Ongoing insecurity isolating southern areas and eroding food access countrywide

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected across South and El-Nabatieh through September 2026, driven by sustained airstrikes, infrastructure destruction, collapsed market functionality, and severely constrained humanitarian access. Only a fraction of shops remain operational and key transport infrastructure is destroyed, leaving supply chains severely disrupted and in-kind food assistance unable to reach increasingly isolated southern populations. While cash assistance is expected to continue, households in the south are largely unable to use it to purchase food due to non-operational markets.
• In Akkar, Baalbek-El Hermel, Beirut, and parts of Mount Lebanon, Bekaa, and North, Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected through May, with a deterioration to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from June to September. This deterioration reflects the compounding effects of large-scale displacement and reduced income-earning opportunities due to labor market disruptions amid a sharp decline in food assistance after May.
• Outside of insecurity-affected areas, markets remain largely functional; however, food access is increasingly constrained by elevated food and fuel prices and substantially reduced purchasing power following the recent escalation of hostilities. Income-earning opportunities remain below average countrywide, with tourism and seasonal agricultural labor no longer expected to provide meaningful relief during the summer months. The combined effect of high prices and reduced income is expected to push a growing share of poor and displaced households to increasingly engage in coping mechanisms to meet basic needs.
• Humanitarian food assistance remains a critical source of food for households in Lebanon. However, assistance is expected to decline sharply starting in June, with no confirmed funding for several key emergency programs beyond May. Amid persistent economic and livelihood constraints, reduced assistance will weaken households’ capacity to mitigate food gaps, particularly among Syrian refugees, displaced populations, and poor Lebanese.

This report provides an update to the February 2026 to September 2026 Food Security Outlook and March 2026 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of April 28, 2026. 

• Following the escalation of hostilities between Israeli forces and Hezbollah in early March, sustained airstrikes and expanding ground operations have continued to concentrate in South and El-Nabatieh, with strikes also increasingly affecting parts of Beirut and Bekaa. While the April 16 ceasefire announcement and its three-week extension on April 23 have led to temporary lulls in fighting, sharp intermittent escalations in violence continue, including an unprecedented series of more than 100 airstrikes within a 10 minute period on April 8. Broad evacuation orders covering more than one-third of the population — including all areas south of the Zahrani River and half of Beirut — remain in effect, triggering large-scale displacement toward central Lebanon. Hezbollah has increasingly shifted toward asymmetric activity as elements of its conventional capacity are degraded, progressively isolating southern areas.

• Large-scale and sustained population movements due to the escalation are intensifying pressure on markets, labor opportunities, and household food access. Cross-border movements remain dynamic, with over 142,000 exits and 83,500 entries recorded between April 1-20, reflecting sustained and fluid population flows. The escalation has also internally displaced over 1.3 million people, nearly one-fourth of the population, with the majority residing outside formal shelters and relying on markets and host communities for access to food and income. 
• Market functionality remains severely degraded in South and El-Nabatieh, while markets remain largely operational in other areas of the country. Supply deliveries to southern Lebanon have largely halted due to displacement, road inaccessibility, and insecurity. Israeli airstrikes also destroyed the last remaining bridge over the Litani River on April 16, severing supply routes for food, fuel, and essential goods to southern Lebanon and further isolating southern populations (Figure 1). 
• Labor conditions in construction, services, and transport have deteriorated following slight improvements observed in 2025 due to the escalation and large-scale displacement since early 2026. In rural and insecurity-affected areas, access to labor opportunities remains particularly constrained, and increased competition for limited jobs driven by the surge in displaced workers entering the labor market since early March continues to exert downward pressure on wages. 
• Prices of food and non-food items remain elevated despite relative exchange rate stability, reflecting structural import dependence and persistent inflationary pressures, with overall food price levels remaining 10–20 percent higher year-on-year. The sharp increase in fuel prices (71 percent) between mid-February and mid-April — from approximately 70,000 LBP per liter to nearly 120,000 LBP per liter — has introduced renewed upward pressure on transport and distribution costs, compounding supply chain disruptions in areas affected by the escalation and contributing to localized price increases, further limiting market efficiency and sustaining high cost-of-living pressures.
• Seasonal agricultural activities are disrupted due to the escalation of hostilities and access constraints in key production areas. The harvest period for key crops — particularly potatoes in the Bekaa Valley and Akkar — typically begins around April-May, alongside a seasonal increase in demand for agricultural labor that represents a critical income source for poor households and Syrian refugee farm laborers. However, restricted access to agricultural land, damaged irrigation infrastructure, and insecurity are constraining harvesting activities in escalation-affected areas, including southern areas, Bekaa, and parts of Baalbek-El Hermel. Since the start of the recent escalation, hostilities have damaged approximately 22 percent of agricultural land countrywide and displaced 76 percent of farmers in southern Lebanon. 
• The escalation has severely degraded access to essential services, particularly in southern areas. Attacks on health care and emergency services have placed additional pressure on Lebanon’s already strained health system, with airstrikes forcing the closure of six hospitals and 55 primary health care centers since March 2, increasing the risk of disease and acute malnutrition. Water systems have also sustained significant damage, with 18 reported incidents affecting critical infrastructure across Baalbek-El Hermel, Bekaa, South, and El-Nabatieh, disrupting access to safe water for affected populations. The destruction of all bridges over the Litani River has further severed civilian movement and humanitarian access in the south.       

