Persistent conflicts in the east will lead to significant humanitarian needs until January 2025

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected from June 2024 to January 2025, with populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the northeast and central-east areas. These outcomes stem from clashes between the M23 rebellion and other armed groups against the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), which have caused the displacement of approximately 7.3 million people across the country (OCHA). The June 2024 and January 2025 harvests are expected to be significantly below average due to the conflict and are not anticipated to substantially improve food availability for poor households. Some displaced households in the northeast, who were unable to cultivate and are struggling to recover their livelihoods, are expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
• The areas of greatest concern with the most intense conflicts remain in the provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu in the northeast of the country. In these provinces, the territories of Djugu (Ituri), Kalehe (South Kivu), and Rutshuru, Masisi, and Lubero (North Kivu) remain hotspots of tension.
• Although the seasonal floods of October and November 2024 are not expected to reach the historic levels observed over the past two years, according to rainfall forecasts, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are anticipated in areas most susceptible to flooding, particularly the riverine areas along the Congo River and the shores of Lake Tanganyika.
• FEWS NET estimates that between 14 and 14.99 million people will be in need of urgent humanitarian assistance during the Season 2 lean season from October to December 2024. However, as in recent years, the total needs remain higher than the projected levels of assistance. The anticipated assistance during the projection period covers only a small proportion of the population in the areas most affected by conflicts and floods.

Food assistance needs will reach their annual peak between October and December 2024, coinciding with the peak of the Season 2 lean season across most of the country. Another year of below-average harvests in June 2024 and January 2025 due to reduced cultivated areas related to conflict, crop losses, and floods will result in only a brief improvement in household food consumption before households are forced to resort to expensive food purchases. Many households have lost access to their livelihoods and are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes due to years of conflict, repeated forced displacement, and two consecutive years of historic severe flooding (Figure 1). Although food deficits will slightly decrease with the January harvests, these reductions will be short-lived. The effects of escalating conflicts, seasonal flooding, and macroeconomic instability leading to high inflation are expected to maintain high assistance needs until January 2025.

Intense conflicts are expected to lead to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in North Kivu and in certain parts of the provinces of Ituri, South Kivu, Tanganyika, and Mai-Ndombe from June 2024 to January 2025. The M23 rebellion, and increased incursions by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and other armed groups are likely to result in another consecutive year of below-average harvests. Many households will need to purchase most of their food due to significantly reduced access to own-production activities, fishing, and foraging. Severe market and supply disruptions further limit income-earning opportunities and lead to a surge in prices for essential food and non-food items, pushing some households facing the compounded shocks of flooding and conflict into Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Many recently displaced households are also likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. Poor households are expected to adopt negative coping strategies, such as selling remaining assets or begging, in an attempt to mitigate their food consumption deficits. The presence of a large number of displaced persons in several areas also increases competition for resources and income opportunities, while exacerbating high prices for food and non-food items.

While much of the country will experience seasonal flooding, the most affected regions, including the provinces of Équateur, South Kivu, Tanganyika, and Haut-Katanga, are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) until January 2025 due to the impact of the seasonal floods. Households affected by the floods are expected to experience significant crop losses and reduced income opportunities as rivers become impassable. In flood-affected areas along Lake Tanganyika, outcomes are expected to improve by October 2024 and transition to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) as the floods recede. Households are likely to continue struggling to meet their minimum food needs until January 2025 as they recover.

The humanitarian response program for the DRC remains underfunded in the context of consistently high humanitarian needs resulting from repeated and compounded shocks throughout the year. WFP and its partners will continue to provide emergency food assistance to households affected by conflict and flooding, with the majority of this assistance directed towards the most critical areas in the northeast. However, the planned food assistance will only reach less than 25 percent of the total population, which is insufficient to mitigate acute food insecurity at the Crisis (IPC Phase 3) level. Households facing severe acute food insecurity cannot meet their minimum calorie needs without resorting to unsustainable coping measures and require urgent humanitarian assistance.

