Multifaceted conflicts continue to hinder household food security

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with a low proportion of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), persist in the eastern provinces, primarily affecting poor and displaced households. Armed conflicts involving multiple local and foreign actors are driving significant population displacement. These dynamics limit household access to arable land and income-generating activities, such as artisanal mining, fishing, and petty trade. Due to the reduction in cultivated areas following displacement and low access to inputs, Season 2 (S2) harvests between December and February are expected to be below average. In 2025, more than 2.68 million people were newly displaced in DRC, bringing the total to approximately 5.3 million displaced persons.
• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) acute food insecurity could persist through September 2026 in flooded areas, particularly in the central basin zones and in lowlands. Household production is depleted, and incomes are too low to meet household needs on the market following damage related to the overflow of rivers and lakes, affecting road infrastructure and population livelihoods.
• FEWS NET estimates that approximately 16-16.99 million people will be in need of food assistance, with peak needs expected between August and September 2026. Needs will remain high throughout the country even after the harvests, particularly for displaced populations, returnees, refugees, and households that are unable to meet their food needs without resorting to negative coping strategies. Starting in March, the depletion of food stocks among poor and very poor households will increase their dependence on assistance.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 20, 2026.

Agriculture plays an essential role in sustaining livelihoods across the country. In rural areas, most households depend heavily on temporary and casual agricultural labor, as well as the gathering of forest products and fishing, both for consumption and income. The month of June marks the harvest period for Season 1 (S1), which is generally less significant than that of Season 2 (S2), which occurs in January. In the southeast, however, there is only one agricultural season, with harvests beginning in April. With the exception of the far southeast, where maize is more dominant, cassava is the main staple food and is harvested throughout the year. Despite its importance, overall agricultural production remains insufficient to meet the needs of a rapidly growing population. As a result, DRC continues to depend heavily on food imports to fill this gap.

Conflict remains the major driver of acute food insecurity in DRC. While chronic poverty is linked to persistent structural challenges such as weak infrastructure and services, a large part of the country remains resilient to acute food insecurity, largely due to a favorable climate and abundant and regular rainfall that supports agricultural production. In the absence of severe shocks, most households can meet their food and non-food needs through subsistence agricultural production and purchases in local markets. Rising conflict increasingly threatens stability. Tensions related to natural resources and interethnic rivalries fuel violence and displacement. In the northeast, the resurgence of the M23 offensive has intensified instability. Meanwhile, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has extended its operations in Ituri, joining other non-state armed actors, including Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) and Convention for Popular Revolution (CRP). In the southwest of the country, intense intercommunal conflicts in Mai-Ndombe also continue to disrupt livelihoods, despite signs of improvement in recent months. This widespread insecurity severely limits access to fields, reducing cultivated areas and sometimes leading to the total abandonment of agricultural land. This disruption also affects fishing and commercial activities, which are essential for local food supply and income. The decrease in production is accompanied by market dysfunction and sharp price instability that further limits the capacity of households to regularly access food.

At the beginning of 2025, the rapid intensification and territorial expansion of the M23 rebellion conflict triggered massive population displacements and disrupted household participation in both agricultural seasons. New offensives in November and December 2025 led to additional displacements, particularly in South Kivu, and disrupted S2 harvests in January. Despite the M23's withdrawal from the city of Uvira in January, food security remains precarious following the continuation of clashes in the area. The ADF took advantage of the regional security crisis to significantly increase the frequency of its attacks. The ADF conflict, volatile and unpredictable, has the greatest impact on food security, health, education, and humanitarian assistance operations. ADF terrorists are conducting a scorched earth policy that destroys schools, health facilities, population livelihoods, and even targets displaced persons and refugee camps, spreading terror among civilians. Between 2020 and 2025, the ADF was responsible for approximately one quarter of reported violence against civilians in eastern DRC, making it the non-state armed group (NSAG) most frequently involved in such violence, until the expansion of M23 activities.

