Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) expected in areas with high displacement in the east

• FEWS NET estimates that between 14-14.99 million people will need urgent humanitarian assistance during the lean season from October to December 2024, which coincides with the second agricultural season (S2). Although the number of people in need will decrease in the post-harvest period (January-February 2025), needs will remain high in conflict zones (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Mai-Ndombe provinces), as well as in the northern areas of the river basin where severe flooding has occurred in recent agricultural seasons.
• Household food access remains a major concern in the four conflict zones mentioned above. The persistence of security incidents has caused the displacement of about 6.29 million people, according to OCHA, in addition to the ongoing disruption of livelihoods of households on the move and for those in these areas. The biggest trouble spots are in the territories of Djugu (Ituri), Rutshuru, Masisi, and Lubero (North Kivu), Kalehe (South Kivu), and Kwamouth (Mai-Ndombe).
• Following discussions with humanitarian agencies and based on access to new information on current and future food aid distributions, FEWS NET believes that food assistance is mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity among displaced populations in Djugu, Masisi, and Rutshuru territories to a greater extent than compared to estimates in previous assessments. Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected during the lean season, when access to food and income will be minimal during S2 and food assistance will prevent worse acute food insecurity.

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in areas at risk of flooding, notably in the Congo River basin and along the Lakes. The 2024-2025 first agricultural season (S1) rains caused flooding in several regions. Although the S2 seasonal rainfall forecast does not anticipate the historic levels observed over the past two years, cumulative rainfall levels could still cause flooding, leading to crop losses, reducing access to food, and affecting household livelihoods. 

  The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 16, 2024.

Food assistance needs are expected to reach their annual peak between October and December 2024, coinciding with the peak of the S2 lean season in most regions. Many households will experience a temporary improvement in food consumption with the S2 harvests around January 2025. However, due to conflict-related reductions in cultivated areas, crop losses, and seasonal flooding, they will have to resume resorting to costly purchases to meet their food needs. Forced displacement due to conflict and severe flooding over the past two years has weakened livelihoods and households' ability to cope with shocks. The effects of escalating conflict, flooding, and high food prices are likely to keep assistance needs high through May 2025.

Conflict and insecurity are expected to lead to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes at the area level in North Kivu and parts of Ituri, South Kivu, Tanganyika, and Mai-Ndombe provinces from October 2024 to May 2025. Continued attacks by the M23 rebellion and other armed groups are expected to result in another year of significantly below-average harvests and reduced household access to fields for production, fishing, and wild food gathering. Market and supply disruptions are pushing up prices for basic necessities, while disrupting key income-generating activities. Recently displaced households are also likely to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in the absence of urgent humanitarian aid, and may be forced to sell their remaining assets, beg, or engage in illicit activities to mitigate their food consumption deficits. Increased competition for scarce resources and income opportunities in areas hosting large IDP (internally displaced persons) populations is likely to exacerbate already above-average prices for essential food and non-food products.

Following discussions with humanitarian agencies operating on the ground and access to additional information on current and planned food aid distributions, FEWS NET has assessed that food aid is playing a more important role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity among displaced populations in Djugu, Masisi, and Rutshuru than previously assessed. These territories are the most severely affected by the ongoing conflict and have some of the highest concentrations of IDPs in the region. Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected in these areas during the lean season and in a context of minimal access to food and income during S2, while food assistance prevents more severe acute food insecurity. FEWS NET estimates that at least 25 percent of the population in these territories, many of whom are internally displaced persons, should meet at least 50 percent of their kilocalorie needs through humanitarian food aid through May 2025. 

The most flood-prone areas, including Equateur, Sud-Kivu, Tanganyika, and Haut-Katanga, are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC phase 3) through May 2025. Flood-affected households are expected to suffer significant crop losses during S2, destruction of productive assets, and reduced income opportunities as rivers become overflowed. Households are expected to continue to struggle to meet their minimum food requirements through May 2025 as they recover from the historically severe flooding of the past two years.

Agriculture is crucial to livelihoods throughout the country. In rural areas, households rely heavily on temporary agricultural labor, as well as on fishing and gathering wild foods and forest products, for consumption and sale. With the exception of the southeast, there are two agricultural seasons. June marks the season 1 (S1) harvest, which is smaller than the season 2 (S2) harvest in January. In the southeast, there is only one agricultural season, with harvesting starting in April. Cassava is the main staple and is harvested all year round, with the exception of the far southeast, where maize is more important. 

Conflict is one of the main drivers of acute food insecurity in the DRC. Although chronic poverty is widespread, exacerbated by structural factors such as poor infrastructure and services, much of the country is resilient to acute food insecurity, thanks to a favorable climate and regular rainfall. In the absence of severe shocks, most households cover their basic kilocalorie requirements and other essential needs. However, having experienced protracted conflicts due to ethnic tensions and competition for its mineral resources, the country has seen a noticeable intensification of conflict in the northeast since 2021, with the reappearance of the M23 rebellion in North Kivu after almost ten years of dormancy, as well as the incursion of Ugandan ADF rebels into Ituri. In addition, since 2022, an intense intercommunity conflict has been raging in Mai-Ndombe in the west. Insecurity in conflict zones limits access to fields, reducing cultivated areas or leading to their abandonment, thereby disrupting households' ability to feed themselves and fish. In addition, reduced production and disrupted markets have led to higher food prices, limiting household access to food.

