Insecurity, drought, and economic constraints drive outcomes aligned with Crisis

• Across Syria, outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) are likely ongoing and expected to persist through September. Multi-year drought, the impacts of the 2011-2024 civil war and ongoing insecurity, and weak economic conditions are key shocks. Repeated poor rainfall seasons have reduced cereal production, degraded rangelands, and weakened agricultural labor demand. Conflict-related damage to irrigation systems and infrastructure continues to constrain cultivation and economic activity, while periodic clashes, population displacement, and shifting territorial control disrupt market functionality and livelihoods. Limited foreign currency reserves and economic constraints are expected to restrict import capacity, increasing the risk of national food supply shortfalls. Inflation and weak labor demand will continue to constrain access to food countrywide.
• The population in need of food assistance is currently estimated to be 6.0-6.99 million during the January-April lean season and is expected to decline modestly following summer harvests. Northwest (NWS) and Northeast (NES) Syria are areas of highest concern. Within these areas, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees are of highest concern due to limited livelihood opportunities and high market reliance. Worst-off households in parts of NES and some internally displaced person (IDP) households in NWS likely face outcomes aligned with Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In NWS, recent flood damage and winter storms are leading to more severe outcomes. In NES, disruptions to the oil-linked economy following shifts in control of key oil assets have further reduced labor opportunities and household income.
• Through the end of the lean season in April, the exhaustion of food stocks from the 2025 harvests and seasonally high staple food prices will exacerbate constraints on food consumption. From June to September, wheat and vegetable harvests will offer modest relief for some rural households; however, below-average agricultural production, tight national food supplies, and weak household purchasing power are expected to limit area-level improvements. 

The analysis in this report reflects information available as of February 27, 2026, and does not incorporate military developments involving Iran that began on February 28 or their broader regional implications. FEWS NET's analysis of the likely impacts on acute food insecurity will become available after March 31, 2026.

Syria's food security context is shaped by more than a decade of civil war, which caused extensive damage to infrastructure, precipitated a severe economic collapse, and compounded the effects of recurrent agroclimatic shocks. From 2011 to 2024, the civil war displaced millions, devastated agricultural infrastructure, restricted market access, and severely undermined public services and state capacity. It also disrupted key productive sectors, including agriculture, oil production, and trade, leaving the economy fragile and eroding household purchasing power. The fall of the Al-Assad regime in December 2024 and the formation of a transitional government in March 2025 ushered in a period of transition, during which governance has fragmented across multiple authorities while localized violence involving multiple non-state armed groups (NSAGs) continues to trigger displacement. In addition to conflict, recurrent drought has accelerated the erosion of agricultural livelihoods. The 2024/25 rainy season was among the driest in decades, with rainfall more than 50 percent below average, sharply reducing cereal output and pasture conditions in key rainfed wheat areas. These overlapping shocks continue to constrain agricultural activity, disrupt trade flows and market functioning, and weaken household income and purchasing power across many parts of the country.

Displacement remains a defining feature of Syria’s food security context. While approximately 1.4 million refugees and 1.7 million IDPs have returned to their areas of origin since December 2024, more than 5.5 million people remain internally displaced, while approximately 4.6 million Syrian refugees still live outside the country. This includes an estimated 170,000 people in coastal areas of Hama, Homs, Latakia, and Tartus governorates; approximately 155,200 IDPs in As-Suwayda; and nearly 174,000 newly displaced by renewed conflict in NES. Most IDPs live outside formal camps, typically in host communities where access to basic public services, stable sources of income, and affordable food is limited. Displacement continues to disrupt agricultural production, labor markets, and social support systems, while Syria’s fragmented governance landscape and competing sub-national authorities create administrative barriers and operational constraints for food and nutrition assistance delivery.

