

This alert is an update to [FEWS NET's Targeted Analysis Update](#) published on October 17, 2024, of acute food insecurity in Gaza, the latest report in a series of [IPC-compatible targeted analyses](#) FEWS NET has published on the Israel-Hamas conflict. FEWS NET has no operational presence in Gaza; its approach to monitoring and mapping acute food insecurity in Gaza differs from its typical [reporting countries](#). The analytical framework and methods of analysis are consistent with project-wide approaches.


**If food supplies remain blocked, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) will most likely occur in North Gaza**

The severity of acute food insecurity in Gaza has sharply worsened since early October, when Israel began to increasingly restrict humanitarian and commercial food supply flows to the north and commercial food supply flows to the south. In the worst-affected areas in North Gaza governorate, including Jabaliya, Beit Hanoun, and Beit Lahiya, a siege has caused the near-total blockade of food supply flows since October 1. **In the absence of a dramatic increase in food supply flows, Famine (IPC Phase 5) will become the most likely outcome in North Gaza.** In the coming weeks, FEWS NET will collaborate with the [Integrated Phase Classification \(IPC\)](#) partnership and [Famine Review Committee \(FRC\)](#) on the assessment of Famine (IPC Phase 5). However, government decision-makers should not await this classification, which will only serve to confirm excess hunger-related mortality is reaching an extreme threshold for human suffering and loss of life. FEWS NET urges immediate action to facilitate large-scale, sustained delivery of food and nutrition assistance that saves lives.

**A Famine (IPC Phase 5) scenario is unfolding amid the near-total blockade of food supply flows into North Gaza governorate**

In August, [FEWS NET cautioned](#) that Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur in northern Gaza in a scenario where food and nutrition assistance – which was delivered to the north [in large quantities](#) between May and September – was significantly disrupted or suspended for an extended period of time. Commercial food supply flows to the north have been [severely restricted](#) throughout the conflict. In early October, [FEWS NET warned](#) this scenario had begun to materialize when the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) [ordered the evacuation of over 400,000 people](#) from northern Gaza and [launched a siege](#) of North Gaza governorate that blocked humanitarian access and cut off food and nutrition supply flows. As of early November, an estimated [75,000-95,000 people](#) in North Gaza – including civilians who were unable to or were prevented from safely evacuating – have been isolated from food supplies and nutrition services for **at least 40 days**, and the availability of health services is increasingly dire.

The intensity of the IDF's ongoing military operation in [North Gaza governorate](#), especially in Jabaliya, Beit Hanoun, and Beit Lahiya, is comparable to that of November 2023, marked by extensive air and ground strikes, shelling, and demolitions, with near-daily counterattacks by Hamas or other Palestinian militias. While [over 70,000 people](#) fled from North Gaza to Gaza City, in addition to thousands who reportedly displaced south towards the "humanitarian zone," tens of thousands were either reportedly deterred by [extreme levels of insecurity en route](#) or allegedly prevented from leaving by the [IDF](#) and [Hamas](#). The IDF has now reportedly [positioned troops along a newly established armed corridor](#) between North Gaza and Gaza City (Figure 1), effectively [splitting the north](#) in two and isolating those who remain behind in Jabaliya, Beit Hanoun, and Beit Lahiya. **After 13 months of war that has widely destroyed basic infrastructure and left civilians heavily dependent on food aid, remaining civilians have already exhausted their capacity to cope and face rapidly worsening starvation and malnourishment.**



**Humanitarian access to deliver food, nutrition, and health services has been nearly to fully suspended in North Gaza since October 1, and [records](#) show commercial food supplies have not reached northern Gaza since September 16.** After Israel [closed the northern border crossings](#) from October 2-13, the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) approved fewer than 400 trucks carrying roughly 6,000 metric tons (MT) of humanitarian food for [delivery to Gaza City](#) from October 14-31 (compared to roughly [10-15,000 MT monthly in August-September](#)) and just 11 trucks for delivery to North Gaza on November 7, most of which were looted. WFP – which has been the primary food supplier to North Gaza in 2024 – has otherwise [suspended operations](#) in North Gaza; all eight [hot meal kitchens](#) and two subsidized bakeries have also closed. Food supplies [delivered prior to October](#) are now largely depleted; anecdotal reports indicate remaining food is being sourced from the homes of recent evacuees or foraged from rubble, and petty trade consists of food aid sold at exceptionally high prices. In addition, [all seven nutrition outpatient therapeutic feeding program sites and the only stabilization center](#) in North Gaza have been forced to close, halting the provision of emergency Lipids-based Nutrition Supplements (LNS) and other nutrition services.

