Crisis (IPC Phase 3) persists due to various conflicts amid a severe Ebola epidemic

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu; certain territories of Maniema and Tanganyika; and in Mai-Ndombe with an increase of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the eastern provinces. This deterioration is due to persistent conflicts and massive displacement. The ongoing armed clashes between armed groups and government forces continue to create insecurity, causing the degradation of livelihoods, particularly agriculture and livestock, which are reducing household incomes. Conflict remains the primary driver of acute food insecurity in the country. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the three provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu have more than 3.4 million displaced persons. The situation will likely worsen due to restrictions resulting from Ebola epidemic prevention measures.
• The expansion of the Ebola virus epidemic has weakened trade systems and has also limited the movement of people. The epidemic is disrupting the supply of food products already affected by conflict, while causing income loss for thousands of poor households who rely on cross-border activities for their livelihoods. In the medium term, food availability will continue to deteriorate, especially in Ituri, the epicenter of the epidemic, where conflict has already sharply reduced household coping capacities.
• FEWS NET estimates that approximately 17-17.99 million people will need food assistance, with a peak expected between October and December 2026, due to the extended lean season aggravated by persistent insecurity in the east. Needs will remain high beyond the harvests, particularly for internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and refugees, while early depletion of stocks starting in August will reinforce dependence on assistance and reliance on negative coping strategies.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 22, 2026. 

Agricultural activities remain the main pillar of food systems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In rural areas, households largely depend on agriculture, fishing, and forest products for their food and income. The month of June marks the harvest period for Season 1 (S1), which is generally less significant than Season 2 (S2), which takes place in January. In the southeast, however, there is only one agricultural season, with harvests beginning in April. Cassava is the main staple food and is harvested throughout the year, except in the far southeast, where maize is more dominant. However, food production remains insufficient to meet the needs of the population in light of population growth. The DRC remains heavily dependent on imports of main food products. Despite chronic poverty linked to weak infrastructure and services, most households manage, in the absence of major shocks, to cover their essential needs through their own production and local markets. However, this relative stability is increasingly threatened by the increasing conflict.

Multifaceted conflicts remain the primary driver of food insecurity in the DRC. Tensions related to natural resources and interethnic rivalries fuel violence and displacement. In the northeast, the resurgence of M23 has intensified instability. At the same time, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have extended their operations in Ituri, joining other armed groups, including the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) and the Convention for Popular Revolution (CRP). The ADF conflict is violent and unpredictable, and is destroying infrastructure and livelihoods and directly threatening civilians in North Kivu and Ituri. Between 2020 and 2025, the ADF has been responsible for approximately one-quarter of violence against civilians in eastern DRC. In the southwest of the country, intense intercommunal conflicts in Mai-Ndombe also continue to disrupt livelihoods, despite signs of improvement in recent months. This widespread insecurity limits access to fields, reduces cultivated areas, and sometimes leads to the total abandonment of agricultural land. This disruption also affects fishing and commercial activities, which are essential to the local food supply and household income. The decrease in production is accompanied by market dysfunction and high price instability that further limit the capacity of households to regularly access food. Since the beginning of 2025, the rapid intensification and territorial expansion of the M23 rebellion in North Kivu and South Kivu have caused massive population displacement and disrupted household participation in agricultural seasons. New offensives over the past three months have led to additional displacement, particularly in the Fizi Highlands in South Kivu and Masisi in North Kivu, and disrupted S1 agricultural activities. Food security remains precarious due to the continuation of clashes in these areas. At the same time, the ADF has taken advantage of the regional security crisis to significantly increase the frequency of its attacks against civilian populations.

The DRC is facing other cumulative shocks, including seasonal flooding and macroeconomic instability. Excessive and localized rainfall has been recorded in various parts of the country, causing flooding, landslides, as well as destruction of infrastructure and household assets, particularly in the central basin along the Congo River and its tributaries. Multiple shocks have maintained high assistance needs throughout the year, with limited improvements. Economically, growth and stability are supported by favorable price trends for metals, particularly copper and cobalt, as well as by controlled inflation through monetary policy aimed at strengthening economic stability. According to the National Institute of Statistics (INS), overall inflation decreased from 6.88 percent in 2024/25 to 2.48 percent in 2025/26. Inflation continues to exert pressure on the purchasing power of poor households despite the relative slowdown.

