Food aid is essential to prevent more severe consequences in conflict-affected areas

• Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected between June and September, especially in the conflict-affected eastern and northern areas. The erosion of assets, irregular market supply, and restricted movement to access income will lead displaced populations and poor host households to depend on food aid. In most areas under blockade, food assistance will prevent worse outcomes. However, in the municipalities of Bourzanga and Diapaga, the increase in security incidents has limited the delivery of assistance, and an Emergency (IPC Phase 4) situation is expected. 
• FEWS NET estimates that 2 to 2.5 million people will need food assistance during the lean season between June and August. While food aid is expected to partially mitigate levels of acute food insecurity across much of the north, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are still expected. Additionally, in areas under blockade and with a high number of displaced people, some poor households are likely to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes.
• While the start of harvests will improve acute food insecurity in several regions, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely persist in the northern and eastern insecure areas between October and January. The conflict limits households' access to fields and disrupts market supplies. Although the delivery of food assistance should continue in the north, the levels of assistance need to be increased to prevent gaps in food consumption.
• While food aid generally decreases after October, historical trends and current humanitarian priorities suggest that food aid will continue in the areas under blockade. FEWS NET then estimates that Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes will persist. However, if food aid is not maintained and/or the conflict escalates, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will be likely. 

A sustained, large-scale response in the blockaded areas is necessary through January

The persistent threats and abuses by armed terrorist groups (ATGs) and the severe erosion of livelihoods are the main drivers of acute food insecurity in Burkina Faso. Between 2.0 and 2.5 million people need urgent food aid from June to August, with a proportion facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) conditions in the north and east of the country. Although the planned assistance from June to August is expected to reach a large portion of the population in the provinces of Soum, Oudalan, Yagha, and Loroum, successful delivery faces logistical and security challenges. About 30 municipalities continue to rely on military-escort convoys for their supply of basic goods (Figure 1). While most of these municipalities have received at least one supply in the past six months, delays remain long, and shortages are observed two to three months after resupply

Households, whose livelihoods primarily depend on livestock and the production of cowpea and millet, have experienced significant losses due to the volatile security situation and the prolonged blockade. With the ongoing security crisis, cattle theft and asset liquidation to meet needs have led to an erosion of household assets, particularly in the Sahel, Nord, Est, and Centre-Nord regions. Revenue from the sale of firewood, small-scale gold panning in accessible areas, and petty trade is marginal; thus, households are expected to rely more on remittances from relatives abroad between June and September, as well as increase the use of foraged products as they face a deteriorating nutritional situation. The already atypically high rates of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and deaths observed in the first half of the year, particularly in the Est, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Sahel regions, will likely worsen between June and September due to reduced access to food and the seasonal increase in waterborne diseases.

Across the country, a decline in the number of people exposed to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes is likely between October and January due to household access to new harvests. However, food aid needs will remain high, and food insecurity will remain most severe in the northern areas well after the harvests, as blockades have been in place for over two and a half years in some regions. Agricultural production is expected to increase compared to the previous season due to greater government support for production and improved access for households to their fields, especially in the southern and western regions where more areas are experiencing relative security. In the northern areas under blockade, however, the degree of improvement in harvests will be limited. The increased availability of basic goods will likely lead to a seasonal decrease in prices, and the government plans to continue selling subsidized cereals in certain areas of the Sahel region until December. However, prices could remain above the five-year average due to disruptions in supply chains and higher transportation costs. In areas plagued by insecurity where escorted supplies will remain necessary, prices will likely remain atypically high compared to the average. 

Due to the impact of the conflict on agricultural production, poor households in the northern conflict-affected areas—particularly in the Sahel region—are expected to exhaust their harvests quickly and are likely to face significant, and possibly extreme, food consumption deficits. Food aid is expected to partially mitigate the situation, which will likely result in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes from October to January. Marginal sources of income and the resumption of vegetable farming around accessible water reservoirs will not be sufficient to enable households to access irregularly supplied markets. The humanitarian response is likely to be impacted by the volatility of the security situation, as well as by financial and logistical issues related to limited access in most of the northern part of the country. If humanitarian aid is not maintained or if the conflict worsens, food insecurity is likely to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels in these areas. A sustained response from the government and partners is necessary through January to prevent further increases in consumption deficits and high levels of acute malnutrition. 

