Security blockades are accelerating erosion of assets and exposing poor households to Emergency (IPC Phase 4)

• Continued attacks, threats, and control of supply routes by militant armed groups are negatively affecting household assets and food access in the most insecure areas. In Oudalan province in particular, the FEWS NET survey conducted in May–June reveals that 60 percent of host households and 75 percent of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are adopting extreme livelihood strategies, putting them in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The situation is likely similar or worse in Soum province, which has been under blockade since February. 

• In other provinces in the northern half of the country, insecurity is continuing to increase the high number of IDPs in urban centers, limit income opportunities, and hinder market supplies, resulting in atypically high staple food prices. Poor host households and IDPs have large consumption deficits and are in Crisis (IPC Stage 3).

• The whole country is affected by the atypical increase in commodity prices due to well below-average supply; higher demand; additional impacts of the Russia-Ukraine crisis on the prices of wheat and derivatives, oil, and fertilizers; and the impacts of inflation amplified by higher fuel and transport prices. The Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) reached a record high of 24.5 percent in May (source: National Institute of Statistics and Demography – INSD), with a five-year change in staple cereal prices of 70 to 80 percent and double this in blockaded areas. 

• Although the country has a favorable rainfall outlook, the continued increase in the number of IDPs and reduced access for households to their fields will result in a decrease in the area planted. Similarly, reduced access for producers to inputs, due to lower subsidized volumes and 40 to 50 percent higher prices, could negatively affect yields. Overall, production is expected to be below average, and combined with the continuing effects of the global crisis, it is likely that commodity prices will remain above their seasonal averages until January 2023.

Current Situation

Since November 2021, militant armed groups, including Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), have carried out increasingly frequent attacks on security forces and civilians in the Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord, Est, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions. The number of security incidents involving JNIM increased by 320 percent between February and April 2022 from the same period in 2021 (Figure 1). In the Nord, Sahel, and Est regions, these militant groups have intensified their efforts to cut off and isolate local communities. Increased attacks along the Ouahigouya–Titao, Kongoussi–Djibo, Kaya–Dori, Dori–Arbinda, Fada–Kantchari, and Fada–Kompienga roads have made it difficult for traders to supply local markets, contributing to record price increases. Militant groups have also stepped up their efforts to sabotage telecommunications infrastructure. In the first four months of 2022, at least 54 telecommunications antennas were damaged or destroyed, limiting mobile communications and money transfers, particularly in Soum and Loroum provinces. Increased violence and threats continue to result in a growing number of IDPs, which were estimated at more than 1.9 million at the end of April—a 20 percent increase since the beginning of the year (Figure 2).

Since mid-May, rains have been regular, especially in the southern half of the country where conditions have been favorable for an early or timely start to sowing. These conditions have also favored new pasture growth in this part of the country. Since the beginning of June, the rains recorded in the north of the country (20 to 75 mm) have also allowed early sowing locally and increased the availability of water for livestock. Nevertheless, new pasture growth remains insufficient and access is difficult due to threats of violence and looting by militant groups. This has led to a deterioration in the physical condition of livestock and higher-than-average mortality, particularly in the Sahel region and surrounding areas. The government is currently providing producers with subsidized fertilizer. However, there has been a 25 percent decrease in volumes of subsidized fertilizer from the previous season. There is below-average availability of these fertilizers in the markets, and prices are up more than 50 percent.

