Seasonal gains insufficient to improve Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes

• In Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz governorates, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to persist throughout the projection period, while the rest of the country will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) with pockets of households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Anecdotal reports suggest more extreme outcomes may be ongoing among pockets of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Amran. Humanitarian food assistance needs are expected to peak at 15.0-15.99 million during the July to September lean season before declining somewhat as agricultural labor demand seasonally increases with the onset of cereal harvests. IDPs, female-headed households, and those along the front lines, with limited to no income sources, or negatively affected by flooding earlier this year are of highest concern.
• Economic contraction and intense competition for extremely scarce labor opportunities will continue to severely limit income, leaving many poor households unable to afford enough food to meet minimum energy requirements. Recent flooding and unfavorable weather forecasts are likely to further limit agricultural labor demand and seasonal improvements in most rural areas as producers reduce cropped area and anticipate reductions in yields and harvests.In areas controlled by the Sana’a-Based Authorities (SBA), the deteriorating business environment and reduced capacity at Red Sea ports are also expected to constrain income-earning opportunities among poor households.
• Global price trends are expected to continue adding upward price pressure on imported goods, especially in areas held by the internationally recognized government (IRG), further eroding household purchasing power. Elevated global prices for fuel, fertilizers, food, and other items, as well as above-average import costs via shipping surcharges and war-risk insurance, are expected to persist. Price controls are likely to slow price transmission without fully containing it, especially in SBA-controlled areas, where administrative enforcement is stronger. In IRG areas, the removal of the customs exchange rate and the imposition of new fees on imported wheat flour are expected to increase price pressures as well. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 27, 2026. 

Yemen has been plagued by civil war since March 2015 between the SBA (known as Ansar Allah and informally, the Houthis) and the allied forces of the IRG. Areas of control have shifted only marginally since the April-October 2022 truce; however, the conflict persists at low levels with minimal changes along frontlines around Ma’rib, Lahij, Al Dhali’, Ta’izz, and northwestern Yemen. Both parties have shifted to the use of economic warfare, aimed at weakening institutions, including banning bank notes and apps and implementing trade blockades and import levies. The SBA controls the most populated areas of northern and western Yemen, including the country’s capital of Sana’a. The IRG controls the southern and eastern areas, including the IRG’s relocated capital of Aden. Since late 2025, fragmentation within the IRG has increased, as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and tribal and local militias vie for influence. 

The economic consequences of the conflict are far-reaching. Real GDP per capita has contracted by more than 58 percent since 2015; damaged infrastructure and unexploded ordnance in rural areas limit productivity; and international business activity and investment have stalled. Since October 2022, the SBA has blockaded oil exports (Yemen’s main source of revenue and foreign exchange), leading to oil sector collapse. The country has essentially been split into two economic zones with competing institutions, preventing unified national fiscal and monetary policy. The SBA cannot officially print new money, and the use of aging, deteriorated bills limits money supply and artificially contains inflation, while IRG areas experience frequent exchange rate and price volatility. Public finances have deteriorated severely, with frequently delayed wage payments for military personnel and civil servants in IRG areas and increasing dependence on external grants (IRG) and heavy taxation (SBA) to compensate. Recent monetary policy changes implemented by the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden) in August 2025 have helped contain the cost of living in IRG-controlled areas, but prices of basic food and non-food items remain well above the five-year average and pre-conflict levels countrywide. Yemen is heavily reliant on imports, accounting for approximately 85 percent of food supply. In recent years, most trade flows reoriented towards Red Sea ports, given security and maritime dynamics and taxation structures, further restricting IRG revenues from import taxes. However, port infrastructure has been significantly damaged by conflict between SBA forces and Israel since late 2024, reducing import volumes, SBA revenues, and labor demand tied to ports.

Over a decade of war has severely impacted local livelihoods. While conflict intensity has eased since the truce, most households have only minimally reestablished typical livelihood activities. Official unemployment rates are around 17 percent; however, Yemen has one of the lowest labor participation rates in the world as the economy cannot absorb additional workers. Barely a third of the working-age population is engaged in the economy, a figure largely unchanged since the truce, highlighting the extreme scarcity of income-earning opportunities. World Bank modeling suggests as much as 74 percent of the country lived below the international poverty line in 2022. In urban areas, where available, poor households typically engage in informal labor (e.g., construction, petty trade, transportation, handicrafts, or port activities). The erosion of livelihoods, high levels of monetary poverty, and high food prices place substantial constraints on household access to food, rendering households highly vulnerable to further conflict, economic, and weather shocks. 