Although the DRC faces multiple epidemics, they generally do not affect enough people to significantly alter acute food insecurity at scale. However, epidemics can increase household vulnerability to shocks by reducing their coping capacity. This is the case with the Ebola virus. The country has experienced 17 Ebola epidemics, which have historically been controlled within a few months. However, the duration and severity of the current epidemic affecting the provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu highlights the vulnerability of health responses in conflict-affected areas.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Democratic Republic of Congo Food Security Outlook Report: February to September 2026
• Latest Democratic Republic of Congo Key Message Update: May 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analyses
• FEWS NET's approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

In the eastern part of the country, clashes between M23 and the Armed Forces of the Congo (FARDC) and its allies continue, resulting in ongoing displacement. Over the past three months, clashes between opposing coalitions have been concentrated in the territories of Fizi (South Kivu) and Masisi and Walikale (North Kivu), with an intensification in June 2026 of clashes between the FARDC and the AFC/M23-Twirwaneho coalition in the Fizi Highlands, particularly around Minembwe. The use of aerial weapons indicates a deterioration of the security situation in this strategic area. These incidents have caused ongoing displacements and the disruption of S1 agricultural activities. In North Kivu, Ituri, and South Kivu, more than 3.4 million people were displaced in March 2026, representing nearly 60 percent of the 5.77 million IDPs recorded in DRC according to UNHCR. Despite some withdrawals under diplomatic pressure, the rebel group has maintained control of the main cities and strategic localities in North Kivu and South Kivu (Figure 1).

In the northern part of North Kivu and in Ituri, the ADF continue to carry out attacks against civilian populations. Since January, more than 300 civilians were killed. During the first two weeks of June, ADF attacks intensified in Beni territory, resulting in more than 40 civilian casualties. This group is now extending its operations of attacks and destruction toward the neighboring provinces of Haut Uelé and Tshopo.

In Ituri, attacks by other armed groups continue. Despite significant defections, the CRP militia continues attacks against the FARDC in Djugu territory, while the CODECO militia intensifies its attacks against displaced populations, the CRP, and civilians, accompanied by cattle looting, house burning, and destruction of agricultural fields. These recurring clashes result in frequent population displacements, disrupt the essential supply route for the zone — National Road 27 (RN27) — and hinder agricultural activities. This leads to land abandonment, delays or cancellation of planting, as well as a reduction in agricultural labor.

In the provinces of Mai-Ndombe, Kwango, and Kwilu, the numbers of incidents from the Teke-Yaka conflict have decreased, due to the engagement of the Mobondo militia in the demobilization process. However, sporadic intercommunal violence persists, particularly in peri-urban areas around Kinshasa, where insecurity and uncertainty continue to partially disrupt commercial activities and mobility.

In Haut-Katanga, displacements continue, particularly in the territories of Mitwaba and Pweto, following attacks by the Movement Debout Katanga for the Liberation of Congo (MDKC), linked to the Bakata Katanga militias. Humanitarian assessments indicate that more than 100,000 people have been displaced between January and April 2026 in the territory of Pweto due to the resurgence of insecurity. Furthermore, localized conflicts have re-emerged in Kasaï, including a land conflict in Dibaya that caused deaths and the destruction of several homes in April 2026.

The Bundibugyo strain Ebola virus epidemic declared on May 15, 2026 has resulted in more than 1,048 confirmed cases and approximately 267 deaths as of June 21, 2026, impacting 34 health zones in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu. Classified as a public health emergency of international concern on May 17, the epidemic led to border closures between the DRC and Rwanda and Uganda on May 17 and May 27, respectively. Economic impacts remain minimal and localized, but include disruptions to cross-border trade and income losses for households dependent on commerce. In Ituri, the epicenter of the epidemic, dependence on imports and cross-border trade, combined with coping capacities already eroded by years of conflict, increases the risks of livelihood degradation.

