Food consumption gaps persist in areas facing significant security challenges

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected between October 2025 and January 2026 in the communes of Djibo, Arbinda, and Sebba, as poor households will extend the duration of their stocks by relying on their own production, limiting both quantities and the number of meals. Food assistance, although insufficient, contributes to household food consumption in areas facing significant security challenges.
• Between February and May 2026, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in the communes of Djibo, Arbinda, Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, Sebba, Kantchari, and Diapaga. Although the sale of cereals at subsidized prices, supplemented by remittances from relatives living outside the province or abroad and by minimal income from gold panning, the sale of wood, water, and fodder, contribute to improving food access, food consumption gaps will persist for poor households. In areas facing significant security challenges, households become increasingly dependent on the market, as food stocks from harvests will be exhausted, and on market gardening production (between January and April), which will constitute an additional but insufficient food source.
• Household demand for cereals is expected to remain average, while prices will remain below last year's average. A more consistent supply and existing export restrictions will support annual price decreases of more than 20 percent, as observed in September 2025. In regions facing significant security and supply problems, prices are expected to remain slightly above the five-year average.
• Food assistance needs are expected to increase seasonally starting in February 2026. However, the number of people in need is expected to decrease significantly compared to last year and the five-year average, due to the anticipated increase in production and favorable market prospects. Populations in need will be located primarily in areas facing significant security challenges.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 17, 2025.

Since 2015, the country has faced attacks by armed terrorist groups (GAT). Starting in 2020, incidents and associated fatalities have significantly increased, with abuses and repression against civilian populations. This has led to the displacement of more than 2.06 million people as of March 31, 2023. Since 2022, GAT have imposed blockades around some thirty communes, particularly in the regions¹ of Soum, Liptako (former Sahel), Yaadga (former Nord), Kuilse (former Centre-Nord), Sirba, Goulmou, and Tapoa (former Est). These blockades restrict the movement of people and goods, severely disrupting access to food, healthcare, and other essential services. The distribution of humanitarian assistance and the supply of markets in these localities are only possible by military escort or by air. Since 2023, the government has prohibited cash transfer operations by humanitarian organizations as part of the fight against terrorism. This limits the intervention capacity of most NGOs, given the logistical and security obstacles to delivering in-kind assistance. Between January and September 2022, the sociopolitical context was marked by frequent demonstrations linked to coups d'état, and subsequently by several attempts to destabilize the government in power. In January 2024, Burkina Faso, similar to Mali and Niger, announced its immediate withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States in September 2023, which became a Confederation one year later, with a view to building a common political and economic zone in the common fight against terrorism, threats of armed rebellion, or external aggression.

Agriculture and livestock constitute the main livelihoods, with the main agricultural regions in the center, west, and southwest of the country. However, prolonged insecurity has disrupted livelihoods in agricultural and agropastoral areas due to the abandonment of fields and population displacements, as well as in the north of the country where livestock is particularly important. Pastoral communities depend on the seasonal movement of livestock in search of water and pasture. However, since the beginning of the conflict, households have experienced movement restrictions, limited access to pastures and water points, and in particular, livestock theft.

The communities’ ability to rely on traditional seasonal cycles for their livelihoods has diminished due to declining agricultural productivity, which has severely eroded the typical seasonal variations in income and food availability in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Furthermore, socioeconomic activities across the country—agricultural and non-agricultural labor, self-employment, small trade, and cash transfers—are greatly disrupted due to insecurity. October marks the harvest period, promoting food availability and the replenishment of stocks. Nevertheless, assistance needs will remain high in the north and east, especially in areas facing significant security challenges, where household access to fields and income is reduced. In these areas, staple food prices are above average due to the disruption of trade flows. It should be mentioned that the return of more than one million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the development of agricultural perimeters by the government have increased the areas of cultivated land, relatively increasing production, which nevertheless remains below the average prior to the security crisis.

Learn more

The following links provide additional information:

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Burkina Faso Food Security Outlook: October 2024 to May 2025
• Latest Burkina Faso Key Message Update: September 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis

Prolonged insecurity remains the main driver of food insecurity in the country, as it limits population movements and their access to typical food and income sources. The offensive tactics used by the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) have enabled the reconquest of 72 percent of the territory and the return of more than one million displaced persons to 795 localities as of July 31, according to the Ministry in charge of humanitarian action. However, armed terrorist groups (GAT) continue to maintain pressure on localities in the regions of Sourou (formerly Boucle du Mouhoun), Yaadga (formerly North Region), Liptako and Soum (formerly Sahel), Sirba, Gourma, and Tapoa (formerly Est Region). The looting of goods and threats of violence against populations by GAT continue to cause new population displacements (317,934 from January to September according to the Rapid Response Operational Coordination Group (GCORR). Although the GAT recorded significant human and logistical losses, the use of explosive devices and drones by the GAT complicates the threat.

