Food insecurity persists despite stabilization in IRG governance and KSA grant

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Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are projected to persist in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz governorates through May. Conflict between the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA) and Israel from September 2025 resulted in port infrastructure damage and trade flow disruptions, the impacts of which persist. Slow recovery of these key revenue-generating infrastructures has diminished labor demand and eroded household income sources. Poor households are facing large food consumption deficits or resorting to emergency coping strategies, such as begging, to access food.
Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to continue across the rest of the country through May. Economic reforms introduced in August 2025 by the internationally recognized government (IRG) drove a rapid appreciation of the Aden-based YER, reducing staple food prices. Despite this improvement, hard currency shortages and limited public revenue continue to delay civil servant salary payments, while the overall cost of living remains elevated. Inadequate public services, including gas shortages, further constrain income-generating activities. While political instability since December has eased and the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia (KSA) has continued its financial support, long-term conditions remain fragile amid internal tensions and the ongoing SBA-IRG economic conflict.
The KSA has continued its support of the IRG with a second deposit of 90 million USD, part of the grant of 365 million USD announced in August, to enable government salary payments for the next two months and fund essential public services such as fuel for power station. Additionally, KSA has initiated a long-term development grant of 506 million USD distributed across IRG-controlled governorates, funding 28 projects in health, energy, education and transport. These interventions are expected to generate short-term employment opportunities and provide temporary income. However, sustained economic recovery is contingent on the resumption of oil production and exports, which remains unlikely in the near term.
Since early December, political dynamics in IRG-controlled areas have shifted rapidly. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) initially expanded control across several southern and eastern governorates, prompting the head of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to declare a state of emergency and cancel the joint defense agreement with the UAE on December 30. The STC head subsequently announced a new constitution for the "State of South Arabia" on January 2. However, with support from the Saudi-led coalition, IRG forces reasserted control over Al-Mahra, Hadhramaut, Shabwah, Abyan, Lahj, and Aden governorates by mid-January. As detailed in FEWS NET's December 2025 Food Security Outlook Update, these developments raised concerns about governance continuity, service provision, and economic stability during a period of heightened uncertainty.
The reassertion of IRG control, alongside the resumption of Saudi financial support, has reduced immediate political uncertainty and helped stabilize conditions relative to December. However, this stabilization remains incomplete. The appointment of a new prime minister on January 16 and ongoing cabinet formation are likely creating short-term leadership gaps that delay the provision of public services, including electricity, despite the resumption of the KSA grant. The UAE's withdrawal of support to the IRG, including the shutdown of solar power stations in Aden and Shabwah, further complicates service delivery. More fundamentally, the IRG continues to face the same structural challenges that preceded the STC takeover, including inadequate funding for public services and delayed salary payments. Risks of destabilization persist due to ongoing factional tensions within the IRG and the economic conflict between the SBA and the IRG, limiting the extent to which recent political developments translate into sustained improvements in food security.
A cybersecurity attack in January temporarily disrupted access to online banking services hosted in IRG areas, which particularly affected households in SBA-controlled areas. The disruption occurred after several banks relocated their headquarters from SBA-controlled areas to IRG-controlled Aden to comply with sanctions, leaving many account holders in SBA areas reliant on digital access through the SBA-controlled Yemen Net. Although the disruption lasted only two days and had limited immediate impacts on food security, it represents a notable escalation in the economic conflict. If similar attacks are repeated or prolonged, they could disrupt access to salaries and remittances, further constraining household income and food access, particularly in SBA-controlled areas.
According to key informants and media reports, governorates in the IRG, particularly Aden, are experiencing atypical price increases beyond typical seasonal trends as Ramadan approaches. Prices for essential food items, such as rice, oil, sugar, vegetables, chicken, and goat, have surged by 5 to 10 percent despite a stable YER since August 2025. While prices typically increase before Ramadan due to higher demand, the ongoing IRG government transition has further weakened already-poor regulatory enforcement, enabling traders to capitalize on seasonal demand with larger-than-usual price increases.
On January 16, the Yemeni Gas Company announced the resumption of operations for 406 gas tankers to IRG areas, including Aden, leading to a gradual increase in gas availability following a significant shortage that lasted over a month. The December 2025 shortage disrupted small business activity, transportation, and household income sources, compounding ongoing economic stress. While the shortage persists despite recent improvements, the gradual stabilization of gas supplies will likely provide some reprieve to households across IRG areas ahead of Ramadan, but will not be sufficient to bridge food consumption gaps.
In highland areas, poor households have depleted their food stocks from the fall cereal harvest, resulting in greater reliance on markets for food, while income-earning opportunities remain limited during the agricultural off-season. Labor availability typically decreases during the agricultural off-season, which lasts through February. Households are likely sending men to migrate to other areas for labor opportunities or to join armed groups, while women engage in local domestic labor for better-off households. However, local agricultural labor availability is expected to increase in March and April with the onset of land preparation, cereal planting, and vegetable planting.
In coastal areas, the eastern plateau, and desert, access to food and income is improving during the ongoing main cereal harvests and vegetable cultivation. However, poor economic conditions are offsetting positive seasonal changes, as poor households face limited income-earning opportunities and have weak purchasing power. The availability of agricultural and non-agricultural labor typically increases in late December and January, coinciding with the start of the agricultural season, and is expected to continue through May. Additionally, the mango season, which begins in March, is expected to slightly enhance access to income-earning opportunities countrywide.

Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Yemen Key Message Update January 2026: Food insecurity persists despite stabilization in IRG governance and KSA grant, 2026.

This Key Message Update provides a high-level analysis of current acute food insecurity conditions and any changes to FEWS NET's latest projection of acute food insecurity outcomes in the specified geography. Learn more here.