Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes or worse persist in highly insecure areas

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are expected between October 2024 and May 2025 in hard-to-access areas with a high presence of internally displaced people (IDPs). In Soum, despite some improvement compared to last year, low production levels will not be enough to prevent Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes between October 2024 and January 2025; food aid remains the primary source of food. The attempted terrorist attacks in Djibo continue to restrict population movements and limit access to marginal sources of food and income. Additionally, there are challenges in market supply, which occasionally face prolonged shortages. Between February and May 2025, vegetable production and marginal incomes will not be enough to cover food deficits, requiring continued assistance to prevent Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.
• Needs will begin to rise seasonally at the start of 2025 and continue until the end of the projection period, with 1.50 to 1.99 million people requiring food aid between February and May 2025, mainly in hard-to-reach areas with a high presence of IDPs in the Nord, Sahel, Est, and Centre-Nord regions. While vegetable production could help mitigate severe deterioration in food security in areas where water points are accessible, this will not be the case in areas where this resource is limited or non-existent. Poor households will be exposed to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse.
• Although national agricultural production is likely to be above the five-year average, cereal prices are expected to exceed seasonal averages from October 2024 to May 2025 due to the replenishment of public and private stocks, reduced imports, and higher-than-typical flows to Niger.

The analysis presented here is based on the information available as of October 15, 2024.

Despite the prospects of better harvests, assistance will remain necessary, especially in areas with significant security challenges

Although security incidents have moderately decreased in the country since the beginning of the year compared to the previous year, armed terrorist groups (ATGs) continue to exert pressure around certain localities in the Nord, Sahel, Centre-Nord, and Est regions. The supply of these localities remains dependent on convoys under military escort, with sometimes long delays leading to shortages of basic foodstuffs, particularly in the markets of Titao, Djibo, and Diapaga (Figure 1). Given the logistical and security challenges, assistance planning for the lean season began late and is ongoing, contributing to maintaining Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes, especially in the municipality of Djibo, where assistance remains the primary source of food.

The start of the season was difficult, but the rains became regular from mid-August and continued into late October, allowing crops to complete their cycles. Despite localized disruptions and limited access to fields in some areas, the expected agricultural production could be above both last season's levels and the five-year average. This is due to the support efforts in land development and the significant provision of inputs by the government. The good level of water in reservoirs will promote vegetable production in localities where this resource is accessible to households. The additional production (mainly vegetables) available between January and April will not be enough to compensate for the absence of basic food. Although new harvests will contribute to improving household food security in the relatively calm areas of the country, the areas with significant security challenges will have insufficient stocks, and these may run out atypically early by February. 

Despite better production prospects, the demand for replenishing public and private stocks, which are at their lowest levels, is high. Additionally, export restrictions in some neighboring countries reduce the availability of imported food, while outgoing maize flows to Niger are higher than typical. All these factors will maintain cereal prices above their seasonal averages from October to May. Significant upward variations compared to the five-year average could persist in areas supplied by military escort, thus limiting access for poor households. With the prolonged blockades of various municipalities, households have lost assets related to their livelihoods, which were previously primarily focused on livestock. The diverse sources of income: marginal income from vegetable production, particularly in the municipalities of Diapaga, Titao, Djibo, Arbinda, and Gorom-Gorom, gold panning (Arbinda, Markoye, Sebba), sales of water and fodder, and transfers from relatives abroad, will not be enough to make high-priced purchases on the markets. 

Food aid should continue, especially in areas with significant security challenges, to avoid a deterioration of the food situation beyond Crisis (IPC Phase 3), particularly in Soum, where Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are anticipated between February and May. Across the country, a seasonal decrease in the number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will be observed between October and January due to households' access to new harvests. However, the need for food assistance is expected to remain high and grow between February and May, when households' own production will no longer be available. 

Learn more 

The following links provide additional information: 

•  Latest Report on Food Security Outlook, June 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET's approach to analyzing humanitarian food aid

Since 2015, Burkina Faso has been facing attacks by ATGs. Starting in 2020, incidents and fatalities associated with these groups have significantly increased, with abuses and repression against civilian populations. This has displaced more than 2.06 million people as of March 31, 2023. Since 2022, ATGs have been attempting to impose blockades around about 30 municipalities, particularly in the Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Est regions. These blockades restrict the movement of people and goods, severely disrupting access to food, healthcare, and other essential services. The distribution of humanitarian aid and the resupply of markets in these localities are only possible by military escort or by air. Since 2023, the government has banned cash transfer operations by humanitarian organizations as part of the fight against terrorism. This limits the intervention capacity of most NGOs, given the logistical and security obstacles to delivering aid in kind. The sociopolitical context of Burkina Faso is marked by frequent protests related to the coups that took place in January and September 2022. Since September 2022, several attempts to destabilize the current government have been reported. In January 2024, Burkina Faso, like Mali and Niger, announced its immediate withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These countries formed the Sahel States Alliance in September 2023, which became a Confederation a year later, with the aim of creating more synergies in the joint fight against terrorism, as well as threats of armed rebellion or external aggression. 