Livelihoods vary across Syria’s diverse ecological and economic zones. Rural households rely primarily on crop and livestock production, seasonal agricultural labor, petty trade, remittances, and food assistance, while urban households depend mainly on wage labor, small trade, and limited formal employment (Annex 3). Markets supply the majority of food for both urban and rural populations, making household purchasing power a central determinant of food access. Other key household expenditures include fuel, electricity, health care, housing, and transport. Agricultural labor demand typically peaks during planting and harvest periods, and livestock production depends on seasonal pasture availability between October and April. However, conflict-related damage to infrastructure, movement restrictions due to insecurity, drought, and high input costs have reduced cultivated area and limited agricultural labor opportunities in many areas. At the same time, the impacts of conflict, drought, and high fodder prices have constrained livestock production, forcing many herders to sell animals off or exit livestock production altogether. 

Syria’s economy remains fragile in the post-Assad transitional period. Although some macroeconomic improvements occurred in 2025, including modest increases in remittance inflows and public-sector salaries and an easing of food inflation in localized areas, purchasing power remains constrained by persistently high prices for food, fuel, and other essential goods. Average monthly salaries (between 75-150 USD) remain near or below the cost of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket. Heavy reliance on imports, past years of currency depreciation, and weak domestic production continue to sustain elevated staple food prices. At the same time, sharp increases in telecommunications and electricity costs — reaching up to 1,000 percent and 6,000 percent, respectively — are placing further strain on household budgets. High fuel costs, transport constraints, liquidity shortages, and limited livelihood opportunities also restrict economic activity and income generation across much of the country. As a result, relative improvements in economic conditions are fragile and uneven, especially in drought‑affected or insecure regions. 

Humanitarian food assistance has become an important component of household food access following years of conflict, displacement, and poor economic conditions. Assistance programs implemented by humanitarian agencies and local partners have supported displaced populations and other acutely food-insecure households across the country. However, the scale, coverage, and consistency of assistance have varied over time due to operational constraints, funding availability, and access challenges associated with Syria’s fragmented governance landscape.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information:  

• Special Report: Syria Context Report
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Agricultural production in Syria has been severely weakened by multiple years of adverse weather conditions. Prolonged drought throughout 2025 caused major soil moisture deficits, delayed planting, and sharply reduced crop establishment. Heavy snowstorms and localized flooding in January-February 2026 further damaged agricultural systems across Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, and Tartus governorates. Floodwater and snow accumulation damaged farmland and irrigation infrastructure, disrupted markets and roads, and displaced IDPs that had already experienced multiple prior bouts of displacement. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), cereal production in 2025 was more than 60 percent below average, severely depressing agricultural wage labor demand and sharply reducing labor income among poor rural households.

Adverse weather conditions have continued to affect the 2025/26 agricultural season. Below-average rainfall during the October-December planting period (Figure 1), combined with insecurity that limited farmers’ access to fields, delayed planting and left only an estimated 40 percent of farmland cultivated. Early‑planted crops suffered poor germination and stunted early growth, further diminishing expected yields. However, while rainfall deficits constrained crop production, recent rainfall has supported improved grazing conditions. Expanded pasture availability has enabled seasonal increases in milk production, improving access to fresh dairy products at a time when cereal stocks and household incomes are typically lowest.

Ongoing conflict is contributing to below-average agricultural production while also constraining income-earning opportunities and driving population displacement. In NES, insecurity substantially reduced 2025/26 wheat planting, as tensions among NSAGs and shifting frontlines limited farmers’ access to land during the autumn planting window. At the same time, widespread explosive ordnance contamination in former frontline areas continues to restrict safe access to fields and hinder farm operations by constraining the movement of workers, machinery, and agricultural inputs needed for planting and cultivation. In Deir ez-Zor Governorate, pollution from informal oil refining has contaminated soil, groundwater, and sections of the Euphrates River, degrading agricultural land and water supplies. In southern governorates, intermittent clashes, military activity, and explosive ordnance contamination have also limited access to farmland during key agricultural periods, contributing to below‑average seasonal performance. Along the Syria-Israel border in Quneitra Governorate, sustained chemical exposure has degraded soil quality, affected water resources and civilian health, and contributed to vegetation loss and crop damage.

