Increased food assistance needs expected through May 2026 following intensified conflict in the east

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), are expected through May 2026 in the worst conflicted-affected areas in the eastern part of the country. Although millions of displaced households have returned (some forcibly), new forced displacements are expected to continue in contested areas, eroding local livelihoods. In areas expected to remain under the control of government forces or M23, improved security will allow a partial resumption of agricultural activities, temporarily reducing the proportion of the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse following harvests. However, the improvement in food consumption is not expected to be sustained at the same level beyond March, given the anticipated slightly below-average due to limited access to agricultural inputs after years of displacement and poor production.
• Despite a decrease in conflict intensity and a slight increase in household participation in agricultural activities, Kwamouth territory is expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through May 2026. Season 2 harvests are expected to be below-average due to the atypically low level of financial resources available for agricultural inputs. Moreover, many households are only beginning to recover economically from repeated displacements and several years of poor harvests. Although the situation has stabilized, it remains precarious.
• FEWS NET estimates that between 16-16.99 million people will be in need of humanitarian food assistance during the major lean season from October to December 2025. Even though the number of people in need will decrease in the post-harvest period (January to March 2026), needs will remain high in areas of intense conflict.
• The areas of highest concern are the territories of Djugu (Ituri), Lubero (North Kivu), Uvira (South Kivu), and pockets of Rutshuru, Masisi, and Walikale in North Kivu where households are at high risk of food consumption deficits due to volatile conflict dynamics.

The analysis presented here is based on information available as of October 21, 2025.

Agriculture is crucial for livelihoods throughout the country. In rural areas, households depend heavily on temporary agricultural labor, as well as gathering, forest products, and fishing products, for consumption and sale. The month of June marks the harvest of Season 1, which is smaller than the Season 2 harvest in January. In the Southeast, there is only one agricultural season, with the harvest beginning in April. Except for the far Southeast, where maize is the key crop, cassava is the main staple food and is harvested year-round.

Conflict is the major driver of acute food insecurity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Although chronic poverty is widespread and exacerbated by structural factors such as weak infrastructure and services, much of the country is resilient to acute food insecurity due to a favorable climate and abundant regular rainfall. In the absence of severe shocks, most households meet their kilocalorie needs and non-food needs through their own production and purchases. However, DRC has experienced prolonged conflicts due to inter-ethnic tensions and competition for its mineral resources, with a marked intensification of conflict since 2021 in: the Northeast with the reemergence of the M23 rebellion in North Kivu after almost 10 years of dormancy; the expansion of Ugandan terrorists from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Ituri; and the CODECO and CRP militias that also plague Ituri. Additionally, intense intercommunal conflict has been raging in Mai-Ndombe Province in the southwest, although security conditions have begun to improve in recent months. Insecurity in conflict zones limits access to fields, reducing cultivated areas or leading to their abandonment, disrupting households' ability to feed themselves through both agriculture and fishing. Additionally, declining production and market disruption have led to rising food prices, limiting household access to food.

At the beginning of 2025, the rapid intensification and territorial expansion of the M23 rebellion conflict caused massive population displacements and disrupted household participation in Season 2 harvests and Season 1 planting activities. The ADF took advantage of the regional security crisis to significantly increase the frequency of its attacks. Of all the armed conflicts in DRC, the one involving the ADF is the most volatile and unpredictable and has the greatest impact on food security, health, education, and humanitarian aid operations. ADF terrorists conduct a “scorched-earth” policy that destroys schools, health facilities, population livelihoods, and even targets displaced persons and refugee camps, sowing terror among civilians. Between 2020 and 2025, the ADF was responsible for approximately one quarter of reported violence against civilians in eastern DRC, making it the non-state armed group (NSAG) most frequently involved in such violence, until the expansion of M23 activities.