Agriculture is crucial to livelihoods across the country. In rural areas, households rely heavily on temporary agricultural labor, as well as foraging for forest products and fishing for both consumption and sale. There are two agricultural seasons in the country (except for the northeast): the Season 1 harvest in June, which is smaller compared to the Season 2 harvest in January. In the southeast there is only one growing season, with the harvest starting in April. Except for the far southeast, where maize is more significant, cassava is the main staple food and is harvested year-round (Figure 2). 

Conflict is one of the main drivers of acute food insecurity in the DRC. Although chronic poverty is widespread and exacerbated by structural factors such as weak infrastructure and services, much of the country is resilient to acute food insecurity due to a favorable climate and abundant regular rainfall. In the absence of severe shocks, most households are able to meet their essential food and non-food needs. However, prolonged conflicts due to ethnic tensions and competition for mineral resources have driven a marked intensification of conflict in the northeast since 2021. This includes the resurgence of the M23 rebellion in North Kivu after nearly a decade of dormancy, and the incursion of Ugandan ADF rebels into Ituri. Additionally, since 2022, intense intercommunal conflict has been raging in Mai-Ndombe in the west. Insecurity in conflict zones restricts access to fields, reducing or causing the abandonment of cultivated areas, and disrupting households' ability to grow food and fish. Moreover, decreased production and market disruptions have led to an increase in food prices, limiting households' access to food.

The DRC is facing additional compounded shocks, including seasonal flooding and macroeconomic instability. The last two agricultural seasons have experienced excessive rainfall, causing historic flooding, landslides, and damage to infrastructure and household assets. These phenomena have been particularly intense in the central basin areas along the Congo River and its tributaries. Moreover, the local currency has depreciated significantly over time, leading to high inflation rates and preventing households from meeting their basic needs. Assistance needs remain high throughout the year due to multiple shocks.

Learn more

The analysis presented here is based on the information available as of June 15, 2024. The following links provide additional information: 

• Latest Food Security Outlook: February to September 2024 
• Population movements in the DRC; May 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET's scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET's approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Conflict and insecurity: Conflict remains the main cause of food insecurity in the DRC. Within the country, the DRC has approximately 7.3 million displaced persons and 2.4 million returnees, according to OCHA (Figure 3). Most of these people have been displaced by internal conflicts, although there is also a significant number of refugees from crises in Sudan, Burundi, and South Sudan.

The level of conflict remains most intense in the northeast. Clashes between the M23 rebels and the FARDC, supported by various Wazalendo militias, continue in North Kivu Province. Despite ongoing political negotiations, the M23 rebellion continues its attacks to expand its areas of influence in the Masisi and Lubero territories and to control key trade and transport routes. On the other hand, various local self-defense militias, in collaboration with the loyalist army, have formed a coalition to fight these rebels. These self-defense groups are strengthening their positions in support of the SADC (Southern African Development Community) regional force, led by the South African army, in areas not yet conquered. Thus, violence continues between these warring parties, and abuses are being committed against the population by all the forces involved. These abuses lead to constant displacement of the population. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 1,524,306 people have been displaced and are living in camps and host families due to the crisis in North Kivu.

On the other hand, the ADF terrorists have increasingly demonstrated their ability to operate in the Irumu and Mambasa territories in Ituri Province. In April 2024, nearly 20,000 residents of the Sayo neighborhood in the Mulekera municipality of Beni (North Kivu) abandoned their homes due to the activities of the ADF. Meanwhile, the FARDC, supported by the UPDF (Uganda People's Defense Forces), continue their operations against these terrorists in the area, bombarding several rebel positions since the beginning of this year. In addition, six active local armed groups, including FRPI, URDPC/CODECO, FPIC Mapi, and Auto-défense, have signed a ceasefire agreement and joined the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization Program (PDDRC-S). However, the armed groups CODECO and ZAIRE, active in the Djugu and Mahagi territories, continue to clash for control of mining sites, and attacks on displaced persons' sites by these militias persist.