Learn more

The analysis presented here is based on the information available as of June 14, 2024. The following links provide additional information: 

• Latest Food Security Outlook, February 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET's scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET's approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Since 2015, Burkina Faso has been facing attacks from armed terrorist groups (ATGs). Starting in 2020, incidents and fatalities associated with these groups have significantly increased, with abuses and repression against civilian populations. This has displaced more than 2.06 million people as of March 31, 2023. Since 2022, ATGs have been attempting to impose blockades around about 30 communities, particularly in the Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Est regions. These blockades restrict the movement of people and goods, severely disrupting access to food, healthcare, and other essential services. The distribution of humanitarian aid and the resupply of markets in these localities are only possible by military escort or by air. Since 2023, the government has prohibited cash transfer operations by humanitarian organizations as part of the fight against terrorism. This limits the ability of most NGOs to intervene due to logistical and security constraints on delivering in-kind assistance. The sociopolitical context in Burkina Faso is marked by institutional instability, with coups d'état occurring in January and September 2022. In January 2024, Burkina Faso, along with Mali and Niger, announced their immediate withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These countries later formed the Alliance of Sahel States to create greater synergy and engage in a joint fight against terrorism and external aggressions. 

The prolonged conflict has negatively impacted livelihoods, particularly in the northern part of the country. Agriculture and pastoralism are the main means of livelihood for the majority of the Burkinabe population. The main agricultural regions are located in the center, west, and southwest of the country, where the climate is more favorable for farming. Pastoralism is particularly important in the northern regions, where livestock farming is a crucial activity. Pastoral communities depend on the seasonal movement of livestock in search of water and grazing areas. However, the livelihoods of pastoralists have been severely disrupted by movement restrictions, theft, and limited access to traditional grazing areas and water points because of blockades and violence.

These shocks have severely eroded the typical seasonal variations in income and food availability in the north and east of the country. Persistent insecurity has disrupted agropastoral activities, leading to a reduction in harvests due to field abandonment. The decline in agricultural productivity during the lean season reduces communities' abilities to rely on traditional seasonal patterns for their livelihoods. The month of June, the current period of this report, typically marks the start of the lean season, which has become longer and more severe in the north and east of the country. The period from October 2024 to January 2025 marks the typical harvest and post-harvest period (Figure 2). Nevertheless, due to the ongoing disruption of trade flows and the above-average prices of basic foodstuffs, humanitarian needs will remain high in the north and east, especially in areas where households have limited access to their fields and income sources. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Insecurity: The security situation is still a serious cause for concern, marked by attacks, repression, and abuses against civilian populations by ATGs, as well as against the positions of Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). From the beginning of the dry season in November to May 2024, the number of security incidents decreased by about 15 percent compared to the same period last year, but the number of associated deaths has slightly increased, maintaining a record high level (Figure 3). The increased offensive actions by the FDS and VDP, supported by aerial assets, have indeed achieved successes in reclaiming and securing certain areas in the west and south of the country. However, ATGs remain mobile and continue to maintain blockades on about 30 municipalities in the northern half and eastern part of the country. Supply to these areas still depends on military escorts, and delivery times can reach up to four months (as in the cases of Djibo and Titao) or even longer (as in the cases of Diapaga, Kompienga, and Sebba). 

Insecurity also negatively impacts the operation of health centers, which frequently face shortages of medical supplies due to supply chain difficulties. Moreover, restrictions on movement significantly reduce the attendance of these centers by low-income populations. According to the Health Cluster, as of March 2024, 69 percent and 49 percent of health centers were closed in the Sahel and Centre-Nord regions, respectively.

Displacement of populations: At the end of May 2024, the government announced the return of more than 716,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 524 localities, mainly in the Sud-Ouest, Cascades, Hauts-Bassins, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions. However, the abuses and threats from ATGs continue to lead to new cases of population displacement, with the number of new displaced individuals reaching over 120,000 from January to June 2024, according to the Rapid Response Coordination Group (GCORR). The most recent update on the number of IDPs is from March 2023, with a total of 2.06 million (SP/CONASUR). Secondary displacements in search of income opportunities in urban centers, relatively calm areas in the south, or neighboring countries continue to occur; populations are taking advantage of the return of military convoys to escape from areas under blockade. 

