Weather events and economic constraints continue to drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will remain widespread in Northeast Syria (NES) and Northwest Syria (NWS) through September, with some households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees with minimal income-earning opportunities. Below‑average harvests, flood‑ and hailstorm‑related crop losses, unexploded ordnance contamination (UXO), insecurity, and limited labor opportunities will keep households heavily market‑dependent amid high food prices. Seasonal gains from livestock products, agricultural labor, and pasture improvements are expected to be insufficient to prevent continued use of negative coping strategies as households attempt to mitigate food consumption gaps.
• From June to September, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to continue or develop in coastal and southern governorates, driven by seasonal harvests, pasture improvements, and increased agricultural, fishing, and domestic tourism‑related labor. However, weather shocks, high input and fuel costs, damaged infrastructure, insecurity, and reduced remittance values will constrain recovery. While Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in areas with relatively more diversified income sources, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will persist where livelihoods and food access have been most severely eroded, limiting the extent of seasonal improvement countrywide.
• Rapid depreciation of the SYP in April, rising fuel and transport costs, high transaction costs, and restrictive exchange‑rate policies have led to steep increases in staple food prices during a period of high market dependence. Although a public sector salary increase is planned in May, associated price increases are likely to offset most gains and further disadvantage poor households reliant on informal and daily wage labor and remittances. As a result, household purchasing power is expected to remain weak through September, with many households relying on credit, reducing non‑food expenditures, and limiting diet quality and quantity.

This report provides an update to the February 2026 to September 2026 Food Security Outlook and March 2026 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of April 28, 2026. 

Severe flooding and hailstorms across Syria in April have significantly disrupted agricultural conditions, compounding earlier rainfall deficits and negatively impacting the 2025/26 wheat season at a critical growth stage. After below‑average rainfall during the October-December 2025 planting period reduced wheat cultivation areas, above‑average rainfall earlier in 2026 had raised the possibility of a partial production recovery; however, successive floods and hailstorms during the critical final growth stage of wheat have undermined these gains, resulting in crop losses countrywide. In NES, flooding between mid‑March and early April damaged shelters, farmland, and infrastructure in Al‑Hasakah, Ar‑Raqqa, and Deir ez‑Zor. In Deir ez-Zor, more than 5,600 people were affected by flooding in the subdistrict of Abu Kamal, as the collapse of the Al‑Suwai’iyah bridge cut off access for nearby villages, isolating some populations from markets and services. In Ar‑Raqqa, floodwaters displaced landmines and UXO and caused road closures — including parts of the M4 highway — disrupting cross‑border movement, agriculture, and market access. In NWS, repeated flooding caused major agricultural losses in Aleppo and Idlib, while runoff from the Qweiq River and surrounding catchments in southern Aleppo caused the collapse of the protective barrier of the western basin, resulting in damage to agricultural land, including approximately 600 hectares of cultivated wheat, with an estimated 30,000 hectares still at risk as of early April. In southern Syria, a severe hailstorm damaged crops across rural Daraa, affecting approximately 100 hectares with losses of 50-100 percent, including damage to orchards and irrigation systems. Although above‑average rainfall refilled the Samakiyat dam and improved irrigation access for some farmers, additional hail and heavy rain in April caused further crop damage and flooding, compounding localized livelihood losses.

Rapid currency depreciation and restrictive exchange‑rate policies in April drove steep increases in staple food prices, reducing incomes and constraining food access for many households. Syria relies heavily on imports to cover domestic staple food requirements, agricultural inputs, and fuel, making the exchange rate a primary inflation driver. Retail food prices surged following a rapid depreciation of the SYP that reversed earlier macroeconomic stability. The parallel exchange rate rose by more than 10 percent in days — from approximately 120 SYP/USD in early April to 133-136 SYP/USD by mid‑month — while the Central Bank of Syria’s official rate remained at 110 SYP/USD, widening the gap between official and market rates. By late April, reports indicated up to four different exchange rates operating simultaneously, adding uncertainty to import and trade conditions. New government regulations requiring remittances to be paid in SYP at the official rate further constrained access to USD and reduced household purchasing power.