Despite the peace agreement signed on April 6, 2024 between the Téké and Yaka communities, there has been a resurgence of activities by the Mobondo militias In the Kwamouth territory of Mai-Ndombe Province. On April 12, the traditional chief of Kimomo reported a new incursion, with attackers controlling several villages and looting the belongings of fleeing residents. In addition, this militia attacked the village of Engawu on April 8, killing at least five people. This crisis has displaced more than 157,000 people in the provinces of Kwango, Kwilu, Mai-Num, and Kinshasa. 

Ongoing conflicts are severely disrupting agricultural activities vital to rural livelihoods. In conflict zones, cultivated areas have significantly decreased due to restricted access to fields and abandonment of farms, leading to reduced demand for agricultural labor and, consequently, poor harvests. With below-normal supplies, seasonal declines in food prices during harvest and post-harvest periods are atypically minimal, keeping prices high and increasingly unaffordable for poor households. Insecurity also restricts access to markets, reducing supplies and negatively impacting household incomes. Insecurity further impacts households by limiting their ability to procure forage and engage in fishing. This restriction exacerbates difficulties related to decreased agricultural production by reducing access to other sources of food and income. The combined effect of reduced agricultural production, limited work opportunities, and restrictions on foraging and fishing makes it difficult for most households to sustainably cope with the consequences of prolonged conflicts. Repeated displacements during conflicts further diminish households' ability to cope and recover their livelihoods.

Natural disasters and floods: The effects of climate change continue to cause disruptions in rainfall patterns in the DRC compared to previous years. Flooding in low-lying areas due to riverine floods continues in several provinces (Tanganyika, South Kivu, Ituri, Équateur, Tshopo, Kasai, Haut-Uele, Bas-Uele). Damage caused by overflowing rivers and lakes affects road infrastructure and livelihoods. For example, from March to May 2024 in the Tanganyika Province, nearly 28,000 households were displaced due to the rising water levels of the lake, and rail traffic between different provinces from Kalemie was interrupted due to the destruction of bridges. In the city of Baraka and its surrounding areas (South Kivu), nearly 35,000 people are affected by the floods. Given this situation, a deterioration in food availability in these areas is expected, and affected households may face difficulties accessing their food sources.

Macroeconomic situation: The prices of major minerals exported by the DRC have been increasing since the beginning of the year due to increased Chinese imports, according to analysts at the Central Bank of Congo (BCC). The price of a ton of copper has increased by 17.5 percent compared to December 31, 2023. Over the past 12 months, the copper price has increased by 16.7 percent, reaching 10,024.50 USD per metric ton, its highest level in two years. Tin has seen a price increase of 1.6 percent, while the price of an ounce of gold has risen by 18.8 percent. These prices bode well for a strong Congolese economy, as the bulk of exports consist of minerals. However, the depreciation of the local currency continues. According to the BCC, the annual inflation rate was 51 percent as of May 10, 2024, compared to 7.2 percent for the same period in 2023. 

Resurgence of epidemics: The cholera outbreak is affecting 13 provinces: since the beginning of 2024, health services have recorded 16,554 cases and 250 deaths (a case fatality rate of 1.5 percent), according to the WHO. Additionally, from the beginning of the year until May, approximately 45,647 measles cases and 1,062 deaths (a case fatality rate of 2.3 percent) have been reported in 440 health zones across 26 provinces. Health officials are concerned about worsening disease due to flooding in certain areas of the country and the resulting increase in displaced persons living in crowded conditions. Additionally, an outbreak of monkeypox has been reported, with 6,872 suspected cases recorded across 20 provinces.

Agricultural production: Agricultural production is the main source of food for households in the DRC as households consume own-production. The sale of agricultural and livestock products remains the main source of income for almost 70 percent of households. These revenues are currently falling in some areas affected by conflict, as well as areas affected by flooding. Some poor households, particularly those which have not been able to grow crops, are taking on temporary agricultural work but there is high competition for available labor opportunities. 

