Crisis outcomes expected from climate and conflict in north, central, and south

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in the conflict-affected zones in Cabo Delgado. These zones have seen an increase in attacks by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) since the year began. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the security situation in Cabo Delgado remained highly volatile in July. Attacks on civilians by NSAGs and armed clashes between NSAGs and Mozambique's security forces led to the displacement of over 56,200 people. From October 2025 to January 2026, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist and likely expand to new areas due to the evolving insurgency tactics, shifting from territorial control to highly mobile and dispersed operations that aim to overwhelm both security forces and civilians.
• Following two consecutive years of poor harvests, many poor households in southern and central Mozambique are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Poor households in these areas are resorting to coping strategies indicative of Crisis outcomes, as they were unable to recover in the 2024/25 season from the effects of the 2023-2024 El Niño-induced drought. In these areas some districts are projected to deteriorate from Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as food stocks are depleted and purchasing power is below average. Furthermore, households facing two consecutive years of poor harvests are expected to have reduced coping abilities.
• As of July, the Mozambique Food Security Cluster reported food assistance reached around 78,500 people (roughly 50 percent affected by conflict and 50 percent by cyclones in Cabo Delgado and Nampula). In conflict affected-areas, food assistance met around 40 percent of beneficiaries' monthly caloric needs. The General Food Distribution kit for Cyclones Chido and Jude covers nearly 80 percent of daily caloric requirements for a month. Agricultural support was given to 46,265 individuals affected by conflict, cyclones, and drought. Additionally, 1,015 individuals received assistance through income-generating activities. WFP Mozambique, responsible for 98 percent of humanitarian food assistance in Cabo Delgado, is facing resource shortages for ongoing operations, with cash-based transfer assistance expected to run out by November 2025.
• In July, maize grain prices were stable nationwide, typical for the post-harvest period. However, prices in the southern zones were over 50 percent higher than the five-year average and over 20 percent higher than last year, affecting the purchasing power of many poor households. In contrast, prices in the central and northern regions were 20-50 percent lower than the five-year average due to improved agroclimatic conditions. Rice and maize meal prices remained stable from June to July but were 20-70 percent above the five-year average, with the highest increases in the southern zone.

Conflict-affected areas of Cabo Delgado. According to OCHA, the security situation in Cabo Delgado remained highly volatile in July. Attacks on civilians by NSAGs and armed clashes between NSAGs and Mozambique's security forces led to the displacement of over 56,200 people. In response, as the number of recorded incidents followed an increasing trend in July, two new sites for internally displaced persons (IDPs) were established in Macomia Sede, in addition to the six existing IDP camps.

A notable geographic shift in violence was also observed, expanding southward into Ancuabe, Chiúre, and Erati (Nampula). This expansion further restricted road access to Macomia. OCHA estimates that more than 208,100 civilians have been impacted — both directly and indirectly — by the violence. A total of 47 attacks targeting civilians were reported in July, which included killings, abductions, extortion, and looting, resulting in at least 29 deaths and 69 abductions. 

Second agricultural season. The second agricultural season is ongoing, following the harvests from the first and main agricultural season. The second season focuses on vegetable cultivation, including cabbage, lettuce, tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers, okra, onions, and other vegetables. It is typically practiced in areas with access to irrigation and is mainly intended for immediate consumption and sale.

The harvesting and sale of these vegetables are underway, which helps increase the vegetable consumption and income of the families involved, particularly those in low-lying areas with the potential for a second agricultural season and proximity to urban markets. In some regions, maize is also produced, primarily for green consumption rather than grain, due to low residual moisture content.

However, many areas are unable to grow vegetables in the second agricultural season due to unfavorable agroclimatic conditions, including a lack of residual moisture and limited water sources for irrigation.

Macroeconomic situation. Mozambique recorded a near 4 percent GDP contraction in the first quarter of 2025. According to the government, this decline is partially due to violent post-election demonstrations, an increase in attacks by NSAGs in some districts of Cabo Delgado, and the occurrence of Cyclones Dikeledi and Jude. 

As of June, Mozambique recorded a declining trend in revenue and spending. The reduction in spending, especially its impact on expenditures such as hiring new employees, may further compound the already high levels of unemployment (particularly in urban areas, which significantly increased following the post-election demonstrations).

In July, the National Statistics Institute (INE) reported an annual national headline inflation rate of nearly 4 percent, the lowest recorded since December 2024; however, food inflation is nearly 9 percent. Components affecting the majority of the population, such as housing, water, electricity, and other fuels, rose slightly by approximately 0.7 percent, while transport service prices remained stable. Tete City experienced the highest price increase at around 7 percent, while Quelimane recorded the lowest at about 2.1 percent.