Prolonged insecurity has had a negative impact on livelihoods, particularly in the northern part of the country. Agriculture and pastoralism are the main livelihoods for the majority of the Burkinabè population. The main agricultural regions are located in the center, west, and southwest of the country, where the climate is more favorable to agriculture. In the agricultural and agropastoral areas also affected by the conflict, the abandonment of fields, population displacement, and disruption of agricultural operations have negatively impacted agricultural production in recent years. Pastoralism is particularly important in the northern regions, where livestock farming is a key activity. Pastoral communities depend on the seasonal movement of livestock in search of water and grazing areas. However, since the onset of the conflict, pastoralists' livelihoods have been severely disrupted by movement restrictions, limited access to typical grazing areas and water points, and looting, due to the effects of blockades and insecurity.

Insecurity has severely eroded the typical seasonal variations in income and food in the northern and eastern parts of the country. The decrease in agricultural productivity during the rainy season reduces the communities' ability to rely on traditional seasonal patterns for their livelihoods. Furthermore, socioeconomic activities such as access to agricultural and non-agricultural labor, self-employment, small-scale trade, and cash transfers are greatly disrupted due to the prevailing insecurity in most areas of the country. October, the current period of this report, typically marks the harvest season across the country, promoting food availability and the replenishment of stocks. However, due to production constraints, the continued disruption of trade flows, and above-average prices for basic foodstuffs, the need for humanitarian assistance will remain high in the north and east, especially in areas where households' access to their fields and income is limited. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Insecurity: 

The security situation is still concerning despite the increase in operations by the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) as part of the effort to reclaim the territory. Indeed, incidents recorded between January and September 2024 have decreased by approximately 23 percent compared to the same period last year (Figure 3). Associated deaths have also slightly decreased during this period but remain high. Overall, internal flows and agropastoral activities remain disrupted. In around 30 localities, particularly in the Nord, Centre-Nord, Sahel, and Est regions, population movements are restricted to small security perimeters, thereby limiting access to their typical sources of income and food. As with last year, these localities continue to rely on irregular military supply convoys, often facing long delays exceeding three months. 

Population movements: 

Although the latest update on the number of IDPs dates back to March 2023, when the figure exceeded 2 million, population movements continue, particularly in the northern part of the country. In the areas under blockade, whenever there is an opportunity for convoys to return under military escort, populations take advantage of the situation to flee towards urban centers, the relatively calmer southern regions, or neighboring countries in search of work opportunities. However, the decrease in security incidents and the security efforts initiated by the FDS and VDP have contributed to reducing new cases of population displacement compared to previous years. Humanitarian actors have reported 296,917 new IDPs between January and August 2024 (SECAL Cluster, September 2024). In addition, the government announced a cumulative total of 931,652 people who had returned to their places of origin as of the end of September. 

Flooding: 

Following the intensification of the monsoon season starting in late July, flooding was recorded in several localities across the country. Although comprehensive assessments of the damage are not available, housing and road infrastructure were the most affected. Preliminary assessments by the technical services of the Ministry of Agriculture indicate that 3,433 animals have been reported lost and over 4,450 hectares of crops have been affected, with total losses amounting to 12 percent as of September 10. The main regions affected are Cascades, Hauts-Bassins, and Boucle du Mouhoun. 

Agricultural production: 

Agricultural production, the main source of food and income for households, continues to face reduced accessibility to fields due to insecurity. During this harvest season, farming households rely on self-production for their food, including cowpeas, peanuts, early millet, fonio, and maize. Despite the PREGEC results, which predict an annual production decrease of about 4 percent as the most likely scenario due to the late start of the agricultural season, the continued rainfall until October suggests more optimistic outcomes. In addition to the state's support for producers in 2024, particularly in the north and west (including the timely provision of inputs, free plowing, perimeter improvements, and the relative improvement of security perimeters), the increase in the number of returning households that were able to engage in agricultural activities has reduced their dependence on the market.

