Escalation of violence continues to worsen food insecurity in conflict-affected zones

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) conditions continue in conflict-affected areas at the start of the short lean season, amid ongoing clashes between armed groups and government forces in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces. The insecurity continues to disrupt livelihoods, limit access to food, and drive significant displacement, as well as reduce household participation in Season 1 (S1) agricultural activities. 
• Low stock levels and reduced participation in S1 agricultural activities are increasing households’ dependence on markets for food access. As a result of the persistent conflicts in these areas, households are experiencing deteriorating livelihoods, losing access to assets, and resorting to negative coping strategies to obtain food. These households are expected to continue facing food consumption gaps despite the June harvests, maintaining the need for food assistance through September at least.
• Supply chain disruptions linked to developments in the Middle East have led to rising market prices, particularly for fuel. The government has increased petroleum product prices according to the national market’s division into four regions. This trend is beginning to erode the purchasing power of poor households, further reducing their access to food on markets (especially in eastern areas already weakened by armed conflict) where households are resorting to negative coping strategies.
• The relatively successful agricultural season is expected to support Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in the central territories, despite structural constraints — particularly deteriorating roads, which limit producers’ access to markets — and reduced supply, which is driving price increases.

This report provides an update to the February to September 2026 Food Security Outlook and March 2026 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of April 27, 2026. 

Persisting clashes between M23 rebels and the government coalition in South and North Kivu provinces continues to restrict access to food and income sources. The conflict has seen new escalations along the front lines, marked by intensified fighting involving drones, airstrikes, and heavy artillery. These acts of violence, aimed at expanding the areas of influence of the belligerents, have disrupted socioeconomic life along major strategic routes, causing significant civilian displacement. New negotiations took place between M23 and the government in mid-April, and the parties agreed to establish a ceasefire verification mechanism and guarantee rapid humanitarian access for civilians. However, persistent skirmishes continue to be reported.

Population displacement during the cultivation period disrupted S1 agricultural activities. Although households living in areas controlled by M23 or the government have generally been able to access their fields, those located along frontline areas continue to face difficulties accessing farmland. In addition, insecurity and displacement have forced many farmers to abandon their livelihoods, which are their primary sources of income, and have reduced cultivated areas, signaling a likely decline in agricultural harvests next season. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that as of February, there were approximately 5.6 million internally displaced persons and 4.3 million returnees; this includes more than 300,000 newly displaced people in 2026, according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

A resurgence of violence attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has been recorded in the territory of Mambasa in Ituri. While relative calm has been observed in the territory of Lubero in April, nearly 100 people were killed and hundreds more abducted at the beginning of the month in Mambasa territory. According to civil society organizations, around 400 people had been kidnapped by the ADF since mid-March. Areas previously spared from attacks, such as Mambasa and Niania, as well as mining sites (Muchacha and Bebeusa), have also been targeted. At the same time, Congolese and Ugandan armed forces are conducting joint operations against these militants, who have fragmented into mobile units to evade pursuit. These attacks are causing population displacement, with households abandoning their livelihoods (businesses and farms) and losing their sources of income.

In March 2026, a new armed group known as the “Mouvement Debout Katanga pour la libération du Congo” (MDKC), associated with Bakata Katanga militias, carried out attacks in Haut-Katanga in Nkonga, within Mitwaba territory, targeting Upemba National Park, the village of Lusinga, and surrounding areas. These acts of violence displaced households into host families in nearby villages. House burnings and looting disrupted agricultural and mining activities, thereby reducing displaced households’ ability to meet their food needs.

Nomadic Mbororo herders arriving in the provinces of South Ubangi, Bas Uele, and Haut Uele from South Sudan are committing abuses against local populations. As a result of this violence, hundreds of families have fled their villages to seek refuge in the localities of Apodo, Ndu, Mungbere, and Gombari, increasing pressure on the livelihoods of host families. The national government has deployed a security mission to identify and disarm the Mbororo herders in the affected areas.