The DRC faces other cumulative shocks, notably seasonal flooding and macroeconomic instability. The last two agricultural seasons have seen excessive rainfall causing historic flooding, landslides, and destruction of infrastructure and household assets. These phenomena have been intense in the central basin areas along the Congo River and its tributaries. Multiple shocks keep assistance needs high throughout the year.

Learn more 

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Food Security Outlook from June 2024 to January 2025
• Population movements in the DRC; August 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET's scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of IPC and IPC-compatible analyses
• FEWS NET's approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section. 

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Security situation and population movements: The DRC is experiencing a concerning security situation caused by the following armed conflicts:

• M23 rebellion in North Kivu: Under Angolan mediation, Rwanda and the DRC have signed a ceasefire as of July 30. On August 17, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit in Harare encouraged the authorities in Kinshasa and Kigali to scrupulously observe the measures recommended in the Luanda Roadmap. Furthermore, in order to combat the M23 rebellion, the Security Council authorized the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) with SADC forces in the DRC to support the local army. However, despite these ongoing political and diplomatic negotiations, the M23 rebellion continues to launch attacks to expand its areas of influence in Masisi, Walikale, and Lubero. Conversely, the various local militias (Wazalendo), in collaboration with the Congolese army, continue to fight these rebels. As a result, violence continues and atrocities are committed against the population by all the forces involved. As a result, the population is constantly on the move. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), by October 2024, the M23 crisis had displaced more than 1,987,056 people (Figure 3). Nevertheless, in view of these political and diplomatic efforts, tension on the ground has diminished. OCHA estimates that about 383,000 IDPs returned to their villages between March and July in the Rutshuru territory, following the relative lull observed in some areas.

• Conflict between the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) terrorists and the FARDC Congolese army supported by the Ugandan army (UPDF): In recent months, these ADF terrorists have increasingly demonstrated their ability to operate in several territories beyond their former stronghold in Beni. Indeed, following joint operations by the Congolese and Ugandan armies, these terrorists have scattered across several territories. As a result, the populations of the Lubero, Beni, Oicha, Irumu, and Mambasa territories continue to suffer the abuses of these terrorists. At the same time, since the beginning of this year, the FARDC, supported by the UPDF, have continued their operations against these terrorists in the area, bombing several ADF rebel positions.
• Conflicts in Ituri between various armed groups against the FARDC supported by MONUSCO: Since June 30, the Congolese Armed Forces supported by MONUSCO have launched new operations against non-state armed groups (GANE) in several localities in this territory. These operations occurred after the non-compliance of the cessation of hostilities commitment signed by these groups in April 2024, and an escalation in violence observed since last June. In addition, the CODECO and ZAIRE armed groups active in the Djugu and Mahagi territories continue to clash for control of mining sites. At the same time, attacks by these forces continue on sites with displaced persons. This situation has led to new waves of population displacement estimated at over 40,000 people moving towards Mongwalu, Pluto, Pilipili, and Iga, with OCHA estimating over 524,000 IDPs (or 35 percent of the population) as of June 2024 in this territory. These IDPs are abandoning their livelihoods and food sources, and are thus exposed to food insecurity in their displacement sites and within host families.
• Conflicts between the FARDC and various armed groups in the provinces of South Kivu and Maniema: Fighting between various Mai-Mai militias and the FARDC, as well as attacks on civilians by these Mai-Mai and community militias, continued in early 2024 at levels similar to those seen in 2023. Burundian militias known as "RED Tabara" are taking part in the fighting to support local militias. However, the intensity and brutality have diminished considerably. Militia attacks on civilians remain concentrated in the territories of Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga in South Kivu province, and Kabambare in Maniema. With the support of the Burundian army, FARDC forces continued to confront armed groups on the high plateaus of Uvira and Fizi, which remain hot spots for attacks on the local population and security forces. These clashes continue to cause population movements. According to OCHA, South Kivu province was home to around 1.9 million IDPs at the end of March 2024.
• Teke-Yaka community conflict and Mobondo militias against the Congolese government: Despite the signing of the Act of Global and Inclusive Commitment to Peace and Stability by representatives of the Teke and Yaka communities on April 6, 2024, under the supervision of the President of the Republic, an upsurge in Mobondo militant activities is evident. Indeed, more than fifty people were killed during an incursion by Mobondo militia on Saturday July 13 in the village of Kinsele, located on national road number 17 on the border between Kinshasa and the province of Maï-Ndombe. This crisis has displaced over 132,500 people in the provinces of Kwango, Kwilu, Mai-Ndombe, and Kinshasa.

According to OCHA, in August 2024, the country counted around 6.29 million displaced people and 2.9 million returnees. Since the beginning of 2024, more than 2.4 million people have been newly displaced in the DRC. All these conflicts lead to movements of people who abandon their livelihoods and are deprived of income, leaving them vulnerable to food insecurity. 