Overall improvements in national production are observed for the 2025/26 agricultural season, due to favorable rainfall, government investments in agricultural activities, including input support and farmland development, as well as an increase in cultivated areas in the western and northern areas with the return of IDPs. However, in areas facing significant security challenges, particularly in the far north and east of the country, access to fields remains limited. Nevertheless, the expansion of the security radius around areas and the support of FDS and VDP for securing agricultural activities have enabled an increase in cultivated areas compared to the last three seasons. As an illustration, record rice production is expected in the communes of Dori and Djibo, where 83 and 62 hectares, respectively, have been developed, compared to the small areas typically cultivated in normal years.

Insecurity continues to disrupt the functioning of agricultural markets (Figure 1). Internal trade flows are characterized by weak transfers from production or collection zones to structurally deficit northern areas plagued by insecurity. In addition to the degradation of roads during the rainy season, security and logistical constraints inhibit regular supply, which is conditional on escorted convoys, to areas facing significant security challenges. Although the number of areas facing significant security challenges has decreased compared to last year (from about thirty to about twenty), certain communes such as Djibo, Arbinda, Kelbo, Diapaga and Sebba remain dependent on convoys under military escort with delays sometimes reaching six months. However, the government has increased its logistical capacity, facilitating a greater volume of goods to be transported. In addition to retail stocks, supplies include stocks for distribution and sale at subsidized prices (120 XOF/kg), as well as food and non-food assistance from some NGOs. Assistance and the sale of products at subsidized prices help reduce pressure on market demand by households, which prevents retail stocks from being rapidly depleted.

The functioning of livestock markets in pastoral zones is also heavily disrupted due to insecurity. The persistence of livestock theft by GAT continues to erode herders' assets and severely test their resilience. Furthermore, restrictions on population movements impede pastoral activities, which limits households' capacity to reconstitute their herds. Difficulties from the livestock collection and the closure of certain markets in areas facing significant security challenges also contribute to reduced livestock trade and related income. Despite the increase in livestock prices, households have fewer livestock to sell. In addition, poor households who derived their income from animal herding and fodder sales no longer have access to these sources given the departure of large herders from the areas and the decline in demand for fodder for the few animals still present.

Cereal prices in hard-to-reach areas are above average. Although at the national level, cereal prices decreased by approximately 20 percent in September compared to the same period last year, in areas facing significant security challenges, prices varied between 50 and 80 percent compared to the five-year average. The main factor contributing to this increase is the high transportation cost for supplies under military escort due to security risks on routes and long travel times, which generate additional costs and/or supply irregularities.

In conflict-affected areas, household purchasing power remains weak due to limited access to income sources. However, a moderate improvement in purchasing power was observed in 2025, driven by staple goods sales at subsidized prices, a slight recovery in informal work opportunities, and the collection and sale of wood, among other factors. In Djibo, for example, sales at subsidized prices that began in July allow households to access cereals at a price four times lower than the market price. Moreover, with each announcement of an upcoming convoy, households increasingly rely on money transfers from relatives to build up stocks.

Humanitarian food assistance

The volume of food assistance has experienced successive declines in recent years despite significant humanitarian needs. This decrease is linked, among other things, to the cessation of cash transfers, logistical and security constraints that limit the delivery of in-kind assistance, and in particular, to the reduction in funding. Coverage of food needs has been low overall during the last three months. Although the humanitarian response to the lean season reached approximately 20 percent of the population in the provinces of Loroum and Oudalan and helped reduce food consumption deficits of poor households, it remained concentrated in the capitals of these provinces. In localities such as Arbinda and Sebba, given the delays in program implementation, the food assistance planned for the lean season is now available, however details on the number of beneficiaries in these communes are not yet available. Otherwise, households rely primarily on their own harvest, which is their main source of food.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) acute food insecurity outcomes are expected in the provinces of Karo-Peli (formerly Soum), Yagha, and northern Loroum due to restricted movement caused by insecurity, preventing households from rebuilding their livelihoods and accessing income and adequate food. In these communes facing significant security challenges, the scarcity or the shortage of commodities in markets and the insufficiency or the absence of assistance have forced households to impose significant consumption restrictions. In the commune of Arbinda in Karo-Peli province (formerly Soum), the last supply convoy dates back to April 2025, while Sebba in Yagha province was recently resupplied on October 5 after eight months. These households limit adult food consumption, reduce the quantity and number of meals per day, and resort to consuming green harvest. In the commune of Djibo, the sale of cereals at subsidized prices and the availability of new harvests have helped facilitate food access for poor host households and IDPs whose income, mainly based on foreign remittances, is low.