The DRC faces other cumulative shocks, including seasonal flooding and macroeconomic instability. Excessive rainfall recorded in 2023 and 2024 caused historic flooding, landslides, as well as destruction of infrastructure and household assets. These phenomena were intense in the central basin along the Congo River and its tributaries. Multiple shocks have maintained high assistance needs throughout the year, although some improvements are currently ongoing compared to the situation approximately two years ago. Epidemics (human, plant health, and zoonotic) also constitute a chronic problem in DRC. However, these epidemics by themselves do not generally prevent households from meeting their minimum food needs, due to well-diversified livelihood strategies and the absence of major shocks in the majority of the country. Moreover, the number of people directly affected by these epidemics is generally not significant enough to have an impact on acute food insecurity on a larger scale.

Learn more

The following links provide additional information:

• Democratic Republic of Congo Key Message Update: July 2025
• Democratic Republic of Congo Key Message Updates: August and September 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Conflict in the eastern part of the country: Conflict dynamics have changed considerably this year, following the intensification and territorial expansion of the M23 conflict in early 2025. At this time, the front lines are relatively static, with each party attempting to consolidate its position for negotiations. Nevertheless, the major conflicts in the eastern part of the country continue to cause incessant population movements, disrupt main trade flows and market functioning, and erode the livelihoods of households caught in the violence. Despite mediation efforts, the various belligerents continue to clash on the ground in South Kivu and North Kivu. Meanwhile, the various Wazalendo groups assert their presence with sporadic attacks.

Since mid-2025, improved security in areas where the FARDC or M23 have consolidated control has led to massive returns to places of origin (Figure 1), including some forced returns. Returns are concentrated in North Kivu, which is predominantly under M23 control. However, ongoing clashes in some parts of South Kivu continue to displace populations southward to Tanganyika, which is already facing security problems related to intercommunal conflicts. Although internally displaced persons (IDPs) represent only a small portion of the provincial population, the territory of Kalemie hosts a relatively higher concentration of them.

In the northern part of North Kivu and southern Ituri, the ADF continues to carry out an increasing number of attacks against civilians, despite joint operations by the FARDC (the Congolese army) and the UPDF (the Ugandan army). In recent months, these terrorists have massacred hundreds of civilians, particularly in the localities of Komanda and Ntoyo.

Also in Ituri, abuses by other armed groups continue against civilians (with the exception of the territory of Aru). Despite the reaffirmed commitment to peace by six armed groups in August 2025, other groups remain active, and in October, the CRP militia intensified its sporadic attacks against the FARDC and civilians in several localities of Djugu. The FARDC, supported by MONUSCO, continues operations to track down these armed groups that continue to clash for control of mining sites and attacks against displaced persons' sites.

Conflict in the western part of the country: The security situation in Kwamouth is improving compared to the previous two years. Certain government initiatives in August 2025 have significantly reduced security tensions. This situation has allowed for relative calm and significant flows of returnees to Kwamouth. As of August 2025, nearly 97,118 people have returned to Mai-Ndombe Province this year, most of whom were displaced from Kwamouth. However, attacks by Mobondo militiamen against the civilian population have continued in recent months in the neighboring territory of Bandundu, although at a lower intensity than that observed in recent years.

Seasonal flooding: The Season 1 floods, especially in the central basin, were less severe than in previous years. The flooding remained relatively localized, affecting a significantly smaller proportion of the population. So far, this trend has continued during this Season 2, although rainfall and associated risks of localized seasonal flooding are just beginning to reach their peak in mid-October. However, water levels in Lake Tanganyika and Lake Albert remain close to their historical records, presenting an increased risk of flooding for local populations. In addition, several ports on the shores of Lake Tanganyika remain unusable or difficult to access. Trade with Tanzania, a key supplier of maize, has become difficult, increasing prices.

Agricultural production: Despite favorable agroclimatic conditions, conflicts continue to severely disrupt access to fields at the beginning of the agricultural season. Insecurity reduces agricultural labor opportunities and wages, elements particularly important for very poor households and IDPs. In addition, some armed groups engage in looting of harvests and livestock. In other areas, improved security has allowed households to resume agriculture, although cultivated areas remain atypically reduced due to limited access to essential agricultural inputs and financial resources. Households affected by previous floods are also struggling to obtain seeds, which is hindering agricultural recovery.