The DRC is facing other cumulative shocks, including seasonal flooding and macroeconomic instability. The excessive rainfall recorded in 2023 and 2024 caused historic flooding, landslides, and destruction of infrastructure and household assets. These phenomena were intense in the central basin along the Congo River and its tributaries. Multiple shocks have maintained high assistance needs throughout the year, although improvements are currently perceptible compared to the situation approximately two years ago. Although the multiple chronic epidemics present in the DRC (human, plant health, and zoonotic) generally do not prevent households from meeting their minimum food needs through diversified livelihoods, and the number of people directly affected generally remains insufficient to have a significant impact on acute food insecurity at large scale, these epidemics can nevertheless increase household vulnerability to shocks by reducing their coping capacity. Despite the sharp appreciation of the CDF in August 2025, macroeconomic stability remains fragile. The currency has depreciated over time with high inflation, eroding households' meager incomes while recurrent shocks maintain high assistance needs throughout the year.

Learn more

The following links provide additional information:

• Latest Democratic Republic of the Congo Food Security Outlook Report: October 2025 to May 2026
• Latest Democratic Republic of the Congo Key Messages Update: January 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

In the eastern part of the country, the Congo River Alliance/M23 group continues its offensive operations against civilian and military targets, leading to ongoing displacement (Figure 1). In North Kivu, fighting continues with Wazalendo militia groups in the territories of Masisi, Rutshuru, and Walikale. In South Kivu, despite the forced withdrawal from the city  Uvira, M23 has continued its efforts to consolidate its political and economic control over the areas it has conquered. Simultaneously, the Banyamulenge "Twirwaneho" militias, affiliated with M23, have extended their presence in the highlands of Fizi, around Minembwe, leading to the deployment of Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and Burundian reinforcements. Thus, violent clashes have continued for more than two weeks between the belligerents in all these areas, causing significant population movements. According to the population movement commission as of December 31, 2025, South Kivu province had a cumulative total of more than 1.42 million internally displaced persons, while North Kivu province had approximately 1.8 million.

In the northern part of Nord-Kivu Province and in the southern part of Ituri Province, the ADF continues to carry out attacks against civilian populations. Although the number of attacks in Nord-Kivu has slightly decreased compared to last year, the violence remains extremely deadly. According to the Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), from January to November 2025, at least 700 people were killed, 150 abducted, and 40 injured in Beni and Lubero. ADF operations are characterized by massacres, destruction of infrastructure, and looting. This has severely compromised the security of civilians and disrupted the livelihoods of communities. The resulting insecurity has caused massive displacement, with nearly 250,000 people displaced from Beni and Lubero since January 2025.

In Ituri, attacks by other community armed groups continue, particularly in Djugu territory. In this area, militiamen from the CRP group are confronting the FARDC in the Bule Region, causing deaths, destruction, and displacement, paralyzing the agropastoral economy. This violence has emptied more than 70 villages in January 2026, disrupted the main logistics routes, and forced thousands of people to displace under extremely precarious conditions. According to OCHA, nearly 100,000 people are newly displaced in Djugu territory during the last three months following armed clashes.

In the provinces of Mai-Ndombe, Kwango, and Kwilu, the Teke-Yaka conflict has continued to affect local civilian populations. Despite peace efforts undertaken by the government, violence persists, with sporadic attacks causing continued population displacements on the outskirts of Kinshasa, around the territories of Kikwit and Kwamouth. Civilians are the primary victims of the conflict; their essential livelihood activities are disrupted and the main road routes remain dangerous for mobility and the movement of goods and services. An International Organization for Migration (IOM) rapid assessment conducted at the end of September 2025 identified 83,847 newly displaced persons, bringing the total to more than 280,000 (an increase of 43 percent in less than six months). At the end of January 2026, a government mission had been sent to the area to raise awareness among militiamen to cease fighting and a group of these militiamen agreed to demobilize, but mistrust persists and the return of displaced persons has not taken place.

Localized flooding in several provinces disrupted households' daily activities and access to markets. This flooding remained relatively localized, affecting a significantly lower proportion compared to two previous years. Several localities in several provinces were affected, notably Kindu (Maniema), Moba (Tanganyika), Walikale (North Kivu), Haut Katanga (Katanga), Nyiragongo (Nord-Kivu), Shabunda, (Sud-Kivu), and Malemba Nkulu (Haut Lomami). This flooding paralyzed the local economy, resulting in destruction of fields and severe disruption of livelihoods. The interruption of commercial flows caused by this heavy rainfall on certain road axes hinders the movement of goods and people and affects household incomes.