Although domestic agriculture remains one of the few functioning economic sectors and an essential source of food and income for rural communities, multiple, concurrent shocks have severely limited access to land, water, grazing areas, and inputs, reducing productivity and rural incomes. Before the conflict, agriculture contributed 13.7 percent of GDP in 2014 (a reliable post-conflict estimate is not available). Staple cereal and cash crop production are most important to rural livelihoods. Most cultivated land is in the largely SBA-controlled northern and central highlands, which are among the most densely populated rural areas. Farmers in highland areas typically produce cereal crops (mostly rainfed and for own consumption), along with fruits, vegetables, and qat. In lowland areas, farmers produce cereal crops (typically irrigated by highland runoff and artesian wells), as well as fruits and vegetables. Production patterns are dictated by the two main rainy seasons (March-May and July-September). Livestock productivity improves during the rainy seasons when pasture and water availability increase, and sales peak between February and June, coinciding with Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, and the typical season for Yemeni marriages. Poor households are generally highly dependent on daily labor for income. Peak labor demand in the highlands (September-January) roughly coincides with the main cereal harvest (October-December), while peak labor demand in the lowlands follows the spring cereal harvest (February-May).

Humanitarian food assistance has historically played an important role in mitigating food consumption deficits for millions of people across Yemen. However, assistance has been reduced several times since the end of 2021 due to funding shortages, and a total pause in assistance across SBA-controlled areas has been in place since September 2025. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Yemen Food Security Outlook: February to September 2026 
• Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Yemen: April to September 2026 
• Latest Yemen Key Message Update: May 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Conflict events persist at low intensity. On June 8, the SBA launched a missile toward Israel and declared their intention to renew a ban on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea. However, no maritime disruptions or follow-on attacks against Israel have since been observed. The conflict between IRG-aligned forces and the SBA remained geographically limited, with intermittent hostilities such as sniper fire, drone strikes, and shelling in several areas. Troop mobilizations and clashes were reported in early and mid-June in northern Al-Dhali’, with fighting also in southern Al-Hudaydah on June 9, in Shabwah on June 16, and further clashes for several days on and off in Lahij, with no significant territorial changes made. According to ACLED, in May 2026, the targeting of civilians decreased by 25.9 percent compared to last year, while fatalities and political violence also declined during the same period by 31.1 and 30.1 percent, respectively. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), between January and June a total of 1,261 households were newly displaced across multiple governorates, with the highest numbers recorded in Ma’rib, Ta’izz, Al-Hudaydah, and Hadhramaut. In IRG-controlled areas, security and governance challenges persist. The IRG-STC relationship remains adversarial, shifting from battlefield confrontations to competition for legitimacy and public space. Deteriorating public services triggered protests across Aden, Hadhramaut, and Lahij, resulting in injuries and casualties among demonstrators, and there have been multiple assassinations, most notably the recent failed attempt on the Aden governor's life on June 12. 

Economic conditions remain challenging across Yemen. In areas controlled by the SBA, measures introduced to address declining revenues continue to undermine the business environment and erode private-sector confidence, leading to reductions in labor demand and income. In June, livelihoods were further negatively impacted by reports of increases to commercial electricity rates burdening small businesses, business closures, new fees levied on small businesses, and restrictions on begging and street vending. In IRG-controlled areas, authorities approved new economic and financial measures to increase public revenue and simultaneously address inflationary pressures. They include a substantial increase to the exchange rate customs authorities use to calculate import duties and taxes on imported goods (with exceptions for basic commodities), raising the rate from 750 YER/USD to align with the prevailing market exchange rate, which was around 1,550 YER/USD at the time of the announcement. In addition, they approved a 20 percent cost-of-living increase for all public sector employee salaries and authorized the payment of previously suspended job adjustments and annual salary increments to help ease the burden of rising living costs. Although CBY-Aden continues to pursue actions to stabilize liquidity, strengthen monetary controls, and encourage savings, key informants confirm that currency shortages and declining confidence in macroeconomic policy persist.