Non-agricultural labor (mining activities): Mineral production continues to increase and prices continue to improve, largely due to changes made to the export regime. Between February and October 2025, the price of cobalt metal and cobalt hydroxide increased by 92 and 194 percent, respectively. This has stimulated labor demand and associated income in mining areas, particularly in the Katanga provinces.

Monetary instability: The Central Bank of Congo announced the sale of 50 million USD on the interbank market on August 18, 2025, with the stated aim of strengthening the CDF after more than two years of sustained depreciation. The rapid appreciation of 21.5 percent (as of October 17, 2025) has likely reduced margins and caused losses for currency traders (Figure 2). Small traders have been disrupted by stocks purchased at the old rate and are struggling to adjust prices.

Household purchasing power: Inflation continues to gradually decline, falling from 15.1 percent last year to 7.8 percent in September 2025. Inflation is close to the medium-term target of 7 percent, and its slowdown, coupled with the recent appreciation of the currency, slightly benefits household purchasing power. However, food prices remain high, especially in conflict hotspots, and overall purchasing power remains limited after years of high inflation and currency depreciation.

Humanitarian food assistance

Historically, areas affected by conflict and flooding in eastern DRC have received significant volumes of humanitarian food assistance. FEWS NET is aware that significant distributions of humanitarian food assistance are likely ongoing in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. However, FEWS NET has not been able to obtain access to distribution plans (including number of beneficiaries and ration sizes) for the month of October, which limits its ability to assess potential impacts on current acute food insecurity outcomes at the area level.

Conflict zones (Northeast DRC and Kwamouth): In these conflict-affected areas, households cannot safely carry out their livelihood activities, resulting in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Many are unable to leave their homes or sites to access fields or other livelihoods for own production, or venture into forest areas to hunt or gather food, depriving them of stable food sources. This period of increasing food insecurity coincides with the current peak of the lean season, forcing households to resort to coping strategies that jeopardize their future livelihoods. Newly displaced households, whose coping capacities have been severely eroded after several repeated displacements, are most vulnerable to food insecurity and are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). These households may be forced to resort to extreme coping strategies, such as begging or illicit activities; they are primarily located in the provinces of North Kivu (territories of Masisi, Walikale, and Lubero), South Kivu (territories of Uvira, Fizi, Mwenga, and Walungu), and Ituri (territory of Djugu).

A larger proportion of displaced persons in Djugu are living with host families than FEWS NET previously assessed, and the majority are concentrated in a single health zone (Lita), located in the relatively densely populated livelihood zone CD13. FEWS NET no longer assesses that Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes at the area level are the most likely scenario in the absence of humanitarian food assistance.

In other areas in North Kivu where M23 has consolidated control and in Mai-Ndombe, most poor households are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Although security conditions remain volatile, millions of formerly displaced households have returned. These returnees continue to experience challenges in reviving their livelihoods, including access to seeds and agricultural tools for farmers. Households that were able to harvest crops or receive in-kind payments during Season 1 risk seeing their stocks depleted prematurely due to below-average harvests, resulting in an early start to the lean season. These households are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), as it is difficult for them to meet their basic needs given the strong competition for poorly paid casual jobs. Many households will be forced to consume cheaper and less preferred foods, reduce meal size and quantity, or decrease other essential expenditures, such as health or education.

Central basin zones: Many poor households in the central basin zones (particularly Équateur Province) that suffered significant crop and asset losses during the historically severe floods of the last two agricultural seasons (in the territories of Bolomba and Lukolela), are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. During the current height of the lean season, many of these households are likely attempting to mitigate widening consumption deficits following premature depletion of food stocks. As a result, poor households are likely reducing their health and education expenditures. In other areas less affected by flooding, a large proportion of poor households are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, due to the seasonal increase in already elevated transportation costs given the remoteness of these areas. Although these households can hunt, fish, and gather to supplement their access to food, they will likely have difficulty meeting their essential non-food needs. These households are likely consuming less food or selling atypically high quantities of poultry.