Mining temporary and wage labor: The price outlook for major minerals mined in the DRC is positive. Given that 16 percent of the Congolese population depends on mining activities (both artisanal and non-artisanal), the improvement in global commodity prices, particularly for copper and cobalt, could enhance the income of households relying on these activities. 

Non-agricultural labor: With over 1.5 million civil servants across the country, the public sector is also a significant source of income for more than 10 percent of households in the DRC. However, the ongoing devaluation of the local currency is eroding the already inadequate salaries of these civil servants. Income for other socio-professional categories is also affected by this ongoing devaluation. 

Market supply: Throughout the country, market supplies are expected to remain stable from the end of 2024 and continue through September, after which they will experience seasonal variations during the lean season (September to December). However, cereal supplies during the projection period are expected to be reduced, particularly for maize and rice, especially in the southeast (Haut-Katanga, Lualaba) and central-east regions of the country (Kasaï Region). In Katanga, agricultural services have reported a significant decline in maize production, directly resulting from irregular rainfall and the sudden cessation of precipitation in February. Initially, a harvest of around 460,000 metric tons from the planted areas was anticipated, but recent inspections indicate a reduction of over 45 percent.

This situation is even more alarming given that Zambia, facing a production drop of over one million metric tons, has intensified controls at maize exit points and has already begun negotiations with Tanzania to acquire an additional 500,000 metric tons.

Commodity prices: Prices of the main commodities, particularly those imported, have increased. For example, the price of imported rice increased by 22 percent compared to May 2023 and by 10.4 percent compared to the five-year average. On the other hand, the price of locally grown yellow maize in Kinshasa has increased by 7 percent compared to May 2023.

Livestock: The livestock sector in the DRC, particularly in the territories of Masisi and Djugu in North Kivu and in Ituri, has been heavily affected by the ongoing conflict and insecurity. Livestock activities have been severely disrupted by population displacement, cattle theft, and the slaughter of livestock by armed groups. Moreover, while animal diseases (epizootics) such as foot-and-mouth disease regularly affect livestock in this context, reduced access to veterinary services due to the conflict has led to additional losses for herders. The sale of livestock as a source of income for households is expected to decrease, limiting households' access to animal feed and income sources.

Foraging: In the DRC, foraging remains a crucial source of food for many households, particularly in rural forested areas and in currently conflict-affected regions where access to cultivated food is often limited. To date, there are several limitations in accessing this food source due to conflicts throughout the northeastern and central-eastern parts of the country. In the western region, floods have prevented communities in the equatorial zone from accessing this food source due to the flooding observed during the last agricultural campaign of 2023/24. Other challenges to this traditional practice include deforestation in logging areas, demographic pressure on resources, and inaccessibility in conflict zones. 

Follow this link for more information on supply and market outlook. 

Follow this link for more information on prices in key markets.

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

Available data on food assistance indicates that the humanitarian response is ongoing but only covers a small proportion of the total population in the affected areas due to logistical and financial constraints. According to the Food Security Cluster (FSC), from January to March 2024, only 36.6 percent of the individuals targeted for assistance were reached. Approximately 2.6 million people received food assistance, but the coverage was insufficient to prevent a deterioration in food security across all analyzed areas.

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Conflict zones (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Mai-Ndombe): As of June 2024, the harvests for agricultural Season 1 are underway. Although considered below normal, these harvests have improved the food consumption of poor households in these areas. However, displaced households that have not had access to land due to displacement must rely on the market to obtain food. They use coping strategies that will enable them to generate income and access food from local markets. Some will depend on agricultural labor during the harvest season, while others will turn to alternative economic opportunities (such as small trade and early sale of livestock, among others) as well as humanitarian assistance. However, many households are forced to use crisis strategies such as eating less expensive and less preferred foods, reducing the number of meals and/or portions, or cutting back on other essential expenditures such as health or education. Thus, most of these areas remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In the worst-affected areasof Ituri (Djugu territory) and North Kivu (Masisi and Rutshuru territory), an increase in the number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) has been observed.

