Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in areas closest to the frontlines

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through January 2027 in isolated frontline and Russian-occupied areas where conflict has severely disrupted markets, access to income, and agricultural production. Households remaining in these areas are disproportionately elderly, rural, and/or very poor, with limited ability to relocate. Markets are minimally functional, access to public services, including pensions, is constrained, and households are increasingly reliant on limited own production, sale of livestock and other productive assets, barter, or travel to distant markets to access food. Humanitarian access is limited.
• In other government-controlled frontline and near-frontline areas, Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected. Significant in-kind assistance is likely preventing worse area-level outcomes in several frontline areas, including parts of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Kherson oblasts.However, poor and elderly households remain unable to cover essential non-food expenses such as health and utilities. Households in areas with better access to employment and markets, including parts of Zaporizhzhya Oblast, have relatively better access to food, though still face weak purchasing power. 

• Monthly estimates of the population in need are expected to peak at 1.5-1.99 million people in January 2027, when the winter lean season begins. The most severe needs will remain concentrated in areas closest to the frontlines in both government-controlled and Russian-occupied areas of eastern and southern Ukraine. From October to January, households will face higher food, heating, utility, transport, and health expenses while temporary and seasonal employment declines and own-produced food stocks become less available. Market functionality and humanitarian access are also expected to deteriorate in some isolated rural areas, including parts of Kherson Oblast, driving deterioration from Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

  The analysis in this report is based on information available as of 25 June 2026. 

Ukraine has long been a major producer of grains, oilseeds, edible oils, pulses, and other agricultural products, with 56.8 percent (32.9 million hectares [ha]) of total land area classified as arable as of 2023, one of the highest rates globally. Ukraine’s agricultural output and exports expanded substantially from the early 2000s onward, driven by productivity gains and rising global demand. Agricultural exports rose from 27 percent of export earnings in 2013 to 41 percent in 2021. Ukraine is a strategic supplier of wheat and other products to global food markets, including structurally deficit and import-dependent markets in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Production in Ukraine spans rural households, family farms, private and public agricultural enterprises, and agricultural holdings. The top 30 holdings control 3.75-3.77 million ha of land, or 9-11 percent of the total arable land under production. Households provided about 42 percent of total agricultural production in 2020. 

As of 2025, approximately 70 percent of Ukraine’s population is urban. Ukraine is highly industrialized, with most urban employment concentrated in industry and services. Formal salaried employment is common, though many urban poor households depend on informal, temporary, or seasonal work. Approximately one in three households in both urban and rural areas depend on social protection payments, including pensions, which are especially important for Ukraine’s growing elderly population.

The primary driver of acute food insecurity is Russia’s full-scale invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory. In 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion that included repeated attacks on Kyiv, the capital city, as well as the southern and eastern regions. As of June 2026, Russia occupied around 20 percent of Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory, including Crimea and parts of Donbas occupied before 2022. The war has left large areas affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO). Over 130,000 square kilometers (km²) are assessed to be at risk of contamination, while the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) has identified about 1,000 km² of dangerous areas. These figures measure different levels of risk and identification, rather than confirmed contamination across all potentially affected territory. The presence or suspected presence of UXO limits access to agricultural land for crop production and livestock grazing, reducing related labor and income-earning opportunities. 

Infrastructure damage and economic impacts have been severe. For example, the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023 damaged irrigation infrastructure covering up to 584,000 ha of cropland and damaged water infrastructure across much of southern Ukraine. Damage to the Lower Dnipro River and facilities along the river has restricted trade along parts of the river and through the Black Sea, including ports in Mykolayiv and Kherson. As a result, Ukraine relies heavily on Odesa and smaller Danube ports, as well as more expensive and increasingly crowded land routes through Europe. Across Ukraine, households are exposed to the “war economy” through higher costs. Inflation rose to 22 percent during the first year of war in 2022; while the pace of inflation has slowed since then, prices remain atypically high, constraining household purchasing power. 

Poor rural households, especially those closest to the frontline, are particularly impacted by conflict. These households have lost livestock, access to land and related labor opportunities, and depleted their savings; in some cases, households have lost access to social protection payments (including pensions) due to changing areas of control between Ukrainian and Russian forces over time. As of June 2026, about 1.5-2.0 million people remain within 50 km of the frontline on the government-controlled side, where they face high levels of property damage, shelter needs, and limited access to markets. While information is limited, conditions on the Russian-occupied side of the frontline are likely similar, marked by property damage, depopulation, and more limited access to markets and income-earning opportunities.