However, the communes of Titao in Loroum and Gorom-Gorom in Oudalan, also facing significant security challenges, are Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) due to the availability of food assistance, which has helped limit food consumption deficits among poor households. Although insecurity continues to disrupt access to health care and hinder the prevention and treatment of children suffering from acute malnutrition, health center admission data from January to September in the Liptako and Soum (formerly Sahel) regions indicate a decrease of 30 percent and 40 percent, respectively, in severe and moderate acute malnutrition compared to the same period last year. Associated deaths also decreased by 25 percent over the period (Nutrition Office, data from weekly bulletins of Community-Based Management of Acute Malnutrition, PCMA). Although diet is not the only factor in malnutrition, these decreases are indicative of a reduction in food consumption gaps in the region. However, practices such as reducing both the number of meals and the quantity and quality of food consumed persist in poor households to make stocks last as long as possible. Poor host households and IDPs remain the most susceptible to acute food insecurity.

In other hard-to-reach communes such as Markoye in Oudalan province, Barsalogho in Sandbontenga province, Diapaga and Kantchari in the Tapoa region, Kompienga and Pama in Kompienga province, most households in these areas were able to produce and now have access to new harvests of legumes primarily, but also cereals (rice, maize, millet). Although incomes are below the pre-crisis average, income sources are relatively more diversified (sale of firewood, gold panning, market gardening, small trade, raising a small number of chickens or small ruminants). Staple goods have been available in markets for six months or more, despite prices being 10 to 30 percent above average, which limits access for households with low incomes. However, the majority of households in these localities are no longer facing significant consumption gaps despite precarious incomes, given their own production. From a nutritional standpoint, available data on admissions of children suffering from acute malnutrition (SAM and MAM) in health centers and associated deaths indicate decreased between January and September compared to the same period a year ago: 31 and 52 percent respectively in the Kuilsé region (former Centre-Nord region), 19 and 28 percent respectively in the Yaadga region (formerly Nord region), 27 and 47 percent respectively in the Gourma, Tapoa and Sirba regions (formerly Est region). In these areas, the deterioration of livelihoods exposes poor host households and IDPs to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity.

In relatively calm production areas in the south and west, most poor households experience Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food insecurity due to new harvests, particularly cowpeas, fonio, and maize, which constitute the main food source for poor households. Improved access to fields, non-timber forest products, and the functioning of local markets promote income and food opportunities. Despite the livestock looting by armed terrorist groups in certain localities, most poor households are attempting to reconstitute or preserve their livelihoods by selling peanut, cowpea, and vegetable crops or through typical destocking of poultry or small ruminants.