Southeast zone (former Haut-Katanga Province): In this area, Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are ongoing at the area level, given the ability of poor households to meet their minimum food and non-food needs through their own production or in-kind work, mining activities, and small businesses, as well as through temporary agricultural work opportunities for the main season. In regions recovering from severe flooding and also facing the challenge of inter-ethnic conflicts and high concentration of IDPs, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are likely ongoing.

Southwest zones (Kinshasa, Bandundu, Kongo-Central): The stability and socioeconomic advantages of the city of Kinshasa enable households in these areas to generate income and access food in local markets, supporting Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. This phenomenon is reinforced by the strengthening of the CDF and other government measures,such as the reduction in fuel prices. Households in these areas depend on agricultural labor, small trade, early sale of livestock, fishing, hunting, and gathering to meet their food and non-food needs.

• Persistent conflicts throughout the projection period, with particularly high levels of violence in the east and southwest of the country, will continue to cause household displacement and severely disrupt access to livelihoods and income.
• According to the FEWS NET Agroclimatology Team, rainfall from October to December is expected to be average, with below-average rainfall in the southeast, northeast, and parts of south-central DRC.
• Rainfall from January to March is expected to be below average in the southwest, above average in the north and some central regions, and near average elsewhere.
• Given the increasingly irregular rainfall recorded in DRC over the past two years, the risk of a third consecutive year of devastating flash floods persists, particularly during the peak seasonal flooding period from October to November, in low-lying areas (notably the central basin and along the shores of Lakes Tanganyika and Albert).
• Agricultural production will remain below average, with localized declines expected in areas most affected by conflict or flooding. At the country level, production is expected to be near average given favorable forecasts.
• Although agricultural declines are expected, the return of more than 3.28 million IDPs may foster an atypical recovery in household participation in agricultural activities, contributing to improved food availability and access.
• The inflation rate will continue its downward trend and is expected to continue decreasing gradually. This trend will be supported by the recent strong appreciation of the local currency.
• In the medium term, the repercussions of this appreciation on household purchasing power are expected to remain mixed: while import prices are expected to decline, the adjustment period has created short-term frictions in the market and has likely disrupted small business activities.
• Despite the mitigation of inflationary pressures, prices of basic food commodities are expected to remain above average, particularly in conflict zones. However, imported maize prices are expected to be significantly lower than last year due to improved regional supply.
• Economic growth is expected to slow due to the weakening expansion of mining production, with a decline in the GDP growth rate from 6.5 percent last year to 5.1 percent this year. This will likely have consequences for investments and economic opportunities. Furthermore, the escalation of the conflict has increased the national budget deficit due to increased security expenditures and public investments.
• Despite peace talks between the government and M23, it is unlikely that M23 will abandon the areas under its control in North and South Kivu. The front lines are expected to remain relatively stable until May 2026.
• Clashes with the FARDC, Wazalendo militias, and other armed groups are expected to continue, although with less intensity than in early 2025, particularly in the territories of South Kivu (territories of Uvira, Mwenga, Fizi, and Kalehe) and North Kivu (territories of Walikale, Lubero, and Masisi). New forced displacements are likely, but the total number of IDPs is expected to remain lower than in recent years, given the previous massive departures.
• Attacks against civilians by the ADF in the territories of Lubero, Oicha, Beni, Irumu, and Mambasa are expected to continue during the projection period. However, despite an increase in the frequency of attacks, their impact on the local population is expected to remain broadly similar to that of 2024.
• The intensification of joint operations conducted by Congolese and Ugandan forces will continue to progressively weaken the operational capabilities of the ADF. Attacks are expected to become less significant and less complex, and to focus more on populations living in more remote areas in order to loot their food reserves and other resources.
• In Ituri, these armed groups will remain active and continue to commit abuses against rival communities, due to the slow progress of the Community Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (PDDRC-S) amid lack of funding. Conflicts are expected to continue sporadically, with a lower incident number than the previous year. Thousands of IDPs will remain displaced during the projection period.
• In Mai-Ndombe, intercommunal conflicts are expected to continue sporadically, with fewer incidents compared to the levels observed in recent years. The recent improvements in security conditions in most areas of Kwamouth territory are expected to continue, although the situation remains precarious, and a continued influx of returnees is expected.