Flooding: With the return of the rains in October, flooding has also returned, paralyzing economic activities and impacting household livelihoods. In the Mahagi territory, for example, between March and May 2024, around 3,500 households were affected by flooding. Many fields of food crops were flooded, dozens of houses were destroyed, and fishing equipment ravaged. In the province of Nord-Ubangi, the rising waters of the Ubangi River flooded 23,000 residents’ homes in the commune of Nganza after more than a week of torrential rain. The city of Kinshasa was paralyzed by flooding on October 19, 2024. A large part of this megalopolis was deprived of electricity, and loss of life was recorded. The Équateur region has been plagued by flooding for around two months. METTELSAT (Agence Nationale de Météorologie et de Télédétection par Satellite) has warned that Kinshasa and its suburbs will face flooding from October through January 2025. Givven this situation, a deterioration in food availability in these areas is expected, and affected households will face difficulties in accessing their food sources. 

The macroeconomic situation: At the national level, staple food prices remain 25 to 40 percent above their five-year averages and still higher than last year in the majority of the country's provinces. However, they remained stable overall in September compared with the previous month. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts 4.7 percent economic growth for the country by the end of 2024. Inflation is expected to remain high at 17.2 percent on average in 2024, although inflationary pressures will have slowed in 2024 compared to 2023. Since May 2024, the local currency has been stable, in contrast to the strong depreciation trends seen in the recent past. The Congolese franc is currently experiencing a slight appreciation of 2.14 percent against the dollar. In addition, the price of a liter of fuel at the pump has been cut by 13 percent by the DRC government in the western zone. 

Resurgence of epidemics: All 26 provinces in the DRC are affected by the Mpox epidemic. By the end of September 2024, the country had already recorded 26,267 cases, with eight provinces (Sud-Kivu, Bas-Uele, Tshopo, Tshuapa, Sud-Ubangi, Nord-Kivu, Sankuru, and Kasaï) accounting for 86 percent of reported cases. With regards to measles, although the number of cases is relatively lower in 2024 than in the previous year, the epidemic has already affected 83,798 people in 26 provinces. The cholera epidemic has hit 13 of the country's provinces. Since the beginning of 2024, health services have recorded 24,742 cases of cholera and 250 deaths.

Crop production: With favorable rainfall expected for agriculture according to international forecasts, the agricultural season is off to a good start throughout the country. In bimodal zones, the agricultural season had a good start in September, with sowing of the principal food crops such as maize, groundnuts, and beans. However, a low level of participation by households in conflict zones is reported due to lack of access to their land and displacement at the peak of the harvesting season. In areas that experienced flooding in previous seasons, poor households are struggling to find seeds due to below normal harvests. In insecure areas, access to fields is severely disrupted due to persecution and killings of farmers by armed groups at the start of the agricultural season. The lower level of activity during this period of crop establishment considerably reduces agricultural opportunities in these areas, particularly for IDPs. 

Livestock production: The DRC has considerable livestock potential. The Congolese national livestock population is highly diversified although, dominated by goats: 11% cattle, 14% sheep, 15% pigs, and 60% goats. Goat are raised in all provinces of the DRC because of their tolerance to trypanosomiasis. However, a decline in livestock numbers has been observed since 2015. The provinces with the highest amount of livestock (Ituri, Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu, Kasai) are experiencing unstable security conditions as a result of repeated wars, leading to looting of livestock by armed groups. As a result, many head of livestock have been looted, and other animals have died from diseases such as African swine fever, erysypelas and pseudo-avian plague, while veterinarians have been unable to provide adequate care for the animals because of the conflict. According to the livestock inspectorate in North Kivu, around 57 percent of cattle were decimated between 2018 and 2023 in this province. This decline in livestock numbers reduces household access to animal products, as well as income for pastoral households.

Off-own-farm sources of income

• Temporary agricultural labor: In conflict zones (Ituri, North Kivu, Tanganyika, Mai-Ndombe, and South Kivu provinces), displaced persons supply a large workforce but in competition with households in host communities. This significantly reduces the cost of daily labor and, consequently, the income of poor households. Better-off households see their ability to hire reduced by the negative impact of the conflict on their incomes. In areas that have experienced flooding, farmers have suffered significant income losses and are unable to afford additional labor, reducing the supply of agricultural labor in these areas.
• Non-agricultural labor: The outlook for the principal minerals exported by the DRC continues to be encouraging. Production of these minerals continues to rise and prices continue to improve. For example, the price of tin has risen by 34 percent, while the country's annual production has increased by 28 percent since the beginning of the year. This situation favors an increase in the workforce as well as in household incomes from mining activities. 
• Petty trade: The activities of petty trade in the DRC depend significantly on the flow of supply and demand. In relatively quiet areas, markets generally operate normally and have become magnets for small traders. As a result, many households are able to earn above-average prices from the sale of their products. However, these activities are highly dependent on the behavior of the local currency. At the same time, excessive taxation by the state is eating into the incomes of small traders. Since last May, the local currency seems to be stable, and the activities of petty trade also appear to be stable. Last September, for example, inflation slowed for the sixth week running to 0.11 percent for the week of September 13-20. 