While there is a below-average supply of cereals in all markets in the country, the deteriorating security situation is having a negative impact in particular on the flow of staple foods from production areas to the areas in the north with structural deficits (Figure 3). The most freely available products are imported rice and maize. Millet and sorghum stocks are low or scarce, especially in hard-to-reach areas. The government has opened 63 social price cereal outlets (fewer than normal), but the quantities delivered (40 tons/outlet) are far from meeting demand and are not sufficient to affect price levels in the markets. Terrorist group controls on certain roads continue to obstruct supply to some major markets (Titao, Djibo, Markoye, Arbinda). Defense and security force escorts sometimes facilitate the movement of goods to these markets, but intermittently. Demand for staple foods is higher than average due to the increasing number of displaced populations, premature depletion of households’ own produce, and the needs of the brewing industry and poultry feed processing units. The global crisis, particularly restrictions on food exports linked directly or indirectly to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, is negatively affecting the country's supply of wheat, oil, milk, petroleum products, and fertilizers. According to statistics from the Ministry of Commerce, in May, stocks of imported products were lower than the five-year average by 84 percent for edible oil, about 80 percent for wheat flour, 30 percent for milk powder, and 53 percent for sugar. The HICP (source: INSD) reached a record high of 24.5 percent in May and during this period, staple cereal prices maintained atypically high levels compared to last year and the five-year average: 45 and 74 percent for maize, 58 and 70 percent for millet, and 70 and 78 percent for sorghum, respectively. Compared to last year, wheat flour and pasta prices have increased by 30 to 50 percent, and oil prices by 50 to 90 percent. Staple food prices are more than double the average in the blockaded areas, especially in the markets of Titao, Djibo and Markoye. In May, goat prices were 26 percent higher than average in Dori market (which is more accessible to buyers), but remained stable in Gorom-Gorom market (which is less used). Compared to last year, prices are stable in Dori, but down 23 percent in Gorom-Gorom. With food prices at atypical levels, terms of trade for millet/goats are 37 percent below average in Dori market and 55 percent below average in Gorom-Gorom market. There is even more significant deterioration in the Djibo, Titao, and Markoye markets, which are not frequented by foreign buyers.

To support themselves during agricultural activities and the lean season, households usually rely on income from gold mining, market garden produce sales, remittances from migration, and livestock sales. Overall, income from these sources is below average. This is because the deterioration in the security situation since the end of the last rainy season in November has limited access to gold mining and market gardening sites. At the same time, market garden production is below average due to water shortages and difficulties in accessing fertilizer. In the relatively stable areas, households can rely on livestock sales. However, they have to sell at least two goats to obtain the same amount of grain that one goat would buy in a normal year.

With the premature depletion of stocks produced for their own consumption, the market has become the main source of food for most households. Low incomes and atypically high food prices are causing poor households in relatively stable areas (central, south and west) and in urban centers to reduce both the number of daily meals (to two or even one) and the quantities consumed. They are also using cheaper foods. These households are Stressed (IPC Phase 2). In the southwest, although market prices remain high, households in production areas have sufficient stocks and income to ensure an adequate diet and are in Minimal (IPC Phase 1).

In the areas most affected by insecurity (Sahel, Centre-Nord, and Est regions, Yatenga and Loroum provinces in the Nord, Kossi and Sourou provinces in the Boucle du Mouhoun), poor host households and poor IDPs are more dependent on markets and assistance for their food. However, poor households' incomes are well below average amid record or atypical food prices. This is due to loss of assets to looting by militant armed groups, limited movement to access usual sources of income, closure or slowed functioning of livestock markets, and a decline in remittances from migrants due to the destruction of communication networks. As a result, these areas are experiencing severe restrictions in household consumption. The strategies most used by poor households are to eat only one meal a day, limit portions, and reduce adult consumption in favor of children. Poor households are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In areas currently under blockade and with a high presence of IDPs (Soum and Oudalan provinces)—as well as in neighboring communes (Bahn, Sollé, Bourzanga, Rollo, Pensa, Barsalogho, Bouroum, Gorgadji, Sebba, and Mansila, where IDPs represent less than 20 percent of the population of their respective provinces)—it is common for poor households to go a full day per week without eating, or to engage in begging. Wealthy and middle-income households that still own livestock are being forced to destock to purchase feed or to avoid mortality losses due to deterioration in the physical condition of livestock following lack of feed. Access to health and nutrition services is also limited, due to the closure of health facilities or a lack of medical supplies for care, prevention and management of malnutrition. Food assistance is difficult to implement. It is insufficient and irregular. The campaign carried out in April-May reached less than 20 percent of the population and is only intended to cover 50 percent of needs. However, in practice, it is voluntarily redistributed by those who have received it, in solidarity with those who have not. Key informants report visible signs of malnutrition in these areas, especially among poor IDPs, and that more than 20 percent of the population, who are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), are resorting to extreme strategies.