The war has driven substantial displacement. Over 5.2 million Ukrainians had migrated to other European countries as refugees as of late April 2026, and another half million had migrated outside of the region. As of May 2026, 3.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) were registered by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in Ukraine. IDPs are more likely to face difficulty accessing income-earning opportunities while contending with the high cost and limited supply of housing. In both urban and rural areas, the most challenging time of year for most households is the January-March winter season, when heating, electricity, food, and health expenses rise amid seasonal declines in work. While not all IDPs are food insecure, newly displaced households are often acutely food insecure and depend on humanitarian assistance while in transit or before securing more stable housing. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Ukraine Key Message Updates: March 2026, April 2026, and May 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Fighting, aerial strikes, and drone attacks continue in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhya oblasts. Drone attacks in Kherson have driven large-scale displacement from settlements along the Dnipro River over the past several months, while evacuations from frontline areas in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy have been underway since May and June, respectively. Displacement has left frontline areas heavily depopulated, more rural, and disproportionately comprised of elderly households. Drone attacks in frontline areas in June have nearly tripled compared to the same time last year, according to ACLED. 

Attacks on key infrastructure continue to disrupt trade, transport, fuel supply, and economic activity. In March and April, there were 352 strikes on railway infrastructure countrywide, following the over 1,200 strikes in2025. Russian forces also escalated strikes on fuel depots and stations in frontline regions, where 150 stations were hit in May and June. Ukrainian drone attacks on infrastructure also escalated in Russian-occupied Crimea in June, causing authorities to limit fuel sales and causing blackouts in Sevastopol.

In government-controlled areas close to the frontlines, conflict has directly reduced agricultural production, economic activity, trade, and market functionality. Households are increasingly only planting in plots closest to their homes, while larger farms face difficulty hiring agricultural labor due to the shrinking labor force as many working age men, in particular, have been conscripted or moved away. At the same time, many businesses have closed, moved, or sustained damage, reducing the availability of non-agricultural employment. Trade flows are increasingly limited, daily markets are less frequent or no longer functional, and goods are more expensive at remaining stores. Public services (including pensions and other social safety net payments) remain available, but elderly households may need to travel to a nearby post office or send a proxy to retrieve the payment. Humanitarian agencies can reach most frontline areas, but several isolated areas in the east and south are costly and dangerous to reach due to drone attack threats.

In government-controlled areas farther from, but still near, the frontline, agricultural production, markets and economic activity, and public services are comparatively more functional but still affected by missile and drone attacks, infrastructure damage, blackouts, higher operating costs, and the arrival of IDPs. Agricultural production has had fewer direct interruptions, and both farming households and larger farm enterprises are generally able to market their production. However, labor supply and demand are more broadly affected by military conscription, the influx of IDPs, damage to electrical and transportation infrastructure, reliance on backup generators, and rising production costs. While most humanitarian agencies focus on service delivery in frontline areas, services also prioritize newly displaced arrivals.

In Russian-occupied areas close to the frontlines, available information suggests similarly high depopulation, with remaining populations likely skewing toward elderly and rural households. Agricultural production near homes is continuing, but larger farms, businesses, markets, and employment opportunities are understood to be less operational than last year. Access to public services is also likely prone to periodic disruption. While some international and local humanitarian agencies are operating in these areas, information on the scale and coverage is very limited. 

Meanwhile, in Russian-occupied areas farther from the frontlines and in Crimea, agriculture, markets, public services, and employment are operating on a larger and more typical scale. However, blackouts, disrupted fuel access, and infrastructure damage are constraining activity. Most assistance in Crimea is believed to be provided by local administrative bodies. 

In Western Ukraine, cold weather and below-average rainfall (Figure 1) have adversely affected agriculture and damaged some crops, but most large enterprises and commercial farms have planted spring grains and oilseeds according to plan. At the start of the harvest in June, winter wheat is in better condition than recently planted spring maize. In central and northern Ukraine, winter wheat also appears in good condition, and spring grain and oilseed planting generally proceeded according to plan despite higher input costs, including fuel and fertilizer. Fruit production has suffered more significant setbacks. April frost damaged about half of the cherry and apricot harvest in central and southern Ukraine and the Transcarpathia area in the west; however, the sweet cherry harvest was reportedly atypically high yielding, and lower prices combined with high labor costs has reduced financial returns. 