Market supplies: Market supplies will be stable throughout the country. The supply of staple foods is generally satisfactory in relation to demand, yet is below last year and the five-year average. The disruption of internal and external flows caused by the deterioration of transportation routes, combined with last season's drop in production, are the main factors behind this fall in supply. Difficult access to certain production areas and insecurity along supply routes are creating disparities in supply from one locality to another. In areas where security is a major challenge, supply is low and certain products are sometimes scarce due to long lead times.

Harvesting: Wild food gathering is a source of income in forest areas, particularly for poor households. The return of the rains since the beginning of October has also favored a regeneration of foraging products, notably mushrooms, insects, and green vegetables, among others. These products are available within an accessible radius of secure areas, providing a complementary source of food and income for poor households.

Household purchasing capacity: Prices of essential food and non-food products remain well above average in FEWS NET markets across the DRC, despite recent stability. Returns from agricultural production, temporary labor, and other sources of income have not kept pace with the price rises seen in recent years. This has kept household purchasing capacity below average for most poor households, particularly those in conflict-affected areas of eastern DRC. In these areas, prices remain particularly high due to supply disruptions linked to insecurity and lower local production levels. Meanwhile, household agricultural incomes have fallen sharply, and households have faced repeated forced displacement, eroding their livelihoods and their ability to cope with such high prices.

• Follow this link for more information on prices in key markets. 

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable. 

FEWS NET does not have access to planned humanitarian assistance data for the period covered by this analysis. However, based on discussions with key informants and partner organizations in the field and on historical data, FEWS NET believes that ongoing humanitarian assistance will continue at similar levels in priority areas for displaced persons in the northeast of the country, notably in the Masisi, Rutshuru, and Djugu territories. 

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Conflict zones (northeastern DRC and Kwamouth): Following discussions with humanitarian agencies and based on access to new information on current and future food aid distributions, FEWS NET believes that food assistance is mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity among displaced populations in Djugu, Masisi and Rutshuru territories to a greater extent than compared to previous assessments. Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are present, and FEWS NET believes that food aid is currently preventing more severe acute food insecurity. These territories, marked by the most intense conflict in the DRC, are home to many displaced persons living in formal or informal sites, or with host families, after displacements disrupted their livelihoods and reduced their access to food and income, especially during this lean season when staple foods are more expensive.

This insecurity has severely limited households' ability to access food or earn income to buy high-priced staple foods, which are most expensive at this time of year. Many cannot safely leave their homes or sites to access fields for their own production, engage in temporary agricultural work or petty trade, and they cannot risk going into forested areas to fish, hunt or gather food. As a result, many IDP households and some host households currently meet the majority of their minimum kilocalorie requirements through food and cash distributions from humanitarian aid. Despite access to humanitarian aid, many households are likely to face increasing consumption deficits during the current peak of the lean season, and are probably selling their remaining goods or reducing portion sizes and meal frequency. The most disadvantaged households, including the newly displaced or those whose survival capacities have been largely eroded after repeated displacement, are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and may have to resort to extreme survival strategies, such as begging or illicit activities.

In the other conflict zones of North Kivu, Ituri, South Kivu, and the Kwamouth territory to the west (Mai-Ndombe), security conditions are still volatile but more likely to allow displaced households some degree of access to fields, temporary work, and petty trade in their respective areas. For those who were able to harvest crops or receive in-kind payments during S1, household stocks were likely depleted prematurely due to below-average harvests, resulting in an early start to the lean season. However, competition for informal jobs is very strong and wages are below average, making it difficult for many households to meet their minimum kilocalorie requirements. Many households, however, will be forced to consume cheaper and less preferred foods, reduce the number of meals or even portion sizes, or cut back on other essential expenses (health or education). As a result, most of these areas are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

Central basin areas (especially Équateur): Crisis (IPC Phase 3) area-level outcomes are ongoing for areas that have experienced repeated flooding in previous years (Bikoro, Lukolela, Bomongo, Bokungu, Monkoto, and Ango territories). Many poor households affected by flooding have lost more than half their harvests, particularly in the last two agricultural seasons, when flooding has been historically severe. Now, at the peak of the lean season, many of these households are probably trying to mitigate the consumption deficits that are growing because of the premature depletion of food stocks. As a result, poor households are likely to reduce their spending on health and education, or borrow money to buy expensive staple foods to meet their minimum caloric needs. In other areas that have suffered a lesser degree of flooding, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) area-level outcomes are likely to be ongoing due to the aggravating shock of significantly above-average food prices.

Southeast zone (former province of Haut-Katanga): Minimal (IPC Phase 1) area-level outcomes are likely ongoing, as most households are able to meet their minimal food and non-food needs through own production or in-kind labor, mining activities, and petty trade. Temporary agricultural work opportunities, such as sowing and weeding activities,  are available during the main agricultural season and enable poor households to generate income for food purchases and basic needs. In most regions, households can hunt, fish, and gather to supplement their access to food and income during the lean season. Recent positive trends in the mining sector (higher production and ore prices) are also supporting household incomes. In areas recovering from severe flooding, and also facing the challenge of inter-ethnic conflict and high concentrations of IDPs, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to be ongoing. 