Markets remain volatile due to structural constraints (logistics, transport, road conditions) and aggravated by conflicts, trade restrictions (border closures), and seasonal dynamics. Conflicts in the east have profoundly disrupted markets, leading to an increase in prices of basic commodities in Bukavu, Uvira, Beni, and Goma in May compared to the May 2021-2024 average (57 percent for white maize flour, 20 percent for cassava flour, 25 percent for refined oil, and 37 percent for fuel). Beni is the most affected area, with increases exceeding 150 percent for white maize flour, 49 percent for cassava flour, and 64 percent for fuel, which is essential for transport and supply. This price increase is explained not only by the increase in fuel costs, but also by the intensification of the conflict and the reorientation of supply chains linked to conflicts, which have increased transport costs and disrupted trade.

Humanitarian food assistance

Faced with a critical and prolonged funding deficit, the humanitarian community in DRC has been forced to strictly prioritize humanitarian responses in 2026. However, despite this prioritization, only 17 percent of targeted beneficiaries have received assistance through the month of April, according to the Food Security Cluster. On average, assistance is provided for 2.5 months, which is below the recommended minimum duration of three months, and covers approximately 1,886 kilocalories per person, representing nearly 80 to 90 percent of energy needs (out of the recommended 2,100 kilocalories). The coverage rate of affected populations varies by territory.

In Walungu, more than 25 percent of households have received food assistance, and Food Security Cluster data from January to April indicate that this assistance covers up to 80 to 90 percent of their needs for an average period of 2.5 months. According to field observations conducted in May, food assistance has continued. With approximately 25 percent of households likely receiving humanitarian food assistance, this assistance is contributing to preventing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in Walungu.

Conflict zones in North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, as well as certain areas of Tanganyika and Maniema impacted by the spread of conflict and displacement, are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with an increase in the proportion of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in certain hotspots. These conflict-affected zones host numerous displaced persons living in formal sites and with host families. These displacements have disrupted their livelihoods by limiting their access to fields, agricultural production, and work opportunities. The displaced, host families, and returnees depend more on the market, despite reduced incomes due to insecurity. The continued increase in food commodity prices on markets, combined with reduced household purchasing power, is forcing households to borrow food and reduce the number of meals per day, resulting in persistent food consumption deficits and increased dependence on food assistance. Faced with these deficits, households are resorting to negative coping strategies, such as selling water and straw and selling assets. In Walungu, humanitarian food assistance reaching 25 percent of households is preventing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, resulting in Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes.

A small proportion of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are observed in certain health zones of Djugu territory (Ituri); Masisi, Oicha, and Lubero (North Kivu); as well as Fizi and Uvira (South Kivu), where thousands of households are caught in the crossfire. In these zones, thousands of households are deprived of their food sources because they cannot access their livelihoods. These households may be forced to resort to extreme survival strategies, such as begging.

Although conflict remains the primary driver of acute food insecurity, the Ebola epidemic constitutes an additional shock in the affected areas, notably through the closure of borders with Rwanda and Uganda, which has reduced income from cross-border trade, limiting the purchasing power of households in these areas. Due to limited alternative income-earning opportunities and increased constraints on market access, poor households in these areas continue to resort to negative coping strategies, including the sale of assets to cover food needs.

In the southwestern zones, households are generally Stressed (IPC Phase 2) except in the territory of Kwamouth in Mai-Ndombe Province, where they remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to the Mobondo conflict. In Kwamouth, despite partial demobilization of combatants, incidents continue and displacements persist. Displaced populations who have abandoned their lands face reduced access to income and a deterioration of their livelihoods due to the persistence of the conflict. To meet their food needs, many households are forced to reduce the number of meals and decrease other essential expenditures. In neighboring territories, although the effects of the conflict are felt through displacements and disruptions to agricultural activities and markets, the impact on income and livelihoods remains less severe than in the epicenter of the conflict. Consequently, these zones are Stressed (IPC Phase 2). In contrast, Kongo Central and some territories of Kwango remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), benefiting from security stability favorable to agricultural activities.