In both government-controlled and occupied areas closest to the frontlines in the south and east, both winter and spring planting has been much more limited due to the UXO risks, insecurity, and related logistical constraints on movement. While households have planted near their homes, large swathes of land remain unplanted. Labor-intensive crops like fruits and vegetables, which are typically a key source of income for the rural poor, are far less accessible in these areas relative to the rest of the country. Furthermore, locust infestations remain an additional risk: in June, the State Phytosanitary Service and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) confirmed infestations are ongoing in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts for the second year in a row.

Livestock losses are reducing food and income access for rural households, especially in eastern and southern frontline areas. In April, there were 33 percent fewer cattle in the household sector countrywide compared to the same time last year, while household production of milk in March was 25 percent lower year-on-year. These reductions are concentrated in frontline areas where high fodder costs, UXO-related constraints on grazing, and destruction of barns and other infrastructure have significantly raised the cost and difficulty of raising cattle. Milk sales to urban areas are also more constrained by damage to collection, cold storage, and transport infrastructure. Some households in frontline areas are selling livestock to cover food expenses, and some displaced households abandon their livestock when they flee westward.

Elevated bread and essential goods prices continue to constrain purchasing power, particularly for elderly households on fixed pension income and households in frontline areas. Headline inflation slowed from 8.6 percent year-on-year in April to 8.2 percent in May, but bread prices are rising much faster than headline inflation. The national average bread price reached 56 UAH/kilogram in May, reflecting an 18 percent increase from last year. Higher labor and energy costs appear to be the main driver behind bakeries raising prices. More broadly, available market monitoring shows the cost of living is 8.3 percent higher in areas closer to the frontlines. Damage to bakeries, logistical challenges in sending bread from bakeries to markets, and increasing fuel costs are likely driving even higher bread prices in frontline areas.

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian food assistance is mitigating food consumption gaps in several government-controlled frontline and near-frontline areas, though coverage remains uneven and information is unavailable for occupied areas. In May 2026, Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster partners reported distributing 950,000 food boxes estimated to cover around 70 percent of kilocalorie needs per month, while 235,000 people received cooked meals. Assistance delivery is concentrated in frontline areas, including areas in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson where at least 25 percent of the population in some districts are receiving at least 25 percent or more of their kilocalorie needs. Local and grassroots initiatives are also active in these areas. In areas within 50 km of the frontline, most food assistance is provided in-kind due to market disruptions. Since April, cash assistance has shifted to Unified Cash Transfers (UCT) targeting households affected by sudden shocks, including displacement and strike-related damage. Frontline cash assistance is valued at 10,800 UAH per person per month, designed to cover 66 percent of multisectoral, basic needs(56 percent of the needs are food based on Ukraine’s actual subsistence minimum (ASM) measurement). Information on the number of UCT recipients in May or June is not yet publicly available. 

In government-controlled areas near the frontlines in Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson, outcomes vary between Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!), and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) depending on market access, income-earning opportunities, and levels of humanitarian food assistance. Households remaining in these areas are disproportionately elderly, rural, and reliant on social protection benefits as a primary source of income. Currently, market activity is highly limited by insecurity, the threat of attacks and drone strikes, depopulation, reduced trader presence, and transport infrastructure damage. Where market activity does occur, it is temporary, and prices are higher than in the rest of the country. While public services are still available, accessing these services is challenging, requiring travel on limited transport routes or reliance on neighbors or proxies.

The most isolated government-controlledfrontline areas are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Households rely on food produced on their household plots and purchased staples using pension income, social safety net benefits, savings, borrowed funds, or income from the sale of assets such as livestock. However, market access is highly constrained, food prices are elevated, and income-earning opportunities are scarce. Poor households remaining in these areas are unable to obtain sufficient food without resorting to selling their assets, bartering, or traveling in search of food and services. While in-kind food assistance is reaching some of these areas, such as Iziumskyi and Kupianskyi districts in Kharkiv and Kramatorskyi district in Donetsk, the scale and amount may not fully cover all food needs. 