Southwest zones (Kinshasa, Bandundu, Kongo-Central): These areas depend on Kinshasa, with which they are economically connected. These areas are also stable and benefit from the socioeconomic measures currently promoted by the government, notably lower prices for basic necessities and fuel. This economic stability and integration enable households to generate income and access food in local markets. Some depend on agricultural labor during the current planting season. Other households in these areas resort to other possible economic opportunities (petty trade, early livestock sales, fishing, hunting, and gathering) in a context of safety and stability and are able to cover their food and non-food needs. These areas are in Minimal (IPC Phase 1). 

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions 

• Insecurity and displacement: Conflict and insecurity are expected to continue throughout the outlook period, with particularly high levels of violence in the northeast. Attacks by armed groups will continue to force the displacement of households and severely disrupt their access to fields, fishing, gathering, and other sources of income.
• Agricultural production: 
  • In areas of the country not affected by severe seasonal flooding or conflict, agricultural production in S2 is expected to be average to above-average, given international forecasts of generally average to above-average rainfall.
  • Production is expected to be below average in severely flooded areas along Lake Tanganyika and in the central basin. Areas most affected by the historically severe floods of the last two agricultural seasons are also likely to see below-average production, as household access to seeds and agricultural inputs is below average in the context of ongoing economic recovery. 
  • Agricultural production will remain well below average in the conflict-affected regions of northeastern DRC. 
  • Given the below-average harvests during S2 2024 in the conflict-affected northeast, in flood-affected areas in the central basin and along the Lakes, and in the southeast, which has been affected by rainfall deficits linked to the El-Niño phenomenon, household stocks from the S1 harvest that ended in September 2024 are expected to run out earlier than usual. Stocks for the next S2 are also expected to run out earlier than usual in conflict zones and flood-affected areas. 
• Flooding: The rains return during the September-April period and there is a high probability of localized flooding in areas on the periphery of rivers and in basin areas, notably Equateur, Tshopo, Tshuapa, Sud-Kivu, Tanganyika, and Haut-Katanga.
• Temporary agricultural labor: Based on recent trends in population movements in conflict zones, there will be an increase in agricultural labor due to IDPs being added to the already available local workforce. As a result, there will be an abundance of labor, but fewer opportunities due to the impacts of conflict on production.
• Temporary and salaried workers (non-agricultural): 
  • Salaried employment in urban areas: Given the positive economic outlook and the expected six-percent rise in international commodity prices, a stable local currency and a slight increase in salaried employment are expected.
  • Mining activities: Households dependent on mining activities in the DRC (18 percent) are likely to see a slight increase in income given the expected 6 percent rise in international commodity prices.
  • Other informal labor: The availability of other informal labor such as in construction, transportation, and petty trade is expected to be average in most parts of the DRC, and below average in conflict-affected areas. 
• Market functioning and food prices: Prices of staple foods are likely to remain higher than last year and the five-year average in most of the country's provinces, particularly Katanga. The Congolese government's ban on the import of certain brands of flour deemed contaminated by aflatoxin, together with the reduction in the quantities of maize exported to the DRC by Zambia due to internal shortages, is expected to continue to push up the prices of maize-based products (Figure 4). 
• Inflation: Inflation is likely to remain high throughout the outlook period, although it should continue to fall gradually. 

Sub-national assumptions for conflict zones in the eastern part of the country 

• In general, conflicts in eastern DRC are likely to persist, with varying intensities and evolving strategic objectives for the different provinces. These various conflicts will continue to cause population displacements throughout the projection period.
  • M23 rebellion in North Kivu: Despite the ceasefire negotiated by Angola on July 30, 2024, fighting between M23 and Wazalendo forces is expected to continue, albeit at low intensity, in the territories of Lubero, Walikale, and eastern Masisi during the scenario period, particularly for control of the main mining areas and trade routes.
  • ADF terrorist activities in North Kivu and Ituri: Despite a degraded capacity due to FARDC/UPDF operations, the ADF is likely to extend its attacks beyond its traditional strongholds in Beni, in an attempt to broaden its influence into the Lubero and Mambasa territories.
  • Community-based armed groups in Ituri: Sporadic violence by militias such as CODECO and ZAIRE is expected to continue, but at lower levels than last year, allowing a partial resumption of agricultural activities.
  • Mai-Mai and community militias in South Kivu: Ongoing attacks and clashes are expected, particularly in Uvira, Fizi, and Kalehe. The intensity of fighting is expected to remain stable compared with 2023, despite the withdrawal of MONUSCO.
• Market functioning: Market functioning is expected to be affected by persistent insecurity throughout the scenario period, due to disruption of supply flows, illegal taxation of sellers and customers, and even market closures. Staple food prices are expected to remain well above average, even after the S2 harvests in January, due to conflict-related reductions in cultivated areas and above-average demand for food purchases.