According to INE, monthly inflation remained stable between June and July. The food had a deflation of 0.8 percent, while transport service prices remained unchanged. Within the food products category, notable price declines were seen for cabbage, lettuce, tomatoes, and onions, attributed to ongoing second season harvests. Diesel and gasoline prices also fell by about 4.8 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. However, certain products, such as charcoal and beef, saw price increases of around 4.6 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively, along with minor increases for dried fish, fresh fish, and wheat bread.

National inflation rates may obscure the more severe impacts of high food prices in hard-to-access remote and semi-arid areas. In these regions, many poor households that have endured more than two years of consecutive poor harvests face challenges in accessing food in local markets due to the high prices of essential food items.

Prices of maize grain, maize meal, and rice. In July, maize grain prices followed the seasonal trend in most of the country, typical for the post-harvest period (Figure 1). However, in the southern region, maize prices remain over 50 percent higher than the five-year average and more than 20 percent higher than last year. This situation is negatively impacting the purchasing power for many poor households that have little to no food reserves and struggle to earn a living.

In contrast, maize grain prices in the central and northern regions were 20-50 percent lower than the five-year average in July, supported by a generally favorable 2025 harvest. Compared to last year, maize prices in these regions decreased by approximately 47 percent.

Rice prices also remained stable from June to July, but are currently 40-70 percent above the five-year average. The southern region saw the highest increases, while the central zone experienced the lowest. When compared to the previous year, rice prices were 20-55 percent above average, with the most significant increases again in the south.

Maize meal prices were stable from June to July and are now 20-35 percent higher than the five-year average, with the largest increase in the central zone and the smallest in the south. Compared to the previous year, maize meal prices remained relatively unchanged in the southern and northern zones, but were about 20 percent higher in the central zone.

Humanitarian food assistance. As of July, the Mozambique Food Security Cluster reported that food assistance has reached around 78,500 people (roughly 50 percent affected by conflict and 50 percent by cyclones in Cabo Delgado and Nampula). Additionally, support was provided to more than 12,200 people in Niassa under Social Protection and to 55 individuals in Sofala for anticipatory drought response actions. 

In conflict-affected areas, food assistance met about 40 percent of the monthly caloric needs of the beneficiaries. The General Food Distribution kit, designed for responses to Cyclones Chido and Jude, effectively supports beneficiaries for a month, covering nearly 80 percent of their daily caloric requirements. 

According to OCHA, as of July 31, the establishment of checkpoints along the main routes significantly restricted humanitarian access, delaying assistance for over 85,000 people in Macomia and Muidumbe. In response to the growing threats, armed escorts are in place between Macomia Sede and Oasse to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches those in need.

Agricultural support was provided to 1,765 individuals affected by conflict, 18,850 individuals impacted by cyclones, and 25,650 beneficiaries in response to drought. Furthermore, income-generation support was offered to around 1,015 individuals as part of a development program. 

Currently, there is significant concern regarding the scarcity of resources for humanitarian response following funding cuts. According to the Global Perspective Human Stories from the UN, only 19 percent of Mozambique's Humanitarian Response Plan for 2025 had been funded. Of the 352 million USD requested, only 66 million USD has been received, forcing agencies to reduce their response targets by more than 70 percent. 

WFP Mozambique, which represents 98 percent of humanitarian food assistance in Cabo Delgado, is facing a critical shortage of resources for conflict operations in the northern region. A pipeline break for cash-based transfer assistance is anticipated as early as November 2025.

FEWS NET’s scenario development process is used to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

• October to December rainfall is expected to be above-average in southern Mozambique, near-average in the central zone, and below-average in northern Mozambique. Cyclones may be associated with flooding that may be further enhanced by the weak trend of the La Niña phenomenon through January 2026.
• Above-average temperatures are expected across Mozambique through January 2026, except for some southern areas of the region that may experience average temperatures due to increased chances of above-average rainfall.
• NSAG violence is expected to persist during the coming months, primarily impacting the southeastern region of Cabo Delgado. The actions and movements of these groups are likely to create a continuous atmosphere of insecurity throughout the scenario period. Additionally, surprise attacks may occasionally occur in the neighboring Niassa and Nampula provinces.
• Second season vegetable production is likely to be below average due to insufficient residual moisture, particularly in the southern areas of the country. However, in areas with irrigation systems, production levels remain normal.
• A timely start to the rainy and agricultural season is anticipated, and the availability of agricultural work is expected to be close to average. However, due to the impacts of previous shocks, payments for agricultural labor — both in cash and in-kind — are anticipated to be below average due to reduced liquidity among middle and wealthy households.
• The difficult macroeconomic situation, marked by increasing urban unemployment, is projected to persist throughout the forecast period. While rural areas may see some increase in income through agricultural work with the onset of rains in November, opportunities will likely remain below average.
• In the southern region, maize grain prices are expected to remain above the five-year average throughout the scenario period, with an average margin of 50 percent above normal. However, in the central and northern zones, maize grain prices are expected to follow the same trend as observed in July, due to greater availability compared to the southern region. Rice prices, which are primarily determined by imports, and maize meal prices, which are influenced by imported maize grain used in processing, are likely to remain relatively stable.
• Humanitarian assistance (primarily from the WFP) is likely to face a pipeline break for cash-based transfer assistance as early as November 2025, and by early 2026 for in-kind assistance.

