Increased food aid must be maintained to limit loss of life in Djibo

• The increase in food aid in March has probably reduced the size of the population facing extreme hunger in the blocked communes of the north, including Titao (Loroum), Djibo and Arbinda (Soum) and Sebba (Yagha). Nevertheless, given the persistent state of conflict and insecurity, it remains uncertain whether food aid will be sustained at substantial levels in the upcoming months. Intermittent distribution of aid will provide only temporary relief to those in need, as a considerable number of households are expected to experience substantial deficits in food consumption on average. This predicament may force them to resort to extreme coping strategies such as begging or forced displacement. In order to prevent Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) scenarios in these regions, where households face limited or no access to food and income, and where rates of severe malnutrition are alarmingly high, it is imperative to sustain substantial levels of food aid.

• In regions with limited access to such aid, particularly in the communes located in the northern part of Oudalan, IDPs and impoverished host households are experiencing an alarming rise in the frequency of entire days and nights without food. They resort to desperate measures such as consuming unconventional food sources like water lilies from ponds or being compelled to migrate towards more southern areas. Emergency food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) persists in this area, as do severe forms of starvation or malnutrition, exposing some people to Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

• In the past month, military escorts have been enabling the delivery of supplies to approximately ten besieged towns located in the northern region of the country. Despite engaging in discussions with traders, the prices being charged continue to be unaffordable for impoverished households whose assets have been significantly depleted. Unprecedented levels continue to be recorded in these regions, exhibiting five-year fluctuations ranging from 110% to 190%, significantly higher than the national average of 40-50%. The persistence of security incidents is expected to continue, further disrupting market operations, causing delays in supply to besieged regions, and resulting in food shortages in specific markets.

• While it may not be the most probable scenario, FEWS NET evaluates that there exists a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in the commune of Djibo, where IDPs and host households are enduring an extended period of Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In the event of intensified attacks by armed groups, the population's mobility would be further constrained, particularly limiting their ability to participate in market gardening, forage for wild foods, and engage in agricultural activities during the rainy season. Furthermore, the availability of market supplies and humanitarian aid is anticipated to become even more erratic and insufficient than currently anticipated. If these conditions were to materialise, Famine (IPC Phase 5) would probably occur. An urgent need exists to significantly escalate the frequency of air deliveries for humanitarian aid, ensure unimpeded humanitarian access, and promptly lift the blockade in Djibo to effectively eliminate the risk of famine (IPC Phase 5). 

On a national scale, while the number of security incidents linked to non-state armed groups recorded between October 2022 and March 2023 showed a 26 percent decrease compared to the same period in the previous year, the corresponding loss of life increased by 55 percent during the same period. These armed groups continue to extend their reach of threats and atrocities into the central-northern and northwestern regions of the country, thereby broadening the areas vulnerable to attacks. This is limiting population movements throughout the country to gain access to the usual sources of income, and is also increasing the number of IDPs, estimated at around 2 million at the end of February.

Since March, air and ground offensive operations by the Defence and Security Forces (FDS) and the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP) have intensified against the positions of armed groups, causing significant logistical damage and loss of life among these non-state armed groups. Despite this, attacks and threats along the main routes (Yako-Tougan, Ouahigouya-Titao-Djibo, Kongoussi-Djibo, Kaya-Dori, Dori-Arbinda, Dori-Sebba, Gorom-Markoye, Fada-Kantchari, Fada-Gayéri, Fada-Kompienga) remain commonplace. 

Persistent security incidents continue to disrupt market operations. This disruption is more pronounced in areas under blockade, notably in the northern provinces (Loroum, Soum, Oudalan, Yagha, Sanmatenga) and the eastern provinces (Komondjari, Tapoa).  The number of localities requiring supplies under military escort has risen to around ten, extending supply lead times by up to 3 months. Households in these areas also face frequent shortages of basic foodstuffs. In the commune of Djibo, which has faced a blockade since February 2022, the market remained unsupplied for a period of four months, spanning from the end of November 2022 to March 21, 2023. This prolonged disruption led to a total absence of cereals from mid-January to mid-March, amounting to two months without any cereal sales. According to key informants, some 20 traders have stocks that could last until next May. Demand is low because most households, especially the poor, do not have the income to make purchases and build up reserves.

At the national level, cereal availability is generally satisfactory, ranging from average to above average. This is particularly the case in the relatively stable production regions located in the west and south of the country, as well as in major wholesale markets such as Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, and Pouytenga. The government's ban on cereal and cowpea exports and the drop in internal flows from these areas to structurally deficit areas in the north of the country due to insecurity are the main factors in favor of this supply of products. Conversely, in regions facing blockades or heightened insecurity, the availability of food items on the markets is notably lower than the average. This can be attributed, in part, to the expansion of areas requiring military escort for supply operations. After two to three months of disruption, several localities in the northern half of the country were able to receive supplies in March and April: Titao and Sollé in Loroum, Djibo in Soum, Barsalogho and Bourzanga in the Centre-North, Gayéri in the East, and Tougan in Sourou. However, several areas are still without supplies. For example, the Sebba market was last supplied at the beginning of January. In addition, the communes to the north of the province of Oudalan and the province of Kompienga remain difficult to access for supplies. 

