Food assistance needs are likely to increase into 2026 amid conflict in the north

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through May 2026 in conflict-affected areas of the north, with Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes likely in Nangade and Muidumbe districts until February 2026, and in Macomia and Quissanga districts through April 2026, supported by ongoing humanitarian food assistance. However, non-state armed group (NSAG) attacks have intensified between July and September, causing renewed displacements of thousands of people, which further disrupts livelihoods, limits typical subsistence farming and income-earning activities. This persistent insecurity will likely contribute to localized below-average harvest starting in April 2026, limiting seasonal improvements in food security.
• From October 2025 until at least March 2026, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in the southern and central semi-arid areas, following the 2025 below-average harvest. Households are expected to reduce meal frequency, prioritize feeding children, eating with relatives, consume more wild foods, and to some extent, withdrawing children from school, as households continue to face food consumption gaps. In April and May 2026, seasonal improvements to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) or Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are likely related to the harvest, leading to increased food consumption and income from crop sales.
• Conflict-affected areas of Cabo Delgado province and parts of Nampula province remain areas of highest concern. Ongoing attacks by NSAGs continue to displace populations, disrupt typical livelihood activities, destroy infrastructure, and hinder humanitarian access.  
• FEWS NET estimates that 3.5-3.99 million people will require humanitarian food assistance during the peak of the lean season (January-March 2026). Increasing needs will primarily be due to the resurgence of conflict in Cabo Delgado, its expansion into neighboring Nampula Province, and the effects of two consecutive years of poor harvests in semi-arid areas caused by El Niño-induced droughts and subsequent minimal recovery. The total population in need includes those likely to be affected by potential climatic shocks during the 2025/26 rainy season, such as cyclones or floods.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 30, 2025.

Mozambique faces significant food insecurity challenges despite high agricultural potential. Most of the country is susceptible to extreme weather events, including cyclones, floods, dry spells, and droughts, which can severely impact food production and availability and limit employment opportunities and income. In late 2024 and early 2025, Tropical Cyclones Chido, Dikeledi, and Jude impacted northern Mozambique, compounded impacts from Tropical Storm Filipo and the El Niño-induced drought, and caused widespread destruction of crops, infrastructure, and livelihoods (particularly of poor households) in central and northern parts of the country. Although the rate of chronic malnutrition in children under five years of age has decreased from 43 percent in 2013 to 37 percent in 2023, the levels of poverty and chronic food insecurity remain high, exposing poor households to frequent acute food insecurity in the face of shocks. Among the underlying causes of the high stunting rate, the highlight goes to poor dietary diversity, inadequate primary healthcare, limited access to clean water, and frequent disease outbreaks.

Agriculture is the major economic sector in Mozambique, dominated by subsistence and small-scale rainfed farming (typically 1-2 hectares). Over 70 percent of the population relies on farming as a main source of food and income. Smallholder farmers have limited access to inputs and technologies, leading to persistently low crop productivity that is also highly susceptible to extreme weather events. Regular post-harvest losses average around 30 percent of production, driven largely by inadequate storage and drying facilities. 

Mozambique’s primary harvest typically begins around April and concludes around June. The second season (largely vegetable cultivation) is mainly practiced in the low-lying areas of the central and southern regions using residual moisture from the main rainy season and in some areas with irrigation access. Second season planting begins around April, with vegetable harvests taking place from June through October. Income-generating agricultural activities include main season land preparation and planting from October to December, as well as weeding in February and March. The October to March period is the typical peak of the lean season, characterized by the depletion of household food stocks and income and seasonal food price increases. Food gaps are filled by the green or main harvest in April and May. During the lean season, households resort to coping strategies such as reducing meal sizes, consuming less preferred foods, or increasing reliance on wild foods. This period is also associated with a seasonal rise in acute malnutrition rates. 

Urban poverty has been increasing in recent years as access to income and food is diminished, driven largely by the migration of young people from rural areas to cities where job creation cannot meet demand. Post-election demonstrations from October 2024 through early 2025 further worsened the employment crisis by destroying approximately 40 percent of Mozambique’s industrial infrastructure, resulting in job losses for around 12,000 workers. In 2025, Mozambique is facing a GDP contraction of nearly 4 percent, attributed to the combined effects of violent post-election demonstrations, an increase in conflict in parts of Cabo Delgado, and tropical cyclone impacts. 