Table 1. Key sources of evidence FEWS NET analysts incorporated into the development of the above assumptions

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

From August to September 2025, districts that struggled with two consecutive poor seasons, especially in the semi-arid areas of the south and areas of the central zone, will likely experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. In these districts, many poor households that have already depleted their food stocks three months on average ahead of the typical period, and with below-average purchasing power, are expected to face gaps in meeting their minimum food needs. Some families that own chickens or ducks may resort to an atypical increase in the sale of these birds to purchase food. However, a significant number of poor households do not own animals to sell and may adopt consumption-based coping strategies, which include skipping meals, reducing portion sizes, and increasing their consumption of wild foods.

In areas near the main transportation corridors in the southern and central zones, more households are expected to turn to cutting and burning charcoal to sell to intermediaries who transport it to larger urban centers. However, government restrictions imposed last year prohibited the transport of charcoal without a license, primarily affecting the poorest households. These households produce little charcoal and do not receive preference from large, licensed operators, resulting in below-average income from this source.

In the conflict-affected areas of Cabo Delgado, the volatile situation and persistent insecurity will continue to displace thousands of residents. Some displaced individuals may need to move multiple times, as demonstrated during the recent attack in the Chiúre District.  These people are forced to leave their homes, livelihoods, and food stocks, prompting them to search for new opportunities to sustain themselves. Along with food, these families require humanitarian assistance to enhance their food security. Additionally, they require shelter and healthcare services in IDP centers. Consequently, ongoing insecurity in these regions is likely to increase the number of individuals in need of emergency assistance. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist in most eastern districts of Cabo Delgado, with some households in hard-to-reach areas potentially facing even worse conditions.  

In southern and central regions less affected by shocks, households are likely to experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. While these households can meet their minimum food needs, they may face challenges meeting non-food needs such as healthcare, animal medicines, and agricultural inputs. Households with access to low-lying land that retain residual moisture or access to irrigation systems will produce vegetables until the end of September, helping to stabilize their consumption levels and maintain Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes.

From October 2025 to January 2026, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to expand as own-produced food stocks are depleted and households become increasingly market reliant amid high and increasing food prices (typical for the lean season), particularly in the southern zone of the country. 

Overall, poor households without livestock to sell and with low incomes — whether from agricultural labor or other sources such as the sale of forest resources — will continue to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) conditions through January 2026. These households will likely be forced to adopt Crisis-level coping strategies, such as sending family members to eat elsewhere, reducing the size or frequency of meals, opting for cheaper and less preferred foods, prioritizing feeding children, relying on support from family or friends, and atypical consumption of wild foods. There may be an increase in the number of children withdrawn from school due to food shortages, mainly in schools without meals.

In conflict-affected areas of Cabo Delgado, a similar situation is expected to remain through January 2026, with several districts continuing to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. NSAG attacks are likely to affect new areas due to the evolving insurgency tactics, shifting from territorial control to highly mobile and dispersed operations. Displaced households will require additional time to resettle and return to their normal activities in host areas. They will also need humanitarian support to enhance their food consumption levels and gradually resume their usual routines.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

Delayed and erratic start of rainfall

A late and erratic onset of the 2025/26 agricultural season may result in delayed availability of agricultural labor. Despite below-average wage rates (both cash and in-kind), a significant reduction in income could further deteriorate food consumption levels among poorer households that are already market dependent amid poor purchasing power and struggling to meet their food needs, and could also result in an increase in the number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, specifically in areas of southern Mozambique.

The occurrence of cyclones exceeds projections both in number and intensity

An increase in cyclones could lead to higher-than-expected levels of acute food insecurity. Depending on the affected areas and specific timing of the agricultural season, the food insecurity outcomes are likely to worsen.

Sharp increase in staple food prices in the south and conflict-affected areas

Sharply increased staple food prices, particularly in the southern zone, would likely exacerbate acute food insecurity by further diminishing the purchasing power of poor and very poor market-dependent households. As a result, a further decline in food consumption could be expected, increasing the number of people in need while the area remains in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).