Humanitarian food assistance

• FEWS NET is aware that significant distributions of humanitarian food assistance are likely to continue in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. However, FEWS NET has not been able to obtain access to distribution plans (including the number of beneficiaries and ration sizes), which limits its ability to assess the potential impacts on current acute food insecurity outcomes at the area level. Given funding difficulties, which have resulted in reductions in the number of beneficiaries and ration sizes, it is not possible at this time to conduct an analysis based on historical trends.

Conflict zones (Northeast DRC and Kwamouth): Between October 2025 and January 2026, a period that coincides with the major lean season, most of these areas will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In the tension hotspots in Ituri, South Kivu, and North Kivu, where insecurity significantly restricts access to land, natural resources, and other sources of income, an increase in people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) compared to last year is expected, after at least two severely disrupted harvests. The period from October to January includes the resumption of Season 2 agricultural work and the peak of the lean season in November. Food consumption will continue to deteriorate until the start of the green harvest in mid-December, which will only facilitate a limited decrease in food prices. Very poor and recently displaced households are expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and will likely be forced to resort to begging, selling remaining assets, or illicit activities to attempt to mitigate their food deficits. In areas where security conditions permit, poor households may engage in temporary agricultural activities, but exceptionally low access to agricultural inputs and limited hiring capacity will restrict income from these sources. Until the arrival of the Season 2 harvest, households in these regions will depend heavily on increasingly expensive food supplies and will likely resort to negative coping strategies, such as reducing meal numbers and consuming cheaper and less preferred foods.

From February to May 2026, these conflict zones are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with a significant proportion of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the areas most affected by clashes. Between February and March, the proportion of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse will be relatively lower, as households that were able to cultivate will have access to their own stocks, despite the low level of harvests from the previous season. From March onwards, the Season 1 lean season is expected and food consumption will deteriorate. Thus, the proportion of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse will also begin to increase again.

Central basin zones: Between October and January 2025, the persistent impacts of past severe flooding are expected to result in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in the territories of Bolomba and Basoko in Équateur. During this period, a deterioration in household food consumption will be observed. Households will likely employ coping strategies such as consuming cheaper and less preferred foods, reducing meal size and quantity, or decreasing other essential expenditures, such as health or education. Even though some households risk finding themselves in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in other areas of Équateur, the absence of widespread severe flooding during the last agricultural season has allowed some households to begin their economic recovery, improving outcomes at the regional level. Other provinces in east-central DRC  (notably Sankuru, Lomami, and most of Maniema) will be Stressed (IPC Phase 2). They face higher transport costs, which leads to relatively large price increases during the rainy season.

Between February and May 2025, the areas most exposed to flooding (territories of Bolomba and Basoko) will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). The Season 2 harvests should improve food availability and household access to locally produced foods, although very poor households may still struggle to meet their food needs as they continue their economic recovery. Other agricultural households will be able to improve their food consumption through access to their own production. However, harvests will be below average in localized areas and early depletion of stocks will be expected, maintaining Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in areas less exposed to flooding. In the provinces of Sankuru and Lomami, the arrival of harvests will facilitate the improvement to Minimal (IPC Phase 1), as most households will be able to meet their essential needs through their own production, temporary work opportunities, and forest products.

Southeastern zones (former province of Haut-Katanga): For the majority of this area, Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected until May 2025. From October to December, temporary agricultural work opportunities for poor households during planting and weeding activities for the main season will generate income for food purchases and essential needs, allowing them to meet their minimum food and non-food needs. The start of the green harvest in March and the main harvest in April will also improve household access to food. Positive trends in mining activities are expected to continue to have a positive impact on household incomes. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes at the area level will persist in zones that have experienced severe flooding and are also facing the challenge of inter-ethnic conflicts and a high concentration of IDPs.

