Main harvests provide short-term improvements to Far North conflict zones

• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist in Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Sava, and Mayo-Tsanaga of the Far North and are expected to continue through January 2026. From February to May, area‑level outcomes are expected to deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3). A small proportion of households that are severely affected by repeated attacks, displacement, and production losses are likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
• In the Northwest and Southwest regions, Crisis (IPC Phase 3)outcomes are expected to persist through at least May 2026, as conflict continues to disrupt livelihoods, elevate food prices, undermine markets and trade flows, and drive the ongoing displacement of more than half a million people. The number of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected to rise, peaking during the southern lean season (March-May 2026). A small proportion of households, particularly those in highly insecure and remote areas with severely eroded coping capacities, will continue to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.
• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through at least May 2026 in Mberé (Adamawa), Kadey (East), and Lom et Djerem (East), driven by limited livelihood opportunities and high food prices as large numbers of refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR) continue to strain local markets and resources. A small share of households — primarily refugees with constrained income sources — will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).
• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through May in the urban centers of Yaoundé and Douala, driven by rising food prices and limited purchasing power among urban poor households, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

This report provides an update to the October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook and November 2025 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of December 24, 2025. 

Militants affiliated with Islamic State-West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jamaʾatu Ahl as‑Sunnah li‑al‑Daʿwah wa‑al‑Jihād (JAS) — commonly known as Boko Haram — have escalated attacks against civilians and government forces in the Far North Region in 2025, surpassing levels recorded in 2024 and 2023. The surge has been particularly severe in Kolofata and Mora (Mayo-Sava); Mayo Moskota, Koza, and Mokolo (Mayo-Tsanaga); and Hilé Alifa and Waza (Logone-et-Chari). Recent data from ACLED indicate that incidents rose by 30 percent between September and early December 2025 compared to the same period in 2024. Analysts attribute this escalation to intensified Nigerian military operations, which have pushed jihadist militants into Cameroonian territory, fueling cross-border attacks. Ongoing violence, including frequent kidnappings, has disrupted agricultural and livestock activities during the 2025 main season.

The main harvesting period, which began in September, has now concluded. Household grain stocks from own production, along with income from agricultural labor and crop sales, remain well below average due to limited cultivation across many areas. Although no formal assessments are available at the time of writing, FEWS NET estimates that the total area cultivated in Mayo-Tsanaga, Mayo-Sava, and Logone-et-Chari is greatly below average, similar to last year. Even after the harvest, cereal prices remain well above the five‑year average, driven by low yields, reduced supplies, and increased transport tariffs countrywide. Authorities have maintained partial curfews in several markets, while insecurity and road blockages continue to disrupt trade flows. By early December, sorghum and maize prices were 30-39 percent higher than the five‑year average. Since the start of 2025, however, prices in most markets have stabilized or declined gradually month on month, approaching levels seen in 2024 and 2023. Reduced exports to Nigeria — linked to the depreciation of the NGN — have boosted local cereal stocks and helped ease price pressures. 

In the Northwest and Southwest regions, violence against civilians remained high in 2025. Although clashes between Anglophone separatists and government forces have declined, separatist fighters have increasingly resorted to kidnappings for ransom and targeted attacks against opponents and defectors. While both regions remained relatively calmer amid the October post‑election tensions, separatists intensified attacks against ruling party officials and individuals linked to the electoral process. Conflict‑related reductions in agricultural production, compounded by high transport costs, continued to drive seasonal food prices well above the five‑year average and moderately higher than last year’s levels. Between October and November, prices rose further across both regions: maize increased by 13-20 percent, tubers by 17-20 percent, rice by 6-10 percent, imported frozen fish by 14-20 percent, and wheat flour by 43 percent. These increases, which persisted into December, were largely driven by market instability, supply chain disruptions, and transport constraints linked to the post‑election tensions. Household supplies of maize, potatoes, beans, and rice from the December off‑season harvest — already limited by conflict — were further reduced by the separatist‑imposed lockdown in September and October, which severely disrupted essential farming activities and restricted cultivation.

Political tensions across the country remain high in the aftermath of the October 12 presidential elections, fueled by sharp divisions over the results and continued uncertainty surrounding the political landscape. Localized protests erupted across the country and intensified after the official results were announced on October 27. Protests involved violent clashes with security forces, damage to infrastructure, and road blockades. The unrest continued into early November, with enforced ‘ghost town’ days (stay-at-home strikes) during the first week, causing widespread disruptions such as the closure of markets, businesses, and transportation services. Key hotspots included Garoua in the North Region, Douala in the Littoral, parts of the Adamawa, and West regions. Although protests have largely subsided, the political climate remains tense. 