Agricultural Production: Stocks from own-produced crops from the last agricultural season have been depleted since the beginning of the year in most of the areas under blockade in the Sahel region and its surrounding areas. In areas with difficult access and a high presence of IDPs in the Est, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, household stocks are low, and most IDPs and host households are experiencing an early lean season. Indeed, due to the abuses by ATGs, many have had incomplete access to their fields or were forced to abandon their reserves during displacement. Host households have been forced to share their produce while awaiting external aid. In the production areas in the southern part of the country, households continue to rely on their own-production for food, although stock levels are below average due to difficulties in accessing fertilizers over the past two seasons. In these areas, household consumption is also supported by the seasonal availability of non-timber forest products (NTFPs).

Although early rains were recorded in most regions, the spatial and temporal distribution of rainfall was poor from May to June. Some sowing activities have failed in certain areas, while in the center and north of the country, producers are still waiting to sow. To support the agricultural season, the government is providing free plowing of plains and lowlands, and the distribution of seeds and fertilizers, which began in early May, was nearly completed by the end of June. This measure has covered both production areas in the west and south, as well as those facing significant security challenges in the north and east. Overall, the volume of support for seeds, fertilizers, and land preparation has more than doubled compared to the five-year average. 

Foraged products: The early rains recorded since May have also promoted the early regeneration of foraged products, particularly cassia tora leaves. These products are available in accessible security zones and provide an additional food source for households.

Income: Household income is generally below average. With the persistence of insecurity, looting by ATGs, and asset liquidation to cope with prolonged blockades, household assets have been eroded, particularly in the Sahel, Nord, and Centre-Nord regions. In these regions, the sale or guarding of livestock is typically a significant source of income. Income from this source is significantly below average and almost non-existent in the Soum province. In the relatively calmer areas in the center and south of the country, markets are functioning fairly normally and have become focal points for buyers, who have stopped frequenting markets in the north. As a result, households are able to achieve above-average sale prices from the sale of livestock, vegetables, and non-timber forest products (NTFPs). Agricultural labor opportunities are also more abundant; however, due to demand exceeding supply, the number of workdays for maintaining vegetable plots or preparing fields is decreasing, which reduces the income generated from compared to the average.

The restriction on movement also limits access to other sources, notably gold panning. With the drying up of water sources, vegetable farming experienced a slowdown in April and May, although the rains allowed some households to resume this activity in June. Nevertheless, poor households continue to focus on selling water, and collecting and selling firewood and fodder, which provide marginal income.

With the gradual restoration of mobile phone services, households are also relying on remittances from relatives or acquaintances abroad, which have increased compared to previous years due to higher migration rates. 

Market Supply: The supply of staple goods is generally satisfactory relative to demand but is below the level of the previous year and the five-year average. The disruption of internal and external flows, combined with the decrease in production recorded last season, are the main factors behind this decline in supply. Difficult access to certain production areas and insecurity along supply routes create disparity in supply from one locality to another. In areas with significant security challenges, supply is low, and some products are occasionally scarce due to long delivery times. The supply of several markets, about 30 in the north and east, remains dependent on military escorts. However, most localities received one or two supply shipments during the first six months of the year (Figure 4). Except for the Diapaga market (which was last supplied six months ago), complete product shortages observed in 2022 and 2023 have not yet been reported. This is due to efforts to secure supply routes and resilience strategies adopted by traders to reach certain markets. On the other hand, livestock markets remain closed or continue to operate at a minimal level, particularly in the Sahel, Nord, and Est regions, due to the erosion of livestock assets and/or the lack of potential buyers. 

• Follow this link for more information on supply and market outlook. 

Household Purchasing Power: Nationally, staple food prices remained relatively stable in May compared to the same period last year, but are still 25 to 40 percent higher than their five-year averages. In areas supplied with military escorts, food prices have not experienced significant changes since the beginning of the year, except in the markets of Diapaga and Kompienga (Eastern region). Prices are stable or lower compared to last year, but five-year increases, with the highest ranging between 50 and 100 percent, have been observed in the markets of Sebba, Gayéri, and Kompienga. Since January 2024, the government has begun selling subsidized cereals (120 XOF/kg compared to an average of 310 XOF on the market) at 242 distribution points across the country, including in areas with limited access. For example, subsidized cereal sales have been taking place since April in the municipality of Djibo and since May in the municipalities of Dori, Seytenga, and Bani. In addition to these distribution points, there are also occasional sales organized by the government in certain localities. In these areas, households with depleted resources rely more on remittances from relatives to make purchases, leading to high turnout at subsidized sale points. 