Harvests of food crops from S2, between mid-December 2025 and February 2026 in the northeast and center-east, are estimated to be below average due to the reduction in cultivated areas linked to population displacements, disruptions in access to fields, crop looting, and the reduction in agricultural labor opportunities related to insecurity. In other areas, particularly in the territories of Rutshuru and Nyiragongo, improved security has enabled households to resume agriculture, but cultivated areas remain reduced due to limited access to agricultural inputs and financial resources, particularly for households affected by persistent localized flooding.

For more than three months, monetary stability has continued; however, the foreign exchange market has continued to record contrasting trends between the official and parallel rates. Cumulatively, since the beginning of 2026, the increase in consumer prices has reached 1.01 percent, a rate of increase identical to that observed in the same period in 2025, reflecting recent macroeconomic stability. Year-on-year, the inflation rate stood at 2.26 percent, compared to 11.07 percent in the corresponding period of 2025. Despite this monetary stability, food commodity prices, particularly in areas affected by conflict, remain high while overall purchasing power remains limited after years of high inflation and currency depreciation.

Humanitarian food assistance

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has experienced an exceptional contraction of humanitarian assistance with a decrease of approximately 85 percent in funding since 2025. This slowdown in humanitarian assistance is caused by the humanitarian funding deficit in a context of escalating violence in the east and multiple shocks (massive displacements, epidemics, and floods). This major contraction results primarily from the reduction in contributions from several traditional donors. Information from the Food Security Cluster indicates that in 2025, the quantity of assistance distributed had covered only 39 percent of needs, an average coverage of 2.9 months of 1,647 kilocalories per person per day.

Conflict zones (northeastern DRC and Mai-Ndombe) are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with an increase in the proportion of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in certain hotspots, particularly in Ituri (Djugu territory) and North Kivu (Masisi and Rutshuru territories). Displaced households no longer have access to agricultural land following displacement and depend heavily on the market for their food supply. In these areas, some poor and displaced households resort to strategies of early sale of livestock, sale of productive assets such as agricultural inputs, consumption of cheaper and less preferred foods, and reduction in the number of meals or portions. Essential expenditures, particularly on health and education, are frequently reduced. The ongoing S2 harvests in February 2026, although below average, are providing a temporary improvement in food consumption for poor households without changing the overall food insecurity situation.

In Mai-Ndombe Province, the territory of Kwamouth and its surrounding areas remain affected by the activities of the Mobondo armed group and are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In Maniema, particularly in the border areas of Fizi and Shabunda, households are also in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) following recurrent clashes between the FARDC and various armed groups, the effects of the regional conflict, as well as the arrival of displaced persons from South Kivu. Displaced households, having abandoned their fields and their livelihoods, meet their food needs only by resorting to the sale of household assets and the reduction of essential non-food expenditures.

A small proportion of poor households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will persist in Ituri (Djugu), North Kivu (Walikale, Masisi, Lubero, and Oicha), and in South Kivu (Fizi and Uvira), where populations are caught in combat zones and front lines. With access to their livelihoods severely reduced and their resilience already eroded, these households are likely experiencing food consumption deficits that will significantly affect the already critical nutritional situation for these regions. The latest nutritional surveys in 2025 indicate global acute malnutrition rates exceeding Alert (>5 percent) and Aerious (>10 percent) thresholds in South Kivu, North Kivu, and Ituri. The expected new displacements risk worsening the food deficits of the displaced and further weakening household livelihoods.

In the zones of the central basin, many households continue to experience the repercussions of two consecutive years of severe flooding in these areas, particularly in the territories of Bolomba and Lukolela, which are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Households in these areas have insufficient food access and resort to the sale of livestock to meet their needs. Many depend on forest resources as their main source of food and income, due to the seasonal abundance of wild products.

Areas less severely affected by flooding are in Stressed (IPC Phase 2). In these areas, the deterioration of transport infrastructure, limited access to agricultural inputs, and losses of assets and crops caused by flooding have eroded household livelihoods. Households are adopting strategies such as selling household goods or purchasing food on credit. In contrast, the calm areas of the equatorial region, benefiting from gathered products and staggered harvests throughout the year, are expected to remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1). During this harvest period, households could also resort to other economic opportunities, including petty trade and early sale of livestock, in a context of relative security stability.