The sale of cowpeas provides better income due to more favorable production and a price increase of 122 percent and 83 percent, respectively, compared to last year and the five-year average in September. A lack of sales is observed for seasonal rainy vegetables due to supply exceeding demand, leading to an absence of potential buyers, typically from Ghana, and a reduction in flows to Côte d'Ivoire. Revenue from the sale of wild-harvested products such as baobab leaves, shea nuts, and néré has seen a slight increase this year compared to last year, due to higher prices, despite the challenges associated with collection. 

Livestock production: 

Livestock production is also severely impacted by security threats. Typically, milk and other dairy products are available during this season; however, access to these products is low for pastoral households, particularly in the north and east of the country, which are struggling to rebuild their herds that were previously looted, stolen, or depleted. Moreover, in these areas, most livestock markets are closed or operating at minimal capacity, which prevents households from benefiting from the high prices of livestock and animal products. In contrast, in the relatively calmer areas in the south and west, where potential buyers are redirected, households continue to earn average to above-average income from livestock sales and their products due to higher prices. 

Off-own-farm sources of income: 

Overall, income from agricultural labor has increased this year compared to 2023 but remains below average. Available income mainly comes from labor for harvesting, vegetable production, and the sale of agricultural products such as cowpeas, peanuts, and vegetables. 

With limited access to the main sources of income from agropastoral activities, households turn to other activities from which they earn marginal income, given the limited work opportunities, especially in areas with a high presence of IDPs. Compared to the previous year, these non-agricultural sources of income have not seen any significant changes. These mainly include:

• Income from gold panning activities has significantly decreased compared to the pre-crisis average due to the closure and restriction of access to several gold mining sites, particularly in the north and east. The operational gold mining sites in the south of the country are magnets for young people looking for opportunities. The supply of labor is high relative to demand, which reduces individual earnings. 
• In areas with significant security challenges, households rely on cash transfers, which have become more important this year due to the restoration of money transfer services. Moreover, the increase in the number of migrants leaving insecure areas in search of job opportunities in urban centers (construction, domestic labor, among others), on irrigated perimeters in calmer production areas, and also abroad, has contributed to the rise in the frequency and volume of cash transfers. Added to this are remittances from relatives living outside these areas.
• Small-scale trade and self-employment, primarily consisting of the sale of water, grass, firewood, charcoal, donuts, and condiments employ more people, especially in hard-to-reach areas. However, the earnings generated from these activities are low due to a limited customer base or, in some cases, the lack of raw materials, which depend on supply convoys under military escort. The long delays of convoys and the limited availability of charcoal and firewood (the collection of which requires traveling long distances beyond the security perimeters) have further reduced these sources of income.

Market supply 

As of mid-October, agricultural markets across the country are experiencing low supply levels. Overall, the supply is low and below the levels of 2023 and the seasonal average due to a decrease in production and carryover stocks from the previous season, and a reduction in incoming flows from neighboring countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali. The higher-than-typical cereal exports to Niger and the purchases made by humanitarian organizations, some of which continued until the lean season (July-August), have also contributed to the reduced supply on the markets. In production areas, although early harvests are available, the late start of the season and the heavy rains in recent weeks have slowed the marketing of the new harvests. 

Supplying hard-to-reach areas remains a challenge, and around 30 municipalities continue to rely on convoys under military escort. With the rainy season, organizing convoys under escort has become difficult, and the roads have deteriorated, which has increased supply delays and caused cereal shortages in some markets (e.g., Diapaga, Djibo). As in 2023, supply delays remain long, typically exceeding three months, and in some areas, they reach five to six months (Djibo, Sebba, Kompienga, and Diapaga) (Figure 4). 

Household purchasing power: 

The price trends for staple cereals remained generally stable or lower than last year's levels until June, but have become volatile since July. In addition to the low availability on markets relative to demand, speculative practices have increased due to the difficulties in establishing the rainy season. Overall, significant price increases (between 40 and 60 percent) compared to the five-year average continue to be observed in September for maize, white sorghum, and millet. In areas of insecurity, where supply depends on military escorts, significant price fluctuations between 50 and 100 percent are observed compared to the average, due to high transportation costs and irregular supply.