The Greater Kasai zone is generally in Stressed (IPC Phase 2). Households are able to meet their food needs through subsistence agriculture and artisanal mining. However, agricultural production remains low due to the post-conflict context, limited access to agricultural inputs, seed degeneration, and crop and livestock diseases. Poor transport infrastructure continues to limit income and market supply. Poor households are adopting negative coping strategies, including consuming less preferred foods, in order to maintain minimal food consumption. A small proportion of households, particularly the displaced, will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to destroyed fields and looted livestock. Community conflicts occurring in certain territories thus prevent households from accessing resources to generate income.

In Haut Katanga, the territories of Mitwaba and Pweto remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) due to MDKC attacks that have caused population movements and reduced household incomes, preventing households from meeting their essential non-food needs. However, the rest of the territories are in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), supported by the two previous favorable agricultural seasons and productive mining sector.

In the central basin areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing. This year, fewer poor households lost their harvests following floods, which supported access to seeds during S1. However, the deterioration of transport infrastructure, coupled with harassment, is disrupting trade and supply, limiting access to markets and income. Many households cannot meet non-food needs without resorting to strategies such as making purchases with credit or borrowing food. In Bolomba and Lukolela, the decrease in flooding has favored an improvement in household livelihoods, supporting Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

The southwestern regions generally remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), supported by good food availability. Economic instability, although moderate, affects poor households in Kinshasa and its surroundings, as well as persistent structural dysfunctions that promote urban banditry (kuluna), reducing household purchasing power and limiting their capacity to cover non-food needs, which places a small proportion of households in Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

• The multiple ongoing conflicts in DRC are expected to persist and continue to cause household displacement and disrupt livelihoods and income sources.
• Fighting between the M23 and the FARDC supported by the Wazalendo militias is expected to continue in North Kivu and South Kivu, but at a lower intensity than at the beginning of 2025. The withdrawal of the M23 from conquered territories remains unlikely. The FARDC are expected to intensify their offensives against the M23, resulting in more civilian casualties and displacements, as the M23 likely consolidates control over occupied areas.
• The ADF will continue to favor simultaneous and intermittent attacks against civilian targets and the looting of local businesses. These attacks will continue to cause massive population displacements in the provinces of North Kivu, Ituri, and surrounding areas.
• In Ituri Province, CRP attacks are expected to decrease in frequency, as a sign of appeasement toward the government. However, sporadic clashes with FARDC and CODECO will persist, with fighters moving across the territory to obtain supplies through looting and extortion.
• Violence related to the Teke-Yaka conflict is expected to continue to decrease with the demobilization process, despite sporadic incursions into agricultural areas which will likely result in agricultural disruptions for smallholder farmers and localized displacement.
• The Ebola virus epidemic is expected to increase rapidly and exponentially over the coming months, according to CDC models. This trend is expected to drive localized disruptions, including the persistence of border restrictions with Rwanda and Uganda, impacting commercial flows, supply chains, and market function. In the worst-affected areas, these impacts will likely reduce market participation, limit certain economic activities, and exert moderate pressure on prices. Nonetheless, these effects will likely remain localized and be partially mitigated by the harvests and informal commerce.
• El Niño conditions are expected to persist through January 2027, and rainfall in the northeastern part of the country will likely be below average from June to September 2026. The S2 rainy season from August/September to January is expected to begin on time. From September to December, rainfall is expected to be average to above average across the entire country, while it is expected to be below average in the far west from September to November (Figure 2). River levels in the DRC are expected to be above average from June to September in the southern half and central areas of the country, with flooding likely.
• S1 agricultural production is expected to be below average in the northeast and center due to the decrease in cultivated areas following population displacements and the escalation of insecurity. In addition, throughout the country, poor rainfall distribution and flooding in several territories of Tanganyika, Kasai, Haut-Lomami, and Tshopo during the planting period, and the lack of inputs are reducing S1 production forecasts.
• S2 agricultural production, with harvests beginning in December and January, will likely be below average due to the impact of conflict, which is disrupting access to inputs, fields, and labor.
• In conflict-affected areas, the availability of agriculturallaborwill remain higher than demand, due to restrictions on access to fields. Poor and displaced households will continue to depend on agricultural day labor (particularly weeding) and informal labor to generate income, but these opportunities will remain limited, and income is expected to decrease.
• In the territories affected by the Ebola epidemic, a reduction in agricultural labor could be observed due to the self-confinement of certain households and the implementation of health measures by local authorities. These restrictions could limit access to fields and reduce the availability of labor for agricultural activities, thus affecting seasonal work and household livelihoods.
• The increase in fuel prices linked to global supply chain disruptions is expected to maintain pressure on transportation costs and food prices through January 2027. In the medium term, poor households living in food insecure areas will be most affected by the increase in fuel and transportation prices, as well as by the increase in prices of goods and services.
• Annual inflation is expected to remain generally stable, with an inflation projection by the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) of up to 6 to 7 percent in 2026, reflecting moderate but persistent pressure. The exchange rate is expected to remain generally stable in the short term, despite a possible depreciation at the end of the year linked to the increase in demand for foreign currency, which could support stabile food prices.
• According to growth projections for 2026, economic growth in 2026 is expected to reach 6.2 percent, supported by the increase in mineral exports. This dynamic could stabilize the macroeconomic framework and monetary stability, contributing to price stability, particularly for imported food commodity prices.
• The household nutritional situation is already concerning and expected to worsen due to the persistence of conflict and food insecurity, as well as flooding in certain provinces.

