Skip to main content

Growing season B disrupted by renewed violence in the northeastern region of the country

Growing season B disrupted by renewed violence in the northeastern region of the country

Download Report

  • Download Report

  • Key Messages
  • CURRENT SITUATION
  • UPDATED ASSUMPTIONS
  • PROJECTED OUTLOOK TO SEPTEMBER 2021
  • Key Messages
    • Armed groups’ attacks on civilians continue, leading to a decline of the security situation in the Beni territory, which has already been weakened by repeated epidemics and armed conflicts. Since the beginning of April, there have been at least seven attacks, with 35 civilians killed, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Additionally, the resurgence of inter-community conflict in Bakwakenda in Kasaï, in March and April resulted in nearly 36,400 people being displaced. This insecurity portends difficult conditions for farmers who will be restricted in their movements and access to livelihoods.

    • While the DRC is launching its post-Ebola operational action plan, which aims to consolidate and stabilize the gains made in the response to the disease, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to progress with 28,955 cases recorded and 745 deaths as of April 17, 2021. The start of the vaccination campaign is part of the control strategy and could reduce the pandemic’s effects on the population in the medium term. However, for the time being restrictions are not expected to be reinstated.

    • The eastern regions of the DRC, which are in conflict, will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during this short lean season. Meanwhile, certain less-affected central regions will be Stressed (IPC Phase 2). A limited number of households in conflict-affected areas are experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity, particularly in Oïcha (Beni territory).

    CURRENT SITUATION

    Political context: After two months of negotiations, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has finally formed a government from the Union Sacrée coalition. This newly elected government’s entry into power has calmed the tense political climate.

    Conflict in the Kasaï region: This province has been experiencing a resurgence of inter-community conflict in the town of Bakwakenge in the Mweka territory between the Bena Milombe (Demba) and Bolempo (Mweka) groups since late March 2021. This conflict is based on the geographical boundaries resulting from the 2016-2017 decentralization. The ethnic conflicts that regularly oppose the two communities have caused the displacement of approximately 36,400 people.

    As a reminder, this conflict is resurfacing after an eight-month lull during which humanitarian actors assisted more than 25,600 people affected by community violence (July to August 2020 episode).

    Declining civilian protection: Armed groups’ violent attacks on civilians continue and the situation is intensifying in the Beni and Lubero territories, further deteriorating the security situation. Since the beginning of April 2021, at least seven attacks have been recorded, resulting in the death of around 35 civilians. According to local civil society, these attacks have been reported mainly in the health districts of Mutwanga and Oïcha, where two health facilities were looted in the Oïcha health district, bringing the total to 10 medical facilities vandalized by armed men in the Beni territory since September 2020. During these attacks, houses and vehicles were burned and property and livestock looted. Several civilians were also abducted.

    Similar violence is also noted in Ituri and South Kivu with no improvement, and more recently in the territories of Djugu and Irumu, with over 70,000 people displaced since the beginning of April.

    Popular demonstrations have been taking place in the North Kivu province since April 5 to protest against insecurity and to demand the departure of UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and humanitarian workers from the province. These “ghost town” days have turned into demonstrations and have paralyzed socio-economic and humanitarian activities in the towns of Beni, Butembo, and Goma. As a result, several humanitarian actors have suspended their movements through several highways in the province. Although no major incidents against humanitarian actors were reported, infrastructure built by some partners was targeted during these demonstrations.

    Population displacements and humanitarian assistance: In some eastern areas of the country, humanitarian actors face difficulties due to the conflicts and frequently have to interrupt their activities, especially in the Mweso area and along the Mweso-Rugarama stretch in Masisi. FEWS NET lacks current data, but it is assumed that the many partners working in these territories are still managing to provide essential support to many households, particularly in terms of food security; shelter; and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH).

    Commodity prices and market operation: For the past two months, prices of basic foodstuffs have been stable on local markets. However, compared to the pre-COVID-19 period, prices of essential commodities have risen mainly because of the devaluation of the local currency, which has lost nearly 12 percent of its value against the US dollar since the onset of COVID-19. It is estimated that, given the integration of the main markets, this stability will continue until the next harvest, scheduled for June.

    UPDATED ASSUMPTIONS

    The current situation could affect the assumptions of the most likely FEWS NET scenario for February to September 2021 as follows:

    Staple food prices and market operation: Despite stability observed in the area during the first two months of the year, the resurgence of conflicts and various demonstrations in conflict areas at this time will undoubtedly have significant negative effects on the availability and prices of basic foodstuffs in this area, during this short April lean season. The structure of the markets under these insecure conditions will be undermined by the low participation of various actors.

    Overall political situation and conflicts: Given the current situation, cohesion problems within the DRC government will continue despite the announcement of the new government on April 12, 2021. Political appointments from the Union Sacrée coalition dominate the new government and influential presidential advisers will continue to oversee important decisions. The opposition is likely to attempt to disrupt the continued consolidation of the Union Sacrée’s control over state-owned enterprises and key ministries, but it is more likely that violence and political unrest will continue to decline overall, with few exceptions, over the projection period until the start of the electoral campaign in 2022.

    Persistent attacks on civilians in North Kivu by the Ugandan rebel group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and increasing civilian casualties will continue to rise, thereby fueling more anti-government demonstrations in Beni, Butembo, and Goma. Recent military offensives against the ADF have dispersed the group over larger parts of the province, increasing the number of civilians at risk of attack. Additionally, with the group’s access to previous resources disrupted, ADF rebels will increasingly target farmers in rural areas over the next year, exacerbating local grievances, which will likely lead to an increase in inter-ethnic skirmishes. The perceived failure of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to eliminate armed groups will complicate the relief efforts of humanitarian groups associated with MONUSCO.

    Conflict in the Kasaï region: With no advocacy for mediation between the conflicting parties, further security-related incidents could be expected to affect other health districts and disrupt activities in these areas experiencing agricultural recovery, after the major Kamuena Nsapu crisis in the Kasaï region. Lower participation in agricultural activities compared to the previous season, increasingly lower-than-normal production, and lower-than-normal availability could also be expected, resulting in food deficits in the next three months.

    PROJECTED OUTLOOK TO SEPTEMBER 2021

    Between April and September 2021, as conflicts keep escalating, particularly in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, households that have experienced a reduction in their livelihoods will continue to rely on markets and community solidarity, and will either experience a moderate food deficit or resort to increasingly negative strategies to meet their needs and acquire food from the market. Without humanitarian assistance, some households will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), particularly those with food consumption deficits or drawing income from the sale of productive assets. On the other hand, a small proportion of newly displaced households with significant food deficits or engaging in emergency strategies such as begging will be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity during this short lean season. This situation is expected to improve during the upcoming season B harvests starting in June 2021 for a number of households.

    In other relatively calm areas, especially in Sankuru, Lomami, northern Maniema, part of South Kivu, and northern Kasaï, where households will continue to consume their stocks from the previous growing season, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food insecurity will continue until the end of the scenario period.

    However, the northern provinces, namely Tshopo, Haut-Uélé, and Bas-Uélé, which are generally stable areas and less affected by the conflict-ridden climate in the east, will remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food insecurity without any food deficit.

    This Food Security Outlook Update provides an analysis of current acute food insecurity conditions and any changes to FEWS NET's latest projection of acute food insecurity outcomes in the specified geography over the next six months. Learn more here.

    Related Analysis Listing View more
    Get the latest food security updates in your inbox Sign up for emails

    The information provided on this Website is not official U.S. Government information and does not represent the views or positions of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Government.

    Jump back to top