Macroeconomic conditions remain fragile despite modest stabilization since late 2024. The recent, partial lifting of sanctions has improved import flows and government revenue, while the removal of military checkpoints and easing of import restrictions have helped reduce transport costs and improve the availability of essential goods in domestic markets. The SYP has appreciated by 18 percent since late 2024, and inflation slowed to 11.4 percent in November 2025, ending years of hyperinflation. As a result, the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB)¹ — a key measure of domestic living costs — fell by nearly 20 percent year-on-year in November 2025. Despite these relative improvements, household purchasing power remains constrained by high food and non-food prices, weak labor demand, wage payment delays, and limited government capacity to finance public spending and salary payments. The official minimum wage covers only half of the MEB’s food component. At the same time, government efforts to formalize parts of the economy have reduced informal self-employment opportunities for poorer households. 

Recent developments in NES illustrate how shifting territorial control and governance arrangements continue to shape local economic conditions and livelihoods. In January 2026, Damascus-aligned forces consolidated control over parts of NES previously administered by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) – a Kurdish-led autonomous governing structure – prompting clashes between Damascus-aligned units and AANES’s security forces, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Hostilities subsided after the Syrian government initiated early steps to integrate the SDF into state security structures. Expanded state control over strategic oil fields, electricity networks, and water infrastructure has improved service delivery in some areas, reducing reliance on private generators and water trucking. However, these gains have also introduced economic trade-offs. Electricity tariffs increased sharply, while households that previously relied on informal oil refining lost an important source of income. Fuel shortages have also led to higher irrigation costs, reducing farmers’ ability to afford water pumping for agricultural production. Although the transfer of control of NES’s major oil assets (including the Al-Omar, Rumeilan, Al-Suwaydiyah, and the Conoco gas complex) from the AANES administration to the state-owned Syrian Petroleum Company initially disrupted the local oil-linked economy, activity has begun to stabilize. However, years of conflict, sanctions-related gaps in maintenance, and makeshift informal refining have severely degraded Syria’s oil infrastructure, meaning any recovery in production levels will likely be slow.

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian assistance remains a critical lifeline for millions across Syria, but deepening funding shortfalls have forced agencies to scale back support. Food assistance deliveries in 2025 dropped below levels recorded in 2024 due to funding gaps and operational constraints, including insecurity, infrastructure damage, electricity outages, and fuel shortages that reduced distribution capacity countrywide. Assistance distributions are thus increasingly prioritized for areas where the impacts of conflict, drought, and other shocks are most acute, while other regions, such as parts of Damascus, receive comparatively limited coverage. According to the Food Security Cluster, emergency responses to displacement and flooding in January and February 2026 reached over 120,000 people in NES and over 400,000 people in NWS with a combination of bread, ready-to-eat meals, and emergency food rations, while distributions have expanded in some areas where humanitarian access has improved relative to the height of the war, such as in As-Suwayda. However, the quantity of food assistance provided remains insufficient to prevent widespread food consumption gaps. At the same time, reduced funding for livelihood programs has limited households’ ability to rebuild assets or diversify income sources, leaving many households more vulnerable to shocks and maintaining dependence on food assistance even as humanitarian assistance contracts.

Outcomes aligned with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) are ongoing amid the January-April lean season, when household food stocks are at their lowest and dependence on markets remains high. Prolonged drought, high input costs, damaged irrigation and other agricultural systems, and reduced rural employment have driven declines in agricultural production and are intensifying lean season pressures across both rainfed and irrigated areas. Severe winter weather — characterized by erratic and torrential rainfall, flash flooding, high winds, and snowstorms — and protracted displacement are further constraining households’ ability to meet basic food needs. Persistent insecurity and large-scale population movements continue to constrain livelihood activity and restrict access to essential services. 

