Abnormal use of foraged produce in areas under blockade in the northern half of the country

• In the commune of Djibo, which has been under blockade since February 2022, aid has become the population's main source of survival. Although it fell in July due to logistical problems, over the last three months it has averaged around 25% of the population, meeting at least 50% of their needs. Nevertheless, IDPs and poor host households are forced to rely more than usual on foraged produce, the availability of which has improved since the onset of the rainy season. In addition, the poorest continue to resort to extreme survival strategies, such as begging and subsisting solely on foraged produce due to the absence of cereals. FEWS NET believes that Emergency! (IPC Phase 4!) will persist until September in Djibo, a classification which indicates that food aid is the main factor preventing Famine (IPC Phase 5). The severity of hunger will decrease only marginally in the post-harvest period, and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) results are expected between October and January.

• Although incidents and associated fatalities have fallen relatively since the onset of the rainy season in July compared with their averages observed in previous months, they remain at record levels compared with the seasonal average since the start of the conflict. With threats from armed terrorist groups on the increase and the number of communes under blockade rising to over 50, food aid and market supplies remain a challenge in the Sahel, North, Centre-North, East and Boucle du Mouhoun regions. With the looting of livestock and property and limited access to usual sources of income, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and poor households in these areas are exposed to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) acute food insecurity.

• Since mid-July, rain has been falling more regularly across the country. However, crop growth is lagging behind due to late rains and planting, as well as the under-use of fertilisers that are difficult for growers to access. Agricultural production is expected to decline due to field abandonment by displaced people, reduced planting areas stemming from insecurity and lower yields. 

• Although this is not the most likely scenario, FEWS NET believes that a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) will persist in Djibo until at least January. With food aid deliveries likely to continue into August, more extreme outcomes will be avoided, particularly as market gardening around the dam and wild food harvesting are underway. If the disruption to food aid continues into August and September, Famine (IPC Phase 5) will be a possibility, although this risk will depend on the duration and scale of the reduction in food aid. Given the size of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during the post-harvest period from October to January, there will remain a risk that any intensification of the conflict further restricting crops, market supplies, and aid will lead to Famine (IPC Phase 5). Food aid deliveries must not only be maintained, but also increased in order to limit the loss of human life and put an end to the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Djibo. 

Since the rainy season began in July, there has been a relative reduction in incidents (11%) and fatalities (30%) compared with the monthly averages observed since the start of the year. Despite these reductions, the incidents and associated fatalities are at record levels compared with the seasonal average since the start of the conflict. Despite the successes achieved by the Defence and Security Forces (FDS) and the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), violence against civilians is on the increase in the Boucle du Mouhoun, Cascades, Centre-East, Centre-North, Centre-West, East, Hauts-Bassins, Sahel and South-West regions. Pressure is particularly heavy in the Sahel, North, Centre-North and East regions, where terrorist armed groups (GAT) control the main supply routes. Incidents are multiplying on a daily basis in these regions. Attacks on cargo convoys, explosive devices or the destruction of road infrastructure continue to hinder the delivery of supplies to many blockaded areas. The looting of livestock and foodstuffs, the abduction of civilians, the destruction of homes and threats of reprisals continue to lead to new cases of population displacement, particularly in the communes of Seytenga, Sampelga, Ouahigouya, Bogandé, Piéla and Pissila. In addition to the regions mentioned above, GAT threats and atrocities are also disrupting farming activities in the Boucle du Mouhoun (Kossi, Sourou, Banwa), Hauts-Bassins (communes of Padema, Faramana, Koundougou, Fô), Cascades (communes of Mangodara, Ouo) and Centre-Est (communes of Sangha, Komin-Yanga) regions.

Since mid-July, rain has been falling more regularly across the country. Seasonal cumulative rainfall from 1 April to 20 August 2023 was similar to a deficit over most of the country compared with the normal (average 1991-2020) for the same period. The dominant vegetative stages for cereal crops are bolting/tillering. Overall, crop growth has been slower than usual due to delayed rainfall and late planting in June/July, as well as limited fertilizer usage owing to high costs. 

On the whole, markets are operating at a slower pace. The blockade imposed by armed terrorist groups (GAT) in communes in several regions (Sahel, East, Mouhoun loop, North), low household purchasing power and export restrictions are hampering the smooth running of agricultural and livestock markets. The supply of foodstuffs is lower than normal, although slightly higher than in 2022 at the same time. Internal flows have been severely disrupted by atrocities and GAT controls of the main supply routes to structurally deficient areas in the northern half of the country. Military escorts have become necessary for around twenty markets. In addition, supply lead times have increased from 2 to 4 months due to the growing number of threats from the GAT and the increase in the number of areas under blockade. 

In July, the prices of the main cereals remained above their seasonal averages: 35% for millet, 30% for maize, 29% for imported rice and 40% for sorghum, although they were 12% to 14% lower than in 2022. This fall in prices is linked, on the one hand, to the improved availability of foodstuffs compared with 2022, and, on the other hand, to the tighter controls on cereal export bans that have been in place for three years now, and which have led to an increase in supply on the markets. On the other hand, food aid and the opening by the government of 242 cereal sales outlets at subsidised prices (19,000 tonnes subsidised since April) are helping to reduce household demand on the markets. However, record price levels persist in the sub-block areas, with, for example, five-year variations of 110% for millet in Djibo, 125% for white maize in Kompienga, 150% for white sorghum in Sebba and 148% for imported rice in Arbinda (SIM/SONAGESS, July 2023). The food shortages reported in the areas under blockade mainly concern oil, sugar and condiments.

