Despite above-average national harvest, food gaps likely in deficit areas by late 2026

• Starting around October, ongoing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in typical deficit-producing areas in the south, east, west, and extreme north, which will persist through January 2027. Poor households can currently meet their minimum food needs with stocks from the recent harvest, but not their non-food needs. However, starting around October, an increasing number of households will have exhausted their own-produced food stocks as is typical, and become market-reliant amid weak purchasing power driven by below-average incomes and high prices. 
• Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected through January 2027 in most surplus-producing areas of the Mashonaland Provinces, supported by own-produced food stocks and income from crop sales, casual labor, and other sources. However, some areas, especially the less-productive communal farming areas in these provinces, are expected to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes starting in October/November as own-produced food stocks diminish, and income becomes constrained.
• The 2025/26 harvest has increased cereal availability on the open markets, leading to seasonal maize grain price declines in many areas; however, prices remain elevated in some deficit-producing and isolated areas due to limited supply and weak market linkages. Maize meal demand has declined in many areas following the harvest, but remains high where staple cereal production was low. Despite recent fuel price reductions, fuel and transport costs remain above average since the escalation in the Middle East conflict in February, reducing disposable income and access to basic food and non-food needs, particularly among poor households. However, prices of most basic food and non-food commodities and exchange rates remain relatively stable. 
• Household incomes in most deficit-producing areas remain below average due to low or no crop and livestock sales; limited casual labor, self-employment, and remittances; and high competition for petty trade. In southern areas, the lack of Mopane worms (Gonimbrasia belina) has deprived communities and households of a seasonal income source. However, horticultural production, construction activities, thatch grass sales, and artisanal and small-scale gold mining are providing alternative income streams, helping households engaged in these opportunities to sustain some food and non‑food purchases.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 25, 2026. 

Households in Zimbabwe typically rely on multiple on-farm and off-own-farm food and income sources to meet their food and non-food needs. However, food and cash crop production and livestock rearing are important to rural livelihoods. In the high-rainfall areas, largely in northern Zimbabwe, farmers typically have higher yields and produce staple crops like maize that can meet their food needs for most of the year, while earning income from the sale of surplus crops. However, in the lower-rainfall areas of southern, western, eastern, and extreme northern Zimbabwe, crop production tends to be lower and typically provides food stocks only for three to four months of the consumption year for most poor households.

In surplus-producing northern areas (Figure 1), some farmers also grow cash crops such as tobacco, along with a variety of pulses/legumes, root crops, vegetables, and fruit. In the dry season (June-September), irrigated winter wheat is grown under commercial production. Maize, sorghum, and millet are grown for food in the deficit-producing areas, while cash crops like cotton are produced for income. Livestock, particularly cattle, is an important source of wealth and is mainly reared by middle and better-off households across the country. Most livestock rearing occurs in the country's southern, eastern, western, and extreme northern parts. Small livestock, mainly goats and chickens, are reared by all household groups, with poor households regularly selling stock to earn income to buy food and meet other needs.

The main agricultural season occurs from October to May, with rainfall from November to February particularly important for crop production. While households historically prepared their land and started planting in October, the late onset of rainfall in recent years has resulted in planting in November or December. Rainfall in January and February is considered critical for harvest potential, as staple cereals are often in their reproductive and grain-filling stages. The green crop harvest occurs from February to March, with the main harvest taking place from April through June. Zimbabwe is prone to weather shocks, particularly drought during the October to March rainy season, negatively impacting crop and livestock production and other livelihoods. Most recently, El Niño-driven droughts in 2015/16, 2019/20, and 2023/24 resulted in poor and sometimes failed harvests.

Households also engage in off-own-farm income-earning opportunities such as casual labor, self-employment, petty trade, crafts, artisanal mining, and the sale of wild foods and products (including fruits, vegetables, Mopane worms (Gonimbrasia belina), and thatch grass) to earn income. Some households also rely on remittances from relatives in urban areas and abroad. Labor opportunities vary seasonally and are mainly linked to agricultural production and marketing chain activities. Poor urban households also engage in urban and peri-urban agriculture to help meet their food needs.

Over the last two decades, Zimbabwe has experienced significant economic volatility, characterized by foreign currency shortages, highly unstable exchange rates and prices, and high inflation. However, macroeconomic stability has been observed from early 2025, with notable exchange rate stability and significant reductions in inflation. A multicurrency regime continues, consisting mainly of the local ZWG, the USD, and the ZAR in southern areas. Poor households mainly depend on informal markets where prices are cheaper and USD/ZAR-dominated, as these households are often paid in USD/ZAR for casual labor, self-employment, and other informal income-earning opportunities.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Zimbabwe Food Security Outlook: February 2026 to September 2026 
• Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Zimbabwe: April 2026 to September 2026
• Latest Zimbabwe Key Message Update: May 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

• The government’s 2026 Second Round Crop, Livestock, and Fisheries Assessment (CLAFA 2) has estimated 2026 maize production at 2.35 million metric tons (MT) (Figure 2), two percent higher than the 2025 CLAFA 2 estimate, and about 40 percent above the 10-year average. Small grain production was projected at around 390,000 MT, eight percent lower than the 2025 estimate. Total cereal (maize and small grains) production was estimated at 2.7 MT, almost 17 percent above last year’s estimate. However, some parts of Manicaland, Masvingo, and Matabeleland South Provinces were affected by excessive rains and dry spells during the 2025/26 production season.
• Statutory Instrument 87 of 2025 (SI 87 of 2025) came into effect on April 1, 2026, constraining the importation of maize grain and oil seeds and promoting local procurement by commercial millers, stockfeed manufacturers, and other processors. The 2026 CLAFA 2 reported a national cereal (maize and small grains) surplus of between 550,000-960,000 MT for the 2026/27 marketing year, based on variable consumption rates. 
• Increased market availability of staple cereals from the 2026 harvests has resulted in seasonal price declines. According to key informants, maize grain prices in surplus-producing areas are between 0.23-0.29 USD/kilogram (kg) (or 4-5 USD/17.5 kg bucket), about 40-50 percent lower than the prices during the January to March 2026 peak lean season and lower than the same time last year. 
• Maize grain prices in some deficit-producing areas remain elevated, according to key informants and the WFP. Prices are around 0.46 USD/kg (8 USD/17.5 kg bucket) or higher. Small grains also maintain high prices between 0.57-0.69 USD/kg (or 10-12 USD/17.5 kg bucket), similar to last year and the five-year average. This is mainly due to limited local supply. Maize meal demand has declined in most areas, except in those areas with low cereal production where demand remains atypically high. 
• The fuel cost and transport fare increases since February following the Middle East escalation continue to reduce households’ disposable income and access to basic food and non-food items and services, especially among poor households. Despite recent fuel price reductions by the Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority, petrol and diesel prices are still 27 and 31 percent higher than the pre-conflict levels, respectively, while transport fares are still 50-100 percent higher. However, prices for most basic foods and other commodities, inflation, and exchange rates, have remained relatively stable.  
• A record 2026 tobacco harvest (Annex 5) is anticipated, reportedly between 360-400 million kg. As of early June, the Tobacco Industry and Market Board reported a 17 percent increase in sales volumes since the start of the marketing season in early March compared to the same time last year. However, tobacco prices remained around 25 percent lower than last year. Though the estimated 2026 cotton production (38,500 MT) is 33 percent above last year, it is significantly lower than peak production of 360,000 MT in 2011, affecting potential household income in typical cotton-producing areas. The 2026 cotton marketing season started in mid-May, with a 17 percent price increase compared to last season.
• Above-average water availability and access are supporting favorable water and pasture conditions, improving livestock body conditions and prices. However, herd sizes for households in some areas have declined, partly due to recurring livestock diseases and/or the impact of previous droughts. Above-average water availability and access are enhancing vegetable production and sales, and brick making and construction activities, which are at typical levels across most areas. The Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) reported average national dam levels at about 91 percent full as of June 22, of the 154 monitored large dams. This is significantly above average and compared to about 85 percent at the same time last year and 70 percent in 2024.
• Income from most common livelihood activities, including crop sales, casual labor, petty trade, and sale of some wild produce, is atypically low, especially in deficit-producing areas. 
• Remittances (a significant source of food and income for some households, especially in the southern parts of the country) are atypically low. This is due to income constraints locally and social instability in South Africa, where most emigrants, especially from the southern districts, reside and work.
• Income from the sale of Mopane worms in the southern districts is significantly below average due to limited availability and harvests of the worms. The worms have reportedly not recovered following reproduction cycle disruptions during the 2023/24 El Niño drought. 
• Informal artisanal and small-scale mining, particularly gold, is above average across much of the country. The sector accounts for 75 percent of national official gold sales. 

Humanitarian food assistance

No emergency food assistance is ongoing.

Deficit-producing areas

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing in typical deficit-producing areas in the south, east, west, and the extreme north. Households are meeting their basic food needs from the recent main harvest and with income from casual labor and other sources. However, poor households continue to face constrained access to non-food essentials due to weak purchasing power driven by below-average income and continued high staple cereal prices. Typical income sources such as crop sales, casual labor, self-employment, and livestock sales are below average in some areas due to localized poor harvests and liquidity challenges. Some poor households who had no or poor harvests are already market-dependent for food, which is atypically early. Usually, an increasing number of households start depending on markets from August/September in typical seasons.

Surplus-producing areas 

Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes continue in surplus-producing areas mainly in the Mashonaland Provinces, driven by favorable 2025/26 harvests and some 2024/25 carryover stocks. Households are consuming own-produced cereals and other diversified foods, supplemented by income from crop sales, labor opportunities (paid in cash or in-kind), livestock sales, and other sources, allowing households to meet their basic food and non-food needs. In addition, above-average water availability is supporting activities such as gardening, brick making, and construction, providing households with additional income to meet essential non-food expenses.

Urban areas

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing in urban areas as poor households can only meet their basic food, but not non-food, needs. Constrained income and high food, rental, and utility costs are limiting their purchasing power.

• Improved national cereal availability on the open markets is expected from June onward from the 2025/26 harvests. However, trend analysis shows that during past El Niño years, open market supplies typically decline before and during the lean season, as some farmers and traders withhold stocks in anticipation of higher prices later in the marketing year. 
• Own-produced household stocks in surplus-producing areas are expected to last throughout the projection period. However, in deficit-producing areas, households with low 2026 harvests are likely to deplete their cereal stocks two to four months post-harvest and start relying on market purchases atypically early.
• The government may allow unrestricted maize grain imports under Statutory Instrument 87 of 2025 if national supply tightens later during the 2026/27 marketing year, as happened last season in late September 2025.
• Typical maize grain flows from surplus-producing areas to deficit-producing areas are likely to be minimal through August or September as households in deficit-producing areas are expected to still access their own-produced stocks, except in areas with very poor harvests. Flows are likely to increase thereafter as households deplete their own production and become market-reliant.
• Maize grain prices in surplus-producing areas are expected to remain seasonally stable through August/September, then rise gradually with increasing demand in deficit-producing areas. Maize grain prices are likely to be lower than last year and near the long-term average. In deficit-producing areas, grain prices are expected to remain elevated throughout the projection period, driven in part by increased transportation costs.
• Water and pasture conditions are expected to remain fair to good through August/September due to cumulative average to above-average 2025/26 rainfall in most areas across the country. However, pasture and water conditions are likely to start deteriorating thereafter in most typical arid areas.
• Livestock body conditions are expected to remain fair to good through August/September due to fair to good pasture and water conditions. From then onwards, livestock body conditions will likely start to deteriorate as pasture and water conditions decline seasonally. Historical trends indicate that the situation typically worsens during El Niño years.  
• Livestock prices are likely to remain above last year and near average during much of the 2026 dry season amid anticipated overall good livestock body conditions. However, livestock income in some areas will likely be affected by livestock diseases among cattle and small stock. 
• According to the ZINWA, water availability from major dams will be adequate to support winter crop irrigation and urban and commercial water needs throughout the projection period. 
• Energy prices (petrol, diesel, and petroleum gas) are likely to be maintained at elevated levels in the medium term due to the protracted and lingering effects of the Middle East conflict. This will drive increased production and transportation costs and prices of goods and services. However, formal and informal exchange rates are likely to remain stable throughout the projection period. 
• Fertilizer prices are also likely to be above average, resulting in potential limited access and application during the main growing season starting in October/November.
• Income from crop sales, casual labor, self-employment, petty trading, remittances, and sale of some wild products in some areas will likely to be below average throughout the projection period.
• Above-average surface and groundwater supply due to favorable rainfall received during the 2025/26 season are expected to support post-harvest livelihood activities such as horticultural production, brick making, and construction. Engagement in artisanal mining and small-scale mining is also expected to remain above average. 
• Above-average veld fire risk is anticipated across most provinces through the 2026 dry season (Figure 3) due to above-average biomass following average to above-average 2025/26 cumulative rainfall. 
• The 2026/27 lean season onset is expected to be atypically early (before August/September) in areas with poor crop production and constrained sources of typical income.

Humanitarian food assistance

No emergency food assistance is expected during the projection period.

Deficit-producing areas

From June to September, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in deficit-producing areas in Masvingo, Matabeleland North and South, parts of Manicaland and Midlands Provinces, and the extreme northern parts of the country. Households in these areas will be able to meet their minimum food needs from own-produced stocks but will not be able to afford essential non-food needs. Production in these areas was affected by excessive rainfall and prolonged dry spells during the 2025/26 rainy season. Harvested stocks are likely to start depleting around August/September. 

From October to January, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to emerge as an increasing number of households deplete their own-produced food stocks and become market-reliant for food. During this time, high demand for cereal will result in increased prices, limiting the ability of poor households to access food on the market due to low purchasing power, as typical income sources remain below average.

Surplus-producing areas

Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected through January 2027 in surplus-producing areas across the Mashonaland Provinces. Households in these areas will access food from own-produced stocks and income from food and cash crop sales. However, households in some parts of the typical surplus-producing areas are likely to experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes because of localized below-average harvests and income. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will also emerge in the less productive communal farming areas of the typical surplus-producing areas in October/November due to reduced own-produced stocks and diminishing income from crop sales. 

Urban areas

Stressed IPC Phase 2 outcomes are expected throughout the projection period. This is driven by below-average incomes among poor households amid high transportation, rental, and energy and other costs.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. 
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

If conflict continues in the Middle East, it will likely drive further increases in fuel and fertilizer prices, as well as reduced supply. Increases in fuel prices will result in increased production costs, which will be transmitted to supply chains. As a result, the cost of goods and services will likely increase, driving inflation. This will further erode the purchasing power of poor and low-income households, worsening their food security outcomes.