In the relatively calmer central and southern regions, the terms of trade between cereals and livestock are favorable to livestock herders. Indeed, livestock markets are frequented by buyers more often due to the difficulties in accessing markets in the pastoral areas of the north and east. This increase in demand leads to above-average livestock prices. On the other hand, the reduction in cereal flows from these areas and the typical household demand allows for a relatively satisfactory cereal supply and slightly above-average prices. For example, on the markets of Léo and Boromo, a goat sale in May allowed a herder to acquire 172 and 147 kg of maize, respectively, compared to the 100 kg benchmark set by the national early warning system (SAP).

However, for the poor in urban centers, the decline in income opportunities due to the economic situation prevents them from meeting their basic needs in the market. In May, the harmonized consumer price index was 128.3, showing a slight increase compared to the previous year (INSD). Speculative practices in the sale of imported rice, a staple food in urban centers, have maintained its price 32 percent above the five-year average, despite control measures implemented by the Ministry of Commerce.

• Follow this link for more information on price bulletins.

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

Food aid remains the primary source of nutrition in areas with a high presence of IDPs and those facing significant security challenges, where households have only marginal incomes for market purchases. However, this aid still faces logistical, security, and financial difficulties. Moreover, the base population figures (IDPs and host communities) are not updated, while significant population departures from blockaded areas have been reported with each return of escorted convoys, making it difficult to assess the impact of the aid. During the period from January to June 2024, only 19.2 percent of the food aid needs had been funded. Between January and April, the humanitarian response reached 865,815 people, or 23.8 percent of those targeted by the Humanitarian Response Plan, and covered 31 percent of their needs (OCHA). Between April and May, assistance was intensified, particularly in the municipality of Djibo, where it reached about 25 percent of the population and covered at least 50 percent of their needs. In June, the majority of the population in the municipality of Sebba received food aid that covered at least 50 percent of their needs. However, in the municipalities of Arbinda, Markoye, and Gorom-Gorom, aid has been insufficient over the past three months. The resumption of free food distributions in Gorom-Gorom and Arbinda this June should help reduce consumption gaps. 

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

The weak and irregular market supply in areas with significant security challenges and the erosion of household assets limit their access to food. These households rely more on aid, which was insufficient during the first quarter. While vegetable farming was a significant source of food and income during the period, the early drying up of water sources limited this resource between April and May. Indeed, the early rains recorded in May have facilitated a resurgence of this activity and the regeneration of foraged products, but household food supply remains insufficient. In Djibo, the strengthening of assistance from April and the access to subsidized food due to remittances from relatives abroad have allowed households to reduce significant consumption gaps. This has led to a decrease in the number of full days without meals each week and a reduction in the consumption of less preferred foods. The majority of populations are in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!). In contrast, in the municipalities of Arbinda, Bourzanga, Titao, Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, and Diapaga, the food aid provided is insufficient, and the marginal incomes from selling water and firewood, gold panning, and vegetable farming remain inadequate to cope with prices that are still above seasonal averages. Households in these localities are forced to reduce both the quality and the number of daily meals to one. Visible signs of malnutrition primarily affect pregnant or breastfeeding women and the elderly, who are forced to limit their consumption in favor of children and are also weakened by extreme heat. Some households occasionally go an entire day and night without food. The increase in cases of begging and the forced search for firewood, fodder, and foraged products despite security threats are indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. 

In other municipalities with significant security challenges and a high presence of IDPs in the regions of Nord, Centre-Nord, Boucle du Mouhoun, and Est, the early depletion of own-produced stocks, low income from gold panning and vegetable farming, above-average price levels, and limited access to NTFPs due to threats from armed groups, are resulting in a deterioration of food access and livelihoods. Despite solidarity between host communities and IDPs, households are forced to limit their meals to one per day and increase their reliance on foraged products. Poor households and IDPs in these areas are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. 

In urban centers, the above-average prices of essential goods (rice, oil, sugar, and fuel sources) are putting pressure on the purchasing power of households, particularly the poorest who. The latter are forced to reduce the quality and/or quantity of meals. The majority are Stressed (IPC Phase 2). 

In the relatively calmer production areas of the south and west, poor households continue to have typical access to food due to own-production, supported by more accessible NTFPs in these areas, resulting in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. 