Central basin areas (former Equateur Province and Eastern Province): These areas have experienced repeated natural disasters, including flooding of crops and other resources. As a result, households lost more than half of their harvests. The limited harvest obtained will primarily be dedicated to own-consumption and will not be sufficient to meet the food needs of households. These households will have to use coping strategies such as eating less expensive and less preferred foods, reducing the number of meals and/or portions, or cutting back on other essential expenditures such as health or education. As a result, most of these areas will be in Stressed (IPC Phase 2), but areas that have suffered major floods (Bikoro, Lukolela, Bomongo, Bokungu, Monkoto territories) will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).

Southwest areas (Kinshasa, Bandundu, Central Kongo): These areas are unaffected by conflict and economically integrated, enabling households to generate income and access food from local markets. Some households will be dependent on farm labor at harvest time, while others will take advantage of other possible economic opportunities (petty trade and early livestock sales, among other things). These areas are able to meet their food and non-food needs without engaging in negative coping strategies and will face Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes.

In the southeast (former Katanga Province): In these areas, revenues from mining activities and small-scale trade will be sufficient to guarantee the food needs of households that remain dependent on markets, particularly in urban areas. These areas will face Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes.

Acute malnutrition: The latest nutritional surveys, which report the prevalence of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) above the critical (>5 percent) and emergency (>10 percent) thresholds, have been conducted in provinces such as Kasaï, Haut-Lomami, Ituri, and Nord-Ubangi. Additional population movements are expected in the upcoming period, which will further weaken the livelihoods of households most affected by the conflict and floods. This will likely lead to increasingly alarming food shortages for those in conflict-affected areas, as well as for the 4.4 million people suffering from malnutrition in the DRC, including 3.4 million children under five years old.

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions

• The multiple ongoing conflicts in the DRC are expected to persist throughout the projection period, with maximum intensity in the northeast. Attacks by armed groups will continue to displace households and significantly disrupt households' access to their fields and livelihoods. 
• Despite likely above-average temperatures throughout the scenario period, good soil moisture due to average rainfall is expected to remain favorable for agriculture outside flood-prone areas.
• The average rainfall expected, according to the precipitation forecasts, could alleviate the flooding situation compared to the last two years, thereby facilitating a minor improvement with the resumption of livelihood activities in the areas affected by these floods.
• The effects of seasonal natural disasters, such as floods and landslides, are likely to impact the livelihoods of households in high-risk areas (including impacts like impassable roads, damage or destruction of homes and mining sites, flooded hectares of land) during the rainy season (September to January). The areas of concern are primarily the provinces of Haut-Lomami, Maniema, Kwilu, Kasaï-Central, Kinshasa, South Kivu, and Equateur.
• Agricultural production for Season 2 is expected to be below average in flood-prone areas of the country.
• Temporary labor opportunities are expected to increase given the stability of raw material prices on which the DRC relies for over 65 percent of its exports. A strong national economy will create new economic opportunities for poor households. To rebuild their incomes and improve their food access, artisanal mining operations are becoming more attractive, as are domestic work opportunities, particularly in the country's mining areas.
• As a vital source of revenue for the country, the international demand for key minerals exported by the DRC (copper, cobalt, gold, tin) is increasing and could significantly boost foreign exchange earnings. 
• The national currency has depreciated by 26.2 percent over the past year, with further declines expected throughout the forecast period. The instability of the local currency is likely to lead to an increase in the prices of imported products, such as vegetable oil and rice. Prices of locally produced commodities are also likely to be affected, although to a lesser extent during the projection period. 
• Considering that fuel prices continue to rise despite the exemption policy implemented by the DRC, transportation and service costs may keep increasing during the projection period, which will place additional pressure on food prices.
• The stability of the Congolese franc (CDF) relative to the USD across most markets establishes a fundamental economic condition. However, if the situation deteriorates, particularly due to flooding in Tanganyika, Equateur, Tshopo, Kindu, Ituri, and South Kivu, as well as conflicts in the East and West, it could intensify inflationary pressures. The slight increase of 1.45 percent in the national Consumer Price Index in May suggests possible future price hikes.
• Staple food prices are expected to remain higher than last year and the five-year average in most of the country; the highest prices are likely to be seen in conflict zones. With the instability of the local currency, food prices are expected to continue to rise. According to FEWS NET price projections (Figure 4), the price of white maize flour in Goma, a key reference market, is expected to rise from October to December during the lean season. Prices are projected to decrease with the arrival of the Season 2 harvest in January 2025. Prices for cassava flour are also expected to remain high but relatively stable in Kinshasa, another key reference market. 
• In areas most affected by conflict and flooding, households' access to food from harvests is expected to be below average. In the safe regions of the country that are not experiencing significant flooding, the availability of foraged foods (including fish) is expected to be average.