Most areas of Grand Kasaï are classified in Stressed (IPC Phase 2), with localized pockets in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) depending on agricultural performance and market access. Poor households are adopting strategies of consuming less preferred foods in order to maintain minimal food intake. Their income, primarily derived from subsistence agriculture, small-scale trade, artisanal mining, and informal transfers, is vulnerable to shocks such as plant diseases and animal epidemics, limited access to agricultural inputs, and seed degeneration. Despite persistent structural constraints, including poor road accessibility and limited access to agricultural inputs, seasonal harvests and gathered products contribute to supporting local food availability. Markets remain functional, although characterized by relatively high prices due to transportation costs.

In the southeastern zones, particularly in the territories of Tanganyika (Kalemie, Manono, and Kongolo), communal conflicts and recurrent flooding maintain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Displaced and diverted households face food consumption deficits and manage to cover their essential food needs only marginally by reducing essential expenditures, particularly on health and education. In contrast, the majority of zones in the southeast (Haut-Katanga, Haut-Lomami, Lualaba) are in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), with households able to cover their essential food needs without resorting to atypical coping strategies. In these zones, income from mining activities and small-scale trade is expected to remain generally stable and sufficient to enable households to access food commodities through the market. The relative security stability and ongoing cross-border trade are also supporting market supply and food availability.

In the southwestern zones (Kinshasa, Bandundu, Kongo Central), Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes predominate. The functionality of markets, the fluidity of commercial trade, and the regular availability of food products support local supply. Most households in this zone are able to meet their food and non-food needs without resorting to atypical or unsustainable coping strategies.

• The multiple ongoing conflicts in DRC are expected to persist throughout the projection period with varying intensity. The eastern regions of the country (North and South Kivu) are expected to experience an escalation around the main mining sites, while in the western regions, particularly in Mai-Ndombe, insecurity will persist, but with a lower frequency of violence, as the demobilization process of the Mabondo militias accelerates. These conflicts will continue to cause household displacement and severely disrupt their access to livelihoods and thus constrain their income sources.
• Clashes between M23, FARDC, the Wazalendo militias, and various local armed groups are expected to continue, particularly in the territories of North Kivu (Walikale, Lubero, Rutshuru, and Masisi) and South Kivu (Fizi, Kabare, Kalehe, Mwenga, Uvira, and Walungu), but at a lower frequency and intensity than in early 2025. In these areas, new internal displacements are likely, although mitigated given that a significant portion of the population fled during previous fighting.
• ADF attacks against civilians in the territories of Lubero, Oicha, Beni, Irumu, and Mambasa are expected to continue throughout the projection period. However, the number of armed clashes and acts of violence involving the ADF is expected to remain stable or decrease slightly, given the continuation of operations conducted by the Congolese government and the Ugandan army.
• In Ituri, clashes between non-state armed actors (CODECO, ZAIRE, PRC) are expected to continue at the same pace. These groups are expected to maintain their asymmetric tactics, including ambushes along major logistical corridors, and will likely continue their targeted attacks against displaced populations and subsistence farmers. These operations will continue to harm mobility and trade, disrupt planting and harvest cycles, and exacerbate food insecurity in affected communities.
• In Mai-Ndombe, Kwango, and Kwilu provinces, violence related to the Teke-Yaka conflict is expected to decrease compared to previous years with government initiatives for the surrender and demobilization of armed groups. This could allow thousands of households to return to their villages.
• Precipitation for the first rainy season in March is anticipated to be above average in the northern regions and near average across most of the country for the entire S1, which is expected to allow good crop development. Some parts of the southeast and southwest, as well as the far west, show slightly higher probabilities of below-average precipitation through March, while those in the north and center indicate above-average precipitation (Figure 2).
• Flooding and landslides in the western part of the country are expected to continue, although their intensity is slightly reduced compared to previous periods. These events will continue to affect certain household livelihoods, particularly fishing, subsistence agriculture, and river trade, by limiting access to resources and disrupting local economic activities.
• The S1 agricultural season, whose activities will begin in February in areas in the center and northeast of the country, is expected to result in below-average harvests in June, as disruptions to agricultural activities are expected to continue in areas affected by conflict and ongoing displacement.
• With the growing number of displaced persons in conflict zones, agricultural labor will be abundantly available in host areas in the eastern provinces affected by conflict. However, with the increase in the number of displaced persons and consequently in the supply of labor, competition will likely lead to a decrease in daily wages for preparatory agricultural activities for S2.
• Cross-border trade between eastern DRC and Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania will continue to function partially despite disruptions related to armed groups. Imports from these countries are expected to support price stability in the eastern provinces, particularly during the short lean season from March to May 2026. In the west, markets will be primarily supplied by local production and targeted imports for urban centers, ensuring relative price stability.
• The local currency is expected to begin to depreciate slightly. Although government reforms led to a rapid appreciation in August 2025 followed by stabilization, recent government projections indicate a depreciation during the projection period. This development, linked notably to the significant increase in the public sector wage bill, is expected to progressively affect food prices, especially for imported products, and lead to a relative deterioration in household purchasing power.
• In conflict zones (North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, and Kwamouth), market access will remain limited for households due to the control of armed groups, which could maintain high prices and limit the availability of maize.
• Moderate economic growth is expected in 2026, supported primarily by the relatively favorable price outlook for the main commodities exported by the DRC. However, the positive effects of this growth could be limited by a possible depreciation of the local currency which would likely increase import costs, particularly for food products and fuel, continuing to strain household purchasing power. Since the end of last year, prices of the main minerals exported by the DRC are stable and increasing, which should increase labor demand in the mining sector.