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions 

• Insecurity: From July to October 2024, seasonal trends will likely result in a relative decrease in attacks. However, overall, the frequency and intensity of attacks carried out by armed groups are expected to remain at least equal to or higher than the current high levels until at least January 2025, and surpass those observed in the second half of 2023. Threats and abuses by the ATGs are likely to continue to cause internal displacement. 
• Seasonal forecasts: Despite a forecast for the 2024 rainy season being wet to normal (PRESASS), atypically long dry periods at the beginning of the season could lead to localized replanting, likely resulting in the substitution of legumes or faster-growing cereal varieties for the typical cereal crops. Similarly, long to normal dry spells at the end of the season could reduce yields locally.

• Agropastoral prospects: Factors supporting agricultural production activities in 2024 include favorable seasonal forecasts, increased government support for the campaign, targeted provision of agricultural inputs, and the development of additional areas around certain cities where movement remains restricted. However, due to the ongoing threats from ATGs, household access to fields will remain restricted, planted areas will be reduced compared to the five-year average, and movement within cities will continue to be limited. Thus, production is expected to be similar to the five-year average but higher than that of the past two years, with some pockets of below-average production in areas with significant security challenges. 
• Market operations: Market supply will be average between October 2024 and January 2025. However, cross-border flows are expected to decrease as both external and internal demand are likely to rise due to the ongoing export ban on cereals to other countries except Niger, and the need for increased humanitarian interventions. 
• The livestock market will continue to be the most affected by the security situation, particularly in the pastoralist areas in the north and east of the country. Domestic supply, although supported by cattle imports from Niger, will remain below average and insufficient to meet the growing demand, in line with the rising meat consumption needs of the population.
• Staple food prices: The seasonal and interannual decline in supply and the increase in demand between June and September will contribute to keeping cereal prices above their seasonal averages during this period (Figure 5). Starting in October, prices will experience a seasonal decline but will remain slightly higher compared to the five-year average. 
• Livestock prices: Livestock prices will remain above their seasonal averages between June 2024 and January 2025 due to the pressure of demand relative to the supply of livestock in accessible markets, challenges in collection from pastoral areas, the loss of household assets, and high transportation costs.

Assumptions in blockaded areas

• Insecurity: Despite the successes achieved by the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) in resettling populations in the Sahel, Nord, Boucle du Mouhoun, Hauts Bassins, Cascades, and Sud-Ouest regions, movements will remain restricted due to the ongoing threats from ATGs. Movement restrictions are expected to remain more severe in the Sahel, Centre-Nord, and Est regions, where armed groups may be active in seeking to control resources or smuggling routes. 
• Agropastoral prospects: Despite favorable seasonal forecasts, government support for production could be difficult to implement in the Sahel, Centre-Nord, and Est regions. The area planted is likely to increase in the Sahel, Centre-Nord, Cascades, Hauts-Bassins, Sud-Ouest, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions compared to the previous season. However, in the Est region, production might remain at a similar level or even decline due to the ongoing security concerns in the area.
• Market operations: The supply of markets in areas with high security challenges will continue to be variable, depending on military convoys. The inaccessibility of roads due to the onset of rains will limit the use of alternative routes by some transporters between June and October. However, the ongoing coordinated operations (free food distribution by humanitarian organizations, government initiatives, and subsidized sales) in several blockaded areas will help reduce market demand and prevent prolonged shortages of goods. 

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumptions

• The planned humanitarian and government lean season programs only cover about 46 percent of those in need, according to the humanitarian response plan. These populations are primarily located in the Boucle du Mouhoun (Kossi, Sourou), Centre-Nord, Sahel, and Est regions. The coverage rate of needs by planned assistance varies from one locality to another, ranging from 100 percent coverage in Komondjari, Loroum, Oudalan, and Soum, to less than 20 percent coverage in Namentenga and Sourou as of May 2024. The seasonal increase in food assistance during the lean season may be lower than or similar to the level seen in 2023 during the same period. However, humanitarian partners will continue to prioritize assistance in blockaded areas. In addition to low funding, the persistence of security and logistical obstacles could limit the adequate delivery of assistance. However, the extension of the subsidized cereal sales operation to provinces with significant security challenges this year could help mitigate the shortfall in food aid until at least December 2024. 