Conflict has affected Cabo Delgado Province in the north since 2017 due to an insurgency led by Islamist militant groups, often referred to as Al-Shabaab. At the peak of the conflict in 2021/22, over 1.0 million people were displaced, infrastructure was destroyed, and local economies contracted. Agricultural activities were severely disrupted and area planted declined sharply. Many farmers remain unable to access farmlands, markets, or income-earning opportunities, limiting their ability to produce food or earn income. In 2025, the rise in NSAG attacks is driving increased displacements, leaving more people dependent on humanitarian assistance, while it continues disrupting assistance delivery and coinciding with international funding cuts. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Mozambique Food Security Outlook: October 2024 to May 2025
• Latest Mozambique Key Message Update: September 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Conflict: In Cabo Delgado, the ongoing conflict has intensified since early 2025, as NSAGs continue to escalate their violent activities. By the end of August, 519 attacks were reported, surpassing the 448 incidents reported in 2022, on track to be the worst year on record. The protracted conflict has severely impacted civilians, destroyed infrastructure, and undermined investments in areas such as Ancuabe, Balama, Chiúre, Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Montepuez, Muidumbe, Quissanga, Meluco, and Nangade. Insecurity has also spread into parts of Nampula Province, specifically into Memba and Eráti districts, contributing to an increased internally displaced persons (IDP) population (Figure 1). According to the latest IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Round 22 report, conducted in February 2025, more than 609,200 people remain displaced across the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa, while nearly 701,500 have returned, reflecting an 18 percent decrease in IDPs and a 15 percent increase in returnees since the previous round (June 2024). However, due to the intensified attacks in recent months, the number of IDPs is likely to have increased since these surveys were conducted.

Weather shocks: Erratic rainfall and above-average temperatures during the 2024/25 agricultural season have primarily affected the semi-arid areas in the southern and central parts of the country (Figure 2). Recovery from the 2024 El Niño-induced drought has been limited, resulting in a second consecutive year of below-average agricultural production (the primary source of food and income), particularly in southern and parts of central areas. 

Macroeconomic challenges: The economy contracted by approximately 4 percent during the first quarter of 2025, primarily due to the combined effects of post-electoral violence and climate-related shocks, notably Cyclone Jude and the El Niño-induced drought, which disrupted most sectors of the economy. The post-election violence affected urban areas in particular: nearly 1,000 companies were impacted by the demonstrations, resulting in approximately 17,000 job losses, leading to an increase in urban unemployment and poverty. 

Staple food prices: In September 2025, maize grain prices in the southern region were 48 percent above the five-year average but remained stable compared to the previous year. Rice prices were significantly higher: approximately 70 percent above the five-year average and 42 percent above the previous year. Maize meal prices were 15 percent above the five-year average, but slightly below last year's price. In the central and northern zones, maize grain prices were relatively lower than both the five-year and last year’s average. The prices of rice and maize meal showed mixed trends when compared to the five-year average and last year's prices.

Humanitarian food assistance

As of September, the Mozambique Food Security Cluster reported that food assistance reached approximately 373,800 people across the country. Among those affected, 82 percent were impacted by conflict, while 18 percent were affected by cyclones in Nampula and Cabo Delgado. Humanitarian food assistance provided nearly 40 percent of the monthly caloric needs for beneficiaries affected by conflict, and up to 80 percent for those receiving the General Food Distribution kit for Cyclone Jude. However, humanitarian access has become increasingly difficult due to security issues and access constraints.

Northern areas

Conflict remains the primary driver of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in Cabo Delgado province and parts of northern Nampula province. Attacks by NSAGs cause widespread displacement, disruption of livelihoods, and restricted access to humanitarian assistance. Since the beginning of 2025, violence has intensified, leading to an increase in the number of IDPs and constraining households’ access to food and income, which sustains high humanitarian needs. The most urgent needs among displaced populations include food, shelter, and protection. Some families that have relocated to safer areas have been provided with land and humanitarian assistance to restart food production. However, due to high numbers of IDPs, many remain dependent on assistance and lack the means to support themselves. Additionally, persistent land disputes between displaced and host communities, and limited access to productive resources, further prevent engagement in, or rebuilding of, livelihoods and are driving widening food consumption gaps. 