• Security incidents and associated fatalities will persist in the country, with pressure from armed terrorist groups around several communes located in areas facing significant security challenges.
• An increase in agricultural production is expected this year compared to last season and the five-year average due to strengthened state support for production (funding increased from 78 billion FCFA in 2024 to 104 billion FCFA in 2025), improved access to fields that increased area planted, and favorable rainfall.
• Overall, off-season production is expected to increase compared to the last three seasons, but it is expected to remain below pre-crisis levels, as not all usual production sites are accessible, especially in areas facing significant security challenges.
• Economic prospects are expected to remain positive in the country, supported by significant income from mining operations, agriculture sector recovery, and continued public investments. Furthermore, GDP growth of slightly more than 4 percent in 2025 and slightly less than 5 percent in 2026 is forecast according to IMF and World Bank projections. The budget deficit is expected to narrow gradually due to efforts to improve revenue mobilization and contain public expenditures, despite high spending on security (BIDC). Inflation decreased by 1.1 percent in July 2025 and is expected to remain moderate, below the WAEMU target of 3 percent throughout 2025/26 due to improved food supply, especially with the upcoming harvests.
• The expected increase in cereal production and the availability of carryover stocks at the beginning of the harvest are expected to strengthen supply through May 2026 and be both greater than last year’s and above average. Market functioning will be marked by weak cross-border flows due to current export restrictions in Burkina Faso and several countries in the region, as well as security constraints along certain routes. Improved internal flows from production areas to consumption areas would be expected following the improvement of the security situation on certain routes. Nevertheless, supplying hard-to-reach areas will continue to be a challenge, and supplies will remain below average.
• Demand for cereals is expected to increase this year, driven primarily by institutional demand, with government farmgate purchase forecasts anticipated to reach 530,000 tons. In areas facing significant security challenges, demand is expected to increase, especially between January and May, when own production is exhausted. Cereal prices will decline seasonally between October and January due to improved supply. Through May, these prices are expected to remain below last year’s due to stronger supply and current restrictive measures on cereal and other agricultural product exports. In addition, maize prices are expected to be slightly below the five-year average, particularly in the Ouagadougou market, due to the increase in supply and weak demand (Figure 2). In areas facing significant security challenges, prices will be above the five-year average.
• The government is expected to continue sales of cereal at subsidized prices to regulate market prices and facilitate poor households' food access. Given the overall decline in prices, sales will be prioritized in areas facing significant security challenges, as decided by the Technical Committee of the National Food Security Council (CT-CNSA) during its monthly session on October 8, 2025.
• Livestock supply is expected to remain generally low and below average during the outlook period due to the continued disruption of livestock market operations in insecure areas. The closure of the main livestock assembly market (Djibo), combined with weak livestock supply and security challenges, will continue to disrupt market supplies and the livestock trade.
• Although insecurity continues to limit market presence by potential foreign buyers, particularly in areas facing significant security challenges, livestock demand will remain strong and above average during the outlook period. This demand will be even stronger during year-end celebrations and religious festivals such as Tabaski. In addition, the recent appreciation of the Ghanaian currency, the Cedi (GHS), could contribute to increased exports to Ghana. Livestock prices, already on the rise, are expected to remain above seasonal averages.
• Non-agricultural income is expected to remain below normal, particularly in areas facing significant security challenges. The main sources of non-agricultural income between November and May are anticipated to be gold panning, market gardening labor activities, and daily work in the construction sector. Despite security constraints, expanding gold panning sites continues to amplify a rural exodus given the context of high gold prices. In areas facing significant security challenges and limited income opportunities, reliance on money transfers from migrant relatives is an alternative, but it is insufficient to support normal incomes.

Humanitarian food assistance

• Assistance planning for 2026 is not yet available. However, the overall volume of humanitarian assistance delivered during the outlook period is likely to decrease due to the seasonal decline in food assistance related to the end of annual programs, reduced funding, and logistical constraints. Nevertheless, due to delays in implementing lean season programs, ongoing food distributions are expected to continue through December in the communes of Sebba and Arbinda. However, details on the coverage of this assistance are not yet available. For Titao and Gorom Gorom, food assistance provided under lean season programs ended in September, and response information is not available for October to December. Furthermore, the government could conduct free distribution operations, particularly in areas facing significant security challenges, as escorted convoys now include food distributions.

Between October 2025 and May 2026, insecurity will remain the major threat that will impede the movement of populations and goods, household access to usual food and income sources, normal market supply, and the provision of basic social services. However, improved household access to fields has enhanced the availability of agricultural products for populations in communes facing significant security challenges. This availability will be strengthened through off-season crops whose production is also expected to increase.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in the communes of Djibo, Solhan, Sebba, and Arbinda. In the commune of Djibo, own production will remain an important food source between October and January. Nevertheless, poor households will be forced to exchange part of their legume production for staple cereals at high prices. Between February and May, stocks from their own production will no longer be available, but households will have access to vegetables produced around the dam. The continuation of operations related to subsidized cereal sales could enable them to build stocks with both remittances from relatives and from the limited income generated from the sale of market garden products, firewood sales, and water sales. To extend the duration of their stocks as much as possible, poor households will continue to limit quantities and the number of meals throughout the period.