Sub-national assumptions for the Southwest conflict zone 

• Teke-Yaka community conflict in Mai-Ndombe and Kwilu: This ongoing intercommunity conflict is expected to continue sporadically, with the number of conflict events staying below levels observed in the first half of 2024. However, it is unlikely that the recent agreements will lead to a significant reduction in violence, as the signatories to the peace agreements do not fully control the parties in conflict. The continuation of conflict events, although less and less frequent, should continue to have an impact on the food security situation in these areas.

Humanitarian food assistance 

National assumption

Regular distributions of food assistance in-kind or in cash should continue to reach at least 25 percent of the population of Djugu, Rutshuru, and Masisi through May 2025, with sufficient rations covering at least 50 percent of households’ kilocalorie needs. Distributions are expected to continue in other conflict-affected areas of eastern DRC, but FEWS NET believes that the planned levels of assistance are insufficient to mitigate the effects of acute food insecurity at the area level.

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.

Conflict zones (northeastern DRC and Kwamouth): Following discussions with humanitarian agencies and based on access to new information on current and future food assistance distributions, FEWS NET believes that food assistance will continue to greatly alleviate the severity of acute food insecurity among displaced populations in the Djugu, Masisi, and Rutshuru territories. Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected through May 2025, and it is estimated that food aid is currently preventing more severe acute food insecurity. Household food consumption will continue to deteriorate until the start of the harvest period in mid-December. However, any seasonal drop in food prices or improvement in food availability is likely to be extremely marginal. Given the lack of secure access to forest areas for fishing, hunting, or gathering, and the limited opportunities for temporary work or petty trade, many IDP households and some host households will continue to rely on humanitarian distributions of food and cash to meet their minimum kilocalorie requirements. Even with humanitarian assistance, many households are likely to face consumption deficits during the current peak of the lean season and after the arrival of the S2 harvests, likely reducing spending on health and education or selling off remaining assets. Some of the most disadvantaged households are likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through May 2025, and may engage in extremely negative coping strategies such as begging or illicit activities. 

In other conflict-affected areas, notably North Kivu, Ituri, South Kivu, and Kwamouth (Mai-Ndombe), security conditions are likely to remain volatile, keeping participation in agricultural activities low, disrupting trade flows, and maintaining prices for basic necessities high. As the S2 lean season peaks in October and November, households will increasingly turn to other sources of income, such as petty trade, to be able to buy staple foods, given the limited opportunities for agricultural work. However, competition for informal labor is likely to remain high, limiting income opportunities. Households' access to fishing, hunting, and gathering for consumption or sale will continue to be limited by insecurity. Many households will reduce meal frequency and portion sizes, or cut back on essential expenditures such as health and education, during this period. The main harvests in January and February should slightly improve household food availability and local market supplies in the short term, enabling some households to meet their minimum kilocalorie requirements for one to two months from own production. However, due to below-average harvests, stocks are expected to run out quickly, around the start of S1 production and the peak of the S1 lean season. North Kivu province and parts of Ituri, South Kivu, Mai-Ndombe, and Tanganyika are expected to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through May 2025. 

Central basin areas: Between October and December 2024, a deterioration in household food consumption will be observed, and households will begin to make use of coping strategies such as consuming less expensive and less preferred foods, reducing the number of meals or even portion size, or cutting back on other essential expenses such as health or education. Thus, the Centre-East regions, notably Sankuru, Lomami, and part of Maniema, will be Stressed (IPC Phase 2) throughout the scenario period due to high prices and the ongoing recovery from the last two seasons of above-average seasonal flooding. The areas that have suffered the most severe flooding and are most exposed to flooding (Bikoro, Lukolela, Bomongo, Bokungu, Monkoto, and Ango territories) will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) with an increasing share of the population Stressed (IPC Phase 2) or higher through December 2024. Between January and May 2025, the S2 harvests should improve food availability and household access to locally produced food. Farm households will be able to consume their own produce, thereby improving their food consumption. However, following the floods, harvests will be below normal in localized areas, and stock will be depleted faster than usual. The small harvest will be used for self-consumption and will not be sufficient to cover the food needs of poor households for as many months as usual. Areas that suffered major flooding (Bikoro, Lukolela, Bomongo, Bokungu, Monkoto, and Ango territories) will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

Southeast zones (former province of Haut-Katanga): Minimal (IPC Phase 1) area-level outcomes are expected through May 2025. From October to December, temporary agricultural work opportunities during the main season, such as sowing and weeding activities, will enable poor households to generate income for food purchases and basic needs. Most households can meet their minimum food and non-food needs by engaging in own production or in-kind labor, mining activities, and petty trade. In addition, households can hunt, fish, and forage to supplement their access to food and income during the lean season, and cassava is harvested throughout the year. Household access to food and income will improve further with the start of the green harvest in March and the main harvest in April. Positive trends in mining activities should continue to have a positive impact on household incomes. In areas recovering from severe flooding, and also facing inter-ethnic conflict and high concentrations of internally displaced persons, it is likely that these areas will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) throughout the scenario period. 

