Conflict and rising food, fuel prices to drive peak assistance needs in lean season

• In February 2024, the government further reduced fuel subsidies, which led to increases in petrol and diesel prices by an average of 15 percent, compounding the previous 16-25 percent increase that occurred in February 2023. The recent fuel price hike is expected to push up the prices of food and essential non-food commodities even further. Poor urban and internally displaced households spend a significant portion of their income on food and are expected to be the most impacted by additional price increases. According to the National Institute of Statistics (INS), annual inflation in Cameroon increased to 7.7 percent in December 2023, after five consecutive months of increases, significantly exceeding the 3 percent target set by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). However, INS data suggests that food inflation decreased from 12.9 percent in 2022 to around 11.6 percent by November 2023. Prices of most staple foods remain higher than last year’s and the five-year average, though this can also be attributed to conflict-induced crop production declines, insecurity, high transportation costs, and global price dynamics.
• The impact of conflict and insecurity, exacerbated by high food prices, is expected to drive widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes during the lean season in most of the Northwest and Southwest regions and some parts of the Far North region. Staple food prices are currently trending at historically high levels in these areas. They are projected to continue rising while households must already rely on food purchases, given the premature depletion of household stocks. As a result, households will continue struggling to meet their minimum food needs with limited income-earning opportunities and eroded coping capacities after years of conflict and insecurity, unable to mitigate their widening food consumption gaps. Food assistance needs are anticipated to peak annually around May/June. 
• Conflict levels are projected to remain high in the Northwest and Southwest regions and continue to disrupt households' access to food and income sources, maintaining Crisis (IPC Phase 3) area-level outcomes until at least July. During peak labor season from March to May, earnings are anticipated to be below average due to reductions in total area cultivated. With high food prices, households will likely resort to selling their remaining assets for cash, buying food on credit, or begging. Some poor households in remote zones in Lebialem, Menchum, and Momo who have already exhausted their coping capacity will face widening food consumption gaps, with a small proportion assessed to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes during the lean season. Humanitarian assistance will likely remain insufficient due to funding shortfalls and humanitarian access challenges. From July through September, household food availability is expected to improve, supported by the dry harvesting season. Still, outcomes will remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) due to limited harvests, likely to only support minimally adequate food consumption.
• The number of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in the Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Sava, and Mayo-Tsanaga divisions is expected to increase with the lean season between June and August. ACLED data shows that the number of conflict events and fatalities caused by ISWAP in these areas have increased markedly since April of 2023. In January, over 1,000 people were displaced from the Mokolo and Mora districts in the Mayo-Tsanaga and Mayo-Sava divisions (IOM). Many have likely been displaced multiple times due to insecurity and have few means to cope with additional shocks. While some poor households in the area will obtain a limited supply of own-produced food supplies and income from crop sales and wage labor during the off-season harvests in March and April, many are expected to be unable to meet their minimum food needs throughout the projected period. As the lean season progresses, households will likely increase their consumption of wild foods and intensify the selling of firewood, charcoal, and handicrafts in an attempt to mitigate their widening food consumption gaps. 

Current Situation

Conflict, insecurity, and displacements: Cameroon is dealing with two major conflicts: one involves clashes between Anglophone Separatists and government forces in the Northwest and Southwest regions, while the other is the insurgency by the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) against government forces in the Far North region. In general, the number of conflict events and fatalities resulting from fighting between Anglophone separatists and government forces in the Northwest and Southwest regions has declined since mid-2022. Throughout 2023, some 215 incidents (excluding social unrest) and 377 associated fatalities were reported in these regions (ACLED), representing a 26 percent year-on-year decrease in incidents and a 22 percent decrease in fatalities compared to the peak levels of fighting observed in 2021 (Figure 1). Mezam remained the most affected division in 2023, with Fako, Ndian, Manyu, and Donga-Mantung also sustaining slightly elevated levels of violence. Separatists continued to use IEDs in 2023 with slightly more effectiveness in causing fatalities, with common targets including government forces and civilians.