Regional insecurity remains a key driver of acute food insecurity in Syria. Escalating tensions in the Middle East have contributed to rising global energy prices, with domestic fuel prices increasing by 10 percent between March and April (from 90 SYP to 99 SYP per liter; Figure 1), adding additional inflationary pressure to an already stressed economy, and increasing transport, irrigation, and food processing costs. These pressures quickly transmitted to markets: tomato prices more than doubled in Daraa, vegetable oil rose to 260-270 SYP per liter, rice to 100-120 SYP per kilogram, and freight costs increased by 40-50 percent, reflecting exchange rate pressures across staple food markets.

UXO contamination continues to constrain safe access to agricultural land and markets, disrupting livelihoods and food availability across multiple governorates. Fatalities and injuries reported throughout April — including among farmers, agricultural workers, and truffle collectors in Deir ez‑Zor, Daraa, Hama, Aleppo, Rural Damascus, and Ar-Raqqa — have reduced labor availability and discouraged cultivation and income‑earning activities. At the same time, intensified Israeli military incursions into Quneitra and Daraa, involving checkpoints, detentions, livestock losses, and destruction of agricultural assets, have further undermined household livelihoods and market access, increasing reliance on markets amid rising prices and heightening risks of acute food insecurity.

Cross-border returns accelerated sharply from late February following escalating hostilities in Lebanon, with more than 251,000 Syrian nationals returning across all 14 governorates by April 21, representing a large, and mostly unplanned, population movement. The sudden scale of returns is increasing pressure on already strained food markets, livelihoods, and social support systems, heightening the risk of acute food insecurity among returnees and host communities, particularly where income-earning opportunities, shelter, and assistance remain limited. 

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian food assistance in Syria is expected to contract significantly beginning May 1, as WFP reduces support by 50 percent due to funding shortfalls, reducing the caseload from 250,000 households across 14 governorates to approximately 130,000 households in just seven governorates. While the 2026 Syria Food Security Cluster’s Livelihoods Sector First Reserve aims to target the 85 sub-districts out of the total 270 sub-districts, approximately 89 percent of the targeted populations are concentrated in NES and NWS, leaving comparatively limited coverage in southern and coastal areas. Concurrently, funding cuts to livelihood programs have constrained households’ capacity to rebuild assets and diversify income sources, increasing vulnerability to shocks and sustaining reliance on humanitarian food assistance, even as overall support declines.

Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the Syria Food Security Outlook from February 2026 to September 2026 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence:

• Remittances are expected to remain below average as Syrians abroad face rising living costs in host countries. New regulations require remittances to be paid in SYP at the official rate — 110 SYP/USD compared with a parallel rate of approximately 133-136 SYP/USD — which will reduce the real value of transfers by an estimated 17–19 percent, limiting poor households’ ability to meet food and non-food needs. At the same time, inflation and weak wage labor demand in urban areas are likely to limit urban‑to‑rural support.
• Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain fragile despite recent wage adjustments. A 50 percent increase in public sector salaries effective May 1, alongside the March increase in the minimum wage to 12,560 SYP per month, will likely provide only temporary relief for public sector households, as gains are expected to be quickly eroded by price increases that typically follow wage hikes. While public employees may remain relatively better off than other groups, overall improvements in purchasing power are expected to be limited. Poor and very poor households — particularly those reliant on casual labor and remittances — are unlikely to benefit and are expected to experience the greatest erosion of purchasing power as prices rise. The April depreciation of the SYP, along with fuel price increase and increased maintenance and spare parts costs, resulted in a reported 40-50 percent increase in freight costs, driving notable increases in staple food and non‑food prices. Additional price pressure is expected in late May during the Eid al‑Adha period (expected between May 27–30), when demand for livestock and key food commodities typically rises, further constraining food access for poor households, particularly in market‑dependent urban and peri‑urban areas.
• Regional escalation remains a key driver of acute food insecurity in Syria. While Syria does not rely directly on the Gulf for imports, disruptions to regional shipping are raising global energy prices, increasing fuel, food imports, and agricultural input costs. Higher diesel, fertilizer, and pesticide prices are elevating transport and production costs, which are continuing to push food prices above expected levels, further constraining food access for poor households.