Poor national wheat production has contributed to significant countrywide flour deficits, exacerbating already heavy reliance on imports (Figure 2) and sustaining relatively high staple food prices. Additionally, the onset of Ramadan in mid-February has increased seasonal demand and prices for staple food items. Meanwhile, inflation continues to outpace minimum wage adjustments, while delays in public sector salaries and weak private sector wages further erode purchasing power. Although remittances remain an important source of income for many households and the inflow of foreign exchange currency via remittances helps to facilitate the availability of imported food in local markets, the real value of remittances has declined. As market dependency is currently high during the lean season, and the reach of humanitarian food assistance is limited to the worst-off households, many poor households are increasingly unable to afford sufficient food while others are shifting toward cheaper, less preferred staple foods and cutting back on essential non-food expenditures.

Governorates in NWS (Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Idlib) are facing outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3), resulting from the effects of protracted and recent conflict, economic, and weather shocks on agricultural production, household income, and purchasing power. These pressures on food availability and access are particularly severe among the region’s large population of IDPs and returnees, who comprise more than 28 percent of NWS’s population and face limited access to stable livelihoods amid overstretched local resources and social support systems. A subset of displaced and returnee households in NWS likely face outcomes aligned with Emergency (IPC Phase 4), as humanitarian food assistance coverage is relatively low and inconsistent, with substantial gaps in a number of subdistricts. Recent shocks illustrate their vulnerability: in February, flooding across 24 IDP sites in northern Syria destroyed shelters, wiped out household food stocks, and disrupted assistance delivery, sharply increasing immediate needs in affected communities. Households in the Harim Mountains of Idlib — which hosts more than 50 displacement camps — are particularly vulnerable to winter storms, as evidenced by the impact of recent snowstorms on displaced communities. Households are increasingly prioritizing winter survival needs over adequate food consumption and similarly employing negative coping strategies. As a result, poor households, IDPs, and recent returnees, in particular, face widening food consumption gaps and growing dependence on negative coping strategies, including reducing meal size and number, relying on cheaper and less nutritious foods, reducing dietary diversity, and prioritizing feeding children.

The governorates of NES (Deir ez-Zor, Al-Hasakah, and Ar-Raqqa) are facing outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to recurrent drought, displacement, the lasting effects of conflict, and challenges associated with governance transition. The recent transfer of control over major oil assets and associated energy infrastructure has also disrupted parts of the oil-linked economy while contributing to fuel shortages and higher energy costs. These factors have contributed to low agricultural production, high staple food prices, and persistently limited access to sufficient income. The decline in agricultural productivity linked to multi-year drought and protracted conflict has driven many households to temporarily or permanently shift to non-agricultural livelihoods such as construction labor, migratory labor in urban centers, and other forms of unskilled labor. Household earnings have decreased or been lost entirely with the shift from previously stable, SDF-linked public-sector employment to irregular, low-paid casual work, leaving many households unable to afford staple foods amid persistently elevated prices. As a result, poor households in NES are increasingly reliant on negative coping strategies to mitigate or prevent food consumption deficits, with the poorest resorting to extreme negative coping methods aligned with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes such as begging and selling any remaining household assets.

In the coastal governorates of Latakia and Tartus, outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) persist as households face worsening access to sufficient food due to disruptions in agriculture and fishing. Conflict- and weather-related damage to orchards, crops, greenhouses, and fishing assets has reduced local availability of fruits, olives, vegetables, and fish. Simultaneously, the fall of the Al-Assad regime has eliminated many former private‑sector and military‑linked income sources. Households are increasingly reliant on irregular, seasonal, and low‑paid casual labor. With agriculture and coastal fishing inactive during the winter season, daily wage opportunities have further contracted, weakening purchasing power amid high prices and reduced humanitarian support. 