In the communes of Solhan, Sebba, and Arbinda, households have started consuming the new harvests prematurely, resorting to selling subsidized cereals, and benefiting from food distributions. This will allow them to reserve their own production through January 2026. Information regarding beneficiaries receiving free distributions is not yet available. To avoid food shortages based on previous experiences, poor host households and IDPs will continue to limit both quantities and the number of meals. Between February and May 2026, as stocks from own production are depleted, the number of households dependent on markets is expected to increase. However, the availability of market gardening products and the continuation of subsidized sales will enable households to avoid significant consumption deficits and maintain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

Between October 2025 and January 2026, in the communes of Markoye, Barsalogho, Gayéri, Diapaga, Kantchari, and Kompienga, household access to fields improved this season, and own production will be the main food source for poor host households and IDPs. In Titao and Gorom-Gorom, in addition to the availability of seasonal products, improved access to off-season crops and/or gold panning will help promote household food access through January 2026, even without food assistance. However, due to decreased income, these households will not be able to afford certain health expenses nor improve the quality of their diet and will therefore experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

Between February and May 2026, poor households and IDPs in these communes will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Due to the depletion of stocks from the winter season production, households will resort to market purchase. Market gardening production will constitute a source of food, but it will be insufficient to replace staple cereals. Income from gold panning, water and fodder sales, and foreign remittances will be insufficient to obtain food products in markets given their high prices. Thus, poor host households and IDPs will be forced to restrict quantities, as well as the number of meals.

In other communes in the regions of Yaadga, Soum, Liptako, and Kuilsé, poor households will remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) throughout the outlook period. Own rainfed production and market gardening production will constitute the main source of food for the majority of households. However, livelihoods will remain considerably weakened as insecurity will continue to limit gold panning activities, access to certain market gardening sites, and livestock rearing practices.

Food access for poor host households and IDPs in the relatively calm production zones of the south and west is expected to be stable throughout the period between October 2025 and May 2026, supported mainly by stocks from own rainfed and market gardening production. Above-average income will help sustain, or even gradually restore, livelihoods, particularly for households that returned to their areas of origin before the onset of the rainy season. Harvest sales will improve income between October and January, a period of high production and stable prices, while February and May relies on the sale of market gardening and non-timber forest products, and on seasonal migration. Overall, the majority of poor households are expected to remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food insecurity throughout the outlook period.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Deterioration of the security situation.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A deterioration in the security situation will further reduce population movements and their access to available income and food sources. This situation will lead to new displacements, which will cause further asset loss and jeopardize ongoing recovery efforts. The number of localities dependent on supplies under military escort will increase, and delays in resupplying markets will increase further. This will also limit the delivery of assistance and lead to increased pressure on market demand, resulting in atypical price levels and food commodity shortages. In this case, poor host households and IDPs, especially in hard-to-reach areas and whose assets are already eroded, will face extreme consumption deficits and will be exposed to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

Areas facing significant security challenges

Improvement in the security situation.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An improvement in the security situation could enable poor households to increase income opportunities by accessing alternative sources, such as market gardening, livestock rearing, gold panning, and small-scale trade, as well as the collection and sale of charcoal, firewood, and fodder. Regular market supply will enable better circulation of trade flows and a decrease in the prices of staple goods, due to increased supply and reduced transportation costs. This situation would also facilitate the delivery of assistance and support for restoration of livelihoods. Improved food access will help reduce the proportion of poor host and IDP households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

Insecurity, characterized by abuses, looting, threats, and attacks by armed terrorist groups (GAT), affects several regions of the country. Despite numerous offensive tactics used by FDS and VDP that have caused logistical setbacks and human losses for GAT, they continue to demonstrate their ability to mobilize and adapt their strategy. In addition to the use of explosive devices along roads, the use of kamikaze drones against FDS positions has increased during this year, making it more dangerous. Security incidents and associated deaths remain high, and the pressure exerted on border communes by GAT is particularly strong in: Barani, Lanfièra, Gomboro, Dî (Sourou region), Titao, Sollé (Yaadga region), Djibo, Arbinda (Soum region), Gorom-Gorom, Sebba (Liptako region), Manni, Gayéri, Foutouri (Sirba region), Kantchari, Diapaga (Tapoa region), Pama, and Kompienga (Gourma region). Although security operations are facilitating the return of larger populations, new cases of displacement persist. From January to September, 317,934 people were forcibly displaced according to data alerts from GCORR.

Due to security risks, the radius of the population’s access to food and income sources remains limited. Although the government and its partners have made efforts to support agricultural production, cultivated areas remain limited, and tall crops (millet and sorghum), which constituted staple foods in normal years, are not authorized for security concerns.