Upward price pressure continues due to Yemen's heavy reliance on imported fuel and food amid international disruptions. Import costs have risen substantially since the beginning of the year, driven by emergency surcharges, freight index increases, and war-risk insurance premiums, including for cargo transiting through Djibouti (a key transit hub for items destined for Yemen). At SBA-controlled ports, YETI – ACAPS data suggest that food, fuel, and total imports dropped 43, 86, and 37 percent, respectively, between April and May, and remained lower than last year at most ports due to regional disruption (Figure 1). Despite these challenges, food and fuel remained available in urban and rural markets, and key informants indicate month-on-month price volatility for both food and fuel despite price controls, and that most items remain unaffordable for many poor households. Deliveries to IRG-controlled ports have faced significant delays and disruptions, contributing to reduced fuel availability, prolonged power outages (despite government and Saudi measures, including a 150 million USD fuel package to support power generation), and interruptions to water pumping and health services. Fuel prices remain well above last year, given sharp price increases announced in April. Between April and May, staple food prices showed month-on-month stability across IRG-controlled areas; however, locally manufactured cooking oils increased by 10 percent in Aden. Overall, most prices remain below last year given CBY-Aden interventions in 2025; however, recent reports in June suggest prices are beginning to climb as import costs and inflationary pressures persist, particularly for food prices. 

Income-earning opportunities (critical for poor households heavily reliant on daily wages) remain below average. In SBA areas, the slow recovery of labor opportunities in and around Red Sea ports, a deteriorating business environment, and the closure of many small- and medium-sized businesses, high production costs, intense competition for available jobs, and obstacles in crop marketing — such as taxes and strict regulations — are negatively impacting daily wages and limiting income-earning opportunities throughout the production and marketing chain. Labor demand for the recently concluded winter wheat and barley harvest in the northern highlands remained extremely limited. In June, ongoing harvests in the central highlands are increasing the number of agricultural working days per month for heads of household to at least 20 days per month in Al-Bayda, Al-Mahwit, Sana'a City, Amran, Ibb, Sa’adah, and Sana'a, and parts of Ta’izz. However, across the rest of the areas under SBA control, agricultural labor demand is currently between just four and 12 working days per month, and non-agricultural labor demand is similarly low at around five to 10 working days per month. Although wage rates have slowly increased over the last several years, they still vary across governorates and remain low considering labor oversupply, with Al Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz recording some of the lowest wage rates for both agricultural and non-agricultural casual labor. In IRG areas, labor demand remains extremely limited in rural areas, with most heads of household currently able to access just four to 12 days of labor this month, with urban areas accessing just five to 10 days per month across most governorates.

Income levels and terms of trade remain insufficient for adequate food consumption, despite price controls limiting inflationary pressures. The average income level among poor households is unable to fully cover the cost of the minimum food basket (MFB). The MFB, defined by the Yemen Food Security and Agriculture Cluster, tracks the cost of 80-85 percent (approximately 1,676 kilocalories per person per day) of the minimum daily caloric needs for an average household size of seven people for one month. The MFB is comprised of wheat flour (75 kg), beans (10 kg), vegetable oil (8 liters), sugar (2.5 kg), and salt (1 kg). In SBA-controlled areas, wage rates have stayed largely stable or increased slightly since last year; however, since February, prices of essential goods in Sana'a City have reportedly risen by between 6 and 13 percent, such that accessing between 5 and 10 working days per month is now likely to cover between only 40 and 80 percent of the MFB in most governorates. Meanwhile, in IRG-controlled areas, currency appreciation has notably reduced wage rates in most governorates and prices remain variable across governorates, resulting in similar gaps between income and the cost of a minimum food basket. Additionally, despite expectations of improvements during Eid al-Adha season, low customer purchasing power resulted in livestock prices and purchasing power remaining below average for small livestock holders and pastoralists.

Between March and April 2026, above-average rainfall triggered flooding, negatively affecting over 100,000 people; causing 28 deaths, 84 injuries, and extensive damage to shelter (both tents and houses), cropland, livestock, infrastructure, and WASH systems; displacing landmines, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW); and interrupting market access. In June, recovery is still ongoing, especially in displacement sites and low-lying agricultural areas, where a portion of displaced or poor households completely lost their shelters or experienced partial damage to their tents and essential belongings. Ta’izz Governorate was hardest hit, making up about two-thirds of those affected, followed by Hadhramaut, Shabwah, Al-Hudaydah, Ma’rib, and Al-Jawf. Atypically wet conditions also increased the spread of malaria, which has been particularly prevalent in Ta’izz, with more than 22,000 cases reported between January and June, as well as cases of dengue fever, which increased 23 percent year-on-year in IRG-controlled areas between January and June 2026. Rainfall patterns have since shifted to below average across western Yemen. Although soil moisture and vegetation health remain mainly positive, the upper layer of soil was already developing negative anomalies across most of southern Yemen by May. Combined with above-average temperatures, abnormal dryness has been observed in the central highlands throughout June. 