Since March, the country has experienced heavy and persistent rainfall in certain regions of the Congo River basin (Maniema, Equateur, and Tshopo), causing severe flooding. Rising water levels in the Congo River in April led to floods that destroyed homes and public infrastructure, disrupting livelihoods and making affected communities increasingly vulnerable to food insecurity. Water levels currently remain high, threatening already affected populations and increasing the risk of further damage. Damage to roads and transportation routes is disrupting trade, limiting market access, and increasing transportation costs, which is restricting supply and keeping food prices high.

Petroleum product prices have changed following supply chain disruptions linked to developments in the Middle East, first due to speculation, and later following an official price adjustment, with different prices set across four regions in mid-April. Data collected by FEWS NET indicate an average increase of 30 percent in gasoline prices and 29 percent in diesel prices countrywide between February and April (Figure 1). Markets in the eastern part of the country have been most affected. In the city of Beni, from February to the last week of April (after the official adjustment), increases of up to 107 percent for gasoline and 109 percent for diesel were observed, due to long logistical corridors and dependence on imports through East African countries. Prices remain high in the south (which depends on the Zambian corridor), while the west has recorded only slight increases. However, prices of staple food products remain relatively stable despite a slight upward trend for imported goods.

Copper and cobalt mining companies in the DRC are reducing their consumption of chemical products because of supply chain disruptions linked to developments in the Middle East. This situation is forcing companies to not only ration the use of these inputs, but also to consider reducing production levels.

Humanitarian food assistance

According to OCHA, funding for the 2026 humanitarian response plan has been drastically reduced by 45 percent compared to 2025 due to weak resource mobilization. As of April, the funding rate for food assistance stands at 22 percent. This situation indicates that available resources are significantly lower than in previous years and that the humanitarian budget has been reduced to align with the challenges of mobilizing resources.

Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the Democratic Republic of the Congo Food Security Outlook from February to September 2026 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence:

• Clashes between M23, the FARDC, Wazalendo militias, and other armed groups are expected to continue in several territories of North and South Kivu, but at a lower intensity than in 2025. With negotiations ongoing, and despite skirmishes along the front lines, areas of control are generally expected to remain stable, allowing for the gradual return of populations and livelihood activities in more secure areas. However, more limited displacements could still occur in frontline zones. 
• According to Ebuteli, ADF attacks against civilians are expected to intensify in Haut-Uélé and Tshopo provinces, while maintaining their presence in the Okapi Wildlife Reserve (RFO) and Maïko National Park, from where they can easily attack villages throughout these protected areas. 
• The persistence of disruptions in the global fuel supply chain linked to the situation in the Middle East is expected to maintain upward pressure on fuel prices in the short and medium term. The DRC is heavily dependent on fuel for the import and transportation of staple foods across the country, prices of these products are therefore expected to continue rising in the medium term as a result of higher transportation costs for goods and services. Poor households living in insecure areas are expected to be the most affected by rising fuel and transportation costs, as well as increasing prices for goods and services. This trend will further reduce household purchasing power and worsen difficulties in accessing food. 
• Overall annual inflation remains generally contained, but possible increases are likely in April due to the combined effects of rising fuel prices and the ongoing short lean season. Seasonal increases in food demand will place additional pressure on the overall price level.

Conflict-affected areas are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with pockets of poor displaced households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) through September 2026, particularly in frontline zones between the government and AFC/M23 forces. During this short lean season period, coinciding with S1 agricultural activities, low stock levels from consecutive seasons, combined with security and road constraints limiting trade flows, are increasing households’ dependence on markets for food access.

In territories affected by the M23/AFC conflict, gradual security improvements in areas under the control of the different actors are expected to allow the progressive return of populations and a partial resumption of agricultural activities and livelihoods in more stable areas. At the same time, access will remain heavily constrained in frontline zones. Poor displaced households will continue relying on daily agricultural labor and informal labor for survival. Although returning populations may access their land during S1, disruptions from previous agricultural seasons will continue to limit access to agricultural inputs (particularly seeds), and households will still face difficulties restoring their livelihoods. S1 harvests beginning in June will briefly improve access to food and income, but they will remain below average due to field abandonment between February and March.

