have resulted in below-average area planted. Additional crop loss is anticipated in some areas due to flood damage. 
• Conflict and insecurity are expected to continue disrupting market functioning and access in the region, leading to below-normal seasonal supplies and atypical seasonal price trends. Over the next few months, seasonal rains and flooding will further limit access.
• The market demand is expected to decrease slightly due to the seasonal harvest, but it will remain above average. This and a slight increase in market supply will lead to slight declines in staple food prices from October through November. However, prices are expected to increase unusually early, around January 2025.
• Prices of staple cereals such as sorghum, maize, and rice are expected to stay well above last year's level and the five-year average, driven mainly by below-normal supplies, persistently high household and export demand, and increased transportation costs. 
• According to FEWS NET's price projection for red sorghum in Kousseri, prices during the scenario period will trend 13-20 percent higher than last year and 46-61 percent above the five-year average (Figure 6).
• Off-season sorghum, maize, and vegetable crops expected in February and March will support household food stock levels but for a shorter than usual period in conflict-affected areas due to anticipated below-average production.  Household cereal stocks will be below average, depleting three to four months earlier than usual. Many will rely on the market for food and face rising food prices.
• Based on the current livestock conditions and the availability of water and pasture, livestock body conditions and productivity are expected to remain good through December. However, seasonal deterioration is anticipated starting in December when the dry season has fully set in. In localized areas of the North and Adamawa regions that have experienced moderate to severe rainfall deficits compared to an average season, faster pasture depletion is likely to occur. This is expected to negatively affect livestock body conditions and productivity, particularly since livestock movements to neighboring Far North, Chad, and the Central African Republic remain constrained by insecurity.

Sub-national assumptions for Northwest and Southwest regions:

• Due to a decline in production caused by conflict, stocks of poor households from both main and off-season production are expected to be depleted by November, four to five months earlier than in a pre-conflict year.
• Household demand is expected to remain higher, with households depending on markets earlier and for longer periods due to the rapid depletion of household stocks. 
• Prices of locally harvested staples such as maize and rice are expected to stay higher than last year's and the five-year average and are anticipated to rise atypically early, starting from November through the rest of the scenario period.
• The widespread insecurity and volatile security situation, including the observance of regular "ghost town days" and lockdowns in both regions, will continue to limit access to typical livelihoods. Market access, functioning, livestock movements, and trade flows will be significantly disrupted, leading to unusual price trends. 
• Insecurity will also limit many households' access to inputs and fields, reducing participation in agricultural activities at the start of the 2025 planting season. With smaller planting areas, poor households are expected to have limited access to labor opportunities, and lower daily labor wages will keep incomes below normal.

Humanitarian food assistance:

National assumption

• In the Far North region, some households affected by flooding have received food and non-food assistance from WFP and other humanitarian partners. The FAO’s flood Early Warning, Anticipatory Action, and Emergency Response System, established in the region in 2020, is helping affected communities recover from the impact of flooding. The government plans to provide around 590,100 USD to support emergency efforts in flood-affected areas (UNICEF). However, it is expected that many households affected by floods will not receive humanitarian assistance due to funding shortages, as well as insecurity and flood-related access constraints.
• Distribution plans shared by the Northwest-Southwest Food Security Cluster earlier this year suggest that about 350,000 people were targeted monthly in the Northwest and Southwest regions. This represents less than 10 percent of the total population at any divisional or regional level. Humanitarian funding in the country will likely remain underfunded relative to total needs during the scenario period, limiting the number of beneficiaries and assistance rations. 

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

Far North region:

In Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari, affected by conflict and insecurity, limited main season stocks from the September-November harvesting season will marginally support household food consumption, maintaining Stressed (IPC Phase 2) area-level outcomes until January 2025. However, households living in areas affected by conflict will likely continue to experience significant food consumption gaps due to significantly below-average harvests and the impacts of continued forced displacements. Given high market dependence and elevated food prices, households in these areas will likely continue to resort to negative coping strategies such as selling productive assets and are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during this period, with worst-off households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In the Mayo Danay and Diamaré divisions, which are unaffected by conflict, some flood-affected and displaced households with minimal harvests from the main season production will primarily depend on food markets. Due to high food prices, they will be forced to continue resorting to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) coping to meet basic food needs.

From February to May 2025, households in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari are expected to experience worsening food security outcomes due to the atypically rapid depletion of food stocks needed to meet their minimum food needs. Pastoral households who now face limited herd sizes will struggle to access grains from the market due to significantly reduced terms of trade. Although off-season sorghum and maize harvests will temporarily increase household supplies in March and April, many households are likely to remain dependent on the market due to poor harvests and will struggle to afford rising and high food prices. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to become widespread in these divisions from February and persist through May. A small number of conflict-affected households with depleted coping capacity and facing the additional impact of flooding are expected to continue experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food security outcomes throughout the scenario period.

Northwest and Southwest regions: 

In the Northwest and Southwest regions, acute food insecurity and nutrition outcomes are expected to deteriorate through May 2025. As poor households deplete their limited main and off-season stocks and face limited access to agricultural labor opportunities amid high basic food prices, their purchasing power is expected to decrease further. Faced with the increasing need for purchased food from the market, many more poor households are expected to use unsustainable coping strategies to mitigate their consumption gaps, such as buying food on credit or reducing meal frequency. The population experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in these regions is expected to increase through January 2025 and peak during the lean season between March and May. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist amongst very poor households in remote areas of divisions such as Lebialem, Menchum, and Momo, where humanitarian presence remains very low.

Refugee hosting communities in East, North, and Adamawa regions:

Area-level Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist in Kadey, Lom-et-Djerem (East), Mayo Rey (North), and Mbéré (Adamawa) divisions until May 2025, with some poor households experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In the Mayo Rey division, an increasing number of host households and refugees are expected to experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, but the acute food insecurity in the area will likely remain Minimal (IPC Phase 1). The many host households and refugees facing limited food stocks, limited access to income-earning opportunities, and high food prices will continue to struggle to meet their essential food and non-food needs. Many are expected to continue engaging in coping strategies such as reducing educational or medical expenditures, contributing to an elevated school dropout rate among very poor households.

Urban livelihoods in Yaoundé and Douala: 

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will likely persist in Yaoundé and Douala, with the poorest households likely in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). High and increasing food prices and limited job opportunities will continue to significantly reduce purchasing power, especially for internally displaced and refugee households. Many of these displaced households no longer own any assets and rely primarily on purchased food from the market. As a result, they are likely to continue reducing the size and frequency of meals and cutting back on non-food expenses throughout the scenario period.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National:

Further reduction of humanitarian food assistance and livelihood support to refugees in the Far North, East, Adamawa, and North regions 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Further reduction of humanitarian food assistance and livelihood support to refugees in the Far North, East, Adamawa, and North regions due to critical underfunding could lead to more households experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) situations. Refugee households would likely continue to struggle to afford enough food and might resort to extreme measures such as selling their remaining livestock, begging, or engaging in illicit activities like theft and prostitution.

Northwest and Southwest regions:

Increased tensions in conflict areas during the leadup to the 2025 elections in Cameroon 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An escalation of tension in conflict areas during the leadup to the 2025 elections beyond levels considered in FEWS NET’s most-likely scenario would further disrupt livelihoods and increase population displacements, negatively affecting agriculture and livestock production, supply chains, market functioning, and raising already high prices of staple commodities. The number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and worse outcomes would likely increase. Increased insecurity might further hamper already limited humanitarian assistance for the most conflict-affected households.