Humanitarian food assistance

In IRG-controlled areas, funding shortfalls have limited coverage for ongoing humanitarian food assistance. WFP’s Targeted Emergency Food Assistance (TEFA) program began in February 2026 and is expected to cover only roughly half the number of beneficiaries targeted in 2025. In May, WFP began distribution under the third cycle of TEFA, reaching more than 440,000 of the targeted 1.7 million beneficiaries by the end of the month. By mid-June, the cycle was reportedly 30 percent complete. Distributions are expected to provide between 25 and 50 percent of a household’s minimum energy requirements per month across IRG areas, with some increased delivery in Shabwah, Abyan, and IRG-controlled areas of Ta’izz and Ma’rib. However, larger household sizes in many rural areas, the high likelihood of sharing between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, and the extent of food consumption gaps are likely reducing the effective coverage of assistance, preventing mitigation of outcomes at the area level. In SBA-controlled areas, all WFP activities remain paused due to security constraints. 

In areas controlled by the SBA, Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz are experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, while Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are widespread elsewhere. In addition to the three governorates with area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, a portion of households are likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across all other SBA-controlled governorates, with higher numbers in Al-Jawf, Sana'a City, Amran, and Dhamar. Internally displaced persons (IDPs), female-headed households, and households with limited or no income sources are of highest concern. Anecdotal reports suggest more extreme outcomes may be ongoing among pockets of IDPs in Al Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Amran, with some households going days without food, consuming expired food, and resorting to scavenging. Multiple years of economic contraction, including a 1.5 percent decline in national real GDP in 2025, continue to drive well below-average labor demand, while competition for scarce opportunities remains elevated, particularly in Hajjah, Al-Hudaydah, Amran, Ibb, and Ta’izz, where the IDP population is high. Ta’izz also remains an active frontline area, with fragmented control between the IRG and SBA severely limiting trade flows and market functionality. Although trade flows have improved slightly since the road between Aden and Ta’izz reopened earlier this year, markets continue to be disrupted by insecurity, checkpoints, dual regulations, and high transportation costs. The local economy is further constrained by limited investment, multiple levies, dual monetary systems, and the impacts of recent flooding, particularly asset and shelter losses among displaced populations. 

Most poor households are highly dependent on markets for food but have extremely low income, leaving many unable to fully cover the cost of the MFB and severely limiting their food consumption. Although access constraints have limited price data collection in SBA areas, prices are reportedly increasing, exacerbating pressure on household budgets and worsening already poor terms of trade. Despite a seasonal increase in labor demand in parts of Ta’izz, the labor-to-food terms of trade in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz are reportedly among the lowest across SBA-controlled areas. Even accounting for income from multiple household members, the limited availability of work, the high number of workdays required to purchase enough food to meet minimum energy requirements, household sizes in many rural areas that exceed the average size used to calculate the MFB, and expenditures on non-food essentials, are likely resulting in small to moderate food consumption gaps among most poor households in most areas. More severe gaps are expected among the poorest households, especially IDPs and those in urban areas and areas outside of the central highlands. IDPs – particularly those in camps and/or those who lost shelter and other essential assets in recent flooding – are of highest concern.    

Across all SBA-controlled governorates, recent food security outcome indicator data capture the scale and severity of household food consumption gaps. Household survey data collected by FAO and WFP in October 2025-January 2026 found moderate hunger using the Household Hunger Scale (HHS) – indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) – among at least 20 percent of the population in each governorate, as well as widespread use of food-based coping strategies, including prioritizing the feeding of children over adults, borrowing food, and reducing the number of meals. Food Consumption Score (FCS) monitoring data collected by WFP in April also captured month-on-month deterioration in the share of households experiencing poor dietary quality and quantity post-Ramadan, which rose to 33 percent. Sana’a City, Al-Mahwit, Al-Hudaydah, and Sa’adah were among the areas with the highest increases, while rates nearly doubled in Hajjah, Amran, Raymah, and Ibb. At the same time, household use of negative livelihoods coping strategies, including begging, rose to 68 percent in April. The results suggest outcomes are worse among IDPs compared to resident populations. 

In addition, admissions forecasting analysis from the Yemen Nutrition Cluster suggests Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) has likely reached Critical (15.0-29.9 percent of children under five) levels across SBA-controlled areas, though this is based on data collected in previous years and there are limitations to the reliability of extrapolated admissions data. Notably, program data covering admissions to severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) treatments from 2023 to 2026 show admissions across program type were generally lower in 2025 and 2026 as compared to 2023 and 2024. However, the decrease in admissions does not necessarily reflect a reduction in acute malnutrition prevalence; it may instead reflect programmatic constraints that limit access to treatment, such as stockouts, facility closures, or other issues related to funding, insecurity, or household financial constraints. 

In areas controlled by the IRG, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are also widespread, with pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across all governorates. The number of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is likely higher in governorates along the frontlines, including Lahij, Abyan, and Shabwah. Labor demand remains extremely limited in rural areas, although access to income is seasonally increasing among households in Hadhramaut, Lahij, and Ta’izz, while small amounts of own production is increasing food availability among households engaged in agriculture in Hadhramaut, Shabwah, and Al-Maharah. However, livestock prices and associated incomes remain below average due to dampened demand, and areas negatively impacted by flooding are still recovering from lost food stocks and productive assets. In urban areas, civil unrest (especially in Aden, Lahij, Abyan, and Hadhramaut), irregular public sector salary payments, and electricity blackouts are also constraining income. Increased shipping costs, macroeconomic policy changes, and spikes in global crude oil prices have increased living costs in IRG areas and reduced household purchasing power. As a result, many poor households in IRG-controlled areas are likely unable to meet minimum food needs with the income from available labor amid high food prices. IDPs and households along the frontlines likely have the most severe food consumption deficits. 

Food consumption indicators and acute malnutrition data further corroborate the assessment of widespread food consumption gaps. Although data suggest marginally better food security outcomes in IRG areas compared to SBA areas, household survey data collected in December 2025 and January 2026 found that that HHS was indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in all areas, as was the use of negative food- and livelihood-based coping strategies, such as prioritizing the feeding children over adults and taking on debt. In April, FCS monitoring data indicated 32 percent of the population had poor dietary quality and quantity, while the use of negative livelihoods coping strategies rose to 57 percent. Finally, SMART survey data collected in December 2025/January 2026 found Critical (15.0-29.9 percent) acute malnutrition levels across Abyan, Lahij, and the lowlands of Al-Hudaydah and Ta’izz, while the Yemen Nutrition Cluster analysis concluded on mainly Critical (15.0-29.9 percent) GAM levels, with some governorates likely experiencing Serious (10.0-14.9 percent) acute malnutrition. 

National

• The informal truce between the IRG and SBA is expected to remain in place, and prevailing conflict dynamics, characterized by relative de-escalation along the frontlines, is expected to persist. However, sporadic frontline clashes and localized escalations are likely to continue, particularly in Shabwah and Ma’rib, where SBA-aligned forces are likely to increasingly target oil- and energy-rich areas to offset revenue constraints and maintain leverage in ongoing negotiations, as well as along front lines in Al Jawf, Ta’izz, Al Dahli’, Al Hudaydah, and Lahij. Increased insecurity in these governorates is expected to intermittently disrupt oil production, transportation routes, and local economic activity, and contribute to localized displacement and limitations on household access to livelihoods and markets in affected districts. 
• Global price trends are expected to continue adding upward price pressure on imported goods, especially in IRG-held areas. Despite anticipated reductions in the medium term, elevated global prices for fuel and energy-intensive goods and services, including fertilizers, food, and transportation, as well as above-average import costs via shipping surcharges, war-risk insurance, transshipment, and rerouting, are expected to persist throughout the outlook period. Shipping surcharges and insurance premiums are expected to gradually reduce from their peaks in the second quarter but will remain elevated. Price controls are likely to slow price transmission, especially in SBA-controlled areas, where administrative enforcement is stronger, without fully containing it, considering fiscal constraints in both parts of the country. 

• Weather anomalies are expected to persist and negatively impact agricultural production and labor demand. Rainfall is likely to be below average across Yemen between June and September (Figure 2) before gradually shifting to above average in the west and near average in the east by the end of the year. Despite above-average pasture and cropping conditions at the end of the first rainy season, below-average rainfall during the second rainy season and above-average temperatures through the end of the year are expected to reduce soil moisture, reduce yields for non-irrigated producers and labor demand, limit the extent of vegetation and pasture regeneration during the rainy season, and result in atypically fast deterioration during dry periods.  

SBA-controlled areas:

• The Houthis are expected to continue demonstrating regional alignment with Iran through limited missile and drone launches towards Israel while avoiding actions that would be likely to provoke sustained retaliation. Although they are likely to continue threatening disruption to commercial shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the broader Red Sea, a major escalation remains unlikely.  
• Reconstruction of damaged Red Sea port infrastructure is expected to remain slow, limiting import flows to below typical levels and limiting labor demand for port-oriented casual labor.  
• The poor business environment is expected to persist throughout the projection period, with additional taxes and regulations likely to be imposed by the SBA. Demand for non-agricultural wage labor is likely to be reduced compared to last year – dropping to below five working days per month in most SBA-controlled governorates – as small- and medium-sized businesses reduce hiring and operational costs to cope, and liquidity constraints continue to limit consumer demand. Income from recently restricted economic activities, such as petty trade and begging, is likely to be extremely limited. 
• In the agricultural sector, multiple factors are expected to reduce cropped areas and agricultural labor demand. Recent flooding damage and unfavorable weather forecasts, above-average production costs (including fertilizers and agricultural inputs), limited government guidance on exports and economic losses incurred last season, and increased taxes and regulations for producers are expected to contribute to these reductions. 

IRG-controlled areas:

• Political tensions and civil unrest are expected to persist at current levels. While armed confrontations between the PLC and remaining STC elements are expected to gradually decline, security gaps and localized power vacuums in former STC-held areas are likely to increase the risk of political violence. Protests linked to southern grievances will likely continue, with demonstrations remaining mostly peaceful and concentrated in Aden, Hadhramaut, and Lahij. 
• Public revenue is expected to remain below average, driven mainly by the continued halt of oil exports, weak customs and tax collection, and uneven remittance of governorate revenues to CBY-Aden. While efforts to increase governorate deposits into CBY-Aden and generate additional revenue through import- and customs-related measures will continue, these are unlikely to fully offset the revenue shortfall. At the same time, expenditure needs are expected to remain elevated, tied in part to higher imported fuel costs, salary obligations, and essential operating expenditures. Grants from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are expected to provide substantial support in bridging part of the gap between revenue and expenditure.
• The YER is expected to remain stable as CBY-Aden and the IRG continue enforcing strict controls and interventions to maintain the YER at its current level. However, local currency supply is expected to remain constrained as large amounts of YER are likely to remain held out of circulation due mainly to public anxiety about financial institutions.
• Prices for most goods are likely to increase throughout the outlook period, despite ongoing government efforts to regulate essential commodity prices. The removal of the customs exchange rate and the imposition of new fees on imported wheat flour are expected to further increase prices of most non-essential goods and of imported wheat flour, respectively. This will compound existing price pressures driven by above-average international prices for key commodities and elevated freight and insurance costs.
• Wage rates from non-agricultural casual labor are expected to remain at current levels (slightly below last year). However, wage rates for construction are expected to increase slightly compared to last year, supported by recent government measures that have streamlined construction-related procedures, particularly in Aden.

Humanitarian food assistance

• Humanitarian food assistance is expected to remain suspended in SBA-controlled areas, while it will continue at current, targeted levels across IRG-controlled areas, with around 1.7 million beneficiaries reached on a cyclical basis (once every two or three months) under the TEFA program. Distributions are expected to continue providing between 25 and 50 percent of a household’s minimum energy requirements. Higher proportions of the population are likely to be reached in Shabwah, Abyan, and IRG-controlled areas of Ta’izz and Ma’rib. However, benefits are likely to be diluted by larger household sizes in rural areas and the sharing of assistance among non-beneficiaries, limiting the extent to which food consumption gaps can be fully closed among recipient households. Consequently, expected levels of humanitarian food assistance are unlikely to mitigate area-level outcomes. 

The scale and severity of acute food insecurity are expected to remain high across Yemen throughout the projection period. Between June and September, poor households are expected to face increasing pressure on both food and income sources due to reductions in labor demand and livelihoods tied to prolonged conflict, political instability, continued macroeconomic deterioration, and forecasted below-average rainfall and above-average temperatures. While this time period coincides with fruit and vegetable production in the highlands, labor demand remains below average; and seasonal declines in agricultural labor opportunities are expected in the lowlands. The population in need is expected to peak at 15.0-15.99 million people during the lean season, between July and September. From October to January, the main cereal and fruit harvests and seasonal increases in agricultural labor demand are expected to improve access to food and income in many rural areas; however, these gains are unlikely to offset persistent economic challenges, including high production costs, elevated food prices, limited private-sector investment, and continued competition for scarce labor opportunities, resulting in only modest improvements in household food security outcomes relative to the lean season. Given extremely limited purchasing power, basic food and non-food needs will remain out of reach of many poor households, particularly IDPs, female-headed households, those affected by recent flooding, and those with limited to no income sources. 

In SBA-controlled areas, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected with pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), while area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will persist in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz governorates. Based on anecdotal evidence, more extreme outcomes may persist among pockets of IDPs in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Amran. The deteriorating business environment and the relocation of enterprises are likely to significantly undermine household income sources and continue restricting financial access to food and non-food items. Although price controls are expected to continue limiting international price transmission, some increases remain likely, putting additional pressure on already poor labor-to-food terms of trade as purchasing power declines. Between June and September, fruit and vegetable production in the highlands – including grape harvests in northern areas – is expected to slightly increase access to food and income from labor opportunities along the production and marketing chains. However, households in lowland areas, particularly in the Tihama Plains, will be in the agricultural off-season, with associated declines in income-earning opportunities. Among poor pastoral households, worsening pasture conditions and above-average fodder prices are likely to exacerbate lean season dynamics and force them to sell livestock at below-normal prices, further reducing income. Consequently, consumption gaps are expected to widen in most areas, forcing many poor households to adopt more severe coping strategies, such as expanding engagement in begging or going without food. While begging has become a primary source of income for some poor households, recent restrictions on begging and petty trade in major cities are likely to reduce income for households engaged in these activities. This situation is particularly concerning for poor households in Hajjah, Al-Hudaydah, Amran, and the Al-Mahwit Lowlands, where begging is most common. In Ta’izz, ongoing localized conflict along active frontlines, significant constraints on market access due to checkpoints, road disruptions, and high transportation costs, as well as the fragmentation of market policies and duplicated taxes, will continue to negatively impact income and business profitability.

From October to January, modest, short-term relief and a reduction in the population in need, including those in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes, are likely due to increased agricultural labor demand in accordance with the main cereals and fruit harvest. Demand for daily wages in both agriculture and non-agriculture sectors is anticipated to increase slightly due to the main cereal harvest and the fruit production season (especially citrus) in the highlands during this time. Cereal production is progressing well, thanks to timely and above-average rainfall in the first rainy season; however, overall business dynamics, flood-related damages, and below-average rainfall during the second rainy season are expected to negatively impact yields and harvests, especially in the Central Highlands and areas impacted by floods, and limit labor demand and income. In addition, the continued loss of medium and small enterprises is likely to increase competition for the opportunities generated by agricultural activities and their value chains. The persistent gap between incomes and the cost of a minimally adequate diet is expected to limit seasonal improvements, sustaining widespread food consumption gaps. Critical (15.0-29.9 percent) levels of acute malnutrition are likely across most governorates. 

In IRG-controlled areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist from June to September 2026, with an increase in the number of people facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, particularly along the front lines and among IDPs, and female-headed households. Seasonal impacts on food and income are similar across SBA- and IRG-controlled areas; however, differences remain in macroeconomic conditions and prices. Civil unrest, irregular salary payments, frequent electricity outages and reduced water supply, liquidity challenges, and stronger upward price pressure on imported goods (particularly fuel and wheat flour) are expected to disrupt business operations and increase operational costs. These factors will also likely worsen non-agricultural labor demand as agricultural labor demand remains atypically low for the season considering recent and forecasted weather shocks. While some improvements in construction activities are anticipated in major urban centers such as Aden and Lahij following the recent lifting of restrictions on the construction sector, the positive effects on income are expected to be offset by the anticipated reduction in business investment activity due to civil unrest and high construction input prices. Purchasing power for households relying on public governmental salaries is likely to improve slightly with an anticipated increase of 20 percent in public salaries payments; however, these gains remain minimal given the inflation in food and non-food prices associated with the liberation of the customs exchange rate and global fuel and freight prices. From October to January, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist, while the number of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected to decline, particularly during December and January in alignment with the agriculture season onset, which is expected to provide temporary access to food and income. However, the main macroeconomic drivers of acute food insecurity are expected to remain, limiting financial access to food and resulting in the persistence of food consumption gaps for millions. Critical (15.0-29.9 percent) GAM levels, with some governorates experiencing Serious (10.0-14.9 percent) acute malnutrition are expected throughout the outlook period. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. 
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a crediblealternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

The persistence of severe restrictions on shipping traffic in the Gulf 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Although the flow of shipping traffic has partially improved since mid-June, the persistence of severe restrictions on shipping traffic or a return to a full closure of the Strait of Hormuz would exacerbate high shipping costs, reduced port, fuel import, and storage capacity in SBA-areas, and delays in shipments with widespread impacts in Yemen. Fuel prices would likely increase more immediately, while food prices would face additional upward pressure through higher freight, fuel, and import costs. If restrictions or a closure were to persist in the medium term, a notable decrease or delay in commercial imports would be expected, particularly for fuel, resulting in reduced availability of food and fuel in many areas. Limited port capacity in SBA areas following damage to Red Sea ports in 2024 and 2025, and limited foreign exchange reserves in both SBA- and IRG-controlled areas have already reduced Yemen’s ability to import at above average prices. New upward price pressure and/or market supply disruptions would likely lead to a rise in the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4), or worse outcomes, with the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes increasing among these households due to diminished purchasing power. 