In the Far North, ISWAP has increased its attacks against civilian populations and government forces. The number of conflict events and fatalities involving ISWAP in the Far North has increased significantly both year-on-year and markedly since April 2023 (Figure 2). During this period, ISWAP attacks in the Far North primarily targeted civilians or involved clashes with security forces. However, while the number of ISWAP-involved conflict events in the Far North increased, the lethality of these incidents declined. From July to December 2023, ACLED reported 243 attacks (a 125 percent increase year-on-year), resulting in 207 fatalities (a 123 percent increase year-on-year). 

Levels of conflict-driven population displacement remain high in the Northwest, Southwest, and Far North regions. According to the latest data from UNHCR, more than 638,421 individuals have been internally displaced in the Northwest and Southwest regions, and about 427,833 in the Far North region. Recent attacks by ISWAP have resulted in the displacement of around 3,737 individuals from the districts of Mokolo and Mayo-Moskota to other parts of the Mayo-Tsanaga division between January 29 and February 5, 2024, as perAccording. According to IOM's Emergency Tracking tool, between January 29 and February 14, ISWAP attacks resulted in the displacement of approximately 5,911 people in the Mayo-Tsanaga division's Mokolo, Mayo-Moskota, and Koza districts, as well as the Logone-et-Chari division's Blangoua district.

Macroeconomic conditions: According to the IMF, Cameroon's economy showed resilience in 2023 despite external shocks, evidenced by an increase in its real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to four percent in 2023, up from 3.8 percent in 2022. The Central African CFA Franc (XAF) remained stable against the US dollar, although current rates are four percent lower than the five-year average. Nevertheless, the economy remains challenged by high inflation, conflict and insecurity in some zones of the country, and persistent climate threats. According to the National Institute of Statistics (INS), Cameroon's inflation rate reached 7.7 percent by December 2023, more than double the target of 3 percent set by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). Additionally, the average food inflation rate was even higher at 11.6 percent by the end of November 2023, driven mainly by high shipping costs, conflicts, and increased fuel and transportation expenses despite stabilizing global prices (according to AMIS and FAO reports). 

Staple crop production: The main agricultural season has started on time in the country’s southern zone, with land preparation activities such as clearing and tilling underway. Meanwhile, in the northern zone, harvesting of off-season sorghum and maize crops has begun. Years of conflict and insecurity in the Northwest, Southwest, and Far North regions have led to significant reductions in the planted area. Many households face challenges accessing fields; others have lost or abandoned their farmland. Additionally, input access constraints are more severe in conflict-affected regions, where household incomes have been significantly limited, and the most food-insecure households have consumed their seed stocks. Access to essential agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and improved seeds remains a challenge nationwide due to high prices and transportation costs, particularly in rural areas. Fertilizer prices have decreased since mid-last year but remain above their five-year average and 2022 levels. Urea and NPK fertilizers are priced 20-35 percent lower than last year. The Ministry of Agriculture's fertilizer subsidy program has distributed thousands of tons of lower-cost fertilizer to producers. However, many households, especially the poor and very poor, have not benefited from the subsidy program as the subsidized prices remain significantly higher than the five-year average and out of reach. 

Agricultural labor opportunities: Agricultural labor demand associated with the start of the main season is at its annual peak. However, households in conflict areas have lower-than-normal access to these opportunities due to reduced cultivated areas and restrictions on population movement in most cropping areas. FEWS NET monitoring reports indicate that daily wages have also gone down across most conflict zones due to the lower financial capacity of wealthy employers. Daily wages during the current off-season cropping in most conflict areas in the Far North range between 700-1000 FCFA compared to 1000-1500FCFA during the same period in a pre-conflict year. Due to wage declines and above-average food prices, current daily wages are only enough to purchase two to four kilograms of sorghum and maize in the Kousseri, Mora, and Mokolo markets, compared to five to ten kilograms in 2020. 