In the southern governorates of As-Suwayda, Daraa, Quneitra, and Rural Damascus, outcomes aligned with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) persist as households face overlapping impacts from conflict, displacement, and drought. Recent hostilities triggered nearly 192,000 displacement movements, primarily within As-Suwayda, disrupting access to livelihoods, services, and markets. Severe drought continues to strain agricultural systems across predominantly rural areas dependent on crop production and livestock rearing, with widespread crop stress and significant rainfall deficits reducing both rainfed and irrigated yields. Water scarcity, combined with damaged irrigation infrastructure, is limiting recovery and constraining seasonal activities. At the same time, livestock losses, limited access to fields, and low purchasing power are leaving households with few remaining income sources and growing market dependence amid rising prices. Households are meeting only their minimum caloric needs while reducing dietary diversity and taking on debt.

In the governorates of Damascus, Aleppo, and Hama, outcomes in the major urban centers are similar to — or slightly less severe than — those in surrounding rural and peri-urban areas, aligning with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, as high inflation and reduced income-earning opportunities undermine households’ ability to afford food. In Damascus, even formal government wages cover only a small share of the MEB, leaving public employees able to meet basic food needs but not essential non-food expenditures. In Aleppo, Syria’s main industrial hub, industrial activity has stalled under severe electricity rationing, driving unemployment. Rising bread prices, bakery closures, and shrinking informal work opportunities are forcing poor households and IDPs to reduce meal frequency and portion sizes. 

• Agricultural drought conditions are expected to persist through at least September, marked by below-average soil moisture and limited irrigation capacity.
• Rainfed crop performance will remain below average, with wheat and barley production unlikely to recover fully due to depleted water tables, damaged irrigation networks, and high input costs. The multi-year drought has affected nearly 75 percent of rainfed cropping areas, and the area affected will likely expand throughout NES, the country’s breadbasket. Wheat production is expected to fall short of needs by 2.73 million metric tons.
• Livestock herds and productivity will likely remain atypically low following multi‑year drought, pasture degradation, water scarcity, and high fodder prices. Livestock mortality and distress sales during 2024/25 will continue to constrain herd recovery in 2026. However, short-term improvements in pasture conditions following late winter and spring rains are expected to temporarily support livestock productivity through May, coinciding with the lead-up to Eid al-Adha. As a result, milk production and availability are expected to relatively increase in February and peak in April, but remain below normal overall due to poor livestock body conditions and reduced herd sizes.
• Conflict and insecurity among NSAGs are expected to persist at current levels, continuing to disrupt livelihoods, market functionality, and public service delivery.
• Population displacement will continue at elevated levels, driven by conflict, insecurity, drought, and shifting territorial control, adding pressure to already overstretched services and markets.
• Macroeconomic conditions will likely remain fragile despite recent stabilization. Conflict-related constraints on trade and investment, as well as limited government fiscal capacity, will continue to limit the pace and degree of recovery. Weak foreign reserves coupled with high import dependency are expected to contribute to inflationary pressure, though inflation is likely to remain lower than in recent years.
• Government consolidation in NES’s AANES region will continue, following the transfer of major oil and gas fields from the SDF to the Syrian state, creating governance uncertainty and changing revenue flows across former AANES‑administered areas.
• Fuel availability will likely remain irregular, with continued shortages affecting transport, irrigation, and electricity generation; increasing market and service disruptions; and increased food prices countrywide.
• Staple food imports will be critical but likely insufficient to offset large domestic cereal production deficits in 2026. Limited foreign currency reserves, fiscal constraints, and economic uncertainty are expected to constrain import capacity, and import volumes are expected to fall short of national consumption requirements.
• Staple food prices are expected to remain elevated and will likely rise further. Although inflation has alleviated food prices recently, worsening domestic production deficits, rising import requirements, high fuel prices, and the likelihood of corresponding supply shortages are expected to drive rising prices. Seasonal relief in prices following the harvests are expected to be short lived.
• Labor demand is expected to remain constrained, as industrial activity, agriculture, and oil‑linked employment continue to operate far below pre‑crisis levels. Oil production in NES is resuming but will likely recover slowly, constraining related income-earning opportunities. Conflict‑related movement restrictions and insecurity will continue to fragment labor markets and limit mobility for work.
• Despite short-term increases in 2025, remittance inflows are expected to remain below average, constrained by rising living costs in countries hosting large Syrian populations that are limiting the amount of disposable income that migrants can send home. Urban‑to‑rural remittances will also remain atypically low as inflation and weak wage labor demand in Syrian cities limit the capacity of urban households to support relatives.