Households' purchasing power is negatively affected due to limited income and the high prices of basic goods. While households in production areas are less market reliant due to the availability of early harvests, in urban centers the purchasing power of both host and poor IDP households is strained by the very high prices of basic goods. These households prefer to rely on cereals sold at subsidized prices, although the quantity available is far below their needs. At most sales points, especially in urban centers, long queues often form several hours before the start of sales, with people hoping to purchase a 50 kg bag of cereal. In areas with significant security challenges, dependent on convoy supplies, discussions between local authorities and traders help limit speculative practices and prevent the sharp price fluctuations observed in 2022 and 2023. However, in some markets facing supply shortages, such as Diapaga and Djibo, informal selling practices lead to exorbitant prices. In Diapaga, for example, the price of maize per kilogram in September was over 1000 XOF, compared to 220 XOF during the same period last year.

• Click here for more details on prices in key markets. 

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

In addition to underfunding, food assistance continues to face security-related delivery challenges. By the end of September, the humanitarian response plan was funded at 36.9 percent, compared to 39.4 percent last year and 48.7 percent on average from 2019 to 2023. The planned assistance for the lean season, scheduled from July to September, started late in several areas, particularly in Loroum and Yagha, and is continuing in October. Over the past three months aid has reached an average of at least 25 percent of the population and met at least 75 percent of their needs in municipalities with significant security challenges: Djibo, Arbinda, Kelbo, Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, Sebba (in the Sahel region), Diapaga, Kantchari, and Gayéri (in the Est region), Ouahigouya in the Nord region, and Barsalogho in the Centre-Nord region. The assistance provided in September and the ongoing assistance are expected to remain similar. In the provinces of Loroum and Séno coverage has been low. 

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Municipalities with high security challenges: 

Due to the imposed blockade and the advanced deterioration of livelihoods, the food situation for households remains volatile, particularly in the municipality of Djibo. It is deteriorating rapidly due to the suspension of assistance and the lack of market supply. While households have begun receiving the new harvests of legumes and vegetables grown near their homes, staple grains are still scarce on the market. Additionally, the limited income from remittances sent by relatives living outside the area is insufficient to cover informal purchases. The majority of basic food is provided through food aid, which has been covering at least 75 percent of the needs of most households since August. Despite the presence of aid, households continue to limit both portion sizes and the number of meals per day, leaving them vulnerable to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes. 

Other municipalities that are difficult to access and have a high presence of IDPs: 

In the municipalities with a high presence of IDPs, where supply depends on convoys under military escort and the security perimeter is wider (such as Titao, Arbinda, Kelbo, Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, Sebba, Barsalogho, and Gayéri), most households have been able to produce and now have access to the new harvests, primarily of legumes, but also of cereals (rice, maize, millet). However, due to limited access to markets for purchasing other basic necessities and the sometimes irregular nature of aid, both poor host households and IDPs continue to reduce portion sizes and the number of meals, leaving them vulnerable to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Available data on the admission of children suffering from acute malnutrition in health centers indicate an increase in cases of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and deaths in 2024 compared to 2023. Between January and September, the cumulative cases of SAM in the Sahel and Est regions have increased by 54 percent and 62 percent respectively, while the number of deaths has risen by 134 percent and 200 percent, respectively, compared to the same period last year. In addition to the decline in food consumption, frequent shortages of nutritional supplies in health centers are limiting the proper management of malnutrition. Moreover, the deterioration of the security situation severely hampers the implementation of community-based malnutrition prevention and screening interventions, as well as other essential health activities, such as vaccination and micronutrient supplementation.

The municipalities of Diapaga and Kantchari, in the Est region, are also facing the severe consequences of the blockade imposed in early 2024. However, the decline in livelihoods is less severe than in the municipalities of Djibo, where the blockade has now lasted for over two years. A large portion of the population also has access to the new harvests of maize and legumes, in addition to aid that covers at least 75 percent of the needs for the majority of households. Poor host households and IDPs in these municipalities are experiencing Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes.

Urban centers: 

The high prices of basic commodities and insufficient income from sluggish informal activities or reduced labor opportunities are worsening food access for poor households in major urban centers. These households are forced to reduce the quantity and/or quality of their meals by resorting to cheaper foods. Poor households, including IDPs, are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. 

Production areas (relatively calm) in the south and west: 

In these areas, the new harvests, particularly cowpeas, fonio, and maize, are the main source of food for poor households. Despite some security threats, including livestock theft by ATGs, most poor households are managing to protect their livelihoods by selling crops such as peanuts, cowpeas, and vegetables, or through the typical sale of poultry and small ruminants. The majority of poor households are experiencing Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. 

