Conflict and its impacts on the economy are resulting in Emergency outcomes

• In Yemen, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected through May. The long-term impacts of conflict continue to limit income-generating opportunities, the economic crisis continues to result in very high food prices, and households are unable to consistently purchase adequate food and other essential needs. While seasonal food and income is expected to alleviate the severity of acute food insecurity from November to May, over one-in-three people are still expected to experience food consumption gaps.
• In areas controlled by the Sana’a-based authority (SBA), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are anticipated in Hajjah, Al-Hudaydah, and Ta’izz governorates. These areas have been worst affected by the destruction of port infrastructure and disruptions to trade linked to the conflict between SBA forces and Israel, as well as recent floods. These conditions have exacerbated weak labor demand, reduced key sources of household income, and damaged cereal and cash crops. Poor households face large food consumption deficits.
• In internationally recognized government (IRG)-controlled areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to be widespread. The IRG implemented robust economic measures in August 2025 that allowed the Aden-based YER to rapidly appreciate, alleviating staple food prices. However, hard currency shortages and a lack of public revenue have led to persistent delays in civil servant salaries, and the cost of living remains very high overall. Failures in public services, such as electricity, also limit income-generating activity.
• Food assistance needs are estimated at 15.0-15.99 million people (40-45 percent of the population) in October. A relative decline in needs is expected from November to May, supported by the main cereal and cash crop harvests and seasonal income from higher livestock sales and gifts/zakat during Ramadan and Eid al-Adha. However, up to 13.0-13.99 million people (35-40 percent) are expected to need food assistance during this period.
• Humanitarian food assistance delivery is low compared to past years. In SBA-controlled areas, no humanitarian food assistance is expected due to WFP's suspension of operations and the SBA's foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designation. In IRG-controlled areas, food assistance is expected to reach 3.4 million people or less. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 17, 2025.

Yemen has been plagued by civil war since March 2015. The major parties to the complex conflict are the forces of the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA, known as Ansar Allah and informally referred to as the Houthis) and the allied forces of the internationally recognized government (IRG). The SBA controls the most populated areas of northern and western Yemen (Annex 6), including the country’s capital, Amanat al-Asimah (Sana’a city). The IRG controls the southern and eastern areas (Annex 6), including the IRG’s relocated capital in Aden (Aden city).

Nearly a decade of war has taken an immense toll on the economy and local livelihoods. While conflict intensity has eased since the April-October 2022 truce, macroeconomic conditions remain poor, and most households have been able to only minimally re-establish typical livelihood activities. Real GDP per capita has contracted by 58 percent since 2015, international business activity and investment have stalled, and the fragmented central bank system (one in Sana’a and one in Aden) prevents a unified national fiscal and monetary policy. Additionally, the SBA-led blockade of oil exports since October 2022 has led to the collapse of the oil sector. While recent monetary policy changes implemented by the IRG and the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden) in August 2025 have been key to recent decreases in the cost of living in IRG-controlled areas, the prices of basic food and non-food items remain well above the five-year average and pre-conflict levels countrywide. The erosion of livelihoods, high levels of monetary poverty, and high food prices place substantial constraints on household access to food and renders them highly vulnerable to evolving conflict and economic shocks and recurrent weather shocks.

Yemen is heavily reliant on imports to meet domestic demand for food and other essential items, with imports accounting for approximately 85 percent of its food supply. The Red Sea ports serve as a vital lifeline for SBA-controlled areas. However, the infrastructure of these ports has been significantly damaged due to the escalating conflict between SBA forces and Israel since late 2024, leading to a notable decline in food and fuel imports since January 2025.

Despite Yemen’s heavy dependence on food imports, domestic agriculture remains one of the few functioning economic sectors and an essential source of food and income for rural communities. Prior to the conflict, agriculture contributed about 13.7 percent of Yemen’s GDP in 2014 (updated data is not available), of which staple cereal and cash crop production are most important to rural livelihoods. Most cultivated land is in the largely SBA-controlled northern and central highlands, which are among the most densely populated rural areas. Farmers in highland areas typically produce cereal crops (mostly rainfed and largely for their own consumption), along with vegetables and qat. In lowland areas (the western Tihama Plain and coastal regions), farmers produce cereal crops (more commonly irrigated by runoff water from the highlands and Artesian wells) as well as fruits and vegetables. Production patterns are largely dictated by the two main rainy seasons from March to May and July to September (Annex 3). Poor households in both urban and rural areas are generally highly dependent on labor to earn income, and agricultural labor opportunities increase seasonally. Peak labor demand in the highlands (September-January) roughly coincides with the main cereal harvest (October-December), while peak labor demand in the lowlands follows the spring cereal harvest (February-May). These seasonal cycles drive fluctuations in poor households’ income from labor over the course of the year, along with seasonal changes in food and cash income from crop production and sales.