Humanitarian food assistance

Ongoing funding shortfalls are expected to limit the coverage and consistency of food assistance, especially in high-need regions such as NES, NWS, and urban displacement centers. Based on current planning figures, food assistance is expected to remain limited and uneven: nationally, approximately 7-11 percent of the population is anticipated to receive regular assistance in NWS and NES, and an estimated 9 percent in coastal areas. Coverage is expected to be even lower in the south, with no plans for assistance in Daraa and As-Suwayda, and just 1-3 percent in Damascus and Rural Damascus. Countrywide, approximately 216 subdistricts — representing an estimated 12 million people — have no planned food assistance. Where assistance is planned, rations are expected to provide approximately 32 percent of minimum daily caloric needs. Meanwhile, agricultural livelihoods support is expected to remain minimal to absent across most subdistricts.

Outcomes aligned with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will persist countrywide through September, with only modest seasonal improvement. From February to May, acute food insecurity will remain high as households enter the lean season peak with exhausted stocks, high market dependence, and inconsistent humanitarian assistance, driven by prolonged drought, damaged irrigation systems, high input costs, and limited rural labor. Ramadan- and Eid-related price spikes will further tighten access for poor resident, IDP, and returnee populations. From June to September, localized harvests and brief pasture improvements will offer only limited relief, as multiyear drought, declining water tables, degraded irrigation networks, high fuel costs, and insecurity continue to constrain production and labor markets. With staple prices remaining well above average, outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will persist in heavily drought and conflict-affected areas, while outcomes aligned with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) are expected in areas where income sources are more diversified and stable but purchasing power remains heavily eroded.

NWS will continue to face outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through September, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes anticipated among a subset of poor IDP and returnee populations who face more limited livelihood opportunities amid recent floods and winter storms. From February to May, poor households will rely heavily on markets for food purchases, while limited livestock products and small quantities of milk will provide only marginal food and income. Drought and recent flooding will limit agricultural labor, pushing workers into temporary livestock tasks or low‑paid casual labor that is insufficient to offset high food prices, resulting in reduced meal size and frequency, reliance on cheaper foods, debt accumulation, and asset sales. From June to September, households will likely remain highly market‑dependent following below‑average harvests. Milk will provide only marginal seasonal support, while agricultural and casual labor will likely offer only limited income. High fodder costs will encourage pre‑winter livestock sales, weakening future coping capacity, while the real value of below-average remittance inflows is expected to decline with rising prices.

In NES, outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) are also expected to persist through September as households continue to face severe constraints on food availability and access, resulting in food consumption deficits and asset sales to purchase food. Outcomes aligned with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are expected to persist among a subset of very poor households who will continue to engage in extreme coping strategies such as begging to meet their food needs. From February to May, households will remain heavily dependent on markets due to limited own-production and weak livestock productivity resulting from insecurity, multiyear drought, degraded pasture, water shortages, and high input costs. Agricultural labor will simultaneously remain limited, pushing many households into low-paid casual labor, while disruptions to the oil-linked economy and uncertainty over shifting control of major fields further erode income previously tied to SDF-related employment. High staple food prices and low purchasing power will constrain their ability to purchase sufficient food. Displacement and insecurity will also continue to hinder access to markets and services. From June to September, limited seasonal labor during harvests will offer only minor relief, given well below-average area planted and yields, and high imported staple food prices will persist amid anticipated national supply deficits.