Food prices in areas unaffected by conflict remain above the five‑year average, sustained by elevated transport costs and reduced supplies from conflict‑affected regions. In most urban centers, prices climbed in October and November as protests disrupted supply chains, and remained high in December, further boosted by holiday demand. In Yaoundé and Douala, prices persisted well above the five‑year average: beef increased by 35 percent, frozen fish by 20 percent, maize by 25 percent, and bananas, cassava, and taro by 26 percent compared to last year. In Mberé (Adamawa), Kadey (East), and Lom et Djerem (East), the presence of large numbers of refugees from the CAR has increased demand in local markets, keeping staple food prices significantly above the five‑year average.

Humanitarian food assistance

WFP continues to provide food assistance to refugees, IDPs, and other vulnerable groups in Cameroon, but the number of people reached has steadily decreased due to funding shortages. In its latest update, WFP reported that these funding constraints have interrupted assistance for some refugees from CAR living in the East Region.

Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the Cameroon Food Security Outlook from October 2025 to May 2026 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence:

• In the Northwest and Southwest regions, clashes between separatist groups and the Cameroonian Armed Forces (FAC) are expected to intensify, especially during national events such as Youth Day (February) and Unity Day (May). Separatists have used boycotts and disruptions during these events, often provoking military responses that increase violence against civilians.
• In the Far North, Islamist militants are expected to continue escalating attacks on FAC positions and civilian communities. The growing strength of JAS and ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria in 2025 will likely prompt intensified Nigerian military operations through 2026. These operations may drive militants to increase cross-border activity, potentially establishing bases in Cameroon to support operations in Nigeria and generate funds.
• Although election tensions have eased countrywide, Cameroon remains vulnerable to renewed unrest due to persistent political divisions. 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity outcomes are expected to persist across the Northwest and Southwest regions through at least May 2026, driven by the impacts of prolonged conflict on agricultural production — the main source of food and income for poor households — alongside anticipated food price increases, recurrent market and trade disruptions, and periodic escalations in violence. Beginning in January, most households will depend on market purchases after depleting below-average food stocks from the 2025 harvest. However, high food prices and anticipated low income-earning opportunities during the January-May peak agricultural labor period will continue to constrain household purchasing power. As food prices reach their highest levels between March and May, an increasing number of households will struggle to afford basic staples, leading to a steady rise in households experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, peaking between May and June 2026. In highly insecure and remote divisions, particularly Lebialem (Southwest) and Donga-Mantung, Momo, Bui, and Menchum (Northwest), a small portion of households will likely continue to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. These households face severe disruptions to agricultural production, markets, trade, and income-earning opportunities amid weakened coping strategies. During the lean season, a small but growing number of households in these divisions are expected to deteriorate further into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes of acute food insecurity.

In the Far North, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist in Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Sava, and Mayo-Tsanaga as of Decemberand are expected to continue through January 2026. Below‑average harvest stocks will keep some households reliant on market purchases, while limited income from agricultural labor, crop, and livestock sales is likely to force many households to continue incurring debt to meet non‑food needs. Many households are expected to run out of harvest stocks by February (four to five months earlier than in a typical year) and depend on markets until at least May. As dependence on market purchases grows, seasonal increases in staple food prices will further restrict household food access. Although food availability will be temporarily supported by the February/March off-season harvests, displaced and other worst-off households facing severely limited cultivation opportunities are unlikely to benefit from these harvests. As a result, many households will face widening food gaps and increasingly depend on wild fruits, vegetables, mushrooms, and fish for survival. At the same time, households will resort to negative coping strategies, including reducing meal size and frequency and cutting non-food expenditures. Area‑level outcomes are projected to deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes from February to May 2026. A small proportion of households, whose coping strategies have been severely weakened by repeated attacks, displacement, movement restrictions, and sharp declines in agricultural and livestock production, are likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through at least May 2026.

In the cities of Yaoundé and Douala, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food insecurity is expected to continue until May 2026, driven by rising food prices and low incomes in poor urban households. During the March-May lean season, further price increases will push very poor households, especially refugees and IDPs without livelihoods, into Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as food access becomes severely restricted.

Mberé (Adamawa), Kadey, and Lom et Djerem (East), which host most CAR refugees, are expected to remain in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food insecurity through May 2026. Local and refugee households in these areas face high food prices and strong competition for resources and jobs, limiting their access to food. In the March to May lean season, very poor households, especially refugees without stable livelihoods, are expected to decline into Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as seasonal price spikes further restrict food access.

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.