**In the absence of a drastic increase in food supply flows, prolonged food deprivation and a lack of access to therapeutic feeding will undoubtedly lead to Famine (IPC Phase 5) in North Gaza.** While the collection of data to monitor whether the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds have been met is no longer feasible due to the siege, extreme caloric deficits are the only logical outcome of the cut-off in the food supply. It is highly likely that levels of acute malnutrition in North Gaza, which ranged between 1.3 and 2.9 percent among children under five (n=2,100) during the last round of nutrition screenings prior to the siege from September 23-October 2, are rising rapidly as a direct consequence of starvation. Furthermore, the operational collapse of North Gaza's [three partially functional hospitals](#) presents a risk of heightened [communicable disease prevalence](#), which will in turn interact with hunger to escalate malnourishment. It is highly likely that hunger-related mortality is ongoing now, on an upward trajectory towards at least 2 deaths per 10,000 people per day.

**In the rest of Gaza, the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) remains very credible amid restricted food supply flows**

**Emergency! (IPC Phase 4!) outcomes<sup>1</sup> with a rising share of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are still considered [the most likely outcome](#) in the rest of Gaza at this time; however, if humanitarian and commercial food supply flows continue to decline, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be anticipated.** In **Gaza City (Gaza governorate)**, where an estimated 325,000 people are located (including new arrivals from North Gaza), humanitarian food aid was finally delivered in bulk during the final days of October after a multi-week disruption; if distributed, this aid could cover around 85-90 percent of the population's caloric needs for one month. [WFP reports](#) sharply rising market prices: from late September to late October, the price of a can of fava beans rose from 3 Israeli New Shekels (NIS) to 13 NIS (3.50 USD); 1 kilogram (kg) of chickpeas rose from 28.8 NIS to 52.5 NIS (14 USD); and 1 kg of red onions rose from 122 NIS to 320 NIS (85 USD). The influx of over 70,000 displaced people from North Gaza in October is not only placing pressure on available food supplies, but also nutrition and health services. Médecins sans Frontières-supported medical facilities reported a [50 percent increase in patients](#) in Gaza City since mid-October.

In **southern Gaza**, where an estimated 1.7 million people are located – most of whom are sheltering in the “humanitarian zone” – food assistance supply flows have remained very low for six consecutive months already. In October, commercial food supply flows, which accounted for a critical 30-60,000 MT of food monthly via the Kerem Shalom crossing between [May and September](#), dropped to negligible levels. Based on [COGAT's dashboard](#) as of November 10, COGAT has approved less than 1,000 MT of commercial food for entry since October 1. Consequently, [market prices](#) increased substantially from September to October: in Deir al-Balah, the price of 1 kg of chickpeas rose from 9 NIS to 19.5 NIS, while the price of 1 kg of flour rose from 1 NIS to 5 NIS (1.33 USD). Unaffordable prices led to a series of [protests and market closures over price gouging](#) in early November, indicative of the population's increasingly difficult financial access to food. Furthermore, due to a lack of flour and fuel supplies, bakeries are operating at [50-75 percent capacity](#), with multiple closings in October. As a result, communal kitchen rations have reportedly decreased and no longer include bread, diminishing a vital source of kilocalories for recipients.

*Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Gaza Strip Food Security Alert, November 12, 2024. If food supplies remain blocked, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) will most likely occur in North Gaza, 2024.*

*In line with protocols for [IPC-compatible](#) analysis, a proposed classification of Famine (IPC Phase 5) must undergo a [plausibility review](#) by the IPC's [Famine Review Committee](#) (FRC). FEWS NET will be cooperating with the IPC partnership, which intends to convene an IPC Update in response to recent events, to classify Famine (IPC Phase 5) via the FRC process. This process typically takes several weeks. The FRC similarly released an [Alert on November 8, 2024](#), communicating alarm that a Famine (IPC Phase 5) scenario is materializing.*

<sup>1</sup> The use of ! indicates the area-level IPC Phase would likely be at least one Phase worse in the absence of humanitarian food assistance.