Assumptions

The most likely food security scenario for June 2022 to January 2023 is based on the following key assumptions about how the national context will develop:

• Security situation: The increased operations of the Burkina Faso armed forces are not expected to have a significant impact on JNIM's operational capabilities in the north. Attacks by militant groups are expected to increase in frequency and intensity, likely reaching the highest levels since the conflict began in 2016, up until the peak of the rainy season in July 2022. Starting from the peak of the rainy season, there should be a relative decrease in attacks until October 2022. Militant violence, particularly in the provinces of Soum and Oudalan (Sahel region), Loroum (Nord), Bam and Sanmatenga (Centre-Nord), Kossi and Sourou (Boucle du Mouhoun), and Gourma and Kompienga (Est), is expected to continue to force school closures and cause internal displacement. After the rainy season ends, it is likely that attacks will resume and increase in frequency and intensity, reaching—or even exceeding—the levels observed between October 2021 and January 2022. Although intensified military and security operations have resulted in local tactical successes in the Boucle du Mouhoun and Cascades regions, they are unlikely to contain or roll back the growing operational reach of militant groups in the southwestern and western regions of the country. Here, militant groups are seeking to extend their control over smuggling routes, particularly along the borders with Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. 
  • Ukraine crisis: The ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis could continue to affect import volumes and domestic prices, particularly for wheat and derived products, edible oil, and petroleum products. In addition, the crisis is negatively affecting fertilizer imports, prices of which have almost doubled in the markets, especially in the large production areas in the south of the country, where spending on fertilizer is exceeding 10 percent of overall income. Producers' limited access to fertilizer is expected to result in below-average crop yields overall. Nevertheless, high prices for agricultural products and high demand may encourage large producers to maintain their usual acreage and maintain average demand for labor.
• Markets and price trends for basic products: Insufficient institutional stocks to regulate prices, speculative practices, high demand from households and processing units, and the impacts of rising global prices of raw materials and oil are going to exert pressure on the markets. These will continue to result in atypical price increases above seasonal averages throughout the lean season. Locally, problems with humanitarian supplies and access due to insecurity are likely to increase pressure and atypical price variations. From October, new harvests may improve market supplies and there should be a seasonal drop in prices. However, demand pressure is likely to remain higher than usual, due to a projected decline in production, likely increased demand for replenishment of institutional and private stocks, and demand from households, particularly from IDPs. As a result, prices are likely to remain above average from October to January.
• Livestock prices and terms of trade: In addition to insecurity which is continuing to prevent the normal functioning of livestock markets, especially in the northern half and the east of the country, the onset of the rainy season could further limit market functioning due to the deterioration of roads. Overall, the decline in households' purchasing power may reduce demand for livestock for consumption during the upcoming Eid al-Adha celebrations. There is also likely to be more destocking of livestock in response to the atypical increase in staple food prices and livestock feed. Livestock prices, particularly for small ruminants, could then remain stable or slightly below average throughout the period in the more accessible areas, due to the sluggish market. Meanwhile, in blockaded areas, there may be greater destocking and also more significant deterioration in terms of trade.
• Agropastoral outlook: The seasonal agro-hydro-climatic forecasts for 2022 made by the National Meteorological Agency (ANAM) in May forecast abundant rainfall, with dry spells at the beginning and end of the rainy season that are medium to short, depending on the area. Although they do not specify temporal distribution, higher cumulative rainfall could lead to local flooding from July to September. Meanwhile, insecurity and population displacements will lead to a reduction in area sown compared to last year and the average. In addition, middle-income and wealthy households will make less use of fertilizers due to the low availability and doubled cost. Overall, agricultural production may remain below last year's levels and the five-year average. Pastoral production and surface water point levels are expected to be average to above average. However, access will remain limited for herds still present in conflict areas.
• Decline in farm income: Middle-income and wealthy households are expected to have a higher-than-usual supply of agricultural labor for plowing, sowing, and crop maintenance from June to September. In response to high fertilizer costs, these households may maintain stable demand or offer lower remuneration. From October to January, lower production could limit new harvests in the markets and keep incomes below average, despite agricultural product prices likely exceeding seasonal averages during this period.
• Decline in non-farm income: The deteriorating security situation is negatively affecting gold-mining activities, forcing some mining operations to decrease activity and dismiss employees. Gold mining, which provides work for poor households, generally slows down during the rainy season, when the authorities close sites. From October to January, this activity should resume, albeit at a lower intensity due to problems with physically accessing the sites. Overall, income from this source will remain below average.
• Deterioration in nutrition: Activities to prevent or manage malnutrition are being limited by the closure or reduced functioning of health services in areas of insecurity, and by health facilities' difficulty in procuring medicines and medical supplies. In this context, the deterioration in household food consumption due to difficulties accessing food, along with the emergence of waterborne diseases during the rainy season, will result in higher-than-average vulnerability to malnutrition throughout the outlook period. From October, the availability of food from harvests, which should increase consumption until January, and the decline in childhood illnesses could slightly reduce the prevalence of acute malnutrition.