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions 

Security situation: 

The abuses and threats by ATGs could persist, further restricting the population's access to their typical sources of food and income. Also, internal flows in general, and the regularity of supply convoys to localities in the Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Est regions in particular, could be disrupted. 

Agricultural production:  

Despite localized crop losses due to flooding, overall agricultural production is expected to be higher than last season and above the five-year average, due to increased government support for producers and the late end to the rainy season, which allowed for the recovery of delays in the planting campaign. However, in the Sud-Ouest region, which was most affected by dry spells at the start of the season, and in regions where access to fields remains restricted due to insecurity (Sahel, Est, and Centre-Nord), the expected production could be below the five-year average.  

Off-season production: 

Insecurity will continue to limit access to production sites, particularly in the Boucle du Mouhoun, Nord, Centre-Nord, Sahel, and Est regions, despite the security measures that have been put in place. Expected production is likely to be higher than last year, but still below the average. 

Macroeconomics: 

Burkina Faso's economy is expected to experience significant inflation growth in 2024 and 2025, reaching 5.3 percent and 5.5 percent respectively (up from 3.6 percent in 2023 and 1.8 percent in 2022), driven by favorable commodity prices, particularly gold (BIDC). Inflation is expected to remain high primarily due to the continued elevated prices of basic necessities and the negative impact of global market trends on domestic prices. An additional rise in the prices of imported goods could occur due to the potential increase in illegal fees and customs taxes at border crossings starting in January, when the country's withdrawal from ECOWAS takes effect. 

Market functioning: 

Despite an expected increase in cereal production compared to the previous year, market supply is expected to be average or below average. In addition to the near absence of carryover stocks from traders, the anticipated decline in production in neighboring countries and trade restrictions across the region will negatively impact the national cereal supply. 

Internal flows will continue to be hindered by difficulties accessing deficit areas in the Nord, Sahel, Centre-Nord, and Est. Outbound flows, particularly of maize to Niger, could remain higher than typical due to the ongoing closure of the Niger-Benin border and export restrictions imposed by Benin and Nigeria, the two main corridors for supplying Niger under normal conditions. 

Overall demand will be above average, driven primarily by the needs of institutions and traders for stock replenishment, as current stock levels are at their lowest. This could lead to higher-than-typical purchasing needs between November and May. Household demand will remain typical throughout the period, especially in the relatively stable southern and western areas, where the main food source will continue to be household production. However, prices will remain above average (Figure 5). 

Supply and demand for livestock in the markets: 

In the pastoral areas of the north, which are more affected by the general disruptions caused by the security situation, several markets will remain closed, and others will continue to operate at a minimal level. In these areas, the supply of livestock will remain below average in most markets in the Sahel and Est regions. For the markets that are relatively more accessible and have become key hubs for buyers from the central and southern parts of the country (Pouytenga, Kaya, Ouagadougou, Fada, Guelwongo), supply will be above average. Demand for livestock will remain average. Outgoing flows of small ruminants to Ghana and large ruminants to Côte d'Ivoire will continue to be negatively impacted by insecurity, as well as by informal border fees. However, demand for livestock, particularly in urban areas, could increase during the year-end and religious holidays, driving prices above their seasonal averages between October and May. 

Agricultural income: 

Overall, agricultural revenues will be higher than both the previous year's level and the average in production areas between October and January. However, in areas more affected by insecurity, agricultural incomes will be below average between October and May due to reduced production and the lack of potential buyers. 

Non-agricultural income: 

The inaccessibility of gold mining sites and the continued ban on gold panning due to the security situation will continue to negatively impact income from this activity. In the relatively calm regions of the south and west, gold panning, small-scale trade, and construction will be the main sources of income for host households and IDPs or migrants who have fled insecure areas. However, these activities will generate reduced volumes compared to the average due to decreased demand. Income from migrant remittances and the diaspora is expected to increase, as households are increasingly reliant on this source of support. All listed income sources will remain below the pre-crisis average.

Assumptions for the municipality of Djibo in the Soum province

Insecurity: 

ATGs will likely continue to exert pressure around the city of Djibo, marked by sporadic attacks and severe restrictions on the movement of goods and people. It is likely that security threats will continue to prevent regular market supply via military escorts and also hinder the proper delivery of aid to the municipality. 