In NES, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through September, with some very poor households likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) as coping capacity is exhausted and reliance on extreme strategies increases. Many households will remain highly market dependent due to constrained own production from insecurity, drought impacts, and high input costs. Above‑average rainfall has modestly improved pasture conditions and livestock productivity, supporting limited food and income gains from milk production and the May-June sheep shearing season; however, benefits remain short-lived and largely confined to pastoral and agropastoral households with adequate herd sizes. Access to agricultural land and pasture remains limited in parts of NES due to UXO contamination and flood‑related displacement of ordnance, including areas where households collect truffles for supplemental income. Income-earning opportunities remain constrained by limited agricultural labor, UXO contamination, disrupted oil- and gas‑related employment, and flooding that damaged already weak crops. While expanded cotton cultivation and summer agricultural activities may provide some casual labor income, high food prices and national supply constraints will continue to erode purchasing power. From June to September, harvest‑related labor and the summer planting season are expected to provide only limited seasonal relief, as flooding has damaged crops that were already projected to perform poorly. Imported staple food prices are expected to remain high due to national supply constraints. As a result, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist among the poorest households — particularly IDPs and returnees with depleted assets — while Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes remain widespread across NES.

In NWS, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through September, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persisting among some of the poorest households, particularly IDPs and returnees with limited access to work and livelihood options. From June to September, households will remain heavily dependent on markets, as the May-July harvest is expected to be below average and further reduced in some areas by flood and hailstorm damage. Limited income from agricultural labor, livestock products, or low‑paid daily work will remain insufficient to offset high food prices, despite modest improvements in pasture conditions and milk availability. While improved pasture conditions since February will support livestock body conditions and modest milk availability, contributions to food and income are expected to remain limited. Structural constraints — including years of drought, damaged irrigation infrastructure, high fuel costs, insecurity, and elevated staple food prices — will continue to restrict production, labor demand, and purchasing power. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are therefore expected to persist across much of NWS, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes likely among poor households with minimal income sources, particularly during June to September, despite limited seasonal improvements.

In the coastal regions of Latakia and Tartus, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through May, with a gradual improvement to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) starting in June. Ongoing weather-related damage to orchards, greenhouses, and tobacco crops, the loss of former military‑linked income sources, coupled with currency depreciation and fuel price increases, have pushed food prices higher, reducing purchasing power for households reliant on irregular seasonal labor, with additional pressure expected during Eid al‑Adha in late May. Although fishing activity and some agricultural work are expected to increase with improved summer weather beginning in June, high input costs, fuel shortages, damaged infrastructure, and layoffs at Latakia port will limit expected income gains. From June, tourism‑related employment is expected to support a modest recovery, with most households improving to Stressed (IPC Phase 2), though households with significant agricultural losses and poor households facing high food prices and reduced remittance value are likely to see only limited improvement.

In the southern governorates of Daraa, Rural Damascus, As‑Suwayda, and Quneitra, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through September amid fragile conditions. Between April and May, displacement, insecurity, and drought will continue to constrain rainfed and irrigated production. UXO contamination will prevent some agricultural lands from being cultivated, limiting agricultural labor and production, while livestock herds remain smaller and weaker than typical, constraining milk production and income. Beginning in June, seasonal improvements in pasture, milk availability, and some agricultural labor opportunities are expected, supported by above‑average rainfall; however, reduced remittance value, high transport costs, and continued insecurity will keep household budgets under pressure, limiting the extent of seasonal improvement.