Humanitarian food assistance

• Humanitarian food assistance remains a critical source of food for households across Lebanon, particularly amid large-scale displacement and income loss. Since the escalation in early March 2026, food security partners rapidly scaled up emergency support, delivering over 6.5 million meals and 86,000 ready-to-eat kits, alongside cash assistance reaching over 393,000 Lebanese and 108,500 Syrian and other refugees as of April 23. However, assistance coverage remains uneven, reaching approximately 60 percent of Syrian refugees and only 20-23 percent of Lebanese nationals. As assistance levels decline, households currently dependent on food assistance face a significant risk of widening food consumption gaps.
• While assistance coverage increased immediately following the onset of the escalation, assistance transfers cover only a share of full food needs. In-kind food baskets meet approximately 60 percent of daily caloric requirements, hot meals around 30 percent, and cash assistance 45 percent of minimum food expenditure, leaving significant gaps for most households. 

Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the Lebanon Food Security Outlook from February 2026 to September 2026 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence:

• Sustained escalation between Israel and Hezbollah is expected to continue through at least July 2026, characterized by expanded airstrikes, limited ground operations, and the establishment of buffer zones in southern Lebanon. Hostilities are expected to remain concentrated in South and El-Nabatieh, with Israeli forces likely to project force up to the Zahrani River and into the Bekaa Valley via air and drone strikes. 
• Social and community tensions are expected to remain elevated and intensify beyond the above-average levels previously assumed, driven primarily by the scale and repeated nature of displacement since early March. Host communities and shelters are reaching absorption limits, increasing competition over housing, labor, and access to services. With host communities nearing absorption capacity, competition for housing, labor, and services is expected to increase. Anti-internally displaced person (IDP) narratives and related misinformation are further straining social cohesion and increasing the risk of intercommunity friction. Localized insecurity linked to non-state actors, incomplete disarmament processes, and ongoing cross-border dynamics affected by the escalation are expected to compound these pressures through September 2026.
• Market functionality is expected to remain severely disrupted in areas affected by the escalation through at least July. While national food supply is expected to remain broadly adequate in the short term, infrastructure destruction, insecurity, and supply-chain disruptions are expected to sustain critically low stock levels and restocking difficulties in South and El-Nabatieh. 
• Most staple food prices are expected to follow seasonal trends, remaining above the five-year average throughout the projection period. Wheat prices are expected to decline slightly from June with the start of the harvest before stabilizing through September. Despite 2025/26 production anticipated to be above the ten-year average and near the five-year average, elevated prices are likely due to persistently high production and transport costs, ongoing market disruptions, and continued import reliance.
• Fuel prices are expected to remain significantly elevated through the projection period, following a sharp increase between February and April due to a combination of domestic price adjustments and regional fuel market pressures following the recent escalation. Lebanon’s near-total dependence on fuel imports leaves it highly exposed to market volatility and regional supply chain disruptions, including the ongoing escalation’s impact on shipping costs and transit routes. Prices are expected to stabilize at elevated levels through September, barring further regional escalation. 
• Tourism labor opportunities are expected to remain significantly below average due to ongoing insecurity, large-scale displacement, and deteriorating economic conditions, removing a meaningful seasonal boost to incomes typically experienced between June and September.
• Agricultural labor opportunities will likely remain significantly below average in areas affected by the escalation, particularly in South, El-Nabatieh, and parts of Baalbek-Hermel, due to displacement, land access constraints, and damage to agricultural infrastructure. These disruptions are expected to limit production and labor demand, reducing a critical source of seasonal income for poor households and Syrian refugee farm laborers.

Humanitarian food assistance

• In insecurity-affected areas of South and El-Nabatieh, in-kind food assistance — including food parcels, ready-to-eat kits, and hot meals — is expected to remain largely inaccessible due to infrastructure destruction, road closures, and active hostilities severely restricting humanitarian access. While multi-purpose cash assistance (MPCA) transfers are expected to continue reaching some households who remain in southern areas, the significant disruption of market functionality in these areas is likely preventing households from using cash assistance to purchase food. For displaced populations who have relocated to Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Bekaa, where markets remain largely functional, cash assistance is expected to retain its utility, though coverage of newly displaced households remains uneven. 
• Current funding plans indicate a significant decline in assistance coverage beyond May, with Syrian refugee coverage expected to fall from approximately 60 percent to 15 percent and no confirmed funding for key emergency programs after May, reflecting the end of extended MPCA cycles and the absence of confirmed funding for Lebanese and Syrian refugee households starting in June, according to the Food Security Cluster. 