Government-controlled frontline areas where market and livelihood disruptions are pronounced but humanitarian access is regular and significant are Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!). In-kind food assistance is a key factor ensuring households’ minimum kilocalorie needs are being met, including in areas of Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson. However, poor households – especially the elderly – are still unable to afford non-food expenses. Outcomes would likely be worse without food assistance. 

Other government-controlled frontline areas where economic activity is relatively more functional are Stressed (IPC Phase 2). In Zaporizhzhya’s frontline areas, most households can reach Zaporizhzhya city for formal salaried employment. Higher market functionality also offers relatively better access to food. However, poor households still face weak purchasing power and cope by borrowing money, spending savings, or reducing non-food expenditures, such as for health, to cover their minimum food needs. 

In government-controlled areas farther from, but still near, the frontline in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolayiv, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing. Poor, elderly, and IDP households are facing the most challenges with maintaining their food consumption amid rising expenses and limited income-earning sources. Poltava currently hosts the highest concentration of IDPs in Ukraine, and IDP households are less likely to have formal employment than other households and are more likely to be in temporary arrangements. While markets are generally functional and economic activity continues, infrastructure damage, blackouts, high fuel and electricity costs, and increased competition for jobs are constraining business activity and access to income. Poor households may be able to cover the cost of minimally adequate amounts of food, but weak purchasing power limits their ability to do so without compromising other basic needs such as health services, shelter, and utilities.

In Russian-occupied areas closer to the frontlines in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely ongoing. In these largely rural areas, very few people have stayed behind; those who remain are more likely to be elderly or very poor, without the funds or family/social connections to support relocation. Available information suggests these households may be able to access social safety net payments, including pensions, but access is either constrained by Russian citizenship and documentation requirements or by the need to travel some distance to financial service locations where they can access funds transmitted from Ukrainian accounts. These households are likely consuming some food from their own production, limited to the land closest to their homes. Market functionality is very limited by the effects of depopulation, UXO contamination, and other risks to movement along key routes, and damaged infrastructure. With limited income and constrained own production, poor households are likely resorting to selling important assets, such as livestock, to pay for food. 

• Conflict intensity is expected to remain near current levels through January. Drone attacks are likely to increase compared to last year, both near frontlines and deeper into the areas beyond in both government-controlled and occupied territories. Both Russia and Ukraine are expected to scale up drone use as it is relatively inexpensive and easily scalable compared to traditional military air assets. 

• Continued drone and missile attacks are likely to disrupt logistics, trade and supply flows, economic activity, agricultural labor, and humanitarian assistance delivery in frontline areas, even with limited ground fighting. 

• Extensive energy infrastructure damage is expected to continue, driving power and fuel shortages in affected areas. Fuel prices are likely to remain elevated throughout the projection period, driven by impacts from the Middle East crisis and logistical domestic transport challenges. 

• Destruction of agricultural infrastructure (including bridges, grain elevators, irrigation pumping stations, electricity supply to farms, and agroprocessing facilities) within or near the frontlines are expected to continue. This damage is expected to negatively impact income for households engaged in providing these services or selling their production to these facilities.

• An estimated 1.5-2 million civilians are expected to remain near the frontline in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts. While some households may refuse to evacuate due to lack of social networks and support elsewhere, others are effectively trapped by insecurity, limited transportation, and isolation. Households in these areas will likely continue to face severely limited access to markets, utilities (such as electricity, heating, and water), and public and humanitarian services due to isolation, infrastructure damage, and insecurity.

• Rainfall during the peak June to September rainy season is likely to be below average in western Ukraine and near average elsewhere. Forecast above-average temperatures are likely to increase evaporation and moisture stress, particularly in western, southern, and eastern areas. These conditions are expected to affect summer crop development and drive localized impacts to fruit and vegetable production, particularly where spring rainfall deficits and frost damage have already occurred. However, grain and oilseed production is expected to improve compared to last year due to generally favorable growing conditions in northern and central areas and continued high area planted outside of the most conflict-affected areas. 

• Rain and snowfall from October to January are expected to be average to above average, supporting generally typical harvest conditions and winter crop planting in September and October and crop establishment afterwards. However, conflict-related impacts, including constrained field access, high input prices (e.g., fuel), labor shortages, and logistics constraints, will likely continue to reduce agricultural activities, with production in frontline areas the worst affected.  

• Income from fruit and vegetable sales is expected to decline, as many rural households near the frontlines will likely face challenges moving fresh produce to urban markets due to fewer aggregators coming to buy at the farmgate and difficulties arranging transportation. Related agricultural labor will also likely decline from June to October due to expected reduced production and yields. Remittances are likely to remain near their current, below pre-war levels through January. Temporary labor migration has been constrained since the start of the war due to increasing competition in areas receiving labor from Ukraine, restrictions on access to Europe, and a reduced working-age male population, which are expected to persist.

• Staple food prices are expected to continue to gradually increase and peak seasonally in January due to elevated energy, labor, and transport costs. Bread prices, in particular, are expected to increase by up to 25 percent by January, reflecting both higher processing costs and seasonal patterns (Figure 2).

• Logistics costs for humanitarian agencies and commercial trade are likely to rise through the projection period. National railway carrier Ukrzaliznytsia is planning to increase freight tariffs by 30 percent starting in August. Continued high fuel prices and rising freight tariffs are expected to increase transport costs for food, essential goods, and humanitarian assistance, with the greatest impacts in frontline and hard-to-reach areas.

• While macroeconomic conditions are likely to remain stable, economic growth will continue to remain limited as it has since the outbreak of the conflict. Some key growth sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and mining, are limited in their ability to grow as they are heavily dependent on energy inputs, which are constrained by extensive conflict-related infrastructure damage.

• Labor shortages are likely to persist in the agriculture, construction, transport, industry, and service sectors. Despite high unemployment levels, nearly 70 percent of businesses reported labor shortages in early 2026, linked to military conscription, fear of conscription, and casualties and injuries, particularly among working-age men. These shortages are expected to constrain agricultural activities, transport and logistics, service delivery, and broader economic activity, limiting income-earning opportunities and contributing to higher production and delivery costs. 

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian food assistance is expected to remain near current levels through January 2027, with continued prioritization of households located in frontline, government-controlled areas. Modalities will primarily include in-kind food kits and cash transfers. However, not all frontline communities will be served due to logistical and access challenges. From October to January, some areas will become more difficult to reach with assistance due to intensified conflict and winter-related logistical challenges. This includes the highly rural Beryslavskyi district in Kherson Oblast, where conflict and poor winter road access are expected to limit humanitarian access. Available information on assistance in occupied areas is very limited; as such, this scenario does not include an assumption about assistance delivery to occupied locations.

In government-controlled areas near the frontlines in Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson, outcomes from June to September will vary between Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!), and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) due to localized differences in market access, income-earning opportunities, and levels of humanitarian food assistance.  With very few daily markets, households will likely consume much of their own production or share it within their community. Rural households will consume some own-produced food, including potatoes harvested from July to October, and may gather wild foods (e.g., mushrooms and berries) to supplement. Public services will likely remain available, but households may have to travel over longer distances or use indirect or less efficient routes to access them, or rely on neighbors or proxies to deliver. From October to January, households may access minimal late harvests and any remaining own-produced food, but stocks will deplete quickly. Access to market activity and public services will decrease as wet and snowy winter conditions constrain travel. Humanitarian agencies will similarly face greater access challenges due to winter conditions, as well as likely increased infrastructure damage related to expected further drone attacks on key logistics and transportation hubs. 

The most isolated government-controlled frontline areas will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through January. From June to September, households will access food from household plots (including the potato harvest starting in July), as well as staples purchased using pension income, social safety net benefits, savings, borrowed funds, or income from the sale of assets. However, market access remains highly constrained, food prices are elevated, and income-earning opportunities are scarce, limiting purchasing capacity. Poor households remaining in these areas are unable to obtain sufficient food without resorting to selling their assets, bartering, or traveling in search of food and services. From October to January, winter conditions and the likely increase in fighting, attacks, and drone strikes are expected to worsen travel difficulties. As a result, a growing number of households will likely face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as access to markets (for both purchases and sales) and the social safety net (including pension income) contracts. Households will gradually deplete any food stocks that are remaining from the June to September period and likely quickly consume anything harvested in October and November. Incomes will be increasingly constrained during the winter months, as food prices, heating and utility costs, and other essential good prices seasonally increase. Medical expenses also typically increase during this period. Households are expected to copy by reducing their food consumption or increasingly sell off assets in order to gain income to purchase food. 