Livestock production is also an important income source for many families in Yemen. Livestock productivity improves during the rainy seasons when pasture and water availability increase. Livestock sales typically peak between February and June, with the approach of Ramadan, Eid al-Adha, and the typical season for Yemeni marriages.

During the Ramadan and Eid period from March to May, many poor households typically experience a temporary seasonal increase in food and income associated with donations/zakat (charitable gifts) in the form of food and cash assistance. Households that own livestock also typically experience a seasonal increase in income from livestock sales.

Given the erosion of economic and agricultural productivity over the course of the conflict, humanitarian food assistance has played an important role in mitigating the size of household food consumption deficits for millions of people across Yemen. At peak levels of food assistance in 2019 and 2021, 12 to 13 million people were reached monthly with nearly full rations. However, humanitarian food assistance has been reduced several times since the end of 2021 due to funding shortages and, most recently, a total pause in assistance across SBA-controlled areas since April 2025, impacting 9.5 million people. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information:

• Yemen Key Message Update: September 2025
• Yemen Key Message Update: August 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Conflict remains the central driver of acute food insecurity across Yemen, mainly by hindering the economy, undermining livelihood activities, and pushing the cost of living beyond the reach of poor households. Israel’s strikes on SBA-held infrastructure for importing food and fuel have caused significant declines in government revenue and labor opportunities. While SBA forces announced a suspension of military operations against Israel and commercial vessels in the Red Sea on October 11 in conjunction with the ceasefire in Gaza, the durability of a pause in hostilities is fragile. 

Domestically, conflict between the SBA and IRG is now largely economic in nature. The SBA continues to threaten IRG crude oil facilities, preventing oil exports, and obstructing the IRG's largest source of revenue. Overall levels of active conflict are small in scale and comparable to those observed in 2024, with sporadic and temporary escalations largely limited to the main frontlines, such as in Ta’izz.

Due to the SBA’s tactics, the IRG continues to face severe revenue shortages marked by inadequate foreign and hard currency reserves, which are undermining the government’s budget and the value of the Aden-based YER. The IRG and Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden) implemented stringent economic reforms in August to strengthen the value of the Aden-based YER and bring down the prices of essential goods, but inflation remains high, government salary payments are often delayed, electricity outages are frequent and widespread, and other essential public services have largely failed. In Aden, power shortages are lasting up to 16 hours per day, while many other IRG-controlled areas are experiencing regular electricity outages lasting a week or more at a time.

In SBA-controlled areas, macroeconomic conditions continue to deteriorate due to worsening liquidity shortages, stemming from the longstanding ban on Aden-based YER and a contracting money supply as old banknotes become unusable. The Central Bank of Yemen in Sana’a (CBY-Sana’a) has responded by introducing a second edition of the 200-rial banknote and new 50 and 100-rial coins, all of which have been issued without financial backing, further deepening monetary fragmentation. The impacts of cash shortages and market fragmentation on business and import-financing costs have been compounded by recent port strikes, resulting in lower import volumes. According to the Sana'a-based Customs Authority, food imports through Al-Hudaydah and Al-Salif totaled 1.7 million metric tons (MT) from January to September 2025, a 23 percent decline from 2024 and 12 percent below the three-year average (Figure 1). Wheat grain imports rose 21 percent in September compared to August; however, wheat flour imports have been halted since January 2025 due to a ban by the Sana'a-based Ministry of Industry and Trade. Despite these reductions, food and fuel availability remain stable, and prices, while unaffordable for many, are controlled through sufficient stockpiles and strict government enforcement. Traders' existing stockpiles have offset import declines and prevented short-term shortages, as most goods (around 60 percent) entered before key ports were damaged from the SBA-Israel conflict. Additionally, low effective demand – stemming from both low household purchasing power and inadequate cash income to purchase additional goods – and strict price controls have prevented panic buying and hoarding. Poor economic conditions are a central driver of recurrent displacement, with 2,460 households (14,760 people) displaced at least once between January 1 and October 11, 2025.

Recent weather shocks are exacerbating the long-term impacts of conflict. The main cereal harvest began in September and will conclude by January. The FAO estimates total cereal production in 2025 will be around 400,000 MT (about 15 percent below the five-year average). Fruit and vegetable production (key cash crops) is also expected to be below typical. The historically dry first rainy season, delayed start of the second rainy season, flooding, and high temperatures are driving large crop losses in Ibb, Lahij, Ta'izz, Ad-Dhal’i, Dhamar, Marib, Hadramout, and Amran. While food availability and labor demand throughout the agricultural value chain are rising seasonally with the harvest, the degree of improvement is limited, especially in flood-affected areas. The reduction in agricultural labor opportunities amid the contracting economy and weak labor market in other sectors has an outsized impact on household income and financial access to food, given that even poor rural households purchase a majority of their food.