Southwest zones (Kinshasa, Bandundu, Kongo-Central): These regions are expected to face Minimal (IPC Phase 1) acute food insecurity through May 2025. The relative economic stability and integration of this part of the DRC should enable most households to meet their basic food and non-food needs with food and income from a variety of sources. The start of harvesting activities for S2 and land preparation and planting activities for S1 will seasonally increase agricultural work opportunities, benefiting poor households in peri-urban and rural areas. Households in these areas are also likely to engage in other economic activities such as petty trade, early livestock sales, fishing, hunting, and gathering in order to afford the above-average prices of essential food and non-food products.

Malnutrition trends: According to the latest IPC malnutrition analyses, about 4.5 million children are malnourished overall in the DRC (23 percent of the child population). At the same time, around 3.7 million pregnant or lactating women are also acutely malnourished. The persistence of armed conflict in certain parts of the country, food insecurity, and the resurgence of several diseases are the main causes of malnutrition in the DRC. Acute malnutrition outcomes are likely to deteriorate during the peak of the lean season, and improve slowly after the S2 harvest. Improvements will remain limited in areas most affected by conflict and insecurity. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Profound and sudden depreciation of the local currency

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes : Since last May, the local currency has been stable. The Congolese franc has appreciated slightly by 2.14 percent against the dollar. However, observers fear a sharp depreciation subsequent to measures the government intends to take, in particular the reduction of customs tariffs on basic necessities to reduce the cost of these products. The country's economy depends on these imports. A sudden depreciation of this currency would lead to higher prices for goods and services, as well as an increase in the price of main food products. This would reduce access to imported food for poor households.

Increased flooding due to excessive rainfall

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The effects of global warming are creating rainfall disruptions in the region, particularly in the DRC. If this situation continues, it could increase flooding and landslides. This would limit normal agricultural production and reduce the flow of local produce into the country. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to extend into areas with surplus rainfall. 

Conflict zones (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika, Mai-Ndombe)

Reduced intensity of armed conflict and surrendering of many armed groups in response to peace initiatives and ongoing diplomatic efforts

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The success of the ongoing peace processes in the region would lead to a reduction in new displacements and would encourage gradual movements of populations returning to their villages of origin. This could increase household participation in agricultural activities and other livelihoods, thereby improving food access and income sources for poor households.

New influx of displaced persons 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The government army and its partners (SADC Force, Wazalendo armed groups, and MONUSCO) are preparing a strong offensive against the rebel coalition in the event of failure of the current peace process. This offensive will increase the level of violence and provoke new influxes of IDPs. These new influxes could create severe pressure on livelihoods and a deterioration in food consumption, in the absence of any humanitarian assistance.

Djugu territory, Ituri province (Figure 5)

The reason for choosing this area: FEWS NET selected the Djugu territory for this report to illustrate the long-term impacts of the 2018-present conflict in Ituri. Djugu faces some of the highest levels of conflict and insecurity in the DRC and has a high concentration of IDPs living in formal and informal sites and with host families. Given these high levels of insecurity, income-generating opportunities are extremely limited, particularly for people living in IDP sites.

Since 2018, Djugu has faced increasing levels of insecurity. The armed groups CODECO (Coopérative pour le développement du Congo) and ZAIRE (Front populaire d'autodéfense en Ituri) continue to clash for control of mining sites, and attacks by these groups against the FARDC, civilians, and even IDP sites continue. Other armed groups, including the FRPI (Force de résistance patriotique d'Ituri) and various Mai-Mai militias, also operate in Djugu. Given that Ituri was once the breadbasket of the region, the conflict has considerably reduced agricultural production here, as well as other sources of income such as livestock, fishing, and mining.

The security situation in Ituri remains volatile and unpredictable. Since June 30, 2024, Congolese armed forces supported by MONUSCO have launched new operations against non-state armed groups in this territory. These operations have resulted in new waves of population displacement. OCHA estimates that there will be more than 570,000 IDPs in this territory by August 2024 (35 percent of the population). These IDPs are abandoning their livelihoods and typical sources of food and income. They live both in displacement sites and with host families. There are over 32 official and unofficial collective displacement sites in the region.

Agricultural production, practiced by 80 percent of Djugu's population, is declining because of insecurity. This has prompted the majority of the farming population to move away from their villages and abandon their fields to live in IDP sites or in trading centers where there is some security. According to data provided by the territorial agricultural inspectorate, agricultural populations and harvested quantities have almost halved since the start of the current crisis. The looting of harvests by assailants has prevented the population from regaining the income levels they enjoyed before the escalation of conflict in the territory. Many cannot safely leave their homes or sites to access plots of land for their own production, engage in temporary agricultural work or petty trade, and they cannot risk going into forested areas to fish, hunt, or gather food. 