Agropastoral production:  

Agricultural output, particularly of legumes, is expected to surpass that of the previous two seasons due to the intensification of crop production in household plots, the use of irrigation from the dam's perimeter, and favorable rainfall. Due to the continued ban on the cultivation of tall crops, millet production is expected to remain marginal. Starting in November, households (at least 40 percent according to key informants) will, as in the previous season, engage in vegetable farming activities around the dam. Pastoral production is expected to be very low due to the near absence of livestock, which had previously been looted and sold off because of insecurity. Furthermore, access to pastoral activities remains highly limited. 

Market functioning: 

The main agricultural markets in the province will remain dependent on supplies delivered by convoys under military escort. With the end of the season, the Djibo market, which has been out of cereals since July 2024, could be supplied by December 2024. The prices of goods could then be slightly below the average of the past two years between October 2024 and May 2025, but still substantially higher than their normal pre-blockade levels. In addition to the low supply, the high cost of transport will contribute to keeping prices elevated.

Assumptions in other areas with difficult access

Insecurity: 

Despite the offensive actions and security efforts carried out by the FDS and VDP, the ATGs will attempt to maintain pressure, particularly around the municipalities of Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, Sebba, Arbinda (in the Sahel region), Titao (in the Nord region), Kompienga, and Gayéri (in the Est region). The movement of populations will remain limited in these municipalities, and their supply will require convoys under escort.

Agropastoral production:  

The measures taken to increase the area planted this year should boost agricultural production in these areas compared to the previous season. However, despite the expected increases, the harvests will remain insufficient. The good water reservoir levels will promote vegetable farming activities between November 2024 and May 2025 around accessible sites, particularly in the municipalities of Titao, Gorom-Gorom, Arbinda, and Kompienga.

Market functioning: 

Market supply will remain dependent on convoys under military escort. With the end of the season, markets that are out of cereals could be supplied by December 2024.The use of bypass routes would, as last year, facilitate the supply of certain markets, such as those in Dori, Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, and Seytenga, without military convoys. Furthermore, the decrease in demand for food due to the availability of harvests will reduce the pressure on market supply. However, the prices of basic goods will remain higher than the national averages and above their seasonal averages between October 2024 and May 2025 due to the very high transport costs.

Assumptions for the municipality of Diapaga in Tapoa province

Insecurity: 

The security situation could remain concerning in this cross-border area where ATGs are seeking to control smuggling routes. The pressure from ATGs around the cities of Diapaga and Kantchari will persist, thereby limiting the movement of populations and trade with other municipalities in the province. 

Agropastoral production: 

The increase in insecurity will lead to significant decreases in the expected harvests in the municipalities of Diapaga and Kantchari compared to the previous season and the average, despite countermeasures.

Market functioning: 

The dysfunction of the main markets in Kantchari and Diapaga will persist due to their reliance on convoys under military escort, with delays of up to six months. The end of the rainy season in October could facilitate the supply of the Diapaga market. With the decrease in production and the difficulties related to market supply, the prices of basic goods will remain above average until May 2025. The lack of potential buyers will limit the sale of livestock, negatively impacting the income of herders throughout the scenario period.

Assumptions in urban areas and IDP concentration areas

Migration flow towards cities: 

Despite the significant number of returns to places of origin recorded between January and September 2024, urban centers will continue to host new displaced persons and migrants fleeing blockades in areas with high security challenges. These population movements towards cities could continue in the coming months, further increasing the number of people seeking employment opportunities. 

Prices of basic goods: 

Despite the expected increase in national production, competition for replenishing institutional and private stocks, in a context of reduced inflows from coastal countries and high transport costs, will keep the prices of basic goods above their seasonal averages.

Humanitarian food assistance 

National assumption

Despite a seasonal decrease in humanitarian aid between October and December, humanitarian partners will continue to provide assistance to the most affected areas in northern Burkina Faso, where humanitarian aid is the main source of food for most poor households. In areas affected by insecurity, where market supply is dependent on escorted convoys, air transport will remain the preferred means for delivering food aid. Since the suspension of direct cash transfer programs to populations by the authorities, many humanitarian actors are facing logistical challenges in addition to financial and security constraints. Assistance could remain below the five-year average. 

Humanitarian assistance plans for 2025 are not yet finalized; therefore, humanitarian aid is not included in the analysis for the period of January to May 2025.

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

Municipalities with high security challenges: 

In the municipality of Djibo, household access to typical sources of income and basic social services remained limited due to the persistence of threats of attack by ATGs. Despite a likely seasonal reduction in humanitarian aid rations, partners will probably continue to prioritize Djibo, as humanitarian assistance has been the main source of food for most households. Key informants indicate that the likely decrease in Djibo's population, due to the use of return convoys to leave the city, resulted in a larger portion of the population receiving a ration that was probably greater than initially anticipated. This may have allowed some households to retain marginal stocks of food aid in case of potential shortages, as has occurred in previous years. 