Assumptions in the eastern part of the country 

• In the southern part of North Kivu Province, fighting between the M23 and the national army FARDC, supported by the Wazalendo armed groups and international forces (MONUSCO, SADC), is expected to continue throughout the projection period. Engagements between forces along relatively static front lines, accompanied by bombings, are expected to continue in the territories of Masisi and Rutshuru. The M23 rebellion will seek to expand its areas of influence, increasingly threatening trade along Lake Kivu and potentially disrupting land trade routes. Thus, population displacement is expected to continue but should be below the levels of the previous year, as a significant portion of the population has already fled during earlier conflicts.
• Attacks by the ADF against civilians in the northern part of North Kivu Province and Ituri (the territories of Oicha, Beni, Irumu, and Mambasa) are expected to persist during the projection period, but at levels lower than those observed in 2022-2023. The operations of the FARDC/UPDF have degraded the capabilities of the ADF.
• In the conflict between various community-based armed groups (CODECO, ZAIRE) in northern Ituri Province, the signing of a peace agreement in April 2024 is expected to reduce intercommunal violence, allowing agricultural households to manage their crops more easily during the farming seasons. However, violence perpetrated by militias is expected to continue sporadically; the conflict situation should remain well below the levels of the previous year.
• The planned withdrawal of MONUSCO from South Kivu is not likely to significantly increase the level of fighting, given the limited presence of the force in the province. 
• The drought experienced by Southern African countries (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and South Africa) during the last agricultural campaign significantly reduced agricultural production (particularly cereals), especially affecting the Katanga and Kasaï regions, which depend on agricultural imports from these countries. This could impact availability further, as local production has experienced a reduction of over 45 percent due to irregular rainfall and the sudden cessation of precipitation in February 2024. Supplies from Tanzania, organized by the government, will not fully mitigate the supply shortages.

Assumptions in the western part of the country

• Concerning the Teke-Yaka community conflict in Mai-Ndombe Province, ongoing intercommunal attacks are expected to continue sporadically. However, the number of conflict events is expected to remain slightly below the levels observed in 2023.

Humanitarian food assistance 

National assumption

• As in the last several years, total needs will remain higher than planned assistance levels. The assistance anticipated during the scenario period covers only a small proportion of the population in the areas most affected by conflicts and floods. In addition, interventions in areas controlled by armed groups are hampered and very limited despite high needs. The coverage of needs will be insufficient to prevent a deterioration in food security in all areas analyzed.

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

June to September 2024: June marks the start of Season 1 harvests in the northeast, central-east, and west of the country, while in the southeast zone (unimodal) it is the post-harvest period. Despite the anticipation of below-average production across much of the country, the June harvest, specifically designated for domestic consumption, is projected to sufficiently meet the food needs of households in the majority of the country's central and northern regions. In areas not affected by conflict, these harvests will improve food availability and thus boost food consumption by farming households in these areas. On the other hand, in conflict zones, displaced households and those who have not had access to land will find it difficult to obtain food supplies and will be dependent on market purchases. Provinces experiencing high levels of insecurity and various natural disasters, and the effects these have on their livelihoods (Ecuador, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika, Kasaï, Kasaï Central, Maniema, and Haut-Katanga) will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In long-term conflict-affected areas with no humanitarian access – the territories of Djugu (Drodro Health Zone), Masisi (Kirotshe Health Zone), and Rutshuru (Birambizo and Kibirizi Health Zone) – an increase in people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will be observed. The populations of these health zones are therefore among the worst affected and no longer have access to their sources of income, with significant deficits in food consumption.