Pastoral situation: In both the northern and southern pastoral areas, livestock body conditions, particularly for cattle, are seasonally poor due to declines in pasture availability during the ongoing peak dry season. The market value for cattle has decreased seasonally due to their poor body condition and atypical below average demand from Nigerian traders due to the fall in the value of the Naira, although prices remain higher than average due to the high cost of animal feed and transportation. The price of small ruminants rose slightly between December and January in livestock-rearing areas due to higher demand for animal fattening, year-end celebrations, and increased transportation costs.

However, pastoral households relying on selling small ruminants to buy cereals are facing unfavorable terms of trade (ToT) due to unusually high cereal prices. For instance, the goat-to-sorghum ToT continues to decline in the Far North region, mainly due to above-average sorghum prices (Figure 3). For many poor pastoral households in this region, proceeds from selling a medium-sized goat can barely purchase enough sorghum to feed a household for a week. Livestock production remains below average in conflict-affected areas due to insecurity, restricted movement of herds, livestock theft by armed groups, poor market functioning, and market closures.

Commodity markets and prices: Nationwide, basic food commodities remain generally available in markets, though the availability of cereals like maize, sorghum, millet, and rice is decreasing seasonally. Despite a ban on grain exports, illegal outflows of these cereals to neighboring countries such as Nigeria, Chad, and the Central African Republic continue to occur, further reducing domestic supplies and increasing prices, most notably in border markets. In the past few months, seasonal prices have risen due to the depletion of household stocks, growing market reliance, and demand for institutional purchases. In the country's Far North region, reduced trade flow from conflict-affected areas, poor market access, strong market dependence by affected households, and demand pressure from Nigeria are keeping monthly prices of sorghum and maize significantly above last year and the previous five-year average. In January, sorghum and maize grain prices trended on average 40 percent above the average of the last five years across the Far North region and were 10-14 percent higher than the same time last year in Mora and Mokolo markets. Meanwhile, in the Northwest region, the average price of maize was 10-15 percent above last year’s average and significantly higher than the five-year average. The presence of refugees from the Central African Republic continues to drive atypically high demand and prices for staple foods in the markets of Mberé (Adamawa), Kadey (East), Lom-et-Djerem (East), and Mayo-Rey (North) divisions. The latest price data collected in host communities in the Mberé division in January suggests that prices of key staples such as cassava and maize had more than doubled compared to a normal year.

According to the annual statistics of the autonomous port of Douala for 2023, Cameroon imported a total of 586,908.367 MT of rice, representing a 9.28 percent decline from the 2022 levels. This decline is primarily attributed to the increased import costs and mixed global rice price trends. In January 2024, the government reinstated the ban on re-exporting rice until further notice. This was done to protect the domestic rice supplies, especially since India had suspended its rice exports, which account for over a third of Cameroon's rice supply. In January 2024, the price of rice in the urban reference markets of Yaoundé and Douala increased by 38 percent compared to the average price in 2020. Although the rice prices in 2023 remained stable in Yaoundé, they continued to rise in Douala and were 11 percent higher in January 2024 than in January 2023.

Across the country, official prices for petrol and diesel are currently trending 33-40 percent above 2022 levels following a second round of price hikes instituted by the government that began on February 3^rd aimed at reducing government fuel subsidies. Prices increased by an average of 15 percent, in addition to the previous 16-25 percent increase enacted in February 2023. Official prices of kerosene and cooking gas prices, however, remain unchanged. The removal of fuel subsidies in Nigeria continues to drive increases in the price of informally imported Nigerian gasoline and diesel, which are highly consumed in some border towns. While fuel availability is generally stable nationwide, periodic shortages were observed in November/December 2023 and January 2024, as fuel deliveries to Cameroon were disrupted, resulting in several days of shortages, long queues at petrol stations, and fuel rationing in several cities.