Access to fields has improved this year, with a wider security perimeter around Djibo resulting in better production for the 2024/25 season compared to the previous two years. However, production remains limited to vegetable farming or small-scale cereal production around household plots and along the dam. The marginal stocks from new harvests are expected to be sufficient for only one to three months of consumption. Market purchases will remain limited due to the shortages currently observed and the prices of basic commodities, which will remain out of reach for households despite discussions between local authorities and traders to reduce speculative measures

The availability of food from household own production is likely to improve food security outcomes between October 2024 and January 2025. However, due to the significant and ongoing levels of food aid, the lack of a functioning market, and the challenges in humanitarian access that prevent field assessments typically used to assess the relative contributions of each food source, it is difficult to determine whether the improvement in the most severe outcomes, up to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, is primarily due to production or humanitarian aid. 

Between February and May 2025, stocks from domestic production will no longer be available. However, poor households may engage in vegetable production. Although this production would primarily be for own consumption, it will not be sufficient to make up for the shortfall caused by the absence of basic food. The marginal income generated from small trade and self-employment (such as selling condiments, wood or charcoal, and water) and monetary transfers from relatives will also be insufficient for purchases at high prices on the market. In the absence of sufficient food aid, the food situation of poor households will deteriorate. Severe consumption gaps will expose the poor households in the municipality of Djibo to Emergency (IPC Phase 4). 

Other municipalities that are difficult to access and have a high presence of IDPs: 

In the municipalities of Titao, Arbinda, Kelbo, Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, Sebba, Barsalogho, and Gayéri, households' access to fields and other marginal sources of income and food is better compared to the municipality of Djibo. Thus, with better harvests than last year, domestic production should be the main source of food for poor households between October 2024 and January 2025. However, poor households and IDPs, whose livelihood assets are limited, will adopt precautionary measures to extend the duration of their stocks as much as possible. Limiting quantities and the number of meals will continue to expose households to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

Between February and May 2025, domestic production will be depleted. Vegetable production could provide a supplementary source of food, but it will not be sufficient, particularly in the municipalities of Titao, Arbinda, and Gorom-Gorom. The income from gold panning (Arbinda, Markoye, Sebba), the sale of water and fodder, and remittances from relatives abroad will not be enough to make high-priced purchases on the markets. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes could affect the majority of households in these municipalities.

In the Est region, Diapaga and Kantchari remain under the threat of blockade. Although insecurity has limited the supply of convoys to Diapaga, which has now gone six months without cereals on the market, the security radius around the municipalities and the possibilities for agricultural activities are relatively better than in other municipalities located further north in the country. With the ongoing harvest and humanitarian assistance likely continuing until December, poor households in the municipality of Diapaga will experience Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes. As household stocks begin to deplete in early 2025, off-season production will not be enough to fill the food consumption gaps. In the absence of humanitarian aid, the food situation will deteriorate, and poor households will be exposed to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes between February and May.

The minimal operation and closure of health facilities will continue to limit the population's access to healthcare services. Furthermore, difficulties in the supply of nutritional inputs will limit prevention efforts and the proper management of malnutrition cases. With the deterioration of the food situation, it is likely that the atypically high levels of Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) admissions and deaths observed since the beginning of the year will continue in these areas between October 2024 and May 2025. 

Urban centers: 

No significant change is expected in the income of poor urban households between October 2024 and May 2025. Income, primarily derived from small trade and labor and negatively impacted by the national situation, will remain below normal. The price level of basic commodities, above their seasonal averages, will continue to limit the purchasing power and typical access of poor households to food. Throughout the projection period, poor households will remain exposed to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. 

Relatively stable production areas in the south and west:

With above-average harvest prospects, except for a few areas of the Sud-Ouest region, poor households are expected to have a typical diet primarily based on their own production from October 2024 to May 2025. Above-average incomes, primarily from the sale of harvests between October and January, and from the sale of vegetables and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) between February and May, will help preserve or gradually restore livelihoods (especially for households that have returned to their areas of origin before the start of the season). Overall, poor households will remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) throughout the projection period. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Deterioration of the security situation 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A deterioration in the security situation could further reduce population movements and their access to available sources of income and food. This situation could also lead to an increase in the number of IDPs. In addition, long lead times for supplying markets by escort would further limit the delivery of assistance and lead to demand pressure on the markets, resulting in atypical price levels and shortages of commodities. In this case, poor households, especially in areas where the blockade continues and whose assets have already been depleted, will face extreme consumption deficits and face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes.