Humanitarian food assistance

• Humanitarian assistance is expected to remain underfunded, and the majority of needs will not be covered. With the limited coverage of food assistance to date and the low funding compared to previous years, it is likely that underfunding and coverage will continue during the lean season from September to December in the northeast and center. In addition, the operations of humanitarian actors are limited or hindered due to insecurity, lack of infrastructure, and the isolation of certain areas of the country.
• In Walungu, it is not possible to confirm the continuation of assistance due to a lack of reliable information on interventions planned for the projection period. Consequently, food security projections are made assuming the absence of humanitarian food assistance during the scenario period.

Conflict-affected areas of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, as well as certain areas of Tanganyika and Maniema, will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through January 2027, with a small proportion of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Between June and September, the various conflicts are expected to continue to drive population movements. The S1 harvests, expected in July, will remain below average due to limited access to fields, abandonment during planting, and lack of inputs. Low food availability combined with reduced income will limit household access to markets and force them to rely more heavily on negative coping strategies, such as reducing meal size and frequency, consuming less preferred foods, and resorting to credit.

Between September and November, during the lean season, households will have limited stocks from the S1 harvests and will depend more on markets amid high prices and reduced incomes. Persistent clashes and continuous population movements will continue to disrupt S2 agricultural activities, reducing agricultural labor incomes and cultivated area. Households will intensify their coping strategies, including the sale of productive assets and, in some cases, begging.

Between December and January, despite the seasonal improvement linked to S2 harvests, the affected areas are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Conflict will continue to significantly limit access to land and production, keeping many households dependent on markets despite insufficient income. In response to reduced income and own production, poor households will resort to negative coping strategies, such as reducing health expenditures and borrowing. A small proportion of households located in frontline areas — in Ituri (Djugu), North Kivu (Walikale, Masisi, Lubero, and Oicha), and South Kivu (Fizi and Uvira) — will continue to experience significant food consumption deficits as a result of lack of access to their own production and to markets, resulting in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

In the southwest, Kwamouth territory will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through January 2027. Despite the demobilization of some Mobondo militiamen, displacement will persist, and agricultural households will continue to have limited access to seeds and inputs. With limited access to their own production and reduced agricultural income, households will have weakened purchasing power and restricted access to food, forcing the adoption of negative coping strategies, including the sale of assets. Most areas will remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) due to plant diseases, animal diseases, and seed degeneration following repeated rainfall irregularities that continue to limit agricultural production, household income, and the ability to meet essential non-food needs. The other territories will be in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), supported by better socioeconomic conditions in Kinshasa.