Humanitarian food assistance: According to the Food Security Cluster, WFP and its partners reached about 476,464 people in the Northwest (NW) and Southwest (SW) regions with emergency in-kind food distributions, cash-based transfers, and livelihood support in 2023. The rations covered 30 to 50 percent of daily kilocalorie needs, with assistance prioritized for the most vulnerable populations, including IDPs, returnees, refugees, and host communities. FEWS NET does not have access to recent statistics on food distribution in the Far North, East, Adamawa, and North regions. Despite having slightly higher monthly targets for 2024 than 2023, FEWS NET assumes that food assistance is unlikely to reach 25 percent of the total population at the divisional or regional level. Humanitarian activities in these regions continue to be limited by funding and insecurity.

Current Food Security Outcomes

A growing number of households in the Northwest and Southwest regions are experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. They have almost or completely exhausted their own-produced food reserves and have started relying on market purchases of food since last November, about four months earlier than the pre-conflict time but similar to the last few years. However, current above-average food and non-food commodity prices and limited access to income-earning opportunities continue to constrain households’ purchasing power. However, current above-average food and non-food commodity prices and limited access to income-earning opportunities continue to constrain households’ purchasing power. Limited labor wages from ongoing seasonal agricultural activities are being further stretched by atypically high staple food prices and debt repayments. Due to limited food availability at the household level, an increasing number of households in the zone are experiencing food consumption gaps. Many have reported using more severe coping strategies such as rationing food, borrowing or purchasing food on credit, and consuming seed stocks and atypically high quantities of wild foods. Area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist across both regions. A small proportion of households living in remote areas of Lebialem, Menchum, and Momo who have eroded their coping capacities are likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

In the Far North region, particularly in Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Mayo-Sava, households are already running out of their harvested food stocks despite the cereal harvest just three months ago in November. High market reliance, high food prices, and limited purchasing capacity are making it difficult for households to access food, causing them to adopt consumption-based coping strategies such as reducing the portion size of meals and the number of meals eaten per day. In addition, they are resorting to livelihood coping strategies such as borrowing money, purchasing food on credit, and prioritizing cereal purchases over health and education expenses. As a result, the area-level outcomes for these divisions have deteriorated from Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) starting in February.

Stressed outcomes (IPC Phase 2) are still prevalent in the divisions that host the largest number of refugees from the Central African Republic. These include the Mberé division in the Adamawa region and the Kadey and Lom-et-Djerem divisions in the East. Both host and refugee households are experiencing minimal food consumption due to high prices and reduced incomes. This is caused by the pressure exerted by the significant presence of refugees on markets and host households' livelihoods. Some households (less than 20 percent of the division's population) facing food consumption gaps, mostly refugees, are resorting to coping measures indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3), such as removing children from school and consuming seed stocks for the 2024 cropping season.

In Yaoundé and Douala, area-level outcomes remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2), given the impact of atypically high food and non-food commodity prices and the fact that a significant number of urban poor households need to reduce meal portions and frequencies and expenses on non-food needs. However, despite higher prices, many poor households in conflict-free areas can maintain Minimal (IPC Phase 1) acute food insecurity outcomes. This is due to their near-normal access to food and essential non-food items, driven by an average availability of their production and income from typical sources.

Assumptions

The most likely scenario from February to September 2024 is based on the following national-level assumptions:

• ISWAP is expected to continue to conduct attacks in the Far North region through September 2024, primarily in the Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari divisions, with conflict levels expected to remain above those observed in 2021-2023. However, fatalities per incident are expected to remain stable as ISWAP continues to shift away from mass-casualty attacks against civilian populations, focusing instead on applying significant pressure on security forces. Attacks by ISWAP are likely to increase seasonally through the end of the dry season in April 2024. This pattern is attributed to the improved road conditions facilitating movement and operational effectiveness. 
• Through September 2024, clashes between the government forces and separatist fighters in the Northwest and Southwest regions are expected to continue at rates similar to or slightly below those observed in 2023. A seasonal surge in attacks will likely occur through the end of the dry season in March/April. This escalation is attributed to the enhanced mobility of armed groups and increased accessibility of road travel during this period. Following the end of the dry season, incidents are expected to seasonally decrease through September 2024. Despite early 2023 talks about potential mediated peace negotiations between the government and Anglophone separatists, the likelihood of these discussions occurring before September 2024 is low.