Due to limited movements and a drop in the number of potential buyers visiting markets, households are finding it harder than normal to generate income. In the relatively more accessible areas of the south and west, households derive their below-average income from the sale of livestock, non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and agricultural labour. NTFP collection areas are restricted, and the demand for farm labour is declining due to the reduction in area as a result of insecurity and the high cost of inputs. Cash transfer operations were carried out in June by humanitarian actors in the Boucle du Mouhoun (Kossi and Sourou) and Nord (Yatenga, Loroum) regions, but generally affected less than 15% of the population. In the areas under blockade, particularly in the Sahel region, households derive marginal income from the sale of water, wood and transfers from exoduses. Livestock, usually the main source of income, have been destocked or looted by the GAT. The main livestock market still in operation is in Dori, but for the past three months the GAT have been trying to isolate it. Despite a slight fall in the supply of small ruminants, prices are down by 25% and 27% respectively for bucks and rams. The terms of trade between livestock and cereals have deteriorated by more than half compared with normal levels. As a result, the assets of poor households are not sufficient to access foodstuffs on the markets. 

With little or no assets, poor IDPs and poor host households rely mainly on food aid to survive in most blockaded areas. Over the past three months, this aid has provided sufficient coverage in the communes of Titao (North region) and Sebba (Sahel region), reaching 70% and 32% of the population respectively, and meeting at least 50% of their needs, resulting in Crisis (IPC Phase 3!) acute food insecurity in these communes. In the commune of Djibo, where the erosion of assets is more pronounced, aid decreased in the previous month due to logistical problems, but over the last three months it has reached an average of around 25% of the population and has met at least 50% of their needs, keeping them in a state of acute food insecurity Emergency! (IPC Phase 4!) . On the other hand, in the province of Oudalan (Gorom-Gorom and Markoye communes), aid has reached on average less than 20% of the population, who remain exposed to Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In most of the communes under blockade in the Sahel region, key informants report the voluntary redistribution of food between households, and a more than abnormal recourse by households to foraged produce (senna tora leaf), whose availability is improving with the onset of the rainy season. Some households also use vegetables planted near their concessions. Despite this, there have been reductions in both the quantity and number of meals per day, and adults are often forced to go without food in favour of the children. The persistence of extreme survival strategies, in particular begging, eating only foraged produce due to the lack of cereals, and visible signs of emaciation leading to frequent cases of abortion, are exposing some people in the Sahel (Soum, Oudalan, Yagha), Centre-North (Bourzanga, Barsalogho, Pensa), and North (Yatenga, Loroum) regions to Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). 

The assumptions in the June to January 2024 Food Security Outlook report remain unchanged, with the exception of those updated below:

• Given the delays in the rainy season in June and July, which delayed planting, as well as insecurity, which reduced access to fields, and the under-use of inputs due to their high cost, harvests for the 2023/2024 season in October are likely to be below average, and below last year. 
• Given the persistence of the blockade (for more than 12 months in the Soum and Yagha provinces), the erosion of household assets, the lack of access for households to their fields for production, and the difficulties in supplying markets and providing adequate aid, it is likely that people will be forced to flee the blockade, risking their lives, and move to urban centres or relatively calmer areas offering income opportunities.
• With the restriction of internal flows between production and consumption areas, demand pressure is expected to be stronger, contributing to higher staple food prices over the analysis period.
  
   

Although national production is expected to be below average due to the large number of IDPs, the reduction in acreage as a result of insecurity, and the drop in yields due to the under-use of fertilisers, the new harvests should nevertheless help to improve supply on the markets from October onwards. Internal flows will remain limited, and supplies to areas under blockade will continue to depend on military escorts.

In the relatively calmer areas of the south and west, poor households will experience Minimal (IPC Phase 1) acute food insecurity, as self-production should provide them with a typical diet until at least January. 

In urban centres, where IDPs and migrants from rural areas are increasingly concentrated, the pressure of demand will keep staple food prices above average. The current tax burden will also continue, and inflation could remain above the five-year average. All of this should have a negative impact on poor households' access to food, and expose them to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity. 

In areas with a large number of IDPs in the North, Centre-North, East and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, the new harvests will help to improve access to food, particularly for host households. But lower-than-average production and sluggish markets will prevent these households from benefiting from the sale of cash crops, and their livelihoods could remain under pressure. IDPs in these areas will be forced to develop crisis strategies (IPC Phase 3) to access food, given the deterioration in their livelihoods and the inadequacy of self-production.

In areas of the Sahel region under blockade, such as Oudalan and Yagha, marginal harvests and foraged produce will not be enough to significantly improve household consumption, and food aid should be necessary to limit recourse to extreme survival strategies and the growth of populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). In Djibo, ongoing food aid will be supplemented by market gardening and foraging to avoid more extreme results. However, given the more pronounced erosion of assets with the duration of the blockade and the high presence of IDPs in the post-harvest period from October to January, there will remain a risk that any intensification of the conflict further restricting crops, market supplies and aid will lead to Famine (IPC Phase 5). Food aid deliveries must not only be maintained, but also increased in order to limit the loss of human life and put an end to the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Djibo.