Shipping costs to Yemen remain structurally elevated relative to the pre-2015 period and are facing renewed upward pressure from escalating tensions and disruptions in the Red Sea and the Gulf. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2015, shipping costs increased sharply, initially driven by higher war-risk premiums and insurance costs, rising from around 0.025 percent before the war to around 0.4 percent, according to key informants. Costs increased further as direct calls to Aden declined, while inspection and transshipment (where containers are unloaded at a hub port and reloaded onto another vessel for onward shipment) through Jeddah added port dues, service fees, feeder charges (the costs associated with transporting cargo on smaller feeder vessels that connect major regional hubs to smaller destination ports), handling costs, and longer routing times, particularly for commodities shipped from eastern markets such as China. According to key informants, the transfer of the inspection mechanism from Jeddah to Aden, announced by the IRG in December 2023 and formally activated in March 2024, contributed to an increase in direct port calls and direct-origin container shipments to Aden. However, the extent of any broader administrative and logistical cost reductions remains unclear and the majority of cargo to Aden Port still does not arrive via direct services. Commercial-sector sources at Aden Port estimate that around 55 percent is transshipped through regional ports – especially Jeddah and Djibouti – and delivered via third-party feeder services, which pushes prices of imported goods higher. Approximately 45 percent of containerized cargo arrives via direct services as major carriers continue to maintain operations and services at multiple Yemeni ports, such as Aden, Al-Hudaydah, and Mukalla. 

Regional disruptions in the Red Sea and the Gulf have substantially increased costs in 2026. Carrier caution, as major shipping lines rerouted selected vessels away from the Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandeb route in March 2026, fuel costs, and additional war-risk, emergency conflict, and fuel-related surcharges all contributed to cost escalation. The IRG attempted to negotiate the reduction or removal of these surcharges, as Aden was not directly affected by events in the Gulf, and the Aden Port Authority and the Maritime Navigation Commercial Chamber discussed the imposition of these additional charges in April; however, key informants confirm the extra costs imposed by shipping lines remained largely unchanged. Some carriers appear to have avoided itemizing these charges by presenting consolidated freight rates rather than separating port handling, transport, insurance, and surcharge components. Although specific surcharge information is not publicly available, reports and key informants from the industry confirm the cost of shipping a container to Aden has almost doubled from multiple destinations. The increases in shipping fees were applied broadly to Aden-bound cargo, including vessels arriving from Mediterranean and Red Sea ports and, in some cases, shipments that had departed before the outbreak of the Gulf-related escalation. This suggests that some of the additional costs may not have been directly linked to route-specific war-risk exposure. Despite a reduction in regional events and relative improvements in ship movements throughout the region, no reductions in surcharges have yet been reported and are unlikely to materialize in the short term.

Higher freight, insurance, feeder, and fuel-related costs are likely to put upward pressure on import costs and will gradually pass through to wholesale and retail commodity prices. The scale of pass-through will likely depend on multiple factors, including exchange-rate stability, fuel costs, carrier pricing practices, trader margins, and market competition. However, it is expected that persistently high shipping costs tied to limited direct services and rising war-risk, emergency conflict, and fuel-related surcharges will lead to substantial upward pressure on prices for imported goods. Combined with the new customs exchange rate, prices are likely to continue to rise – remaining well above average – throughout the outlook period. While the customs exchange rate makes exceptions for basic commodities, price increases imposed by the shipping sector are expected to push prices upwards across imported goods. Thus, household purchasing power is expected to be negatively impacted as households remain highly vulnerable to sustained price increases, further pushing households to severe food and livelihoods coping strategies and widening food consumption gaps. 

As Aden Port is the main gateway for IRG-controlled areas, impacts are expected to be most visible in IRG held-areas. However, price transmission to some SBA-controlled areas is also likely, given that Aden functions as a contingency or diversion gateway for some cargo ultimately destined for northern markets. While the broader rise in shipping costs and war-risk premiums has also increased shipping costs to SBA-controlled areas, transshipment, rerouting, and war-risk costs appear to have had a more direct impact on Aden. However, the exact increase in shipping costs to SBA-controlled areas is less clearly measurable due to differences in routing, access constraints, port use, levies, and enforcement practices.