Humanitarian food assistance

• Due to insufficient resources, the humanitarian food assistance response in 2026 in DRC is supporting 5.9 million people out of nearly 13 million with vital assistance and protection needs, representing a reduction of 45 percent. Given the historically unprecedented decrease in humanitarian funding in 2025 and the resulting significant decrease in operational coverage, it is highly likely that the humanitarian response plan for 2026 will remain severely limited, with a significant proportion of needs unmet.

Most conflict zones (northeastern DRC and Mai-Ndombe) will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) between February and May, with an early lean season starting in April linked to low production levels and stocks from consecutive seasons, and to significant crop losses recorded during the intensification of fighting at the end of S2 (November-December 2025). Humanitarian assistance needs will increase for displaced households and host families. Households that lost the previous agricultural season following displacements will not be able to access seeds. Security and road constraints limit commercial flows, which reinforces market dependence for food access. The deterioration of livelihoods, particularly the depletion of assets sold, reduces the capacity of households to recover from shocks and increases the risk of significant food consumption deficits, as their livelihoods and coping strategies are considerably reduced.

From June through September, these conflict-affected zones are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) with pockets of poor displaced households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), particularly in frontline areas. The S1 harvests will provide a seasonal improvement in food access starting in June and in income for a significant proportion of households, but they will remain limited due to field abandonment. S1 stocks will be depleted early, by August, before the main lean season in a context of low income, leading to a rapid return to market dependence and continued livelihood erosion. To cope with the situation, poor households are expected to adopt atypical coping strategies, including reducing health-related expenditures, as well as the size and frequency of their meals, consuming less preferred foods, and increasingly resorting to borrowing or credit. In frontline areas, households without access to their livelihoods may resort to more severe coping strategies (illegal activities) and will experience significant consumption deficits.

In the central basin zones, repeated flooding in recent seasons has reduced production, disrupted trade, and damaged roads, limiting market access and increasing transportation costs, maintaining high food prices. The most affected territories, Balomba and Lukolela, which have also experienced recent recurrent flooding over the past two years, will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In these areas, households will only marginally meet their essential food needs and will deplete their major livelihood assets by employing negative coping strategies, including consumption of seed stocks and sale of productive assets. In contrast, in other areas, the combination of acute shocks — plant diseases (including cassava mosaic), advanced deterioration of transportation infrastructure, limited access to agricultural inputs — will maintain a situation of Stressed (IPC Phase 2). To meet food needs, these households will have to use certain strategies, including borrowing food and/or selling household assets.

Starting in June, the S1 harvests in June and July will allow households to improve their food consumption for the duration of their food stocks. These households, which will have improved their income through the sale of harvest products, will depend on their own production.