Southern areas (South and El-Nabatieh governorates)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist across most of South and El-Nabatieh governorates through September, including in Sour, Saida, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, Hasbaya, and El-Nabatieh districts. Ongoing insecurity, displacement, and infrastructure damage are expected to continue disrupting livelihoods and constraining access to food. Many poor and displaced households will likely remain separated from agricultural land, livestock, and typical sources of labor, limiting income-earning opportunities during the spring and summer agricultural and informal labor season. Households are expected to rely primarily on market purchases supported by irregular income, borrowing, and humanitarian assistance where accessible. Physical access constraints linked to the recent escalation will likely continue limiting households’ ability to reach functional markets, compounding economic access barriers even where food remains available. As a result, households are increasingly unlikely to be able to meet basic food needs through typical income sources and are expected to intensify consumption-based coping strategies, including reducing meal size and frequency and prioritizing children’s consumption over adults.

Northern areas (Akkar and North governorates)

Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected to persist in Akkar and El-Minieh-Dennie districts through May. From June through September, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to emerge and persist as economic constraints, limited livelihood opportunities, and high living costs continue to restrict purchasing power amid sharply decreased assistance levels. As food assistance declines, households will be increasingly unable to mitigate food consumption gaps. Markets are expected to remain largely functional; however, most poor and displaced households will likely access food primarily through market purchases financed by irregular casual labor, small trade, and remittances. Income from agricultural labor and small-scale trade is expected to remain insufficient to meet minimum food needs, with households likely to prioritize purchasing staple foods while reducing purchases of more expensive items such as meat, dairy, and fresh produce. In Akkar and El-Minieh-Dennie, where concentrations of poor Lebanese households and refugees are highest, households are expected to intensify coping strategies as assistance declines, including purchasing food on credit, reducing portion sizes, and skipping meals. 

Beirut and Mount Lebanon

Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected across Beirut and in Mount Lebanon’s Aley, Baabda, and Chouf districts through May. From June to September, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to emerge — primarily among poor Lebanese households, Syrian refugees, and newly displaced populations — as high competition for limited income-earning opportunities, rising living costs, and sustained large-scale displacement continue to constrain households’ ability to access sufficient food. Reductions in humanitarian food assistance after May are expected to weaken households’ ability to mitigate food consumption gaps caused by ongoing insecurity and displacement. Urban households are expected to depend almost entirely on market purchases made through irregular informal employment and remittances. With economic activity anticipated to slow and seasonal tourism-related income unlikely to materialize, casual labor opportunities are expected to remain limited through September. Increasing population pressure in host communities will continue to intensify competition for low-wage work while contributing to rising housing and food costs. As a result, households are expected to rely increasingly on borrowing, depleting savings, reducing meal size and frequency, and decreasing essential non-food expenditures, such as health care and education. 

Eastern agricultural areas (Bekaa and Baalbek – El-Hermel governorates)

Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected across Baalbek-El-Hermel and parts of Bekaa through May, with large-scale food assistance — reaching more than half of the population in these areas — preventing a deterioration to worse outcomes. From June to September, declining food assistance is no longer expected to be adequate enough to prevent food consumption gaps. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to emerge and become increasingly widespread as limited income from agricultural labor and high production costs continue to restrict household purchasing power, particularly among poor Lebanese and refugee populations. During the summer harvest period, some rural households are expected to access food through limited own production and seasonal agricultural labor; however, insecurity, access constraints, and below-average labor demand will likely reduce typical seasonal income gains. As a result, households will likely sell productive assets, as well as resort to reducing meal size and frequency and prioritizing children’s food consumption. As assistance declines and seasonal income gains fail to materialize, these strategies are expected to deepen, with the poorest households increasingly unable to offset accumulated debt or rebuild depleted assets.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

De-escalation, including a sustained ceasefire or reduction in hostilities

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A sustained reduction in hostilities, including a durable ceasefire, would likely enable gradual improvements in humanitarian access and some population returns, particularly in airstrike-affected areas in South and El-Nabatieh. However, the extent and pace of recovery would be heavily constrained by the scale of infrastructure damage, destruction of transport routes, and prolonged disruption to market systems since the escalation began. Even with improved security conditions, market functionality and supply chains would likely require an extended period to stabilize, and localized food shortages and elevated food prices would be expected to persist through the projection period. 

Income-earning opportunities would recover slowly, as widespread displacement from agricultural-producing areas, asset depletion, and extensive damage to productive infrastructure would continue to limit access to livelihoods for many households. Amid these structural constraints and persistent economic pressures, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes would likely persist across much of the south and among displaced and refugee populations even under a de-escalation scenario. Improvement to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) would be limited in geographic scope to areas relatively less affected by the hostilities, particularly in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and northern governorates, where infrastructure damage has been more limited and market access has remained relatively more stable. While de-escalation would reduce the risk of further deterioration, meaningful improvement in acute food security outcomes would remain fragile and modest through September.

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s February 2026 to September 2026 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.