Most areas of Greater Kasai will remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through January 2027, as the S1 harvests in June and July will allow households to improve their food consumption as long as stocks last. However, certain territories affected by post-conflict conditions will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) starting in October during the lean season, particularly the territories of Dibaya and Lwiza (Kasaï Central) and Mweka and Kamonia (Kasaï). The number of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), primarily displaced households that have lost access to their land and livestock, is expected to increase due to rising food prices during the lean season, weak purchasing power, and degraded livelihoods. Already weakened by communal conflicts, repeated displacements, and asset losses, these households have limited access to own production and remain particularly vulnerable to seasonal price increases. Low incomes linked to the decrease in agricultural labor opportunities will further reduce their capacity to purchase food in markets. Consequently, food access is expected to deteriorate, pushing poor households to intensify their coping strategies, including reducing the size and frequency of meals, consuming less preferred foods, reducing health expenditures, and increasingly resorting to borrowing or use of credit.

In areas of the central basin, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist through January 2027. Repeated flooding since 2024 has reduced production, disrupted trade, and damaged transport infrastructure, limiting market access and increasing transport costs, sustaining high food prices. In addition, the combination of shocks, such as cassava mosaic disease, has reduced agricultural production and food availability and access for poor households. In order to meet food needs, these households will have to use certain strategies, including borrowing food and/or selling household assets. The harvests expected for S2, starting in December and January, is estimated to be below average, but will still improve food consumption.

In the southeast, provinces will generally maintain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes through January 2027. In the territories of Mitwaba and Pweto in Haut Katanga, poor households will continue to face limited income-earning opportunities due to persistent insecurity linked to the MDKC rebellion and Bakata Katanga militiamen, which restricts population mobility and hinders their return. Access to typical sources of income and food, particularly agricultural labor and own production, will remain limited, especially during the lean season, limiting their capacity to meet non-food needs. The other territories in this region, benefiting from relatively stable mining income and functional markets, are expected to remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) through January 2027.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision-makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision-makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. 
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision-makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National

Sharp and abrupt depreciation of the local currency

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Since August 2025, the local currency has displayed atypical stability relative to foreign currencies, following special measures taken by the government. However, a slight depreciation has been observed since the beginning of February 2026. Observers estimate that this trend could continue given that the Congolese economy is externally oriented and that the measures taken by the national bank are unsustainable. A sudden depreciation of the currency would lead to an increase in the prices of goods and services, as well as main food commodities. This would cause decreased access to imported foods for poor households. An increase in the proportion of households in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would be likely, particularly in urban areas where households meet most of their food needs through market purchases. Some urban areas previously classified in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) could shift to Stressed (IPC Phase 2), depending on the magnitude of the currency depreciation.

A marked and prolonged increase in global oil prices linked to developments in the Middle East

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If developments in the Middle East lead to a sharp and prolonged increase in global oil prices, the increase in fuel prices in DRC would likely be even more pronounced. This would lead to an increase in logistical costs for imported products and transportation costs at the national level. This situation would result in a faster and more pronounced increase in prices of imported food commodities (particularly maize in the southern regions), reduce household purchasing power, and exacerbate difficulties in food access on markets. Price increases would be more pronounced in eastern and southern DRC, regions dependent on fuel imports via ports in East African countries. These conditions are expected to lead to an increase in the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, particularly in the eastern part of the country.