Supply in these areas, which face significant security challenges, is conditional on convoys under military escort. Delays in resupplying certain localities persist, resulting in intermittent shortages. The Sebba market was supplied in early October after an eight-month hiatus. The Arbinda market has not been resupplied in six months, since April. Escorted convoys typically include commodities and goods intended for traders, as well as food from the government and some humanitarian partners, for distribution or sale at subsidized prices.

Insecurity also affects the delivery of assistance. In areas facing significant security challenges, humanitarian assistance is provided by air or by escorted convoy. Security threats sometimes lead to temporary suspensions, as was the case in August 2025 for the commune of Sollé. Food assistance remains underfunded and faces logistical challenges. Planning for the lean season (June to August) was 41 percent funded and only covered 14 percent of the population in need, according to Food Security Cluster data.

With the prolongation of the conflict and attempts to isolate certain communes, household assets have eroded. Poor host and IDP households adapt by mobilizing some marginal income from the sale of water, firewood, trade for market garden products, and gold panning, sometimes risking their lives beyond the security radius. They also increasingly rely on foreign remittances from relatives. However, these households are dependent on assistance. Thus, when assistance is insufficient or irregular, household consumption deteriorates rapidly. Reducing both quantities and the number of meals, as well as decreasing adult consumption in favor of children, are common strategies for the majority of households. Although poor host and IDP households have begun consuming new harvests and have been able to build some stocks from sales of cereals at subsidized prices, particularly in Djibo, they continue to restrict both quantities and the number of meals per day, indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) acute food insecurity. In the communes of Arbinda and Sebba, where shortages were observed in markets during September and where assistance was absent, poor host and IDP households were forced to consume new harvests prematurely. Visible signs of malnutrition are observed in a significant portion of the population, particularly children and pregnant or lactating women. Cases of begging have also increased. These factors imply that part of the population is experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) acute food insecurity.

Insecurity will remain the main threat in the coming months. As FDS proceeds with the reconquest of territory, GAT will attempt to demonstrate its ability to mobilize and proliferate attacks against FDS and VDP positions by continuing to use explosive devices and kamikaze drones. The lack for financing could also force GAT to try to control smuggling goods through corridors along borders and to continue looting livestock and other goods from populations. Security incidents will continue to cause population displacements, limit the movement of people and their goods within the country, and disrupt the regular local market supply, particularly in the border areas listed above.

This situation will continue to limit household food and income access. Vegetable production around accessible water points will constitute a source of food and income. but it will be insufficient between January and April. Poor households could also increase the sale of water and firewood and rely more on foreign remittances from relatives. Food assistance is therefore expected to continue, especially in areas facing significant security challenges, to avoid a deterioration in household food consumption.

The government did not publish an annual response plan as it had in previous years, which impeded fundraising by humanitarian partners. During the lean season (June to August), the response only reached 328,325 people, or 14 percent of the population in need. In addition to underfunding, assistance continues to face logistical and security challenges for delivery. Most lean season programs experienced delays in their implementation. Furthermore, assistance was not regular and sufficient in most priority areas, which exposed households to acute food insecurity at Crisis or Emergency levels.

In the provinces of Loroum and Oudalan, 43,495 and 32,853 beneficiaries were reached, respectively, representing 20 percent of the total population in each of these provinces. The target coverage rate for beneficiaries' caloric needs is 75 percent for assistance partners. However, this assistance was concentrated in the capitals of these provinces (Titao and Gorom-Gorom), which are also reception centers for the majority of IDPs in these provinces. Yet it still directly contributed to reducing food consumption deficits and the adoption of harmful strategies by poor host households and IDPs in these areas. Thus, these two communes are in Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!).

In other provinces, less than 20 percent of the population received assistance between June and August. The government also provided assistance during the lean season to communes facing significant security challenges (Titao, Djibo, Kelbo, Barsalogho, Gorom-Gorom, Gayéri, Foutouri, Diapaga, Kantchari, Kompienga, and Pama). Details on the number of beneficiaries and coverage of needs have not been disseminated. Given logistical and security challenges, some distribution operations that were planned for the lean season are continuing in October, particularly in the communes of Sebba and Arbinda.

Although assistance planning by humanitarian partners is not yet available, overall assistance is expected to be low between October and May. It usually decreases during this period because planning is generally focused on the lean season from June to September. Added to this year’s seasonal decrease is the decline in funding. Assistance will therefore remain low compared to the seasonal average during this period.