• Nationally, the total number of internally displaced people (IDP) is expected to continue to rise during 2024 due to anticipated conflicts. The latest data from UNHCR shows that over 638,421 individuals have been internally displaced in the Northwest and Southwest regions and about 427,833 in the Far North region. As insecurity persists, the number of displaced persons from these regions is expected to continue to exceed the number of people returning to their origin. Additionally, flash floods around August and September, particularly along the Logone River in the Far North region, are expected to cause additional, short-term displacements in flood-prone divisions such as Mayo-Danay, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari.
• The El Niño event, predicted to dissipate by mid-2024, is not expected to cause any significant impact on acute food insecurity in the country. Based on historical trends, El Niño years are not associated with rainfall anomalies in Cameroon. FEWS NET's science partners (USGS, NOAA, UCSB CHC) forecast that the March to May 2024 rainy season in the southern zone's unimodal and bimodal areas will commence as anticipated, likely resulting in a typical start of the 2024 cropping season. Furthermore, these forecasts suggest that there will be average rainfall from March to May 2024, favoring crop growth. In the northern part of the country, rainfall is anticipated to begin on time in May 2024.
• National cereal production for 2024 is projected to be average but with localized deficits expected to persist in the Northwest, Southwest, and Far North regions due to persisting conflict and insecurity that continue to restrict agricultural activities, including access to fields and inputs. While many farmers are expected to benefit from the ongoing government fertilizer subsidy program, this may not provide adequate support for poorer households due to low subsidy rates.

• Agricultural labor opportunities in cropping areas throughout the country are expected to be normal due to average production levels. In the southern zone, the demand for labor will peak from February to May during land preparation, planting, and weeding and from July to September during the main season harvest. Similarly,, labor demand will be seasonally highest in the northern zone from April to mid-June during planting and land preparation activities. However, agricultural labor demand is expected to remain below normal in the Northwest, Southwest, and parts of the Far North region, where planted areas have decreased due to ongoing conflict and insecurity. Households affected by conflict, particularly those living in rural areas, will continue to receive lower daily wage rates than usual, as many middle-class and better-off households face reduced capacity to pay for hired labor.
• Despite the recent decreasing trend in international prices and improved global market conditions (as per AMIS and FAO reports), domestic inflation is expected to remain high during the scenario period. This can be attributed to continuously volatile and high global prices and domestic factors such as conflicts and increased fuel and transportation costs. 
• Rice imports during the scenario period will remain lower than average due to the high global prices and shipping costs. Although there is a projected increase in global rice production in 2024 compared to the previous year (AMIS), the export restrictions imposed by India are anticipated to reduce international supplies further. This restriction will limit imports below last year's level, as imports from India, Thailand, and China account for more than 70 percent of Cameroon's rice supplies.
• FEWS NET’s price projections indicate that imported rice prices in the Mfoundi market will evolve significantly above the five-year average and could likely be above or near the previous year 2022/23 levels during the FSO scenario period (Figure 5).