In the southeastern zones in Tanganyika province, communal armed conflicts and repeated flooding will maintain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in the territories of Kalemie, Manono, and Kongolo. A significant proportion of households will continue to face consumption deficits and will only be able to cover their essential food needs marginally by employing negative coping strategies such as harvesting immature crops and drastically reducing vital non-food expenditures. However, the Katanga zones, Lualaba, Haut-Katanga, Haut-Lomami, and Tanganyika (except Kalemie, Manono, and Kongolo), are expected to be in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), supported by relatively stable mining revenues and functional markets. Mining activities experiencing a good price season will enable poor households to generate income that will allow them to meet their minimum food and non-food needs.

Most areas of Grand Kasaï will be Stressed (IPC Phase 2). Persisting low agricultural production and constraints in this post-conflict context will likely maintain the lean season between February and May. Low production will reduce the availability of food on the market, and households will depend on imports of food products from Southern Africa countries. However, this area is characterized by low household income and purchasing power (National Statistics Institute), and poor households' access to food on the market will remain limited. Households will resort to negative coping strategies such as purchasing food on credit or borrowing to access food. From June onward, the S1 harvests of June and July will allow households to improve their food consumption for the duration of their food stocks. Households that will have improved their income through the sale of harvest products will depend on their own production, but this will not be sufficient to notably improve food security and most areas will remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

The southwestern zones (Kinshasa, Bandundu, Kongo Central) are generally stable and will be in Minimal (IPC Phase 1). However, in certain areas of the Kwilu territories, crops continue to experience rainfall irregularities and remain more vulnerable to epizootics. With limited household stocks and reduced yields, agricultural households in these areas are Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a crediblealternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National

Deep and sharp depreciation of the local currency

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Since August 2025, the local currency had shown stability and sometimes an atypical appreciation against foreign currencies, following special measures taken by the government. However, since the beginning of February 2026, a depreciation has been observed. Analysts estimate this depreciation could continue given that the Congolese economy is externally oriented and that the measures taken by the national bank are not sustainable. Thus, a sharp depreciation of the national currency in the near future is to be feared. A sharp depreciation of this currency would lead to an increase in the prices of goods and services, as well as an increase in the prices of main food commodities. This would cause a decrease in access to imported foods for poor households. An increase in the proportion of households in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would be likely, particularly in urban areas where households meet most of their food needs through market purchases. Some urban areas previously classified in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) could shift to Stressed (IPC Phase 2), depending on the magnitude of the currency depreciation.

Increase in flooding due to rainfall disruptions

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Weather effects resulting from deforestation continue to create rainfall disruptions in the region, particularly in the DRC. If this situation continues, it could increase flooding and landslides. This would limit typical agricultural production and reduce the flow of local products in the country. An increase in areas in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will be likely in areas with excessive rainfall, particularly in areas of the central Congo River basin and the shores of Lake Tanganyika.

Conflict zones (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika, Mai-Ndombe)

Increase in intensity of armed conflicts and spread of fighting following the failure of peace initiatives and ongoing diplomatic efforts

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Security incidents will persist across the country through September 2026 at a level likely similar to that of 2025 despite the potential failure of diplomatic initiatives. In an alternative scenario, where diplomatic initiatives and peace efforts fail and lead to an intensification of conflict greater than expected and the widespread resumption of clashes, increased levels of violence and new influxes of displaced persons would be expected. These new influxes could create strong pressure on livelihoods and deterioration of food consumption, in the absence of any humanitarian assistance, thus driving new population movements. An increase in the proportion of the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would be likely in this scenario, even though area-level classifications should remain unchanged.

Since June 2024, the security situation in Lubero has deteriorated sharply due to the repositioning of the ADF from Beni. Repeated attacks against civilians and clashes between rival armed groups have intensified in Lubero territory, especially in the health zones of Biena and Mangurejipa (Figure 3). These zones are the most affected by repeated attacks, characterized by killings, abductions of civilians and the burning of houses, as well as social structures such as health centers and schools. In one week in November 2025, 89 civilians were killed by ADF elements in this part of the territory. These attacks hinder mobility, reduce access to fields, and disrupt agricultural activities.

This violence has caused massive and rapid displacement. From October to December 2025, following the intensification of ADF attacks, the number of displaced persons increased by 79 percent, rising from 236,640 to 422,816 people, representing 29 percent of the population. As of December 31, 2025, the territory had approximately 655,000 returnees, representing 49 percent of the territory's population (according to the Population Movement Commission). These people in movement (displacement and returns) are exposed to food insecurity due to the abandonment of their livelihoods (agricultural activities).