Humanitarian food assistance is making a considerable impact by reducing food consumption gaps in accessible areas of the Macomia, Quissanga, and Nangade districts, leading to a relative improvement in acute food security, as Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected in relatively stable areas. 

Access to information about the livelihoods of households in inaccessible areas of several districts falling within the North-Central Coastal Fishing livelihood zone and other less secure areas remains restricted due to security concerns. Information from various sources indicates that subsistence agriculture and livelihood activities have been disrupted as communities prioritize safety over production. This focus on safety has created challenges in accessing the food necessary to meet their minimum caloric needs. Many community members are compelled to spend nights in the forest, only returning home during the day, which exposes them to precarious conditions away from their homes. These areas, which are not covered by humanitarian food assistance, continue to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Recently, NSAGs have begun adopting socialization strategies aimed at engaging local communities, which is expected to encourage some households to remain in their original home or motivate IDPs to return. However, it is not likely to improve food security outcomes in the near term.

FEWS NET’s rapid field assessment in early September 2025, conducted in relatively safe locations including the districts of Pemba, Mecúfi, Metuge, and parts of Montepuez, shows that the 2024/25 agricultural production was slightly better than the previous year, but remained below the five-year average. Favorable rainfall from January to May 2025 facilitated a partial recovery from Cyclone Chido losses, supporting many households in maintaining food stocks, particularly of cassava, and also generating some income for food purchases from the local markets. losses, supporting many households in maintaining food stocks, particularly of cassava, and also generating some income for food purchases from the local markets.

The availability of agricultural products such as maize grain, dried cassava, and vegetables supported lower food prices compared to both last year and the five-year average, improving households’ purchasing power. For instance, prices of maize were between 38 percent and 44 percent below last year, contributing to increased food consumption. However, IDPs have depleted their food stocks atypically early due to limited production capacity. 

Southern and central areas

Many poor households in the southern and parts of the central semi-arid regions are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes due to early depletion of food stocks following a second consecutive year of significantly below-average harvests. This situation has forced these households, which typically rely on their own agricultural production for food and income, to seek alternative coping strategies for survival. Some poor households who own poultry are selling them to buy mostly maize meal, which they supplement with less caloric foods such as leaves from various edible plants, a practice that only occurs in bad years or during the peak of the lean season in January/February. However, households without livestock have fewer income options and are limited to using forest resources, such as selling charcoal and firewood, traditional beverages, or building materials such as stakes, reeds, and straw. However, selling these products can be particularly difficult for people living in remote areas due to limited market access and long travel distances. In addition, prices for staple foods, particularly maize, are about 50 percent higher than the five-year average in the southern region, significantly reducing the purchasing power of poor households. In this situation, poor households in remote areas without livestock often have to adopt coping strategies to manage their limited food resources. These include reducing the number of meals they eat and the portion sizes, prioritizing food for children, sending family members to eat at the homes of relatives, and increasing their consumption of locally available wild foods. In some parts of the southern region, some families withdraw their children from school, especially when school meals are not provided.

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist in areas less affected by the poor rainfall or where the second season crop production was near average. In these regions, many households are meeting their minimum caloric needs but face difficulty covering essential non-food expenses. In contrast, Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are observed in most of Niassa, western Nampula, and parts of northern Tete, where 2024/25 agricultural production was near or above average, and households remain largely less market dependent, as is typical for the season.

An assessment of acute malnutrition conducted in 25 districts of the country revealed that between April and September 2025, the global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate among children under five was Critical at 15.2 percent in Chemba district and Serious at 10.6 percent in Muanza district, both in Sofala province in the central region. The GAM rates in Mopeia, Derre, Búzi, Caia, and Chibabava, also in the central region, were at Alert levels, ranging from 5 percent to 9.9 percent. In all other districts, including those in the northern and southern regions, the GAM rate was deemed Acceptable, remaining below 5 percent.

Urban areas

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist in approximately 38 percent of households that live in urban areas, particularly in Maputo and Matola, following the post-election violence. The destruction of public and private infrastructure has deepened existing inequalities, with poor households most affected by service disruptions and livelihood losses. Individuals who lost their jobs in the formal sector are turning to informal service sectors and small businesses to make up for their loss of income. Meanwhile, vulnerable households, including those led by children, the elderly, and widows, are among the most affected due to a lack of adequate social support. The destruction of public and private infrastructure has deepened existing inequalities, with poor households most affected by service disruptions and livelihood losses. Many poor households are shifting to informal service sectors and petty trade to compensate for lost income, while child-headed households, the elderly, and widows remain the most affected due to limited social support.