Countrywide, livestock remain an important source of seasonal income in rural areas. According to remote sensing imagery, above-average second season rainfall between August and September has improved pasture availability, ameliorating the negative effects of below-average first season rains on livestock health. Enhanced pasture is expected to support improved livestock body conditions, milk productivity, and overall herd growth prospects.

Casual labor conditions have deteriorated sharply in IRG-controlled areas due to the persistent economic slowdown. Despite the IRG’s recent monetary policy reforms, insufficient public revenues, reduced foreign investment, and declines in humanitarian funding are suppressing overall labor demand, particularly in the construction sector, where most unskilled and semi-skilled casual laborers are employed. As a result, employment opportunities have contracted, leading to reduced income and purchasing power. While the IRG’s economic reforms mainly targeted monetary stabilization rather than labor market recovery, they do aim to address structural constraints such as illegal fees, corruption, and inadequate legal protections that impede broader economic activity.

According to FAO data as of September, casual labor wages in IRG-controlled areas fell 15 percent month-on-month and 7 percent year-on-year, creating significant hardship despite remaining 11 percent above the five-year average. Purchasing power, as measured by the terms of trade between wages and the minimum food basket (MFB)¹, improved by 10 percent compared to August 2025, but remains 8 percent lower than the four-year average. This recent improvement is attributed to recent policies enacted by the IRG.

Conversely, wages have risen modestly in SBA-controlled areas despite worsening economic conditions, driven by both seasonal demand for agricultural labor during the main harvest season and relative stability since the end of the 2022 truce. The truce’s residual effects, including lower conflict intensity, improved access to farmland and agricultural inputs, increased import flows, and partial reopening of key roads, have supported local livelihoods compared to the pre-truce period. However, these gains have been at risk amid regional escalation with Israel and tensions in the Red Sea, and household purchasing power is inadequate relative to the cost of living. In September, a day’s labor wages could purchase just 11-13 percent of the MFB, requiring the head of household to work 9-10 days to afford the cost of food. In September, purchasing power declined by 2 percent compared to both last month and the previous year, and is 13 percent below the four-year average due to limited labor opportunities.

Humanitarian food assistance

Food assistance deliveries have trended downward in 2025 compared to 2024 due to reductions in humanitarian funding. In SBA-controlled areas, assistance decreased due to hostile actions against humanitarians; WFP suspended all activities effective September 16 due to the detention of UN personnel. This is the second suspension following the protracted pause in assistance from December 2023 to August 2024. In 2025, two rounds of targeted emergency food assistance (TEFA) were conducted, each planned to assist 2.8 million people. The first round occurred in February, while the second round began in April, was paused mid-April, and was completed in late August. In IRG-controlled areas, the scale of food assistance has modestly declined from a peak of 3.6 million per distribution cycle in 2024 to 3.4 million people per distribution cycle in 2025. WFP completed the fifth food assistance cycle of 2025 in mid-October, providing 40 percent of a full ration (equivalent to 1,050 calories per person per month, or around 31 percent of kilocalorie needs). At the governorate level, less than 25 percent of the population received food assistance from May to July. Shabwah Governorate had the highest coverage at approximately 21 percent, while other governorates ranged between 1 and 19 percent. While August and September data are unavailable, similar coverage levels are assumed from August to October.Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of October 2025

In most SBA-controlled areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta'izz. Acute food insecurity remains widespread due to weak economic conditions, import bans on non-food items, and limited income-earning opportunities, despite seasonal improvements from the cereal harvest and above-average pasture availability supporting good livestock productivity. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) make up 12 percent of the total population in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz, and they have been severely impacted by flooding, resulting in the destruction of household assets, food stocks, and non-food items. Conflict-related port destruction and trade restrictions in these governorates have eliminated key income sources, forcing individuals who typically work in and around the ports to seek out other casual labor opportunities. SBA-controlled regions of Ta’izz, which include the most densely populated parts of the governorate, face a loss of income-generating opportunities and deteriorating economic conditions, worsened by the impacts of flooding. In highland regions, typical seasonal agricultural labor opportunities are limited due to years of reduced cultivated land and below-average crop production caused by the ongoing conflict, multiple weather shocks, and poor economic recovery.

Recent flooding during the second 2025 rainy season has destroyed cropland and reduced agricultural income-earning opportunities, and additionally burdened households with compounding costs as they must now recover from flood damage. WFP humanitarian assistance has been suspended since April 2025 in SBA-controlled areas, and poor households are facing food consumption gaps without mitigating assistance. As a result, households are adopting negative coping strategies, including reducing meal size and quantity; eating less diverse diets; or regularly foregoing food for the whole day. Acute malnutrition levels remain high in Hajjah, Al-Hudaydah, and Ta’izz, where contaminated water and limited health services are leading to increases in disease, particularly cholera, and malnutrition. Households that were previously dependent on food assistance, particularly female-headed households and those without income, are of the highest concern.