In territories threatened by the ADF in North Kivu and Ituri, restricted access to fields will reduce agricultural production and prolong population displacement. The resurgence of ADF attacks in Mambasa in April is expected to further worsen conditions, increasing populations’ exposure to food insecurity. Households that depend on agriculture, forest products, and mining activities will face severe restrictions in accessing forests and farmland. The return of displaced people and the recovery of livelihoods will remain gradual and limited.

In these conflict zones, the already limited harvest stocks are expected to be depleted early (as soon as August ahead of the lean season), leading to greater market dependence amid high prices and further erosion of livelihoods. In response, poor households will resort to negative coping strategies such as reducing health expenditures, decreasing meal size and frequency, consuming less preferred foods, and increasing reliance on borrowing or credit. In frontline areas, a small proportion of households will remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) — in Ituri (Djugu), North Kivu (Walikale, Masisi, Lubero, and Oicha), and South Kivu (Fizi and Uvira) — where access to livelihoods is severely restricted, resulting in significant food consumption deficits.

In the central basin region, the areas of Balomba and Lukolela, which have experienced repeated flooding, will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In these areas, households will only marginally meet their essential food needs and will compromise their livelihoods by employing negative coping strategies, including consuming seed stocks and selling productive assets. In contrast, other areas less affected by flooding will remain in Stressed (IPC Phase 2), with households able to meet their food needs only with difficulty and at minimally adequate levels due to the combined effects of acute shocks, including flooding, crop diseases (particularly cassava mosaic disease), severe deterioration of transport infrastructure, and limited access to agricultural inputs. To meet food needs, households will resort to collecting and gathering forest products, borrowing food, and selling household assets.

In Tanganyika Province in the southeast, community armed conflicts and repeated flooding from Lake Tanganyika and its tributaries will sustain Crisis (IPC Phase) in the territories of Kalemie, Manono, and Kongolo. The combined effects of conflict, population displacement, and flooding have left poor households with degraded livelihoods and inaccessible assets, reducing their ability to meet food needs without resorting to livelihood-based coping strategies. A significant proportion of households will continue facing food consumption deficits and employing negative coping strategies such as harvesting immature crops and drastically reducing essential non-food expenditures.

Most areas of the Greater Kasai region will remain in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) because of low agricultural production linked to the flight of agricultural labor and the lingering post-conflict situation. The low production is expected to reduce food availability on markets, increasing household dependence on food imports from neighboring Angola. The limited income and purchasing power of poor households in this area restrict access to foods on the market. Households will resort to negative coping strategies such as purchasing food on credit or borrowing from others to access food. Beginning in June, S1 harvests in June and July will allow households to improve their incomes through crop sales and improve food consumption for as long as food stocks last. However, this will not be sufficient to significantly improve their food security.

Although the southwestern zones (Kinshasa, Bandundu, and Kongo Central) are generally stable and classified in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), crops in certain areas of Kwilu territories continue to suffer from irregular rainfall and livestock in the area remain more vulnerable diseases. With limited household stocks and reduced yields, farming households in these areas are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

A sharp and prolonged increase in global oil prices linked to developments in the Middle East

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If developments in the Middle East lead to a sharp and prolonged increase in global oil prices, fuel price increases in the DRC would likely become even more severe. This would result in higher logistical costs for imported products and increased transportation costs countrywide. Such a situation would lead to a faster and more pronounced increase in the prices of imported food products (particularly maize in the southern regions), reducing household purchasing power and worsening difficulties in accessing food on markets. Price increases would be more significant in eastern and southern DRC, regions that depend on fuel imports through East African ports. These conditions are expected to increase the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, particularly in the eastern part of the country.

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s February to September 2026 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.