• A timely start to the October 2025-March 2026 rainfall is expected. Above-average rainfall is expected in southern Mozambique, with the likelihood of excessive rainfall events and flooding anticipated to increase with the start of the tropical cyclone season in November. Below-average rainfall is expected in parts of northern Mozambique.
• Temperature trends from October to December 2025 are likely to be above average in Cabo Delgado, much of Nampula, and localized areas of eastern Niassa. From January to March 2026, above-average temperatures are anticipated in Maputo, Nampula, Cabo Delgado, and the northern part of Zambezia.
• NSAG-driven violence is anticipated to continue throughout the projection period, particularly impacting southeastern Cabo Delgado. The actions and movements of these groups are likely to drive persistent insecurity. Additionally, surprise attacks may occasionally occur in the neighboring provinces of Niassa and Nampula.
• The Ministry of Agriculture, Environment, and Fisheries (MAAP) anticipates that much of the country will experience a moderate to high Water Requirement Satisfaction Index (WRSI), ranging from 60 to 100 percent. However, from October to December 2025, some areas in the northern region are expected to have a low WRSI of 60 percent or less.
• Access to agricultural inputs, such as seeds and fertilizers, is likely to be difficult for poor households in regions that have faced shocks over the past two years, particularly in the southern and central areas, as well as in conflict-affected areas of Cabo Delgado.
• Staple crop production is anticipated to be average to above-average across the country, supported by above-average and timely rainfall.
• Agricultural labor availability is expected to be near average. However, payments for agricultural labor — both cash and in-kind — particularly in areas that were impacted by shocks during the last rainy/agricultural season, may fall below average due to the decreased liquidity of middle and better-off households who hire labor for their farms.
• The challenging macroeconomic situation, characterized by rising urban unemployment, is expected to persist. Although rural areas may see some seasonal increase in income from agricultural labor with the onset of rains in November, incomes are likely to remain below average.
• In the south, maize grain prices are expected to remain above the five-year average (about 50 percent above average). However, in the central and northern regions, maize grain prices are expected to follow the seasonal trend of gradually increasing, but will remain below the five-year average and last year’s prices due to increased supply.

Humanitarian food assistance

• WFP has reduced the number of individuals receiving assistance, due to limited resources, in Cabo Delgado from approximately 550,000 in early 2025 to 425,000 through the first quarter of 2026. Although humanitarian assistance has been reduced, it is expected to continue in the districts of Macomia, Muidumbe, Nangade, and Quissanga. It is projected that HFA will reach over 20 percent of the total population in each of these districts, and the emergency assistance is likely to provide approximately 40 percent of the caloric needs through in-kind and cash-based transfers. WFP requires a total of USD 78.8 million in funding over the next six months (from November 2025 to April 2026), mainly for emergency response efforts to support 500,000 people in need, providing them with complete rations until the end of April 2026. Without additional support, WFP will be compelled to further scale down assistance.

Northern areas

In conflict-affected areas of Cabo Delgado, it is expected that Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will continue through May 2026 in parts of Ancuabe, Balama, Mocímboa da Praia, Quissanga, Chiúre, Ibo, Macomia, Mecúfi, Meluco, Muidumbe, and Namuno. Additionally, Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are projected to persist at least until February 2026 in parts of Nangade and Muidumbe districts, and through April 2026 in parts of Macomia and Quissanga districts, as the humanitarian food assistance narrows the food consumption gaps. The ongoing conflict-driven displacement and associated atmosphere of fear will continue to divert the population's attention from their typical livelihoods, constraining their abilities to access food and income. Given limited own production, many households will continue to rely on forest resources as a complementary source of food and income, as the availability of wild foods is expected to increase with the onset of rainfall in November/December. Households with access to the sea may engage in fishing; however, few can do so effectively due to insecurity and loss of fishing equipment to looting and damage from cyclones. With no food stocks, no humanitarian food assistance, and a focus on self-protection, many poor families will struggle to meet their daily food needs, leading to engagement in coping strategies such as prioritizing feeding children over adults and reducing meal sizes and frequency. Recent evidence indicates that NSAGs are shifting tactics by engaging with the local communities and adopting socialization strategies. This may encourage returning populations to gradually participate in subsistence activities, such as agriculture and fishing. However, significant improvement is unlikely in the short term, particularly during the 2025/26 season, due to a lack of inputs and resources necessary to resume production. For many households, humanitarian food assistance — where available — will continue to be a primary food source, though still insufficient to meet minimum caloric needs or to change area-level outcomes. Acute malnutrition is expected to deteriorate during the lean season but remain relatively low (Acceptable, <5 percent).