• Prices of staple cereals produced locally in the country are projected to remain higher than the previous year and the five-year average despite the estimated average national production during the 2024 season. This is due to production declines in areas affected by conflict, increased costs of agricultural inputs and transportation, and the high demand by Nigeria and Chad for cereal exports from Cameroon, which are currently banned. As households rely more on markets due to depleted own-stocks, prices are expected to continue to rise, especially during Ramadan, which starts in March. 
• Projections indicate that the price of sorghum in the Kousseri reference market will increase significantly compared to last year and the five-year average (Figure 6). However, a modest decrease in prices of harvested crops is expected between July and September across the southern zone when markets receive fresh supplies and at usual seasonal levels.
• In general, livestock prices will follow seasonal trends but are expected to remain above average in most markets due to the rising costs of feed supplements, veterinary drugs, nutritional supplements, and transportation. In areas affected by conflict, decreased herd sizes resulting from rustling, limited access to grazing, and disrupted trade flows will continue to limit market supplies. The depreciation of the Nigerian local currency, the Naira (NGN), is expected to decrease the purchasing power of many Nigerian traders, leading to a decrease in demand. This is likely to drive atypical declines in prices, especially in the border livestock markets of the northern and northwest regions of Cameroon.
• Significantly above-average cereal prices are expected to keep the purchasing power of many pastoral households, as measured by livestock-to-cereal terms of trade (ToT), lower than the three-year average and further reduced compared to last year despite high livestock prices.
• Most markets across the country are expected to function normally, except in conflict-affected areas in the Northwest, Southwest, and Far North regions. In these areas, traders' movement will be limited due to insecurity, disrupting the movement of goods, including freshly harvested products, from rural to urban areas. Lingering border restrictions due to insecurity will continue disrupting trade exchanges with neighboring countries such as Chad and Nigeria, maintaining cross-border trade below average.
• According to the Northwest/Southwest Food Security Cluster, WFP and its partners plan to provide monthly in-kind distributions and cash-based transfers to nearly 350,886 people in the Northwest and Southwest regions in 2024. Assistance will be prioritized for the most vulnerable populations, including IDPs, returnees, refugees, and host communities. FEWS NET assumes that food assistance is unlikely to reach 25 percent of the total population at the divisional or regional level despite slightly higher monthly targets for 2024 than for 2023.

Most Likely Acute Food Security Outcomes

In the Northwest and Southwest regions, area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist throughout the lean season, with the number of households facing large food consumption gaps expected to rise and peak around May. High and rising food prices, below-average incomes, and limited purchasing power will continue to prevent many poor households from meeting their minimum daily energy needs. Households in these regions are expected to intensify firewood and charcoal sales, hawking non-food items, and consuming wild foods to mitigate consumption gaps. Due to limited access to food, many households will continue to reduce their food intake, borrow money, or buy food on credit. Acute food security outcomes are expected to improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) around July through September, supported by the dry harvesting of key staples such as maize, beans, potatoes, and legumes. However, given the anticipated below-average production, own-produced harvested stocks are expected to mitigate food consumption gaps only to some level, with outcomes assessed to stay Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through September. The most insecure divisions of Momo, Lebialem, and Menchum are expected to stay in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) throughout the scenario period as many households will not have been able to cultivate crops during the 2023/24 season and have few other income-earning opportunities.

In the Far North region of the country, particularly in Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Mayo-Sava, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcome is expected to become increasingly widespread during the peak of the lean season from June to August. During this period, households are expected to meet their food needs from market purchases due to the depletion of stocks. Due to the combination of heightened market prices, unusually low purchasing power, and reliance on market purchases, access to food for many households will be atypically limited. As the lean season progresses, households will likely increase their consumption of wild foods and intensify the selling of firewood/charcoal and handicrafts to cope with food shortages. They will also continue to prioritize the purchase of basic grains over essential non-food needs and reduce meal portions and frequency to manage the food shortage. Area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist in the Logone-et Chari, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Mayo-Sava divisions through September.

In the divisions with the highest number of refugees from the Central African Republic, namely Mberé (Adamawa) and Kadey and Lom-et-Djerem (East), it is expected that Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food security outcomes will persist. Both host and refugee households are experiencing minimal food consumption due to the high prices and reduced incomes resulting from the pressure exerted by refugees on the markets and the livelihoods of host households. A small proportion of households (mostly refugees who comprise less than 20 percent of the population) will face food consumption gaps. They will likely resort to coping measures indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3), such as removing children from school, borrowing money, and reducing meal portions and frequencies.
Many households throughout the country will continue to purchase most of their food during the lean season from March to May. Food prices are expected to continue to rise across the country and peak around May in the southern region and around August in the northern region. Despite high and rising prices, many poor households in conflict-free areas are expected to be able to meet their minimum kilocalorie energy needs and maintain Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes throughout the projected period, supported by near-normal access to typical sources of food and income. However, poor households residing in the cities of Yaoundé and Douala are expected to continue to face food consumption gaps indicative of Stressed (IPC Phase 2) due to a higher market reliance and demand compared to those residing in other cities across the country. Due to typically limited incomes amid high prices, many are expected to continue resorting to negative coping strategies such as reducing the number of meals, meal portions, and expenses on non-food needs. 

