


Food access is deteriorating in the north and east due to irregular market supply

Key Messages

- Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected in Karo-Peli Province between February and May 2026.** Due to early depletion of stocks from own production, households with low purchasing power are market dependent for their food amid high prices. Household food consumption is deteriorating, but ongoing food assistance allows coverage of at least 75 percent of their needs and is preventing extreme consumption deficits. Despite the availability of green vegetables due to rains starting in June, limited access to staple cereals on the market will create a significant consumption deficit. **Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will be anticipated** between June and September in the absence of food assistance.
- Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected** in Djelgodji and Yagha provinces between February and September due to early depletion of stocks, low incomes, and weak market supply. Between June and September, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are also anticipated in Bam, Séno, Oudalan, Loroum, Koosin, Sourou, Komandjari, Kompienga, Gobnangou, and Dyamongou provinces, which are areas with high security challenges and a high presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Low food stocks are already depleted or will be depleted early for most households. Given movement restrictions, households will have little income to meet their food needs in the market, where prices of basic food commodities are high.
- With the progressive depletion of stocks from own production, assistance needs will increase to reach their peak during July-August.** The population groups most affected are poor host households and IDPs primarily located in areas with high security challenges in the north and east of the country.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 18, 2026.



Food Security Context

Since 2015, the country has faced attacks by armed terrorist groups (ATGs). Starting in 2020, incidents and associated fatalities have significantly increased, with abuses and repression against civilian populations. This has led to the displacement of more than 2.06 million people as of March 31, 2023. Since 2022, ATGs have attempted to impose blockades around several municipalities, particularly in Soum, Liptako, Yaadga, Kuilsé, Sirba, Goulmou, and Tapoa regions. These blockades restrict the movement of people and goods, severely disrupting access to food, health care, and other essential services. The distribution of humanitarian assistance and the supply of markets in these localities are only possible by military escort or by air. Since 2023, the government has prohibited cash transfer operations by humanitarian organizations as part of the fight against terrorism. This limits the intervention capacity of most NGOs, given the logistical and security obstacles to delivering in-kind assistance.

Since the advent of the current regime in 2022, Burkina Faso, like Mali and Niger, announced its withdrawal with immediate effect from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2024. Subsequently, these countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States in September 2023, which became a Confederation the following year, with the aim of building a common political and economic space in the fight against terrorism, threats of armed rebellion, and external aggression.

Agriculture and livestock constitute the primary livelihoods, with the main agricultural regions in the center, west, and southwest of the country. However, prolonged insecurity has disrupted the implementation of livelihoods in agricultural and agropastoral areas, due to the abandonment of fields and population displacements, as well as in the north of the country where livestock are particularly important. Pastoral communities depend on the seasonal movement of livestock in search of water and pasture. However, since the beginning of the conflict, households have experienced movement restrictions, limited access to typical pastures and water points, and especially the looting of livestock, which has affected the number of herds per herder.

Despite these constraints, the agricultural sector maintains an overall positive performance, supported by the favorable rainfall observed over the past five years, the strengthening of government support for production, and the gradual return of IDPs to their areas of origin. The year-on-year increase in cereal production averages 7.2 percent between 2020 and 2025. Furthermore, after the peak of 14.3 percent in 2022, inflation remained stable, averaging 1.5 percent from 2023 to 2025.

The analysis covers the post-harvest period, corresponding to the off-season, particularly for market garden crops, and the lean season, which reaches its peak in August. Assistance needs will increase seasonally and will be higher in the north and east, especially in areas with high security challenges where household access to their fields and income is reduced. In these areas, prices of basic commodities are very high due to trade flow disruptions. Although the number of localities dependent on military-escorted convoys has decreased since 2025 compared to the 2023-2024 period, supply delays remain long, sometimes exceeding six months for localities such as Djibo, Arbinda, and Sebba.

Learn more

The following links provide additional information:

- Latest Burkina Faso Food Security Outlook Report: [October 2025 – May 2026](#)
- Latest Burkina Faso Key Message Update: [January 2026](#)
- Overview of [FEWS NET's scenario development methodology](#)
- Overview of the [IPC and IPC-compatible analysis](#)
- FEWS NET's approach to [humanitarian food assistance analysis](#)

Current anomalies in food security conditions as of February 2026

Insecurity characterized by persistent threats and attacks by ATGs is the main driving factor of acute food insecurity. The extortions and violence carried out by ATGs continued throughout 2025 at high levels but decreased compared to the previous year. Security conditions continued to improve in the south, west, and east of the country, while the north (Yaadga, Soum, Liptako regions) and northwest (Sourou Region) experienced a continued increase in extortions. While the total number of attacks perpetrated by ATGs remained generally stable from one year to the next, the killings associated with these attacks decreased sharply in the second half of 2025 by 48 percent compared to the first half, according to [ACLED](#). During 2025, operations by the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) improved security, enabled the recovery of several localities, and facilitated the gradual return of displaced populations, estimated at 1.16 million as of December 31, 2025 according to the [government](#). Threats and abuses continue to cause population displacements (Kossi and Gourma provinces), limit population movements, and prevent regular market supply (Soum, Liptako, and Sirba).


Rainfed agricultural production deficits were recorded in 15 provinces.

Despite a record national agricultural production of more than [7 million tons](#) for the 2025-2026 agricultural season, household access to fields was limited in areas with high security challenges, particularly in the far north and east of the country. Stocks are low in these areas compared to a typical year. In the municipalities of Arbinda (Karo-Péli Province) and Djibo (Djelgodji Province), stocks from rainfed production are already depleted for most households. In the municipalities of Gorom-Gorom (Oudalan Province), Titao and Sollé (Loroum Province), Sebba and Solhan (Yagha Province), the delivery of assistance at the time of harvest allowed households to preserve stocks from their own production.

Supply in areas with high security challenges has suffered from ongoing disruptions to internal flows. The transfer of cereals, which typically occurs from production areas in the south and west to structurally deficit areas in the north of the country, remains a challenge due to security and logistical constraints (Figure 1). In the Gourma Region, cereal supply on markets improved compared to the previous two years due to the increase in local production. The markets of Diapaga and Kantchari, in the Tapoa Region, were supplied from Niger, preventing food stock shortages. The major challenge remains the supply of markets in Karo-Peli, Djelgodji, and Yagha provinces, where delays can exceed six months. The last supply to Djibo dates from June 2025, and shortages of basic commodities are observed on the market. Sebba and Arbinda markets were supplied by military escort in October and December 2025, respectively, after nine and eight months.

High levels of staple food prices persist in certain areas with significant security challenges. According to the Market Information System of the National Food Security Stock Management Company (SIM/SONAGESS), national average prices for main cereals in January 2026 were lower than those of January 2025 by 22 percent for millet, 27 percent for sorghum, 29 percent for maize, and 16 percent for imported rice. These prices also showed stability for imported rice and slight decreases between 8-21 percent for maize, millet, and sorghum compared to their five-year averages. The price decrease is due to a higher product supply compared to demand. In contrast, in areas with significant security challenges, prices are high and above the five-year average due to increased transportation costs, linked to the risks of security incidents along routes and long travel times for convoys under military escort. In January, upward variations were 14 and 20 percent for millet and sorghum on the Arbinda market, respectively; 28 percent for sorghum in Gayéri; and 47 percent for millet in Sebba.

Figure 1. Market function and access in Liptako-Gourma



Source: FEWS NET

Humanitarian food assistance

Given the persistent logistical and security constraints, humanitarian organizations are indirectly resorting to military-escorted convoys to deliver food assistance to their areas of intervention. Others are making purchases from local traders for redistribution to the benefit of populations. Due to the irregularity and long delays of convoys, adherence to assistance planning has proven difficult. Some programming for the 2025 lean season could only be carried out in October-December 2025, or even in January-February 2026. Thus, since the October convoy, monthly rations covering at least 75 percent of needs have been distributed to the majority of the population in Sebba municipality (Yagha Province). The December convoy also enabled the delivery of the same quantities of monthly rations between December and February for the majority of the population in the commune of Arbinda (Karo-Peli Province).

Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of February 2026


Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) acute food insecurity outcomes are ongoing in Karo-Peli Province. Poor households exhausted the limited stocks from their own production early before the convoy arrived on December 17 and are now dependent primarily on assistance and the market for food. Typical livestock assets are eroded amid the persistence of insecurity. Income from artisanal gold panning and market gardening in accessible areas and from water sales is low, and households must rely more on remittances from relatives outside the area. Nevertheless, all of this income remains insufficient to access adequate food, given the high food prices. Poor host households and IDPs are forced to reduce both the quantities consumed and the number of daily meals to one. However, ongoing food assistance covers at least 75 percent of needs for more than half of the population and is contributing to reducing extreme consumption deficits.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in Djelgodji Province. The food shortage observed on the market since October has created pressure on stocks from rainfed production, which are exhausted. However, the majority of households, including IDPs, have access to harvests from market gardening production (vegetables and potatoes) around the dam, an activity that is expanding due to the improvement in the security radius and support from the state and partners. However, this production is insufficient for households' food consumption needs. The ongoing distribution of monthly food rations (cereals, legumes, and oil) reaches less than 20 percent of the population, but beneficiaries voluntarily share the quantities received with non-beneficiaries. The combination of assistance and green vegetable production allows most households to afford at least one meal per day and avoid large consumption deficits.

Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are ongoing in Yagha Province. Own rainfed production, although low, improved compared to last year. However, stocks from own production and income from the sale of firewood, petty trade, and cash transfers from relatives are insufficient to prevent consumption deficits among poor households and IDPs. Market supply by military-escorted convoy in October also included food intended for free distribution. Thus, distributions of monthly food rations that began at harvest time and that cover 50 percent of caloric needs for more than half of households are contributing to reducing significant consumption deficits. In addition, they also help reduce demand pressure on the market and preserve the duration of household own production stocks.

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in Liptako, Tapoa, Sirba, Gourma, Kuilsé, Yaadga, and Sourou regions. These regions have a high presence of IDPs and significant security challenges. Own rainfed production, although atypically low, continues to support food consumption for the majority of households. Households have more diversified income-earning opportunities (sale of firewood, gold panning, market gardening, petty trade, small daily labor, remittances from relatives), but movement restrictions do not allow sufficient income generation to support food access and the reconstitution of their livelihoods. Thus, poor households continue to restrict their consumption by limiting

Current acute food insecurity outcomes, February 2026




quantities or maintaining two meals instead of three under typical conditions. The nutritional situation remains concerning, particularly in Liptako, Soum, Gourma, Tapoa, and Sirba regions. The cumulative number of children under five suffering from acute malnutrition and admitted to health centers reached 9,099 during the first six weeks of the year, compared to 8,793 for the same period last year, according to the Nutrition Directorate.

Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are ongoing in relatively calm production areas in the center, south, and west of the country. The majority of poor households have a typical diet, primarily stocks from their own rainfed production. Ongoing dry-season production also provides an additional source of food and income. The decrease in food commodity prices compared to the average is also facilitating food access, particularly for poor households in urban centers.

Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions underpinning the most likely scenario through September 2026

- **ATG attacks against civilians and security forces are expected to remain at current levels through September**, with a relative decrease after the peak of the 2026 rainy season, between August and September. Overall, the frequency and intensity of attacks are expected to remain below the levels observed between 2023-2024 due to sustained operations by security forces. However, security incidents will likely continue to disrupt civilian population movements and livelihoods, as well as market functioning and the movement of goods.
- According to the seasonal forecasts updated in February 2026, **the 2026 rainy season is expected to begin on time in the Sahel region of West Africa**. Average to above-average rainfall is also projected in the region. However, it is still too early to have forecasts with high reliability.
- **Dry season production, between January and May, is expected to increase this year compared to 2025 and the five-year average.** In addition to good water retention levels, the development of additional irrigated perimeters and input support for producers will facilitate production activities. However, these results will likely be mixed, particularly in areas with high security challenges, due to households' difficulties in accessing inputs.
- **The country's economic outlook is expected to remain broadly positive over the February–September 2026 period**, with real GDP growth expected at around 4 to 5 percent in 2026, supported by agriculture, services, and mining production, particularly gold, despite persistent security challenges ([World Bank](#), [IMF](#)). Inflation is expected to remain moderate, at around 2 to 3 percent, staying in line with WAEMU targets, due to improved food availability and price stabilization. The budget deficit is expected to continue to decrease gradually as a result of [revenue mobilization efforts](#) and control of public expenditures, although security-related costs remain high. The main risks will be persistent security tensions, weather shocks, and external financing constraints.
- **Demand for cereals in the markets will generally decrease** this year compared to last year. Household demand will remain typical, particularly in relatively calm production areas where production is above average. Institutional demand, particularly the government's ongoing demand (despite being at a record level of 530,000 tons), will not be sufficient to offset the decrease in commercial demand due to export restrictions. Despite the high cereal needs of populations in areas facing significant security problems, cereal transfers to markets in these localities by escorted convoys may not be regular, and market supply will remain low between February and September.
- **Prices of basic food commodities will remain below last year's levels due to higher supply than demand.** These prices will likely follow trends similar to or slightly above seasonal averages through September 2026 (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Projected white maize prices (XOF/kg) for Sankaryaré market, Ouagadougou



Source: FEWS NET projections, using SIM/SONAGESS data

- **The persistence of security incidents will continue to limit livestock trade.** Furthermore, the looting of animals by ATGs and household livestock assets, particularly in regions with high livestock potential (Yaadga, Soum, Liptako, Sirba, and Gourma), limits their supply capacity in markets. With growing demand sustained by urban consumption needs and exports to coastal countries, **livestock prices will likely remain above the seasonal average** throughout the period.

Humanitarian food assistance

- Planning for assistance in 2026 is not yet available. However, the decrease in humanitarian assistance funding, as well as logistical and security challenges related to its delivery, will negatively affect the regularity, volume, and number of beneficiaries throughout the projection period. The use of local transporters or local purchases from traders for redistribution will be developed by some humanitarian actors for assistance delivery. However, given the long and imprecise timeframes for supplying areas with significant security challenges, it is likely that the targeted periods for distributions will not be met.

Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through September 2026

The increase in rainfed production stocks, improved access to dry season production in secure sites and in areas where populations have been resettled, as well as the general decrease in food commodity prices, will contribute to improving household food access compared to the last three years. Overall, a greater number of households are expected to benefit from typical food access between February and September 2026, which will not be the case in conflict zones.

Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected in Karo-Peli Province between February and May 2026. Households will continue to depend on purchases of high-priced food commodities on the market, despite the marginal availability of vegetable products. In addition, income from gold panning, water sales, and remittances from relatives outside the area will remain atypically low. The quantities of food commodities purchased will be insufficient to cover food needs, forcing households to resort to negative coping strategies, including reducing the number of meals per day. However, ongoing food distributions, which reach more than half of households and cover 50 percent of their needs, will prevent extreme consumption deficits. **Between June and September 2026, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are anticipated.** No significant change in income is expected. Green vegetables will be available with the upcoming rainy season, but limited access to staple cereals will create a significant gap in household food consumption. In the absence of assistance, poor households and IDPs will be exposed to severe restrictions, such as going an entire day and night without food.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in Djelgodji and Yagha provinces between February and September 2026. In Djelgodji Province, particularly in Djibo municipality, where the majority of the population is located, household access to market garden products, record production of irrigated sweet potato, and the continuation of food assistance, although insufficient, will contribute to preventing households from experiencing consumption deficits beyond the reduction in quantities and number of meals to one between February and May. Between June and September, current strategies will be maintained. Rainfed green vegetables will compensate for the decrease in market garden products. Households will also be able to make some cereal purchases on the market due to limited income from remittances from relatives. In Yagha Province, stocks from own production will be depleted in February, and market garden production will remain marginal from March onward, as water points dry up. Households will be heavily dependent on the market between February and May. Given the low income from the sale of wood, market garden products, and remittances from relatives, and considering the high level of food prices, market purchases will be insufficient and households will be forced to reduce the quantities consumed and limit the number of meals to one per day. These consumption gaps will persist from June to September, as market access will remain limited and households will be forced to increase their reliance on wild foods available during the rainy season.

In the Liptako, Yaadga, Sourou, Kuilsé, Sirba, Tapoa, and Gourma regions, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist between February and May 2026. Stocks from own production, market purchases (although limited), and access to market garden products will allow the majority of households to have at least two meals per day. However, **between June and September 2026, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected** as stocks from own production will be depleted. Income, although relatively diversified, will remain low, preventing the purchase of sufficient food commodities

amid high prices. Poor households and IDPs will be forced to reduce both the quantities and the number of meals, which will result in food consumption deficits. They will also intensify the use of wild food products.

Populations in the central, southern, and western regions of the country, who have benefited from relative stability over the past two years, including host households and returned IDPs, are expected to experience Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes from February to September 2026 as they progressively rebuild their livelihoods. Household food consumption will come from stocks from own rainfed production, access to market gardening production, as well as seasonal availability of fruits and non-timber forest products between February and May. Between June and September, although cereal stocks will be depleted, households will have a seasonal supply of wild-gathered products, at average prices accessible on the market (likely lower than the previous year).

Annex 1: Key sources of evidence used in this analysis

Evidence	Source	Data format	Food security element of analysis
Livelihood profiles	FEWS NET	Qualitative	Typical sources of food and income
Food prices	SIM/SONAGESS	Quantitative	Price trends and impacts on food access
Livestock prices	DGESS/MAERAH	Quantitative	Price trends and impacts on food access
Data on admissions of children under five suffering from malnutrition (MAM, SAM) and associated deaths	Monthly bulletin of the Directorate of Nutrition	Quantitative	Nutrition rates (MAM, SAM) and mortality
Food assistance	Food Security Cluster	Quantitative	Availability and access
Sources of food, income, and household coping strategies	FEWS NET/Key informants	Qualitative	Changes in typical sources of food and income
Seasonal forecast data	USGS and NOAA	Qualitative	Harvest outlook
Agricultural production forecast data	Council of Ministers , December 17, 2025	Quantitative	Food sources and availability
Projections of staple food prices	FEWS NET	Quantitative	Price trends and food access
Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI) data	INSD	Quantitative	Food access
Prices of consumer goods	Trade Ministry	Quantitative	Food access
Numbers of newly displaced populations	Rapid Response Coordination Group (GCORR)	Quantitative	Stability of food security conditions
Data on returnee populations and resettled villages	Government Information Service (SIG)	Quantitative	Stability of food security conditions


Annex 2: FEWS NET’s analytical approach explained

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. [Scenario Development](#) is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future.

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the [Integrated Food Security Phase Classification \(IPC\)](#) analytical framework.

- **How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes?** FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase [Integrated Food Security Phase Classification \(IPC\) scale](#) to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, [FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol](#) to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
- **How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario?** A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
- **How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes?** Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
- **How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance?** Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on [Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development](#).

Annex 3: Seasonal calendar



Annex 4: Events that would likely change projected acute food insecurity outcomes

While FEWS NET's projections are considered the "most likely" scenario, there is always a **degree of uncertainty** in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET's scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a **credible alternative scenario** and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National

Deterioration of the security situation

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A deterioration of the security situation will further reduce population movements and their access to available income and food sources. This situation will lead to new displacements, thus causing a new loss of assets while jeopardizing ongoing recovery efforts. The number of localities dependent on military-escorted supplies will increase, and market resupply delays will lengthen further. This will also limit the delivery of assistance and lead to pressure on market demand, with consequences of atypical price levels and commodity shortages. In this case, poor host households and IDPs, especially in areas experiencing restricted movement and whose assets are already eroded, will face extreme consumption deficits and will be exposed to Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Areas with significant security challenges

Improvement in the security situation

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An improvement in the security situation could enable poor households to increase their income-earning opportunities through broader access to income sources such as market gardening, livestock rearing, gold panning, petty trade, as well as the collection and sale of charcoal, firewood, and fodder. Regular market supply will allow better circulation of trade flows and a decrease in prices of basic commodities due to the increase in supply and the decrease in transportation costs. This situation would also facilitate the delivery of assistance and support for livelihood recovery. The improvement in food access will contribute to reducing the proportion of poor host and IDP households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

Annex 5: A closer look at insecurity and its impacts on food security outcomes

Insecurity, characterized by attacks and abuses by ATGs, has plagued Burkina Faso for 11 years now and is the principal driver of acute food insecurity. While the total number of attacks perpetrated by ATGs remained generally stable from one year to the next, the number of deaths associated with these attacks decreased significantly during the second half of 2025. At the end of December 2025, the government announced positive improvements in [regaining territory](#) and the resettlement of displaced populations in [871 localities](#) of origin.


Since 2024, security conditions have relatively improved in the center, south, and west of the country, allowing for increased opportunities for households to access typical sources of food and income. Household access to fields was better during the last rainy season. With the favorable rainfall and government and partner support to the 2025/26 agricultural season, household production increased. IDPs also have access to land for production or labor opportunities for rainy and dry season agricultural activities. In contrast, security incidents and associated killings remain high, particularly in the Sourou, Yaadga, Soum, Liptako, Kuilsé, Sirba, Tapoa, and Gourma regions. In these regions, ATGs are attempting to exert control over a number of localities in which security radii are reduced for access to fields and other sources of income. Although improving compared to last year, population movements are extremely limited, particularly in Djibo, Arbinda, and Kelbo municipalities (in the Soum Region); Gorgadji, Sebba, and Solhan (in the Liptako Region); Gayéri, Foutouri, and Manni (in the Sirba Region); Kantchari and Diapaga (in the Tapoa Region); and Sollé (in the Yaadga Region). In February, stocks from own production were low, or even already depleted in some municipalities.

Although the overall trend is toward the return and resettlement of displaced populations, abuses and threats from ATGs continue to cause new displacements. In 2025, a total of 386,157 new IDPs were registered by [GCORR](#), compared to 379,362 in 2024. The municipalities with a high presence of new IDPs (Figure 3) are those of Djibasso and Di (Sourou region); Dédougou (Bankui region); Gorom-Gorom (Liptako region); Ouahigouya (Yaadga region); and Kaya (Kuilsé region). This high presence places pressure on the local resources of host localities and increases competition for labor supply.

In regions with significant security challenges, market supply remains, for many, contingent on convoys under military escort. The number of markets requiring convoys has certainly decreased compared to the last two years, but supply lead times are still long for certain localities. This occasionally causes food commodity shortages, resulting in irregular and unstable food access for households. Food shortages have persisted at the Djibo market since December; at Sebba in September and October; and at Arbinda between October and December. Transportation costs to these areas are also very high, which impacts the sale prices of products, despite negotiations often organized by local authorities in collaboration with traders.

Furthermore, due to insecurity, certain health services remain closed or are functioning minimally. This limits population access to health care, especially in the Soum, Liptako, Gourma, Tapoa, and Sirba regions. In these regions, the supply of nutritional inputs to health centers remains a challenge and sometimes hinders the treatment of children suffering from malnutrition.

Figure 3. Number of new IDPs in 2025



Source: FEWS NET, using GCORR data

Annex 6: Humanitarian food assistance analysis in detail

Given the logistical and security challenges for delivering assistance, humanitarian organizations are adapting their strategies by using private transporters or local traders for the delivery of food using convoys under military escort. Once local markets are supplied, other humanitarian actors purchase on-site for redistribution to beneficiaries.

The recent convoy in December for Arbinda municipality enabled distribution between December and February. These rations (composed of cereals, legumes, oil, and salt) reached more than 50 percent of the population and covered at least 75 percent of their caloric needs, taking into account household size as defined by the Food Security Cluster. Given the early depletion of stocks from own production and low incomes, assistance has become the main source of food and contributes to preventing significant consumption deficits that expose the poor to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) acute food insecurity. Between February and May, planned distributions in Arbinda are also expected to benefit more than 25 percent of the population and cover 50 percent of their needs, contributing to preventing a deterioration in household food consumption.


The convoy in October for Sebba municipality (Yagha Province) enabled the delivery of monthly food rations (cereals, legumes, oil, and salt) between October 2025 and February 2026. These rations reached more than 25 percent of the population and covered 50 percent of caloric needs at each distribution. They contributed to reducing consumption deficits, while allowing beneficiaries to preserve stocks from their own production at harvest time and to limit their dependence on markets. However, given the advanced erosion of assets and the low incomes available, poor host households and IDPs continue to reduce quantities at meals or to limit the number of meals per day to two.

Food distributions were also conducted over the last three months in Djibo (Djelgodji Province), Loroum (Loroum Province), Gorom-Gorom (Oudalan Province), Diapaga (Gobnagou Province), and Kompienga and Pama (Kompienga Province). However, the rations provided in these municipalities reached less than 20 percent of the population. Furthermore, beneficiaries were generally forced to share the assistance received with non-beneficiary households, reducing the coverage of needs.

Annex 7: Projected acute food insecurity outcomes and areas receiving significant levels of humanitarian food assistance

Each of these maps adheres to IPC v3.1 humanitarian food assistance mapping protocols and flags where significant levels of humanitarian food assistance are being/are expected to be provided. ☒ indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average 25–50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance. ☑ indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average over 50 percent of caloric needs through humanitarian food assistance. This mapping protocol differs from the (!) protocol used in the maps at the top of the report. The use of (!) indicates areas that would likely be at least one phase worse in the absence of current or programmed humanitarian food assistance.


Current acute food insecurity outcomes, February 2026



FEWS NET's classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners. Learn more at <https://fews.net/about>.

Source: FEWS NET


Projected acute food insecurity outcomes, February – May 2026



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Source: FEWS NET

Projected acute food insecurity outcomes, June – September 2026



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Source: FEWS NET

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