Assumptions in Soum, Oudalan, Seno, Yagha, Loroum

• The planned humanitarian responses for the lean season aim to cover at least 50 percent of the caloric needs of approximately 25 percent of the population in these provinces during the June to August period (SECAL Cluster, May 2024). This would represent a significant coverage of the remaining population given the departures recorded during the returns of convoys. However, persistent logistical and security constraints could disrupt implementation of assistance over time. As in previous years, the volume of aid could decrease between October and January with the conclusion of programs by certain partners. However, historical trends, as well as partner planning, point to a continued prioritization of food assistance in blockaded areas until the end of the year.

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

In conflicted-affected and insecure areas, poor households and IDPs will have limited access to the market due to asset erosion and low incomes. As a result, households will resort to foraged products more than normal. Furthermore, the already worrying nutritional situation, with atypically high SAM and death rates in the first half of the year compared with last year in the Est, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Sahel, could deteriorate further between June and September due to the onset of waterborne illnesses with the onset of the rains. Without resupply, ongoing food shortages in the Diapaga municipality (Tapoa province) and Bourzanga in the Centre-Nord region will increase reliance on foraging, exposing more people to extreme gaps in consumption and malnutrition, and thus to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes between June and September. Nevertheless, food aid plans should cover more than 25 percent of the populations in the Soum, Oudalan, Seno, Yagha, and Loroum provinces, and meet at least 75 percent of needs. Planned assistance is expected to partially mitigate levels of acute food insecurity in these areas, otherwise Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) levels are expected. Between October 2024 and January 2025, poor rain harvests and vegetable crops will not be sufficient for household consumption, and low incomes will not allow access to high-priced foodstuffs on the markets. Although the delivery of food aid is expected to continue in the northern part of the country where Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes will persist, levels of assistance must be increased to avoid food consumption gaps. 

In other municipalities with difficult access and low amounts of humanitarian assistance, notably in the Centre-Nord, Est, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, low incomes will be insufficient to meet the needs of poor IDPs and hosts, as well as returnees. The latter will have to seek as much labor as possible in order to acquire in-kind food or marginal income. Between June and September, limiting both the number and quantity of meals, and increasing the consumption of less preferred (or wild) products, should be more widely used, especially in municipalities with a high presence of IDPs and in resettled localities. Difficulties in accessing fields will prevent households from harvesting sufficient crops between October and January. Limited access to the typical sources of income will not encourage purchases due to atypically high prices, particularly in the Est region. In municipalities with a high presence of IDPs, poor households will remain  in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).

In urban centers, the deterioration in purchasing power due to falling cash incomes and above-average staple food prices will force poor households to reduce the quality of their meals by relying on cheaper foods or to limit the quantity of food they eat. These practices are expected to continue between June 2024 and January 2025, and the poor will continue to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes throughout the period. 

In the relatively calm areas of the south and west, the majority of poor households will continue to have a typical diet between June and September based on the reserves of the previous season's own-production and normal access to NTFPs and other foraged products. Food access will be strengthened between October and January with the availability of new basic harvests of vegetable products. The poor will remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food insecurity between June 2024 and January 2025. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National

Deterioration of the security situation impacting the delivery of food aid

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A deterioration in the security situation could further reduce  access to fields, lead to a decline in agricultural production, and limit access to already marginal sources of income and food. This situation could also lead to an increase in the number of IDPs. In addition, long delays in escorting supplies to markets will further limit the delivery of assistance and lead to demand pressure on markets, resulting in atypical price levels and food shortages. In this case, poor households whose assets are already eroded will face extreme consumption deficits, thereby increasing the frequency of whole days without food and resulting in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes, especially in areas where the blockade persists. 

Poorly distributed rainfall or early cessation of rains 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Poor distribution or cessation of rainfall before complete maturation of crops will lead to a decline in agricultural production and reduce the filling level of water points. With low carryover stocks, supply on the market will remain low between October and January, and speculative behavior could develop, leading to higher-than-expected increases in staple prices between October and January. Food access for poor households, particularly in blockaded areas, will deteriorate further, exposing them to extreme consumption deficits and the need to resort to coping strategies, classifying them as Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between October 2024 and January 2025. 