The prevalence of acute malnutrition will increase and peak during the lean season due to a wider food consumption deficit. This will particularly affect vulnerable individuals, such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), who have limited access to high-quality food, HFA, and essential health and nutrition services such as managing acute malnutrition, vitamin A supplementation, deworming, and immunization. However, with the expected increased household availability of freshly harvested foods during harvesting from July to September 2024, some improvements in nutrition outcomes are likely to occur. As typical, an increase in water-related illnesses such as acute diarrhea, cholera, and malaria is expected, especially amongst poor households facing water shortages and poor hygiene and sanitation conditions.

Events that Might Change the Outlook

Western Highlands livelihood zone (CM09) of Northwest and Southwest Regions (Figure 7)

There are multiple livelihood zones of high concern in Cameroon, primarily located in the Northwest, Southwest, and Far North regions. This is in addition to divisions hosting refugees from the Central African Republic, namely Mberé in the Adamawa region and Kadey and Lom et Djerem in the East region. FEWS NET has selected one livelihood zone in the Northwest and Southwest regions for this report to illustrate the current and projected impacts of the ongoing conflict.

Current Situation

Livelihood zone CM09 is located in the Western Highlands and comprises the Northwest region and part of the Southwest region, specifically, the Lebialem division and Bangem sub-division. Production in this zone is mainly rain-fed, with a unimodal rainy season that typically runs from March to October. The main harvest occurs between July and August, following the lean season months of March, April, and May. In a normal year, poor households meet their food needs by growing their own maize, potatoes, rice, beans, and cowpea crops and obtain incomes through on-farm and off-farm labor, petty trade, and crop and poultry sales. 

The ongoing conflict between Anglophone Separatists and government forces since 2017 has been the main driver of acute food insecurity in the zone. This conflict is also characterized by frequent lockdowns and ghost towns, which disrupt livelihoods, trade flows, and market functioning. According to ACLED, 29 conflict events and 97 associated fatalities were recorded between October and December 2023, representing a 55 percent drop compared to the third quarter of 2023 and a 44 percent drop in conflict events compared to the same period in 2022. However, the number of fatalities was 46 percent higher during the last quarter of 2023 compared to the same period in 2022. ACLED data indicate that the incidences and fatalities in 2023 were significantly lower than the peak of 2021.

Households in the area began preparing for the 2024 crop in January, clearing and tilling their fields on time. However, many farmers still face challenges accessing their fields due to insecurity. This is especially true during the weekly "ghost town" days and occasional lockdowns enforced by Separatists. However, reports from the field suggest that some farmers are now adapting to movement restrictions if they have advanced warning. Also, a slightly larger number of households have been cultivating during the last three years compared to the peak conflict years of 2018-2020. This is especially true in areas where separatist activities have been reduced. However, several farmlands remain abandoned, with the area cultivated about 30-40 percent lower than before the conflict. Production is further limited by high input prices and supply disruption in some remote areas due to insecurity and high transportation costs. Current fertilizer prices remain about 35 percent above pre-conflict levels, although they have decreased by about 20 percent since 2022. The illegal levying of taxes on producers by separatists has further eroded the profit margins of producers and, at worst, discouraged some from cultivating altogether.

The demand for agricultural labor during the peak season of February to May has been lower than usual due to the reduced total area cultivated. Additionally, daily wages have dropped by half in most insecure areas, given the reduced financial capacity of better-off hirers of labor. Households relying on in-kind payments for farm labor are reportedly receiving less food than they would in a normal year. Many petty traders in the zone have either shut down or reduced their operations, leading to a decreased need for laborers. Furthermore, some people hesitate to actively seek employment due to local movement restrictions. The availability of construction jobs that are typically in high demand during the dry season, such as stone cracking and bricklaying, has decreased.

Prices of locally produced and imported foods remain above average. In January, maize prices in key markets in the zone trended on average nine percent higher than this time last year and significantly above the previous five-year average. In the urban center of Bamenda, imported rice prices were, on average, 10 percent higher than last year and over 35 percent higher than the average price in 2020. Rural markets are seeing relatively higher rice price trends due to higher delivery costs and insecurity-related supply disruptions. The ongoing conflict in the area has severely restricted market access due to road closures and fear of potential attacks (Figure 8). The major trade routes connecting Mamfe, Kumbo, Mbengwi, and Ndop to Bamenda are frequently blocked or used by only a few vehicles due to pervasive insecurity and numerous checkpoints set up by armed groups to collect illegal bribes. As a result, several alternative routes are currently being used, some of which pass through the West region, resulting in higher transportation costs due to the longer routes and increased spoilage of fresh products.

Assumptions

In addition to the national-level assumptions, the following assumptions apply to this area of concern:

• Agricultural operations across the zone during the 2024 cropping season will remain significantly disrupted by ongoing conflict, occasional lockdowns, and weekly no-work “ghost-town” days, in addition to the anticipated temporary uptick in fighting intensity during March and May. Lockdowns, some of which are anticipated, will continue to limit access to farms and the number of field days. 
• Opportunities for agricultural labor in most rural areas of the zone are expected to be lower than usual due to below-average production, leading to below-average agricultural incomes. Wages for daily labor in rural areas are expected to continue to be much lower than before the conflict started in 2017. This is mainly because the financial stability of households that hire labor has been declining.
• Emergency food assistance will continue to be provided across the zone in 2024. However, according to distribution targets shared by the Northwest/Southwest Food Security Cluster, in-kind distributions and cash-based assistance are unlikely to reach 25 percent of the total population in any of the divisions in the zone. Additionally, the flow of humanitarian supplies to very insecure and remote areas will be disrupted by fighting, insecurity, and seasonal road deterioration. 

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

Between February and May, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist as households in the area will likely continue to face difficulties in meeting their needs due to high market prices, low purchasing power, and high market reliance. Earnings from ongoing agricultural labor opportunities are projected to be below-average income. To mitigate consumption and income gaps, many poor households are expected to intensify livelihood activities such as firewood/charcoal sales, hawking of non-food items, and the consumption of wild foods. Due to limited access to food, engagement in unsustainable coping strategies such as purchasing food on credit, cutting down food portions, and having fewer meals each day will be widespread. As a result, the number of households experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in the area is expected to increase, with a peak assessed during the lean season between March and May. In the most insecure divisions of Lebialem, Menchum, and Momo, a small number of IDP households that have exhausted their coping capacity and have no access to assistance are likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

From July through September, improved household food and income availability due to dry harvesting is expected to result in improvements to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. During this period, food consumption and dietary diversity will improve due to the harvest of maize, beans, potatoes, and ground nuts. Additionally, projected slight decreases in the prices of harvested will benefit displaced households living in urban areas. Starting in July, households will have access to incomes from crop sales and paid harvest labor from better-off households. Significant income improvements are unlikely due to reduced crop production and the need to repay debts incurred during the lean season. Very poor households in severely conflict-affected divisions like Menchum, Momo, and Lebialem are expected to continue to experience significant difficulties in accessing food and income due to significantly below-average production and limited availability of other-income earning opportunities, remaining in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from July to September. Of the small proportion of households experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes during the lean season, some will experience seasonal improvements to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during this period due to improvements in the availability of food and income-earning opportunities. However, others living in bushes, or the most insecure zones will remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).