While demand is atypically low in the areas severely affected by the conflict and the areas under blockade, given the loss of most sources of household income in these areas, it is broadly normal to above normal in the rest of the country. In addition to the growing seasonal demand from households and IDPs as a result of the gradual depletion of self-produced stocks, there is also demand from institutions, breweries and poultry feed production units. The current demand for institutional purchases exceeds 77,000 tonnes, almost double the usual requirements. In fact, institutional food security stocks are at a low level, having been heavily used over the last three years to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, record price rises in 2022 and the growing number of IDPs. 

At national level, cereal prices in March were stable on last year, but 40-50% higher than the five-year average. Record levels continue to be recorded on the Djibo, Titao and Sebba markets, with annual variations of between 30 and 80 per cent and five-year increases of between 110 and 190 per cent (SIM/SONAGESS ).

Prices of imported staple foods, particularly oil and sugar, remain 75 and 45 per cent above average respectively (Ministry of Trade, March 2023). Other essential non-food products are following the same upward trend. The recent rise in the price of fuel (19% in one year) has contributed to the increase in the price of firewood and charcoal, which were already sold at high prices to households, justified by the longer collection times cited by transporters due to insecurity. All of these factors negatively affect the low purchasing power of households. 

Insecurity significantly hampers individuals' access to their usual sources of income, primarily derived from activities such as gold panning, market gardening, gathering and selling of wood, fodder, and non-timber forest products, as well as the sale of livestock and engagement in agricultural labour. Income from these sources are down overall compared with normal levels. While water availability for vegetable production remains satisfactory, challenges such as the high cost of inputs, difficulties in accessing fuel for irrigation and insecurity have resulted in a decrease in cultivated land area and the abandonment of specific sites. In addition, limited access to production sites by foreign buyers due to insecurity has contributed to a fall in selling prices for producers. In the North region, for example, prices for tomatoes and onions are down by between 20 and 30 per cent compared to last year (Regional Directorate in charge of agriculture). Since 2021, the government has banned gold panning in the Sahel region. This represents one less source of income, even if it was reduced due to the blockade of certain localities or difficult access to sites in other localities. In cotton-growing regions, where labour is typically required for construction and field preparation, the decline in income due to production losses of approximately 30% compared to the expected 700,000 tonnes from the previous season (UNPC/B ) is hindering the recruitment of labour. In the sub-blockade areas in the northern half, most poor households have lost their livestock assets and several local markets remain closed or operating at minimal levels. In these regions, the primary sources of income generation have shifted to activities such as collecting and selling firewood and charcoal along with the sale of water and fodder. These endeavors are predominantly undertaken by women, often entailing significant personal risks. 

However, the prices of staple foods remain out of reach for poor IDPs and poor host households, some of whom no longer have any source of income. A significant proportion of these impoverished households struggle to accumulate an adequate supply of goods to meet their needs in times of availability. As a result, they are compelled to live hand-to-mouth, resorting to frequent small purchases from retailers who typically sell at higher prices. For this category, aid remains the main source of food. 

Humanitarian cash transfer operations have been suspended since January in the Sahel regions, and since April in the Centre-North, North and East regions, depriving IDPs and poor host households of one of their main sources of income. In 2022, cash transfers accounted for around 60% of the volume of aid. Because of the security risks (hijacking or destruction of trucks, presence of explosive devices on the roads), air rotations or military escorts are essential for the delivery of food aid, particularly in blockaded areas. This limits the intervention capacities of most humanitarian NGOs and consequently the volume of aid for the benefit of the populations. 

In March, aid by air, provided mainly by the WFP, was stepped up for the benefit of IDPs and poor host households, particularly in the blockaded communes in the north. Distribution reports for March show that humanitarian assistance reached 29 per cent of the population in the commune of Titao (Loroum), 61 per cent in the commune of Djibo, 59 per cent in the commune of Arbinda (Soum), 13 per cent in the commune of Kelbo, 42 per cent in the commune of Sebba, and 9 per cent in the commune of Mansila. In each of these communes, two ration distribution operations (consisting of 25 kg of cereals, 5 kg of pulses, 1 litre of oil and 1.5 kg of enriched flour) were necessary to target 50 per cent coverage of needs.  Although levels of assistance have been significant in several regions, the quantities are not yet representative of a typical trend and it is premature to assess whether assistance is likely to prevent the deterioration of acute food insecurity. The delivery of this aid is still subject to major logistical constraints, in particular the small amount of food that each helicopter can carry, which requires several flights a day to reach the quantities declared above, as well as the restrictions that sometimes intervene due to ongoing military operations. 