Southwestern zones (Kinshasa, Bandundu, Kongo-Central): These regions are expected to face Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes until May 2025. The relative stability and economic integration of this part of the DRC should enable most households to meet their essential food and non-food needs due to food and income from various sources. The start of Season 2 harvest activities and land preparation, and planting activities for Season 1, will seasonally increase agricultural work opportunities, benefiting poor households in peri-urban and rural areas. Households in these areas are also likely to engage in other economic activities such as petty trade, early livestock sales, fishing, hunting, and gathering in order to afford the above-average prices for essential food and non-food products.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National

Sharp and sudden depreciation of the local currency.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Since August 2025, the local currency has shown a strong and atypical appreciation against foreign currencies (USD). Authorities attribute this increase to their efforts to implement monetary and fiscal policies. Nevertheless, observers say that this appreciation is misleading given that the Congolese economy is export-oriented and that the measures taken by the national bank would be short-lived. Thus, a sudden depreciation of the national currency in the medium-term is of concern. A sudden depreciation would lead to an increase in prices of goods and services, as well as an increase in prices of key food commodities. This would cause a decrease in access to imported foods for poor households. In this scenario, an increase in the proportion of households in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would be expected, particularly in urban areas where households meet most of their food needs through market purchases. Some urban areas previously classified as Minimal (IPC Phase 1) could also deteriorate to Stressed (IPC Phase 2), depending on the magnitude of the currency depreciation.

Increased flooding due to rainfall disruptions.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Despite forecasts of average to below-average cumulative rainfall for the upcoming rainy seasons, a credible risk of excessive rainfall and flash flooding remains, given the increasingly erratic rainfall in the country over the past two years. Severe flash floods would likely cause significant damage to infrastructure, housing, and crops, which would likely reduce the flow of local products and increase prices of food and essential goods. An increase in areas in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would be likely in areas with excessive rainfall, particularly in the central basin and along Lakes Tanganyika and Albert.

Conflict zones (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika):

Increased intensity of armed conflicts and expansion of fighting following the failure of peace initiatives and ongoing diplomatic efforts.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Qatar's withdrawal from mediations between the DRC and the M23 rebellion, as well as the DRC's refusal to sign the economic agreement with Rwanda as presented by U.S. mediation, could create a general escalation in conflict. This situation could lead to a broad resumption of clashes, increase the level of violence, and trigger new flows of IDPs. These new flows could create strong pressure on livelihoods and deteriorate food consumption. An increase in the proportion of the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would be likely. An area-level classification in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would be possible in certain contexts, but would depend heavily on the relative size of newly displaced populations compared to the local population, the timing and duration of displacement, as well as their living conditions (e.g., in urban areas, rural areas, with host families).

From late 2024 to early 2025, M23 launched a sweeping offensive in North Kivu and South Kivu, rapidly and dramatically expanding its territorial control (Figure 3). By mid-February, the group had captured the major cities of Goma and Bukavu. During this time, millions of households were forcibly displaced by the violence. Local food stocks, livestock, and other resources were pillaged and destroyed, market functioning and supply chains were substantially disrupted, and food prices skyrocketed. 

The timing of this offensive was devastating for rural households, coinciding with the Season 2 main harvest (January–February) and preparations for Season 1 planting (March). FAO DIEM leveraged satellite data to analyze impacts on harvests, focusing on areas that received the greatest flows of returnees. Their analysis revealed that in many areas, harvesting was delayed until April, suggesting that the Season 2 harvest was neither timely nor fully completed. This disruption also severely impacted Season 1 agricultural activities, especially in Masisi and Kalehe territories, since by April, crop cultivation should be well underway. Rutshuru also experienced a delayed and partial Season 2 harvest. Although Season 1 preparations were affected, the delay was less substantial than Masisi and Kalehe, and some households were able to start harvesting in March (about a month sooner). Though the analysis by FAO DIEM did not specifically highlight the level of delay for harvests in Lubero, Kabare, and Walungu territories, FEWS NET understands that harvests were similarly disrupted by the conflict, but contained to a smaller geographic area. By contrast, Idjwi territory, an island in North Kivu, was also captured by M23, but was comparatively insulated from the violence and its associated disruptions.