Humanitarian agencies will likely continue to serve the same areas as in June to September; however, they are less likely to reach households in Beryslavskyi district in Kherson Oblast, as fighting for control of the Lower Dnipro River in that area and likely high levels of attacks and drone strikes will limit humanitarian access. Intense fighting over transportation, water, and energy infrastructure will further reduce income-earning opportunities, isolate households, and limit the ability of humanitarian agencies to respond. From October to January, households in this area will likely deplete any own-produced food stocks, face constrained travel to markets, and may be isolated in their homes for unpredictably long periods of time. As a result, Beryslavskyi district is expected to deteriorate from Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) from June to September to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from October to January. 

Government-controlled frontline areas where market and livelihood disruptions are pronounced but humanitarian access is regular and significant will be Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) from June to September. In-kind food assistance is a key factor in ensuring households’ minimum kilocalories needs are being met, including in areas of Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk. However, poor households – especially the elderly – are likely still unable to afford non-food expenses. Outcomes would likely be worse without food assistance, even as some households will consume food from their own crop and livestock production. However, from October to January, fresh food availability will decline and households will likely rely more heavily on food assistance. Additionally, household access to already limited labor opportunities will further decline, as well as access to markets and pensions as winter conditions increase travel challenges. Households are expected to employ coping strategies, such as increasingly selling productive assets, to meet their food needs. While these area will remain Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!), the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will gradually increase. 

Government-controlled frontline areas with relatively good market and livelihood conditions will remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) from June to January. From June to September, conditions in and around Zaporizhzhya city will be relatively better, with fresh food coming from nearby rural areas and seasonal work opportunities both for poor households who live in the city and those who can travel for work. From October to January, increased costs for heating homes, increased health expenses, and seasonal food price increases will particularly impact households whose primary source of income is pensions or social safety net payments that remain at fixed amounts. While most of these households will still be able to afford a minimally adequate diet, they will face difficulty covering all of their non-food expenses. An increasing number of households are likely to deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in this area, although the area-level outcomes will remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

In government-controlled areas farther from, but still near, the frontline in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolayiv, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are likely to persist through January. From June to September, market activity in these areas will be at its seasonal high, and temporary employment opportunities will benefit poor local and IDP households. From October to January, rising heating, food, and health costs will gradually erode earlier income gains, particularly for IDP households who primarily depend on informal labor and are less likely to obtain it during the winter months. Likely winter increases in Russian attacks targeting infrastructure will further reduce income due to blackouts and fuel shortages. Households reliant on pensions and social safety net payments are also likely to struggle with the seasonal cost increases due to their fixed incomes. Despite these financial challenges, households in these areas will likely remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

In Russian-occupied areas closer to the frontlines in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely continue from June to January. From June to September, these largely rural areas will likely access some own-produced food. Market functionality and income will remain limited, but access to markets and services will be at its seasonal high. From October to January, winter conditions and infrastructure will constrain travel, and households will face rising food, heating, and health expenses. These areas are likely no longer served by utilities and households will need to make other arrangements for home heat. Households will nonetheless likely risk travel to areas to receive pensions or other payments amid lack of other income-earning opportunities. It is unclear how much, if any, humanitarian assistance will be delivered. Poor households are likely to cope by selling important assets, such as livestock, to pay for food.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. 
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Increasing costs of logistics from drone warfare and targeting of transportation infrastructure

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: While logistics costs have already risen substantially in reaction to fighting and drone strikes, the additional spread of drone warfare threatens to reduce trade and movement of people farther from the frontlines. In these areas, drone warfare is threatening important transportation centers and modes, such as trucking and rail. Trade will likely continue to reach major urban areas due to the large customer base and the ability and willingness of authorities to try to protect supplies going into these areas. However, rural areas, especially those that lie between the current frontline areas and are farther away from major transportation and trade routes, will be much more difficult to supply. Better-off households who have the resources may leave these areas and relocate to more economically active areas, but poor and elderly households are less likely or able to do so, and therefore risk increasing isolation from market access and income-earning opportunities. Humanitarian assistance agencies will also be impacted, as they will likely depend on whatever private sector traders remain operational in rural areas and will be subject to likely price increases amid increased demand and reduced supply. An increasing number of households in areas impacted by the drone warfare-related economic contractions will likely deteriorate from Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as food prices increase and access to markets, income-earning opportunities, and public services (including pensions) contracts.