In urban areas of Damascus, Aleppo, and Hama, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through September as high unemployment and elevated food prices continue to limit purchasing power. From June to September, fuel and transport costs are expected to remain high, power rationing will continue to constrain livelihoods, and remittance values exchanged at official rates will remain depressed, leaving poor urban households with limited ability to meet food and non‑food needs. As a result, many poor households reliant on informal labor are expected to reduce dietary diversity and, in some cases, meal consumption.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Sustained, high fuel prices continue through the harvest

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A sustained surge in fuel prices linked to prolonged restrictions on shipping from the escalation in the Gulf region would likely further disrupt agricultural production, harvesting, and seasonal income through the projection period. Elevated fuel costs would sharply constrain access to diesel for groundwater pumping and machinery, particularly affecting irrigated spring and summer crops — such as vegetables and cash crops, including cotton, maize, and legumes — whose main production and harvest period typically occurs from May to July. Farmers would likely reduce irrigated area, delay planting, or abandon crops with higher input requirements, resulting in lower output and reduced demand for agricultural labor during the summer growing season. While the wheat harvest is already expected to be poor due to ongoing drought and reduced planting, high fuel prices during the June-July wheat harvest would further limit the use of combine harvesters, threshers, and transport, leading to delayed or incomplete harvesting, higher post‑harvest losses, reduced market supply, and lower income for farmers. Elevated fuel prices would also increase the cost of transporting fodder and livestock to markets, compressing margins for pastoralist and agropastoral households in NES and reducing the mitigating benefit of improved pasture conditions currently factored into projections. Increased fuel costs would also raise food and transport prices countrywide, eroding purchasing power. Higher fuel prices additionally push up operating costs for flour mills and food processors, which would in turn drive bread and flour prices above the levels expected from exchange rate depreciation alone, with poor urban households who rely on purchased food likely to be most impacted. More expensive fuel would also raise costs in construction, small manufacturing, and informal transport, and would additionally result in making humanitarian food assistance more expensive to deliver, which could force further cuts in distribution coverage at a time when existing funding gaps are already limiting the scale of response. In this scenario, seasonal improvements in food availability and income typically expected after spring and early summer harvests would be reduced or absent, leading more households to deteriorate into Crisis (IPC Phase 3), while households already in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would likely experience worsening food consumption and livelihoods outcomes.

Northeast Syria

Atypically high temperatures occur during harvest periods

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An extended period of unseasonably high temperatures in NES between April and September would likely exacerbate agricultural and livelihood disruptions beyond current projections. Above‑average heat during the late spring and summer would increase evapotranspiration and crop water requirements at a time when water availability is already constrained, intensifying stress on both rainfed and irrigated systems. For wheat, high temperatures during grain filling and harvest between May and July would reduce grain quality and weights and increase field and post‑harvest losses, compounding already poor production prospects due to drought. For irrigated vegetables and cash crops — primarily produced and harvested between May and August — heat stress would lower yields, increase spoilage of perishable produce, and raise irrigation and fuel needs, reducing net returns and agricultural labor demand. Extreme heat would also limit labor productivity during peak agricultural periods and accelerate pasture degradation, increasing reliance on expensive feed while directly reducing livestock productivity through lower milk yields, slowed weight gain, and higher mortality risk. In urban and peri‑urban areas, heat extremes would raise household energy and medical costs and reduce labor availability, especially where electricity access is unreliable. Overall, seasonal improvements in food availability, income, and diet diversity would be weaker or shorter‑lived, while food prices would rise more quickly due to tighter supplies and higher production costs. Consequently, from July to September, more households would likely slip into Crisis (IPC Phase 3), and those already in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would face deeper food consumption gaps and livelihood erosion. Impacts are expected to be temporary, with recovery once temperatures normalize, but risks would be greatest for very poor households, particularly daily laborers with limited capacity to absorb even short‑term shocks.

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s February 2026 to September 2026 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.