In the months that followed, M23 established an extensive parallel governance structure, consolidating its hold over much of the region, and in some areas, there has been a relative return to normalcy. Millions of people returned to their places of origin (some forcibly) and could safely access land for cultivation and forested areas for fishing, hunting, and gathering, some for the first time in years. Improved trade flows within areas under M23 control and between Goma and Rwanda and intra-regional trade have allowed the worst of the price hikes to largely subside. Despite these signs of stabilization, important challenges remain. M23 has set up its own tax collection system to fund its administration, most notably impacting traders’ profitability. The banking system still faces a liquidity shortage and transactions between banks in Goma and banks in the rest of Congo remain blocked, though people have reportedly begun to adapt by increasingly using mobile money and other various strategies. Trade flows between M23 controlled areas and the rest of the country also remain severely disrupted, most notably between Uvira, a key cross-border market with Burundi, and Goma/Bukavu.

As of October 2025, M23 continues to consolidate its territorial gains (notably Walungu, Kalehe, and Kabare in South Kivu and is reportedly preparing for further offensives, particularly towards Uvira and Walikale. Front lines are expected to be relatively stable, with two key exceptions: a probable southward push toward Uvira to secure the strategic Goma–Bukavu–Uvira economic corridor, and a westward advance along National Road 3 (RN3) in Walikale, an important link to the city of Kisangani in Tshopo province. M23 is likely to avoid taking the direct route (via the heavily fortified and densely populated Ruzizi Plain) and approach from the highlands, encircling Uvira and cutting off supply lines, strategically minimizing casualties and direct confrontation with Burundian forces. 

These developments have serious implications for the upcoming green and main harvests, beginning in mid-December. In contested areas such as Rutshuru (the mountainous portion in livelihood zone CD09), northern Masisi, and parts of eastern Walikale, security conditions will remain volatile, driving continued (and repeated) forced displacements. Insecurity related to this ongoing offensive will greatly disrupt engagement in cropping activities and access to forest resources (hunting, fishing, gathering) for the third consecutive agricultural season. 

Although M23 has already made incursions into Walikale and Uvira territories (including the Hauts Plateaux areas of Bijombo (Mwenga), Lemera (Bafulero, Uvira), Minembwe (Fizi)), these territories are anticipated to become even more contested in the medium term. Increased displacement flows in and from these territories are also expected. Populations in these areas are already grappling with the impacts of insecurity and heavy illicit taxation, which has negatively impacted crop production and supply flows. This in turn has driven up the prices of non-local essential goods and suppressed the prices of locally produced crop revenues by making it more challenging and costly to evacuate agricultural surplus to neighboring areas. The timing of any conflict escalation will be critical; food security impacts would be greatest if hostilities intensify before the green and main harvests (mid-December to February). Seasonal price decreases would likely fail to materialize (in fact, additional price spikes would be likely), and households would have to continue to rely on expensive food purchases with rapidly depleting financial resources.

However, regions under consolidated control (Nyiragongo, parts of Rutshuru (livelihood zone CD11), southern Masisi, Idjwi, and peri-urban Goma and Bukavu) are expected to see higher agricultural engagement than in recent seasons. However, households in these areas are still recovering from previous displacements. Despite favorable weather forecasts suggesting average yields, area planted and total production is likely to be constrained due to limited to no carryover stocks and limited financial resources for agricultural inputs. While households may meet their food needs temporarily following the Season 2 harvest, their stocks are expected to deplete faster than usual. It will also take time for households to economically recover from crop, livestock, and asset losses and from forced, often repeated displacements.

The ongoing and evolving conflict in North and South Kivu continues to threaten the food security and livelihoods of the millions of people who live there. While some areas under M23 control have seen partial stabilization, ongoing offensives and persistent insecurity threaten to derail households’ economic recoveries and exacerbate displacements. As the green and main harvests approach, the timing and trajectory of future conflict will be critical in determining whether vulnerable households can meet their basic food needs or face deepening hardship.