Although an increase in aid in March may have improved food insecurity in these blockaded areas in the short term, the level of deficits faced by households prior to this delivery is sufficiently high that households are likely to continue to face consumption deficits, even though they have already sold off their productive assets. Poor IDPs and poor host households in blockaded areas, particularly in Soum and Yagha, as well as in inaccessible areas such as the north of Oudalan, continue to use extreme strategies, multiplying the number of days and nights spent without food. Some heads of households are forced to migrate to more southern areas in search of food. Others resort to begging or picking water lilies from ponds. These households face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity, with some people suffering from forms of starvation or critical malnutrition, exposing them to Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Soum, Oudalan, and Yagha.

In areas with limited access and a large number of IDPs in the Centre-North and East regions and in the provinces of Yatenga (North), Sourou and Kossi (Boucle du Mouhoun), the majority of IDPs do not have sufficient income to make purchases on the markets. Some are in host families with whom they share food, which leads to an early depletion of stocks of the latter. In these areas, poor IDPs and poor host households are exposed to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity because they have to make do with one meal a day and adults are forced to go without food in favour of their children.

In the relatively quiet production areas to the south and west, poor households continue to consume their own produce and vegetables, as well as fruit and other non-wood forest products (mangoes, néré). They remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food insecurity.

Updates to the assumptions used to develop FEWS NET's most likely scenario for Burkina Faso's Food Security Outlook for February to September 2023 are provided below:

• Despite the growing instances of aggressive actions carried out by the FDS and VDP, leading to significant logistical setbacks and casualties among non-state armed groups, these organisations continue to demonstrate their ability to move freely throughout the country. Furthermore, they continue to pose a threat by imposing blockades on various communities in the North, Sahel, East, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, exerting control over key routes. As a response to the offensive launched by the FDS and VDP, it is likely that non-state armed groups will intensify their punitive assaults on civilians, whom they accuse of complicity. Consequently, we anticipate a rise in the frequency and severity of attacks by these groups during the remaining period of the 2023 dry season, reaching unprecedented levels since the onset of the conflict in 2016. This escalation is expected to persist until the peak of the rainy season in July 2023. Given the rainy season, the mobility of non-state armed groups should be reduced between July and October, but levels of violence could still remain higher than those seen in previous years. Threats and atrocities by non-state armed groups are likely to continue to cause internal displacement or prevent the return of IDPs to their places of origin, as well as causing major disruption to local markets and agro-pastoral activities.
• Although efforts have been made by the FDS to bring supplies to several blockaded localities, non-state armed groups continue to maintain pressure for control of the main market supply routes in the northern half and east of the country. Supplies in these areas should remain dependent on FDS escorts. With the number of blockaded areas in the country increasing, it is likely that supply delays will exceed three months, as is currently the case for the Sebba market in Yagha, and that repeated shortages will be observed, leading to a continuation of the record level of food prices over the coming months.
• Given the deteriorating security situation, the disruption of markets and the ban on cash transfers in the Sahel, Centre-North and East regions, direct food distribution by military escort or by air is likely to be the main method of providing assistance to households over the coming months. FEWS NET has not yet received the final humanitarian aid plans for 2023. However, observations made in previous months show that food aid distributions are often lower than planned due to security, financial and logistical constraints. As a result, FEWS NET believes that increased insecurity will further limit the adequate provision of humanitarian aid in the worst affected areas. 

The increase in the number of localities under blockade and the continuing security threats along the main supply routes will continue to result in long supply delays and shortages, especially in the northern half of the country where there is no local supply of basic foodstuffs. In the blockaded areas, particularly in the provinces of Loroum, Soum, Yagha and Oudalan, food aid will continue to be the main source of food for poor IDPs and poor host households. The irregular distribution of food assistance should only periodically and temporarily alleviate the severity of household food consumption gaps, and most households in these areas will have significant deficits indicating an Emergency situation (IPC Phase 4) and some households will suffer extreme deficits corresponding to a Catastrophe situation (IPC Phase 5). Severe forms of malnutrition are likely to persist among children and pregnant or breastfeeding women, and malnutrition-related deaths are likely to be more frequent. Between July and September, people's exposure to water-borne diseases and cases of malaria could aggravate or contribute to an increase in severe forms of malnutrition and cases of death. 

In areas with a high presence of IDPs in the North, Centre-North, East and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, most poor host households will no longer have stocks from self-production and will find themselves dependent on the market and assistance in the same way as poor IDPs. Atypically above-average seasonal prices and below-average incomes will limit their access to food. This will force them to restrict their diets or increase their use of foraged foods, especially between June and September. They will remain exposed to Crisis level food insecurity (IPC Phase 3) until September, while waiting for the new harvests to appear.

In the relatively calm production areas in the west and south of the country, the food sources of poor households will remain typical and will come from their own production, purchases on the market and recourse to foraged produce which is relatively more accessible and more diversified. Despite seasonal variations in higher-than-average prices, the terms of trade between livestock and cereals will remain favourable for households due to the gradual improvement in animal health and stronger demand from buyers forced by insecurity to limit their visits to markets in the north. Poor households will continue to experience Minimal food insecurity (IPC Phase 1).

Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Burkina Faso. Increased food aid must be maintained to limit loss of life in Djibo, 2023.