The coastal governorates of Latakia and Tartus are expected to face outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from March to May due to conflict- and weather-related disruptions to agriculture, including storm damage to orchards and greenhouses, as well as seasonal reductions in fishing and tourism activities during winter. Additionally, the loss of former political and military income sources is expected to increase household reliance on low-paid and irregular seasonal work that cannot cover essential food and non-food needs. Beginning in April, the reopening of the fishing season and improving weather will offer modest short-term income gains, alongside limited agricultural opportunities that will remain constrained by high input costs, infrastructure damage, and fuel shortages. By June, the summer tourism season is expected to relatively expand employment in services, transport, and hospitality, allowing many households to improve to outcomes aligned with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through September; however, gains will be uneven and unable to fully offset income losses for some households worst impacted by agricultural losses.

The southern governorates of Daraa, Rural Damascus, As-Suwayda, and Quneitra are expected to face outcomes aligned with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through September, though conditions will remain fragile. Displacement, insecurity, and severe drought will continue to suppress rainfed and irrigated production amid water shortages and damaged irrigation systems, while widespread unexploded ordnance contamination in Rural Damascus will further restrict farmland access and agricultural labor opportunities. Livestock productivity will remain below average due to degraded pasture and high fodder costs, limiting milk availability and income. As a result, households will meet minimum needs mainly by lowering dietary quality, relying on costly markets, and taking on debt. However, most households are still expected to meet minimum food needs through a combination of livestock product sales, public sector employment, remittances, and access to credit. Seasonal improvements in pasture and milk production will offer temporary and limited relief, but high fuel costs, restricted labor mobility, and elevated staple prices will sustain weak purchasing power. 

Within the governorates of Damascus, Aleppo, and Hama, outcomes aligned with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) will persist in urban areas through September as hyperinflation, high unemployment, and weak purchasing power continue to limit households' ability to meet their food and non-food needs. From February to May, rising bread prices, intermittent bakery closures, and reduced informal work will force many poor households to reduce dietary diversity, and in some cases, meal sizes. Although slight seasonal relief may occur from June to September, structural economic deterioration, high fuel and transport costs, and ongoing energy constraints will sustain elevated prices and continue to limit households' ability to meet both food and non-food needs.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible with limited exceptions. In rare cases, FEWS NET classification is IPC-aligned rather than IPC-compatible. IPC-aligned analysis is evidence-based but some types of evidence required for IPC-compatibility were not available. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Turkey reduces Euphrates River water outflows to Syria

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If Turkey were to reduce Euphrates outflows — particularly during the spring and summer peak irrigation season — water levels in Lake Assad and downstream canal systems, which are already critically low, would fall to dangerously low levels, severely jeopardizing irrigation and basic water access. This would significantly restrict irrigation for wheat, barley, and cotton across Ar‑Raqqa, Deir ez‑Zor, and parts of Aleppo, further depressing production already undermined by prolonged drought and the poor 2025 harvest. Farmers would likely be forced to reduce planted area or depend on expensive groundwater pumping, increasing fuel costs, and putting additional downward pressure on yields. Reduced access to irrigated agriculture would also diminish seasonal labor opportunities, cutting income among poor residents and displaced households who rely heavily on agricultural wage labor.