In relatively safer areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected, supported by increased food availability from the 2025 harvest. Many poor households will depend on their own production for food, or market purchases using income from crop sales. Food access for IDPs will vary by the level of integration into host communities: long-settled IDPs with access to land are experiencing relatively better conditions than new IDPs. IDPs with some financial capital are expected to engage in petty trade, while the majority will continue to rely on host community support or humanitarian assistance.

Southern and central areas

In the southern and central semi-arid areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist from October 2025 to March 2026, with some improvements following the seasonal trends in April and May 2026. The impact of the lean season is expected to worsen the existing acute food insecurity, limiting households’ access to food and income. Food prices are expected to rise and peak in January and February, further eroding the purchasing power of poor households. The primary sources of food and income (agricultural labor, forest products, charcoal and firewood sales) for these households are expected to remain below average. Households with small livestock, including poultry, may sell some to purchase food, while those without assets and living in remote areas will rely on managing limited food supplies. Households will likely employ coping strategies such as reducing the meal quantity and size, prioritizing feeding children, sending some family members to eat elsewhere, eating less preferred foods, withdrawing children from school unless meals are provided, and increasing consumption of wild foods. In less-affected areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will occur as most poor households meet their minimum food needs but struggle to afford essential non-food expenses such as seeds, veterinary services, school fees, and medical care. Between February and March 2026, some Stressed (IPC Phase 2) households are likely to deteriorate as their resources deplete. However, with a favorable forecast for the 2025/26 agricultural season, some improvement is anticipated from April to May 2026 as the main harvest increases food availability and consumption. Food prices are anticipated to decrease following seasonal patterns, enhancing the purchasing power of many poor households. As a result, several districts are expected to transition from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to either Stressed (IPC Phase 2) or Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes.

Urban areas

In urban and peri-urban areas, many poor households are expected to remain in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) as they continue to prioritize food over other basic needs. These households often rely on informal activities, such as petty trade and reselling goods. However, their incomes are increasingly reduced due to high competition for available income-earning opportunities. The poor households, particularly child-headed households, widows, and elders, who are unable to engage in income-earning activities and lack social support, will rely on assistance from relatives and neighbors and are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. FEWS NET’s analysis estimates 10 percent of the population across four municipal districts of Maputo city (Kamavota, Kamubukwana, Kanyaka, and Katembe) are projected to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes due to their food consumption gaps, while the major urban areas are projected to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, with slight improvement following seasonal trends and income earned from informal employments.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Tropical Cyclones and/or floods impacting high-production areas.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Depending on the scale and frequency, tropical cyclones or flooding could cause a major disruption to agricultural production through damage to standing crops and livestock, disruptions to livelihood activities, and destruction of infrastructure. The impact would be particularly severe if the hazard occurs during flowering or maturation stages of crop development, when recovery or replanting opportunities are minimal. The main concern revolves around poor households that have experienced two consecutive below-average harvests. These households may face a third consecutive year of poor harvests, further limiting labor opportunities, increasing competition for labor work, and reducing income-earning capacity. Households are likely to apply coping strategies such as reducing the number and size of meals and increasing reliance on wild food consumption as they face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

Conflict areas in Cabo Delgado

The occurrence of large-scale attacks could cause increased internal displacements.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The occurrence of larger-scale attacks is likely to drive increased internal displacement, disrupting the typical food and income sources for the affected households and further increasing dependence on emergency assistance, which remains constrained by insecurity and funding shortfalls. As IDPs are unable to meet their minimum food needs and are likely to employ coping strategies, including reducing the number and size of meals, increasing consumption of wild foods, and sending family members elsewhere to access food, they are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse food security outcomes, particularly in insecure areas. Conversely, depending on the location or magnitude of the attacks, access to areas classified as Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) could be restricted, potentially reverting them to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.