Areas with high security challenges

Improved security situation

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An improvement in the security situation could allow households greater access to certain income sources (gold panning, collection and sale of wood and charcoal) and food (wild produce gathering and vegetable farming). This will also facilitate market supply, the delivery of food assistance, and a reduction in the prices of basic goods. A decrease in the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes is likely with improved food access. However, the restoration of livelihoods would take more time.

An intensification of the blockade

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A deterioration in the security situation could exacerbate the blockade and lead to a halt in the delivery of food aid and the supply of markets. The marginal food reserves from vegetable production and previous free distributions will not be enough to prevent significant consumption gaps among households, and will result in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

Soum Province of the Sahel Region, Livelihood Zone BF07: Nord and Est Livestock and Cereals (Figure 6)

Reason for choosing this area: The province was the first to be affected by ATG attacks at the beginning of the security crisis in 2015. Since then, it has been under terrorist threat with several incidents resulting in fatalities. The deterioration of the situation in the province in 2022 led to the displacement of populations from rural municipalities to the main cities of Djibo, Arbinda, and Kelbo. The city of Djibo, under blockade since February 2022, had about 270,000 IDPs according to government figures as of March 31, 2023. Livestock holdings, the main source of income for households, have diminished, while the livestock market is closed due to a lack of animals and buyers. Additionally, the city's supply is reliant on military convoys, which are irregular. After the large-scale attack perpetrated by ATGs on November 26, 2023, combing and security operations by the FDS and VDP eased the pressure around the city of Djibo, but threats persist and movements remain limited. As the blockade persists, people leave every time the convoys return. Since the start of the blockade, the food situation has been volatile, deteriorating when market supplies exceed four months and when food aid is interrupted for long periods.

Attempts by ATGs to infiltrate continue in the province, primarily around the city of Djibo, which restricts the movements of the populations that remain in place. Market supplies are still dependent on military convoys, the last of which took place in mid-April 2024. However, since July, the Djibo market has been out of cereals. The subsidized sale of over 400 metric tons of food, which began in April 2024, was replaced by free food distributions by the government and partners (notably the WFP). Despite the scarcity of supply until its rupture, prices remained below their levels of 2022 and 2023 in June (Figure 7). This price decrease is primarily due to measures taken by the government to limit speculative practices. However, with the rupture of the market supply, some households are sometimes forced to turn to traders or individuals with reserves, who sell at exorbitant prices. 

Humanitarian aid is still primarily delivered by helicopter, which remains costly and logistically challenging. The delay in the implementation of the lean season programs, coupled with their wide coverage, will allow households to have food from food aid until December. In addition to food aid, households' access to their own production, although insufficient to meet needs beyond three months, will help reduce significant consumption gaps throughout the period. 

Households will continue to rely on money transfers from migrant relatives or close ones living outside Djibo as their main source of income. These incomes will be supplemented by those from the sale of water and grass. Income from small-scale trade will remain very low until the arrival of the next convoy. The difficulties related to firewood collection explain the unavailability of this source. Indeed, when the markets are supplied, households are able to restart small-scale trade and meet other basic needs not covered by assistance (e.g., sugar, tea, soap). In Arbinda, where money transfers are less significant, households will turn to gold panning in addition to the transfers received to cover needs not met by assistance. 

Market supply will remain dependent on military convoys. The supply level will remain low and below average due to the irregularity of convoys and the high transport costs that limit supply by local traders. The availability of vegetable products starting from January 2025 will help reduce extreme consumption gaps among households.

The availability of food from own production is likely to improve household food security outcomes between October 2024 and January 2025. However, due to the significant and ongoing levels of food aid, the lack of a functioning market, and the challenges in humanitarian access that prevent field assessments typically used to assess the relative contributions of each food source, it is difficult to determine whether the improvement in the most severe outcomes, up to Crisis (IPC Phase 3), is primarily due to production or humanitarian aid. However, as stocks deplete by early 2025, and in the absence of a functioning market, humanitarian aid will be crucial to prevent the emergence of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes starting in February. Between February and May, stocks from the rainy season's harvest will be depleted, and the vegetables produced around the dam will not be enough to make up for the lack of staple foods. In the absence of assistance, significant consumption gaps could expose poor households to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. A small proportion of households will remain exposed to Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).