The rest of the provinces in the east of the country will be Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and the northern provinces (Haut Uele and Bas Uele) will remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1). Areas of Central Basin (Ecuador and Eastern Province), Central East (Kasai Space), as well as in the southwest (Kinshasa, Bandundu), Central Kongo (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, parts of Kasai, Maniema, and Tanganyika) that are unable to reduce their food consumption deficit will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Most of the country will then remain in Stressed (IPC Phase 2), yet households in the north (Haut-Uele, Bas-Uele, Tshopo, and Nord-Ubangi) will be in Minimal (IPC Phase 1).

October 2024 to January 2025: This period includes the resumption of agricultural work in Season 2 and the peak of the lean season in November. With agricultural production estimated to be below normal, households may deplete their stocks early, and the lean season will be premature, beginning in September. Consequently, households will be highly dependent on the market as a source of food supply. This situation will continue until mid-December and may be alleviated by the green harvests of Season 2 in January. As a result, displaced households and those who did not take part in the agricultural campaign are already vulnerable to food insecurity and will have to continue using negative coping strategies such as reducing the number of meals and consuming cheaper and less preferred foods. Given that food aid is insufficient in conflict areas experiencing population displacement (South Kivu, North Kivu, Tanganyika, Ituri, Maniema, and Mai-Ndombe), most of these areas will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In the conflict-affected areas in Ituri and North Kivu, an increase in the number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected. However, households in the center-east (which has a large area in post-conflict situation, continue to cultivate and depend on their own-production over a large part of the lean season. This allows them to have a minimally adequate food consumption, with at times the use of negative strategies; these households are in Stressed (IPC Phase 2). On the other hand, the areas in the south-west (Kinshasa, Bandundu, Central Kongo) which are experiencing a situation of security and economic stability and are able to cover their food and non-food needs without engaging in coping strategies will be in Minimal (IPC Phase 1). Households in the north (Haut-Uele, Bas-Uele, Tshopo, and Nord-Ubangi) which have grown crops regularly over the course of the agricultural seasons are able to develop food stocks that will enable them to go through a normal lean season pending the next season's harvests. These areas are also in Minimal (IPC Phase 1). 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Increase in floods due to heavy rains

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The combined effects of global warming and the El Niño phenomenon continue to create heavy rains, particularly in the DRC. This ongoing situation could increase flooding and landslides. This would limit normal agricultural production and reduce the flow of local products into the country. An increase in areas in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will be likely in flooded provinces.

Important sudden depreciation of the local currency

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Since the beginning of the year, the local currency has been depreciating steadily, and observers fear a sudden depreciation following the measures taken by the government. A sudden devaluation of currency would lead to higher prices for goods and services (notably higher transport and fuel costs), as well as higher prices for key foodstuffs and reduced access to imported food for poor households. There would probably be an increase in the population in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) or worse.

Conflict zones (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika, Mai-Ndombe):

Decrease in the intensity of armed conflicts and significant surrender of armed groups in response to ongoing peace initiatives

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The success of ongoing peace processes in these regions would lead to a reduction in new displacements and encourage the gradual return of populations to their villages of origin. This could increase household participation in agricultural activities and other livelihoods, thereby improving food access and income sources for poor households. There would likely be a reduction in the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse.

New influx of newly displaced persons

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The government army and its partners (SADEC Force and MONUSCO) are preparing a strong offensive against the M23/RDF (Rwanda Defense Forces) rebel coalition. This offensive could increase the level of violence and thus drive new influxes of displaced persons. These new influxes may create strong pressure on livelihoods and deteriorate food consumption in a context of insufficient humanitarian assistance. In this case, there would likely be an increase in the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse.