Conflict and high food prices sustain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes despite harvest

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through September in Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Sava, and Mayo-Tsanaga, driven by conflict and flooding. Households in Crisis will rise and peak during the June-August lean season, with some in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) as rising food price, low purchasing power, and eroded coping capacity widen food consumption gaps and drive rising malnutrition levels. From October to January, area-level outcomes are anticipated to improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) with the availability of own harvests. However, many displaced households — expected to lack access to harvests — will likely remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse through January 2027.
• Current Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are projected to ease to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) from July to October in parts of the Northwest and Southwest as harvests temporarily improve food access. From November to January 2027, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is likely to re-emerge at the area level due to below-average harvests, early stock depletion and high food prices amid conflict. More insecure and remote divisions with severe livelihood disruptions — specifically Ndian, Lebialem, Menchum, Momo, and Bui — are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) throughout the scenario period.
• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist through January 2027 in Mberé (Adamawa), Kadey (East), and Lom et Djerem (East), where Central African Republic (CAR) refugees drive localized food inflation and job competition, restricting food and income access for refugees and poor hosts. Similar outcomes will persist in Yaoundé and Douala, as poor urban displaced households face constrained food access due to reduced livelihoods, limited income, and high food prices.
• FEWS NET estimated 1.5-1.99 million people to be in need of food assistance in 2026. Needs peaked between May and June, coinciding with the height of the southern lean season and the onset of the northern lean season. While needs in the south are expected to ease with the main harvest, northern requirements will intensify through the June-August lean season amid the escalating Islamist insurgency and flooding risks that threaten food access and humanitarian operations. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 22, 2026. 

Most rural households across Cameroon rely on agropastoral livelihoods, although there are some pastoral communities in northern Cameroon. Livestock production is concentrated in the North, Far North, and Adamawa regions, with more limited activity in the West and Northwest (NW). Seasonal crop and livestock production patterns are shaped by the rainy season in the southern zone (March to November) and the northern zone (June to September). In a typical year, poor households meet most of their food and income needs through own crop production, consuming the majority of what they produce and selling limited surpluses. Agropastoral households also depend heavily on agricultural labor opportunities to earn cash for food and essential non‑food purchases, while poultry, firewood, charcoal, fishing, and small livestock sales provide supplementary income. Pastoral households largely purchase staple grains using income from livestock and animal product sales, while consuming milk and meat from their herds.

Conflict remains the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Cameroon, with two protracted crises affecting large parts of the country. Since 2013, Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal‑Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have carried out repeated attacks in the Far North Region, resulting in sustained insecurity, widespread displacement — estimated at 510,855 people as of May 2026 — and livelihood disruption. Meanwhile, ongoing conflict between Anglophone separatist groups and government forces in the NW and Southwest (SW) regions since late 2016 has caused widespread violence, population displacement, and prolonged economic disruption. As of April 2026, approximately 493,400 people remain displaced due to this crisis. 

Both conflicts have severely undermined agricultural and pastoral activities that are vital for rural livelihoods. In conflict-affected areas, cultivated land area remains 20-40 percent below pre‑conflict levels due to restricted access to fields, insecurity, and repeated displacement, resulting in poor harvests and reduced demand for agricultural labor. Disruptions to market functioning — including fewer trading days, constrained trade routes, and reduced cross‑border flows — have further limited food availability and income‑earning opportunities. As a result, staple food prices across much of the country remain moderately to significantly above pre‑conflict and five‑year average levels, with only limited seasonal price declines during harvest periods. 

In the Far North, persistent insecurity continues to constrain food access despite seasonal harvests and periods of relatively lower cereal prices linked to reduced cross‑border exports, particularly to Nigeria. Conflict‑affected households face limited purchasing power due to disrupted agricultural labor, livestock and fish sales, and petty trade, alongside persistently high prices for legumes, cooking oil, rice, and other essentials. Many displaced and vulnerable households are highly market‑dependent with limited capacity to rebuild livelihoods. Meanwhile, in the NW and SW regions, ongoing conflict restricts cultivation, disrupts markets, and limits mobility, resulting in early depletion of food stocks, below‑average agricultural labor income, elevated staple food prices, and widening food consumption gaps, particularly among households in highly insecure and remote areas.

Acute food insecurity is further compounded by seasonal flooding in the northern zone, high transport and fuel costs, elevated prices of imported foods, and broader macroeconomic pressures. Cameroon continues to host nearly 282,400 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR), primarily in the East and Adamawa regions, where competition for labor opportunities and natural resources places additional strain on host communities and contributes to elevated food prices. In urban areas — particularly Yaoundé and Douala — where households rely almost entirely on market purchases, above‑average food and non‑food prices and limited income‑earning opportunities constrain the purchasing power of poor households, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.

Across conflict‑affected rural areas, refugee‑hosting zones, and major urban centers, prolonged insecurity, high food prices, and eroded coping capacities continue to drive widespread food insecurity. Repeated shocks, displacement, and livelihood losses have left many households with limited ability to recover, increasing vulnerability to additional shocks and sustaining elevated humanitarian assistance needs, particularly during seasonal lean periods.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Cameroon Food Security Outlook: February to September 2026 
• Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Cameroon: April to September 2026
• Latest Cameroon Key Message Update: May 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

In the Far North, ISWAP and JAS attacks against civilians and government forces have escalated to their highest levels since 2022, concentrated primarily in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari divisions (Figure 1). Kolofata district (Mayo-Sava) alone accounts for nearly 30 percent of all reported conflict incidents in 2026, with Mora, Hilé Alifa, Waza, Koza, and Mayo-Moskota also heavily affected. ISWAP has also intensified financial extortion practices, including kidnapping for ransom. As of May, nearly 510,855 individuals remain displaced. Although some households have returned to regain access to farmland or escape worsening conditions in host communities, land preparation and cultivation remain disrupted as many displaced households face limited access to fields or have also lost or lack access to arable land altogether. Demand for agricultural labor has increased with the onset of the main planting season; however, it remains below typical levels due to the overall reduction in cultivated area. Declining humanitarian assistance — especially cash and voucher transfers — has driven a growing number of IDPs into the agricultural labor market, increasing competition and driving wages down. Daily pay for land clearing ranges from 700 to 1,000 FCFA, over 50 percent below pre-conflict levels and below the five-year average. On average, households are able to secure five to ten workdays per month, substantially below the 12-18 required to purchase the Minimum Expenditure Basket (12,395 FCFA).¹ Household purchasing power remains constrained by low income levels and price increases: between April and May 2026, sorghum and maize prices remained generally below the five-year average but increased by 11 to 15 percent in key markets, including Kousseri, Mora, and Mokolo. Groundnut and cowpea prices rose by 11 to 16 percent and remain above the five-year average. Livestock prices, particularly for goats and sheep, are below average in rural markets due to insecurity and reduced cross-border demand linked to the depreciation of the NGN. Trade flows remain severely disrupted by insecurity, with the Mora-Waza and Waza-Maltam corridors currently closed. Market participation has declined as traders and consumers withdraw, and Tourou market has remained closed since March.

In the Northwest and Southwest regions, clashes between Anglophone separatists and the Cameroon Armed Forces (FAC) have declined since 2024, but violence — particularly kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and looting — has escalated. Although “ghost towns” and lockdowns persist, their overall impact has weakened in some areas as communities adopt coping mechanisms and inconsistent enforcement. Nonetheless, fear and targeted attacks continue to disrupt livelihoods and limit voluntary returns, leaving many IDPs concentrated in major urban centers like Bamenda, Buea, and Limbe, where public services and informal economies are strained. Rural households are often limited to cultivating nearby plots under insecure conditions; some face informal taxation, while displaced households frequently lack access to arable land. Reduced cultivation has lowered labor demand and wages, keeping incomes atypically low. In addition, the availability of key food items — including beans, potatoes, vegetables, and maize from green harvests — remains below average. In June, prices for broken rice and maize remained above the five-year average due to strong demand following early stock depletion, supply disruptions, and high transport costs, even as weakened purchasing power continued to dampen overall demand.

Countrywide, food prices remain elevated but have eased overall compared to the previous year’s level, driven by reduced inflationary pressure following post‑election violence. In urban areas, however, price trends remain higher due to strong demand, restricted imports, high transport costs, and reduced inflows from conflict-affected regions. Urban centers hosting large displaced populations — including Yaoundé and Douala — and host communities for CAR refugees in the East, Adamawa, and North continue to face significantly above-average prices, further exacerbating pressures on household purchasing power.

Cameroon has maintained stable but above-average pump prices since March, despite its reliance on imported fuel amid global volatility linked to the Middle East conflict. This stability reflects the country’s limited dependence on Gulf suppliers and the government’s substantial subsidization of fuel prices. Nevertheless, diesel and gasoline prices remain well above average following sharp increases in 2023-2024. Meanwhile, contraband fuel from Nigeria — widely used in the Far North, Northwest, and Southwest regions — has reportedly risen by 25-50 percent, raising transport costs and adding pressure on food and non‑food prices, particularly in border areas that rely heavily on these informal supply chains.

Retail prices of urea and NPK fertilizers have further increased by 8-20 percent since March, driven by higher international shipping costs linked to the Middle East conflict, speculative trading practices, and seasonal demand. Field reports indicate that increased demand during the March-May southern lean season has depleted older stocks, forcing northern households to purchase newer, costlier supplies in June. While government subsidies and cheaper Nigerian fertilizers offer some relief, many poor households — who tend to prefer imported products — face significant access challenges.

Favorable rainfall conditions between March and May in the southern zone supported typical crop development, enabling the timely harvesting of green crops in June. In the northern zone, the sowing of rainfed crops commenced as scheduled in late May to early June, following the timely onset of average June-August rainfall. However, localized planting delays have been reported, particularly in the Logone-et-Chari division (Far North). At the same time, the transplanting of irrigated rice is progressing under typical conditions in the Logone floodplains.

Humanitarian food assistance

Funding cuts have forced WFP to drastically reduce food assistance, reaching only 590,000 people, or half of the planned target, in 2026. Several WFP field offices have closed, further limiting access to hard‑to‑reach communities. In April, WFP assisted approximately 64,800 IDPs and refugees in the Northwest and Far North, down from 91,532 during the same period last year. In March, 56,260 people in the East, Far North, and Northwest received assistance, while reports suggest the Southwest was not covered. Although ongoing distributions help mitigate food access challenges, they remain insufficient to meet daily needs, and coverage continues to fall far short of the population in need.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist across Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Mayo-Sava of the Far North region, with a growing number of poor households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3), as Islamist incursions and widespread insecurity continue to drive displacement, disrupt livelihoods, and limit access to food and income. Food stocks from the September-November 2025 main harvest were largely depleted by January 2026 —three to four months early — leaving households with substantially reduced reserves in June. This premature depletion, combined with below-average February-March off-season harvests, has further reduced household food availability and led to an atypically early and heavy reliance on markets. Rising food prices during the northern June-August lean season, coupled with declining income from seasonal agricultural labor, has severely weakened households’ purchasing power. Pastoral households are similarly affected, as unfavorable livestock-to-cereal terms of trade further erode their ability to access food. In response, poor households are increasingly resorting to unsustainable coping strategies, including reducing meal frequency and portion sizes, consuming less preferred or lower-quality foods, and cutting essential non-food expenditures such as health and education. Coping capacity is largely exhausted among the most affected, particularly some refugee and IDP households who have faced repeated attacks, multiple displacements, and severe livelihood constraints. These households are resorting to extreme coping strategies such as begging for cash to purchase food and are experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

The Northwest and Southwest remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with some very poor households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), driven by protracted conflict that continues to disrupt production, weaken markets, and constrain trade flows. As a result, households face an atypically high reliance on markets, above-average food prices, reduced incomes, and limited purchasing power. Although the June green harvest provides some post-lean season relief for cultivating households, these improvements are constrained by low overall supply and the absence of harvest benefits for non-cultivating households, particularly urban IDPs. Consequently, more than 20 percent of poor households remain dependent on market purchases at above-average prices and are only able to meet minimum kilocalorie needs through unsustainable coping strategies, including purchasing food on credit and cutting essential non-food expenditures. Some of the poorest households have resorted to begging for money to access food. Nutrition conditions — already weakened during the lean season — remain fragile among very poor households in insecure and hard-to-reach areas. This is driven by prolonged consumption of poor-quality diets, reduced humanitarian assistance, and limited access to key health and nutrition services, including vitamin A supplementation, deworming, and immunization.

In Mbere division (Adamawa) and in Kadey and Lom et Djerem (East), Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing, as the high concentration of refugees from CAR continues to place significant pressure on food prices, employment opportunities, and natural resources, constraining both food and income access for host and refugee households. As a result, more than 20 percent of households have only minimally adequate food consumption and are unable to meet essential non-food needs without resorting to negative coping strategies, such as borrowing or selling more livestock than is typical. Very poor households — particularly refugees — face more severe food consumption gaps. With limited or eroded livelihoods, these households are increasingly resorting to unsustainable coping strategies, including withdrawing children from school throughout the school year and reducing meal frequency and portion sizes, indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. In Mayo Rey division (North), where the refugee population from CAR remains relatively small compared to the total population, some refugee households are experiencing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, while the overall area-level classification remains Minimal (IPC Phase 1).

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist for the cities of Yaoundé and Douala as poor urban households — who rely year round on markets to meet their consumption needs — continue to face constrained access to sufficient food due to low purchasing power, driven by high prices and limited income-earning opportunities. These constraints are more acute among IDPs and refugees, who face restricted or lost livelihoods and intense competition for jobs in urban areas. To cope, poor urban households have reduced meal frequency and portions, borrowed money to purchase food, and, among the worst off, cut back on essential non-food expenditures to prioritize food consumption. Very poor households are facing consumption gaps indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

The rest of the country is facing Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes amid an absence of direct conflict impacts and engagement in typical livelihood activities at near-average levels. Carryover stocks from an average 2025 harvest sustained household food supplies through the March-May lean season, and income from crop sales and agricultural labor was average. June green harvests are now easing residual lean-season pressures as households transition toward the main July harvest.

• Cameroon’s macroeconomic outlook is expected to remain moderately positive. Recent IMF estimates suggest real GDP growth of approximately 3.3 percent in 2026, driven by increased public investment, a gradual reduction in political uncertainty, and sustained activity in the non-oil sector. However, structural challenges and persistent energy constraints are expected to continue limiting stronger expansion. Inflation is expected to ease toward the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) convergence threshold of 3 percent. Fiscal revenues are likely to improve as domestic revenue mobilization efforts advance. Key risks and constraints include commodity price volatility, security challenges, energy shortages, and the crisis in the Middle East, tight regional liquidity conditions, reduced external financing, and weaker export earnings from key commodities such as oil and cocoa.
• Armed clashes between separatist factions and the FAC in the NW and SW are likely to continue declining through January 2027 due to limited popular support, ongoing factional fragmentation, and improved FAC capability. However, kidnapping, extortion, and looting are likely to remain widespread as separatist groups increasingly rely on illicit revenue sources to offset declining external funding. Continued fragmentation and FAC operations against organized separatist groups is expected to further shift the conflict dynamics toward increased criminality.
• ISWAP and JAS attacks on FAC positions and civilians in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari are expected to remain above 2022-2024 levels through January 2027, sustaining the upward trend observed since 2025. Meanwhile, increased Nigerian offensives against ISWAP are expected to continue to drive increased cross-border militant activity into Cameroon, as armed groups exploit porous borders to conduct incursions and retreat operations.
• Displacement will persist, with urban centers continuing to absorb and sustain large IDP populations. Despite expected declines in fighting, persistent fear, targeted attacks on perceived defectors, and the legacy of past violence will likely continue to discourage voluntary returns.
• The June-August rainfall forecast indicates average conditions across both the northern and southern zones. These conditions are expected to support crop establishment and growth in the northern zone and facilitate second-cycle production in the bimodal rainfall regions of the South, Center, and East. However, localized dry spells are anticipated in localized areas in the north, which will likely negatively impact crop performance. Although the El Niño event began in June 2026 across West Africa, it is not expected to produce significant rainfall anomalies in Cameroon based on historical trends. Any impacts are likely to remain localized, particularly in parts of the Far North. However, past El Niño periods suggest that overall agricultural production remains stable across most of the country, and Cameroon’s food security is generally resilient to such events.
• Weather forecasts show moderate to high probability of above-average streamflow conditions over the Chari and Logone basins through August, suggesting the possibility of downstream flooding between July and September, with flood-prone divisions such as Logone-et-Chari and Mayo-Danay in the Far North region likely at risk. However, there is uncertainty due to the long-range nature of the forecasts. 
• Crop production will stay well below typical levels in conflict zones due to restricted farmland access. Displaced households will continue to face major barriers to cultivation amid competition for scarce resources. In parts of the Northwest and Southwest, modest gains are expected, especially in peri-urban areas with improved security has allowed partial resumption of farming. Agricultural labor will remain limited, reducing seasonal income, while non-agricultural activities including firewood and charcoal sales, brickmaking, and petty trade will also be constrained by fewer workdays and disrupted market activity during curfews and lockdowns.
• Local harvest supplies during the main harvest season (July-December) are expected to remain below average in the NW and SW due to conflict-related losses. Coupled with early stock depletion, high transport costs, and frequent supply disruptions, this will continue to drive above average and volatile price trends. Seasonal price declines, typically observed during the July–September harvest and post-harvest period, are likely to be limited in most urban markets, largely due to sustained demand from households unable to cultivate, particularly IDPs.

• Across most of the southern zone, food prices will stay above the five‑year average but near last year’s levels, driven by reduced conflict‑affected supply and high transport costs (Figure 2). Prices will be highest in urban centers and in IDP-hosting areas, due to strong demand. Imported staples, including rice and wheat, are projected to remain 50-70 percent above the five‑year average, sustained by persistently high shipping costs.
• In northern markets, sorghum and maize prices are projected to rise and peak during the June-August lean season while remaining below the five‑year average. This trend will be sustained by reduced exports from Nigeria, driven by NGN depreciation and government export restrictions. Increased local availability during the September-December harvest is expected to be absorbed domestically, keeping prices at below‑average levels.
• Fertilizer demand weakened after the southern zone’s main application season ended in May, but prices are expected to rise in northern markets during June–September 2026/27, driven by seasonal demand and higher international shipping costs.
• Pastoral conditions are expected to improve from July onward in northern areas with the progression of the rainy season, supporting better livestock body condition and market value. However, prices in conflict-affected areas are projected to remain below average as insecurity continues to disrupt market functioning, trade flows, and demand. The reduction in Nigerian buyers is also likely to depress livestock prices — particularly for small ruminants — keeping values below average and affecting small ruminants to basic cereal terms of trade across northern markets.

Humanitarian food assistance

• The delivery of lifesaving assistance is expected to remain significantly below needs due to critical funding shortfalls. Statistics on lean season assistance for IDPs and refugees in the Far North region could not be accessed by FEWS NET. WFP continues to warn of an imminent, additional assistance cut; 95.2 million USD is needed to sustain food and nutrition assistance in Cameroon in 2026.

In Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari divisions of the Far North, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist, with the proportion of households experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) projected to rise through August as the lean season peaks. Poor households have largely exhausted food stocks and will rely on market purchases, but below-average incomes from agricultural labor, livestock, milk and fish sales will limit access to adequate food. Many households will likely adopt severe coping strategies, including reducing meal size and frequency, consuming less preferred foods, and cutting essential non-food spending, including health and education. A small proportion — especially those with depleted coping capacity — will likely deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Starting in July, seasonal flooding is expected to intensify displacement and further restrict food access for conflict-affected households, while also driving short-term acute food insecurity in flood-prone, non-conflict areas, including Mayo-Danay and Diamaré. From October to January, food consumption gaps are expected to ease with the main harvest as own production and income from crop sales become available. However, conflict‑related disruptions will likely lead to below‑average production, limiting improvements. While many poor households may achieve minimally adequate consumption — resulting in area‑level Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes — they will continue to struggle to meet non‑food needs. In contrast, very poor and displaced households with little or no harvest and severely eroded coping capacity are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse due to the combined impacts of conflict and flooding.

In the Northwest and Southwest, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will shift to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through October as the July maize and legume dry harvest in the southern zone will improve access to food and income and support better consumption. However, conflict‑driven production losses, high debt, and weak purchasing power will limit recovery, with many poor households still relying on negative coping strategies to meet non‑food needs. In more insecure and remote divisions — notably, Ndian, Lebialem, Menchum, Momo, and Bui — where losses are most severe, more than 20 percent of poor households will continue to face food consumption gaps and employ coping strategies such as reducing meals, selling assets, and increasing debt. These areas will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with a small share with exhausted coping capacity expected to remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). From November to January, area-level conditions are expected to worsen back to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as food stocks deplete early and reliance on markets rises amid low incomes and high prices, leading to widening consumption gaps and increased use of severe coping strategies. 

In Mbere (Adamawa) and in Kadey and Lom et Djerem (East), Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through January 2027, with some of the worst-off households remaining in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). The high presence of CAR refugees is anticipated to continue intensifying job competition, limiting access to arable land and other natural resources. Food availability is expected to improve somewhat from July with the dry harvest of maize, roots, and tubers, reducing the number of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). However, anticipated below‑average production and incomes among refugees and poor host households will constrain recovery. As a result, reliance on negative coping strategies — including borrowing, selling non‑productive assets, and depleting savings to meet essential non‑food needs — is likely to persist throughout the projection period.

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist in the urban areas of Yaoundé and Douala, driven by weak purchasing power among market-reliant poor households sustained by projected high food prices and limited income-earning opportunities. IDPs and refugees who are expected to face ongoing restrictions in accessing livelihood activities will encounter more severe food access constraints. Among very poor households, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are anticipated to persist, with reliance on negative coping strategies throughout the projection period. Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food security is expected to persist throughout the projection period in areas not directly affected by conflict, supported by favorable production prospects and ease of access to typical livelihoods. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. 
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Disruptions in maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz persist 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Although Cameroon’s trade with Iran and the Gulf is minimal, its heavy reliance on imported fuel and fertilizers leaves it highly exposed to global supply chain disruptions stemming from instability in the Strait of Hormuz. Persistent instability in this corridor — driving volatility in global energy prices, tightening reserves, and raising shipping costs — could further constrain Cameroon’s import of refined fuel, fertilizers, and essential staples such as rice and wheat, thereby intensifying domestic inflationary pressures. A renewed surge in fuel pump prices countrywide, including Nigerian fuel that is frequently smuggled and consumed across Cameroon’s Far North, Northwest, and Southwest regions, would elevate transportation tariffs and, in turn, increase the cost of both food and non-food commodities. Further price hikes in food and non-food commodities would compound already elevated costs, deepening access constraints, particularly for conflict-affected households whose purchasing power has been severely eroded. During the ongoing June-September main cropping season in the northern zone, fertilizer prices could rise above currently high levels as supplies shipped through the Douala seaport face additional transportation costs. Although only 10-15 percent of poor households in this zone typically apply fertilizer, rising prices will further limit usage and dosage, contributing to poor yields and worsening production prospects in conflict areas. Both situations risk further restrictions on food access for poor households, pushing an increasing number into Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse levels of food insecurity, above levels estimated in the current outlook scenario. 

Far North region

Severe seasonal flooding 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If seasonal flooding between August and October is severe and exceeds historical levels, access to livelihoods, markets, and trade flows in affected areas will be heavily disrupted. Extensive damage to crops, livestock, and property would sharply reduce food and income sources for impacted households. Flood-prone divisions such as Logone-et-Chari and Mayo Sava — already affected by conflict — would likely face new displacements and further deterioration of livelihood activities, market operations, and overall food and income access. As a result, the number of households experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes would rise, particularly among those repeatedly displaced by both conflict and flooding. Flooding would also restrict mobility, hindering humanitarian assistance delivery in affected areas.