Since 2019, agricultural production has decreased due to the intensification of conflicts. A joint assessment mission coordinated by OCHA in December 2025 in southern Lubero territory indicates that 71 percent of households do not have access to land. In other areas, landowners have been prevented from accessing their fields due to insecurity, which has prevented some households from harvesting cassava, the main livelihood source in this region. Access to land and its availability for agriculture have decreased due to the large number of displaced persons from Beni, Walikale, and Rutshuru. The average area planted per household has fallen to approximately 0.2 ares, compared to approximately 25 ares before the crisis in 2019, according to key informants, with current yields below average.

The conflict has reduced household income sources and changed livelihoods. According to an assessment conducted by humanitarian actors in December 2025, 47 percent of displaced persons depend on agricultural day labor in refugee areas, particularly in the health zones of Manguredjipa, Musienene, Katwa, Butembo, and Lubero. Approximately 21 percent of the population practices subsistence agriculture, while other households have limited or irregular resources. Livestock, also important for households, has been severely affected by looting and displacement. Between 2018 and 2024, the territory experienced a decrease of 52 percent in goats and 74 percent in sheep, according to the Provincial Livestock Inspection, which reduces household income. Some households are turning to small livestock activities such as rabbit farming and guinea pig raising, which provide supplementary income. To meet food needs in this context, most poor households resort to strategies of selling productive assets, withdrawing children from school, and early harvests, with a significant proportion of households resorting to begging and illegal activities.

With the decrease in agricultural production, households in Lubero, particularly poor displaced households, are increasingly dependent on the market. Conflict and displacement disrupt the supply of local markets, with certain road routes cut off due to insecurity, which limits the free access of traders and consumers to food commodities in these markets. Prices show strong variations. According to data collected by REACH from October to December 2025, prices of maize flour is increasing in Kagheri and Kirumba compared to relative stability in the central market of Lubero, while cassava flour remains more available depending on the markets, and beans remain overall the most expensive product. The differences between maize flour prices across markets are explained by the fact that Lubero, under the control of the Congolese government, is easily supplied from Butembo, Beni, and Uganda, while Kirumba, under M23 management, depends on a long and costly supply chain, via Kanyabayonga or even the city of Goma.

Displacement further exacerbates household vulnerability to acute food insecurity and malnutrition. Despite Acceptable (<5 percent GAM) malnutrition rates in Lubero according to the latest surveys in 2025, the joint mission in December 2025 revealed a much more concerning situation among displaced households. The measurement of mid-upper arm circumference of children under five demonstrated a Serious (> 10 percent) GAM rate of 13.2 percent. The severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rate was 2 percent, which indicates significant moderate acute malnutrition and a risk of deterioration into SAM. Displaced children represent a higher proportion of severe and moderate acute malnutrition cases, as they often face limited access to health services and inadequate nutrition.

The presence of conflicting forces and the persistence of ADF clashes are expected to continue in the region, albeit at a stable or slightly lower level in 2025, due to joint operations by the Congolese government and the Ugandan army. The conflict will continue to disrupt agriculture and access to land and inputs, which will severely limit household participation in S1 and reduce production in an area once considered the breadbasket of Kivu. Insecurity and roadblocks in Lubero territory and its surroundings also restrict small trade activities and cross-border commerce, affecting the income of thousands of households that depend on these activities. Food commodity prices will increase overall throughout the projection period, remaining above the five-year average with atypical fluctuations compared to the previous year, despite periods of temporary decrease when the June harvests stimulate market supply.

Due to the ongoing conflict and severe disruption of livelihood activities, the zone will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through September. The planting period is between March and April, and the start of the S1 green harvests is in late May 2026. However, given that a significant portion of the agricultural population is displaced within the territory, production will be below normal for food crops. Given the early minor lean season that is expected at the end of March in the zone, a moderate deficit in household food consumption is anticipated. The S1 harvests in June will be able to improve food consumption for poor households. However, food availability will be atypically low starting in early August with early stock depletion. Poor households will be able to fall back on less expensive and less preferred foods or even community assistance, while displaced persons will rely more on potential humanitarian assistance in the zone. Therefore, the food security situation in this territory will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with a small proportion of the population likely in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).