Areas affected by the M23 conflict

Breakdown of ongoing negotiations in the M23 crisis and widespread resumption of hostilities

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Since the beginning of June, the belligerents in the crisis have been accusing one another of not respecting the terms of negotiations, with each threatening to expand confrontations. While the most likely scenario remains the continuation of clashes and ceasefire violations, an alternative scenario would include a complete breakdown of negotiations, accompanied by a generalized resumption of fighting and territorial expansion by M23. This will increase the level of violence and trigger new flows of displaced persons. These new flows could create strong pressure on livelihoods and deterioration of food consumption. An increase in the proportion of the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would be likely in this scenario, even though classifications at the zone level should remain unchanged.

Areas affected by the Ebola virus epidemic

Quarantine of areas affected by the epidemic

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: While current measures include border closures to people (but not to commodities) as well as temporary suspensions of flights to and from Bunia, the government is primarily favoring community-based control measures without having instituted quarantine measures. During past epidemics, the government had generally not implemented strict quarantines, instead favoring localized containment measures aimed at limiting population mobility, particularly during the Ebola epidemic of September 2025 in Kasai. If the government were to impose stricter quarantine measures in affected areas, such as lockdowns, curfews, and complete isolation of health zones, this would severely limit household access to food and income. In Ituri and the Grand Nord, where the epidemic is concentrated, households depend largely on agricultural labor for their income and on markets for their food. Daily labor represents 60 to 70 percent of income in the most affected areas of Ituri, while market purchases cover approximately 45 to 55 percent of food needs. Any quarantine isolating health zones would disrupt both the supply and demand for agricultural labor, which are particularly critical as the S2 season approaches, as well as market access during the lean season. This would likely lead to an increase in the number of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), in a context already weakened by the decrease in commercial flows and the weakness of agricultural production linked to conflicts.

The outbreak of the Bundibugyo strain Ebola virus declared on May 15, 2026 in Mungbwalu, in the territory of Djugu (Ituri), is the 17th Ebola epidemic recorded in the DRC since the discovery of the virus in the country in 1976. The outbreak has spread to several localities, including Bunia (Ituri); Butembo, Beni, and Goma (North Kivu); Kabare (South Kivu); and certain areas of Uganda, which led the World Health Organization to declare a public health emergency of international concern on May 17. The latest estimates from June 21 report more than 1,048 confirmed cases and approximately 267 deaths, making this Ebola outbreak the fastest ever recorded during its first 100 days. Primarily concentrated in Ituri and North and South Kivu, the epidemic is placing increased pressure on an already weakened health system in these conflict-affected areas, with drug shortages, staff departures, and limited household access to essential water, sanitation, and hygiene services.

In response to the epidemic, Rwanda and Uganda closed their borders to the movement of people, disrupting the activities of small cross-border traders and certain household income sources. The absence of an approved treatment or vaccine against Bundibugyo strain infection, combined with the population's distrust of health services responsible for containing the spread, further complicate the implementation of a response in a region already weakened by conflict, population displacement, and heavy dependence on cross-border trade. The proliferation of armed groups in affected areas hinders the access necessary for the response to this epidemic, similar to during the 2018-2020 epidemic caused by the Zaire strain, which also occurred in a context of conflict in Ituri and North Kivu, and caused more than 3,400 cases. In conflict-affected areas, this combination of security and health constraints risks further limiting populations' access to health services and markets, disrupting agricultural and commercial activities, and intensifying pressures on livelihoods and food security. Although the effects of the epidemic remain limited for now, it risks intensifying medium-term disruptions to markets, livelihoods, and production, worsening the already significant effects of conflict on food security.

Despite the closure of borders with Rwanda and Uganda, commercial trade in the form of cargo continues to transport goods to the DRC. However, the main disruptions concern the mobility of people, which results in income losses for many households dependent on cross-border trade. Apart from the slowdown in cross-border activities, the mobility of agricultural and mining labor continues. In response to official restrictions, informal, costly, and dangerous circuits have developed in certain border areas (Figure 3). In Goma, Kasindi, Bukavu, and in certain areas of Ituri, alternative routes and informal cross-border supply circuits have developed in response to trade restrictions. However, these flows remain limited and generate additional costs related to informal payments. These mechanisms allow for partial continuity of trade and the movement of certain people and certain goods but increase transaction costs and pose significant risks for traders. At the same time, the M23 has strengthened movement restrictions on people from areas administered under government control to limit health and security risks. While the transport of goods remains authorized, transporters proceed with a driver change at Kitsombiro, in the territory of Lubero, which slows down commercial trade and increases transport and transaction costs.