Areas under blockade 

Improved security situation

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An improvement in the security situation could allow households greater access to certain sources of income (gold panning, wood gathering) and food (agricultural and vegetable production). This will promote the supply of markets, the delivery of food aid, and a reduction in the prices of staple foods. Although improved food access would limit the use of emergency strategies between June and January 2025, rebuilding livelihoods would take longer and poor households will remain exposed to Crisis (IPC Phase 3).

Decline in food aid between June and December

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Given the logistical and financial challenges, the delivery of humanitarian assistance remains limited, especially in hard-to-reach areas of the most conflict-affected regions of the country. If humanitarian assistance were to decline significantly or cease, poor households would become increasingly dependent on the market for their food needs, given high food prices and extremely low income opportunities. Poor households' access to food, particularly in areas under blockade, would deteriorate further, exposing them to extreme consumption deficits and the use of coping strategies. In these areas, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will be likely between October 2024 and January 2025, with households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly if assistance is disrupted during the lean season. 

Soum Province of the Sahel Region, Livelihood Zone BF07: North and East Livestock and Cereals (Figure 6)

Reason for choosing this area: The province was the first to be affected by ATG attacks at the beginning of the security crisis in 2015. Since then, it has been under terrorist threat with several incidents resulting in fatalities. The deterioration of the situation in the province in 2022 led to the displacement of populations from rural municipalities to the main cities of Djibo, Arbinda, and Kelbo. The city of Djibo, under blockade since February 2022, had about 270,000 IDPs according to government figures as of March 31, 2023. Livestock assets, the main source of household income, have been eroded, the livestock market is closed due to lack of animals and buyers, and supplies to the town are dependent on irregular military convoys. After the large-scale attack perpetrated by ATGs on November 26, combing and security operations by the FDS and VDP eased the pressure around the town of Djibo, but threats persist and movements remain limited. As the blockade persists, people leave every time the convoys return. Since the start of the blockade, the food situation has been volatile, deteriorating when market supplies exceed four months and when food assistance is interrupted for long periods. 

The security situation in Soum remains worrying despite a relative decrease in ATG pressure. Market supplies are still dependent on military convoys. Although cereal supply is low and below average, it remains above its 2023 level. Demand is also low, despite the high level of need, due to the reinforcement of food assistance from April onwards. Commodity prices, although down in May compared to the same time last year, remain above average at 73 percent for sorghum, 59 percent for maize, and 32 percent for millet. With the resupply of the market in April, the government was able to make food available for free distribution and also for sale at subsidized prices. This sales operation is scheduled to continue until the end of December, and each household is allowed to buy a 50 kg bag of cereal each month. As a result, the majority of households have been able to benefit since it began on April 22. In addition, free food distributions by the government and partners reached over 25 percent of the population and covered at least 50 percent of their needs between April and May and are continuing into June. 

With income from the sale of water, wood, and remittances received from migrant relatives or friends living outside Djibo, households can satisfy other basic needs not covered by assistance (sugar, tea, and soap, among others) or initiate small-scale trade. However, given previous disruptions in market supply or aid delivery, households continue to reduce both the number of meals and the amount of food and remain exposed to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes. 

Market supply will continue to depend on military convoys with below-average supply. Despite supply delays that will remain relatively long (four months), ongoing assistance operations will minimize the risks of prolonged shortages of basic foodstuffs between June 2024 and January 2025. The food aid plans for Djibo for the lean period will cover at least 75 percent of the consumption needs of a large part of the population. In addition, the resumption of sales at subsidized prices in June will strengthen household food stocks. Added to this is the abnormally high use of forage produce and the resumption of vegetable farming with the onset of the rains. These cumulative actions will make it possible to partially reduce the consumption gaps among households that are expected to remain in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) between June and September.

The relative calm around the cities of Djibo, Arbinda, and Kelbo should allow the populations of these municipalities to take advantage of the favorable seasonal forecasts and accompanying measures of the agricultural season to increase the areas planted compared to the past season. However, tall crops are forbidden, and households will have to make do with producing pulses and rice within the security radius. With remittances from out-of-town relatives, some households will be able to build up stocks of products sold at subsidized prices. However, without continued assistance, households could quickly deplete low harvests between October and December. Given the irregularity of market supplies and high price levels, the vegetable harvest from January onwards and low incomes will not be enough to prevent severe food shortages. While food aid generally declines during and after the harvest, historical trends and current humanitarian priorities suggest that food aid delivery will continue in Djibo where Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes will persist.