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

Various factors are reducing households' purchasing power and could worsen food insecurity during the current lean season. These include the ongoing deterioration of the security situation, which is seeing an increase in incidents, the number of IDPs, and the number of areas under blockade that are difficult to access with supplies and food assistance; the decline in food imports; rising prices due to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict; and inflation following rising oil and transport prices.

In the relatively more stable areas of the country, poor households are expected to increase livestock sales, supply of farm labor, and loans or credit purchases from June to September, to cope with atypical food prices. Faced with higher fertilizer prices, wealthier households do not have enough resources to meet the supply of labor and pay in cash or food as usual. Poor households will therefore be forced to increase their consumption of wild products, which have similar availability to normal, and to continue to restrict food intake by reducing portion size and number of meals. Provinces in the Plateau Central region, Kouritenga (Centre-Est region), Passoré and Zandoma (Nord), Nayala (Boucle du Mouhoun), Boulkiemdé and Sanguié (Centre-Ouest), and the Centre region will continue to be severely Stressed (IPC Phase 2). From October to January, access to new harvests will increase household consumption, making Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food security likely. However, poor households in the capital, who are more dependent on the market, are expected to continue to be Stressed (IPC Phase 2), as their reduced purchasing power will limit adequate access to food. In the Sourou and Kossi provinces, poor households saw premature depletion of their stocks, starting in April, due to last season's crop losses. Meanwhile, there was a 48 percent increase in the number of IDPs in the first four months of the year, due to continuing attacks and threats from militant groups. This, in addition to losses from looting, will force poor host households and poor IDPs to sell more livestock or face more significant consumption deficits. They will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). From October, IDPs will remain more dependent on the markets. Poor households will be unlikely to generate enough income from the sale of harvests to make up for livelihood losses and are expected to be Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

In the Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Est regions, which are particularly affected by insecurity and the number of IDPs, the restriction on movement compounded by the blockade will continue to prevent people from accessing their usual sources of income. Humanitarian assistance planned for between June and September will primarily target IDPs. Overall, it is reaching less than 20 percent of the population and meeting about 50 percent of their needs. Given the low coverage, it is likely that households will choose to redistribute this assistance between them. As a result of the erosion of assets and the lack of income to buy food which is at record prices in markets, from June to September adoption of extreme consumption strategies could intensify, and there could be an increase in begging and consumption of wild products and unusual foods. Poor host households and poor IDPs will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse in the provinces of the Est and Centre-Nord regions, and in the provinces of Yatenga and Loroum (Nord region), and Séno and Yagha (Sahel region). The erosion of household assets is more pronounced in the provinces of Soum and Oudalan. Poor households and IDPs are using extreme strategies (e.g. begging, selling their last female animal). Similarly, in the surrounding communes of Bourzanga, Rollo, Namissiguima, Barsalogho, Pensa, and Bouroum in the Centre-Nord region, and Gorgadji, Sebba, and Mansila in the Sahel region, for less than 20 percent of the population of each province, the ongoing blockade, supply disruptions, and prices exceeding double the average will make poor households vulnerable to extreme livelihood losses and food deficits and an increase malnutrition above the emergency level. At least 20 to 30 percent of the population could be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the Soum and Oudalan provinces and surrounding communes. This situation is likely to remain unchanged given that most IDPs and poor hosts are lacking their usual sources of income and food.