Markets continue to function normally, and the majority of products remain available, including imported commodities, although at increasing prices. Markets continue to function overall, with the maintenance of trade flows and the availability of local production supporting supply and limiting supply disruptions despite sanitary controls at borders. A price increase is nevertheless observed for certain staple products between May 20 (just after the declaration of the epidemic) and June 17 (FEWS NET): white maize flour by approximately 20 percent in Beni and Bukavu, reflecting disruptions and price increases in certain markets despite the relative overall stability of supply. These increases are primarily explained by rising transaction costs, delays in cross-border trade, and precautionary behaviors adopted by some traders in an uncertain context. Shortages remain minimal, however, as trade flows have not been interrupted and local supply continues to partially offset slowdowns in imports. This situation is also reflected in price decreases for certain products during the same period, notably mixed beans in Bunia (-9 percent) and vegetable oil in Goma (-14 percent), which demonstrates relative market stability and sufficient supply for several food commodities in the short term.

In Mungbwalu in the territory of Djugu, the epicenter of the Ebola epidemic, mining activities continue without major disruptions, although some traders have left the area for Bunia due to fear of the disease. According to key informants, miners continue their typical activities, with mining remaining their primary source of income. The dry season, characterized by a lower risk of landslides, also favors the continuation and intensification of activities before the start of the rains in September. The maintenance of these livelihoods supports household purchasing power and their access to food. Furthermore, food supply continues to depend largely on neighboring territories, which continue to supply local markets despite the epidemic context. Together, these factors are limiting the impact of Ebola on food security in the area thus far.

Farmers in provinces affected by the epidemic are currently in the S1 harvest period and continue their agricultural activities despite preventive barrier measures against the epidemic. This situation contributes to the availability of local food commodities on markets and partially explains the relative price stability observed in several. In these areas, the Ebola epidemic and response measures have no significant effect on agricultural production or on demand for agricultural labor. In contrast, conflict continues to limit access to land, reduce agricultural production, and restrict agricultural work opportunities. However, conflict-related disruptions and the reduction in cultivated areas is maintaining food supply below its typical level. Nevertheless, the availability of harvests from main counter-season crops continues to support supply and facilitate access to food.

However, this stability remains fragile. If the border closures are prolonged and informal channels become more controlled or insufficient to supplement formal imports, an atypical and more pronounced increase in food commodity prices could be observed during the lean season starting in August and September. In this case, prices would remain generally above the five-year average, with atypical fluctuations compared to the previous year, characterized by a reduction in stocks and increased dependence on markets. Upward pressures on prices of imported commodities are already anticipated due to high transaction costs, risk premiums, and slowdowns in informal channels.

Conflict remains the primary driver of food insecurity in these areas, while the Ebola epidemic constitutes an additional shock with effects that are expected to progressively intensify over the medium term. Following the persistent displacements caused by various conflicts, millions of households have lost their assets, which reduces their resilience and coping capacity, and increases the risk of severe food consumption deficits. Furthermore, the epidemic limits income-earning opportunities and increases marketing costs, leading to additional erosion of purchasing power for households increasingly dependent on markets, particularly as the lean season approaches. The situation is particularly critical in Ituri, where displaced households are exposed to Ebola in certain IDP camps, affecting populations most vulnerable to food security shocks. In areas already classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to conflict, poor households are expected to increasingly resort to the least expensive and least preferred foods, or even depend on solidarity from other households, while displaced persons will rely more on potential humanitarian assistance in the area. The food security of populations in this territory will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) with a small proportion in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).