Other sources of household income in the region have also been affected by the conflict. Fishing on Lake Edouard is an essential source of food and income for poor households, but it has been severely affected by armed groups, notably the FRPI, who occupy spawning grounds, crucial areas for fish reproduction. In addition, some elements of the FARDC are also involved in illegal fishing, exacerbating the situation. At the same time, militants control a large part of the mining quarries, where violence is omnipresent, with frequent murders of miners. As a result of these atrocities, many miners have ceased their activities, and around 18 percent of households in Djugu territory now depend on this activity compared to 8 percent before the crisis. In the face of insecurity, more and more households are changing their economic strategies, turning away from agriculture due to limited access to their fields, towards mining, day labor, petty trade, and the exploitation of natural resources such as charcoal. However, these activities are often less stable and less sustainable, which can exacerbate economic vulnerability and food insecurity. Finally, livestock farming has been severely disrupted by the conflict, with many livestock looted and the migration of many herders to Aru and the neighboring province of Haut-Uele, fleeing the atrocities of armed groups.

The flow of trade has been completely disrupted, as people can no longer move more than 2 km from their respective villages due to the insecurity and atrocities committed by armed groups. Supply routes are also insecure due to armed attacks. The Kpandroma, Bule, and Linga markets still operate on a weekly basis, but are poorly frequented. To access them, each person is required to pay a hefty tax of 2,000 CDF (0.70 USD) to the militants for each visit to the market. 

Although FEWS NET does not collect data on food prices in Djugu territory itself, information provided by key informants suggests that prices are rising steadily, as a result of supply disruptions, and remain well above average.

Food assistance in Djugu territory is generally aimed at IDP households living in host sites and families, as well as at the host households themselves. According to the Food Security Cluster, from January to June 2024, an average of 156,000 beneficiaries received food assistance each month, of the population of around 600,000 people in the area (or 26 percent). Although FEWS NET does not have precise data on the average size of rations, based on conversations with key informants and partners, the size of rations is assumed to be at least 50 percent on average. 

Assumptions

The most likely scenario for food insecurity from October 2024 to May 2025 is based on the following fundamental assumptions:

• The security situation should remain concerning, as attacks by armed groups (notably CODECO and ZAIRE) against civilians in the territory are expected to continue during the scenario period, but at lower levels than the recent peak in June-July 2024, as FARDC/MONUSCO operations have degraded militant capabilities.
• Taking into account the presence of armed groups and the abuses committed by them, season 2's harvest is likely to be well below average compared to last year.
• Given the increase in violence and atrocities committed by armed groups, movements for people in IDP sites related to carrying out agricultural activities, informal labor, fishing, hunting, and gathering will remain minimal.
• The blocking of main trade routes by armed groups will continue to impede the transportation of agricultural and other essential products, leading to persistent disruption in supply chains and further isolation of communities. This will keep prices high and reduce the availability of essential products on the market.
• At least 25 percent of Djugu's population, mainly IDPs and host households, will continue to receive food and cash distributions through May 2025. Ration sizes are expected to remain at least 50 percent on average. Assistance levels are expected to remain similar throughout the scenario period. 

Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through May 2025 

Following discussions with humanitarian agencies and based on access to new information on current and future food aid distributions, FEWS NET believes that food assistance is mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity among displaced populations in Djugu territory to a greater extent than compared to previous assessments. Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected during the lean season, when access to food and income is minimal in S2 and food aid prevents more severe acute food insecurity.

Between October 2024 and January 2025, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected. With low household participation in S1 agricultural activities between March and June 2024 due to massive conflict-related displacement, resulting in significantly below-average agricultural production, food stocks will be completely depleted. Household food consumption will continue to deteriorate until the start of the S2 harvest period in mid-December. Market supplies will remain limited in the area and prices will remain very high until the next green harvest in mid-December, putting pressure on the extremely limited purchasing capacity of households. However, in the mid-December to January period, household food consumption may improve marginally with the green harvest and the S2 harvests. However, in health zones with large population movements, notably Mangala, Drodro, Damas, Mungwalu, Fataki, Bambo, Lita, and Nizi, there will be an increase in the number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). 

Despite the harvest period, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected from February through May 2025. Any seasonal decline in food prices or improvement in food availability is expected to be extremely marginal. Although below average, harvests should improve food consumption for households that have been able to grow their own crops, and who will be relying mainly on own production in February-March. Given the lack of secure access to forested areas for fishing, hunting, or gathering, and the limited opportunities for temporary work or petty trade, many displaced and some host households who have not been able to cultivate will continue to rely on humanitarian distributions of food and cash to meet their minimum kilocalorie requirements. Even with humanitarian aid, many households are likely to face consumption deficits, and after the arrival of the S2 harvests, are likely to reduce spending on health and education, or sell off remaining assets. Some of the most disadvantaged households, such as those who have not cultivated and those who have lost their crops during displacement, are likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through May 2025, and engage in extremely negative coping strategies such as begging or illicit activities. 

The latest IPC malnutrition (AFI) analyses, carried out in July 2024 during the harvest period, classified Djugu territory in Acceptable (IPC AMN Phase 1) apart from the Bambu health zone classified in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3). Acute malnutrition outcomes are likely to deteriorate during the peak of the lean season, with minimal improvements in the short-term after the start of the S2 harvest.