Lower river flows would also constrain hydropower generation at the Tabqa and Tishreen dams, leading to more frequent electricity outages, disrupting water pumping stations, and reducing drinking‑water availability in both urban and rural areas. Recurrent power cuts would further undermine cold‑chain systems and essential health, nutrition, and WASH services, increasing the risk of waterborne and foodborne disease outbreaks and contributing to worsening nutritional outcomes, particularly for children and pregnant and lactating women. As water and staple food prices rise, poor resident and displaced households would face widening food consumption gaps and deepen their reliance on negative coping strategies. These pressures would likely push more households into outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with an increasing subset of households deteriorating into outcomes aligned with Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Flooding from rains and rapid snowmelt, or worse-than-anticipated rainfall in March-May

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Flooding or rapid snowmelt in March-April would further disrupt and damage agricultural activity by washing out irrigation channels, damaging pump stations, isolating rural communities, and delaying early-season vegetable planting, leading to short-term market disruptions and lost seasonal income. As a result, agricultural labor opportunities and petty trade income would decline during a key seasonal period, reducing household cash availability and constraining market food access. Alternatively, if the March-May rains fail and the severity of drought intensifies more than currently anticipated into the spring and summer months, then rainfed wheat harvests would likely decline even more than currently projected, while pasture regeneration in the south, NWS, and NES would remain extremely poor with little to no short-term recovery. In both cases, these shocks would reduce household own-production and pasture availability, increase production costs, and weaken livestock productivity. Notably, rising fodder prices and deteriorating livestock body conditions would reduce milk and meat availability just as household reliance on markets increases prior to the harvest. Together, these shocks would depress crop output, strain livestock dependent livelihoods, and intensify food access constraints for rural households already facing weakened purchasing power, likely driving additional households into outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and, in the worst-affected drought and flood-prone areas with limited assistance, increasing the likelihood that an increasing number of households will face outcomes aligned with Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Heatwaves or pest outbreaks during summer harvest

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A severe heatwave during the grain filling stage (April-June) would reduce wheat and barley yields by drying out maturing crops, shrinking grain size, and increasing crop failure. This impact would be worse under no or limited irrigation. This would be compounded if pests or diseases such as wheat rust or locusts emerged in late spring or early summer, damaging late-planted cereals and vegetable crops. Together, these shocks would directly reduce both household own production and market supply during a critical post-harvest period. With 2025’s wheat harvest already extremely poor and many households entering 2026 with depleted stocks, another shock to cereal production would sharply tighten domestic availability and further increase reliance on imports at a time when purchasing power and capacity to finance required import volumes are already weak. Lower harvests would reduce rural income from both crop sales and seasonal labor, while higher market prices for wheat, flour, and vegetables would erode access to food for poor households. In the worst-affected farming zones, these combined shocks would likely push more households into outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3).

Northeast Syria

Escalation of localized conflict in NES 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Localized clashes in Al-Hasakah and Deir ez‑Zor during the early phases of the Damascus-SDF integration could disrupt spring planting, restrict access to irrigation canals and pumping stations, and interrupt market flows and rural labor migration. If planting and irrigation are interrupted during the critical season period, cultivated area and yield would likely decline, directly reducing household own production and demand for agricultural labor. These disruptions would reduce agricultural labor income, delay crop development, and limit the movement of food and agricultural inputs. As a result, poor households in affected areas would face tighter market supplies, higher prices, and reduced purchasing power, causing an increase in the population facing outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

As-Suwayda

Renewed violence in As-Suwayda

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If violence escalates again in As‑Suwayda, renewed clashes, road blockages, and disruptions to trade flows would further deteriorate local food security conditions, likely driving a shift toward outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in the worst‑affected areas. Heightened insecurity would restrict population movement, reduce access to markets and services, and limit the functioning of supply chains already strained by high transportation costs. Market volatility — particularly sharp spikes in the prices of bread, fuel, and fresh foods — would intensify as traders face increased risk and reduced inflows. Daily labor opportunities would contract, while households dependent on remittances or small‑scale commerce would see incomes fall. Given already weak purchasing power, even short‑term price shocks or market closures would widen food consumption gaps for poor households, IDPs, and those with limited livelihood diversification. Without timely humanitarian access, more households would likely resort to negative coping strategies, leading to outcomes aligned with Crisis (IPC Phase 3).