In IRG-controlled areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist at the governorate level, and some households likely face Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Daily wage earners, IDPs without access to food assistance, and flood-affected households are among those most likely to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). While economic reforms have reduced essential food prices, government employees (e.g., teachers, military members), who make up nearly 25 percent of the population in IRG-held areas, have not received salaries for over three months. Income-generating opportunities, such as agricultural labor, construction, etc., remain severely limited due to the economic slowdown and a lack of public work investment, while government revenue shortages are restricting essential services. For example, electricity outages impact small businesses, workshops, and semi-skilled workers, such as plumbers who require electricity to maintain water pipes; these workers are unable to earn income without reliable power access. The ongoing highland cereal harvest in IRG-controlled areas is expected to decline 15 percent, limiting agricultural wage opportunities. Food and income access remain restricted in lowlands, the eastern plateau, and coastal regions due to the agricultural off-season. Moderate food consumption gaps persist due to insufficient access to income opportunities, constrained by an economic slowdown and revenue shortages that prevent the functioning of essential services.

Countrywide, IDPs and households without any income (both male- and female-headed) constitute the majority of the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and higher, although female-headed households are more likely to be acute food insecure. In October, an estimated peak of 15.0-15.99 million people (40-45 percent of the population) are expected to need humanitarian food assistance due to food consumption gaps. The decline in the population in need relative to earlier in the year is attributed to several factors, including the moderate decline in food prices supported by the appreciation of the YER, and the start of the harvest. Despite funding reductions, some humanitarian assistance is still ongoing in IRG-controlled areas, where it is helping mitigate consumption gaps and is likely preventing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes for some less severely affected households. 

• A deal between the SBA and the IRG is unlikely through at least May 2026. The unofficial truce is expected to persist, with conflict in main frontline areas (Ta’izz, Ma’rib, Shabwah, Al-Jawf, Lahij, and Al-Dali’) remaining at current low levels or decreasing slightly as the SBA prioritizes operations against Israel. The IRG is unlikely to launch offensive operations to seize Al-Hudaydah and coastal areas controlled by the SBA. Local, sporadic escalations will likely follow past patterns, with SBA shelling and skirmishes rotating between different frontline areas.
• Due to flood-induced damage to farmland and crops during the second rainy season, the main harvest of cereals (which starts in September in the highlands and concludes by January) is expected to be not only below the five-year average but also lower than last year, particularly in the highlands, which will result in diminished agricultural labor opportunities. Crop production totals will be lowest in the areas that were worst affected by floods, such as in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, Amran, Sana’a, Lahij, Ta’izz, and Ma’rib governorates.
• In lowland areas, which include coastal regions, the horticulture harvest is expected to be similar to last year but below the five-year average, due to above-average rainfall in late 2025, which caused flood-related damage to some crops. In the highlands, the fruit harvest coincided with a period of heavy rainfall, leading to damage and spoilage of horticultural crops that were not harvested in time.
• Cumulative rainfall during the March to May 2026 rainy season is expected to be average based on ENSO neutral conditions and ensemble forecast models, an improvement to the below-average rains during the first rainy season of 2025 and the flash flooding during the second rainy season of 2025. Above-average rainfall between August and September 2025 and average precipitation for the first rainy season of 2026 are expected to support some improvements to vegetative conditions through the projection period. However, above-average temperatures through May 2026 may neutralize the benefits from average precipitation during the first rainy season of 2026.
• Seasonal demand for agricultural labor is expected to be below normal during the main harvest period for cereals and horticulture (September-January), driven by the below-average harvest and compounded by the long-term, conflict-driven decline in agricultural productivity. While agricultural labor demand is expected to rise seasonally during the subsequent spring production season (March-May), work opportunities for poor households will remain limited by the smaller scale of spring production and long-term decline in labor demand.
• Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain unfavorable countrywide. According to the World Bank, Yemen's nominal GDP is projected to decline by 19 percent in 2025, while real GDP will most likely decline by 1.5 percent. Economic fragmentation and warfare between SBA- and IRG-controlled areas will most likely continue to restrict substantial economic improvements.
• Income from livestock sales is projected to be below average for poor households due to the reduction of their livestock holdings over the course of the IRG-SBA conflict. Although seasonal demand during Ramadan and Eid al-Adha (February-May) typically drives increased income from livestock product sales, weak purchasing power and insufficient economic stabilization in both IRG- and SBA-controlled areas will limit households' abilities to purchase livestock. Livestock prices are expected to remain below average except during the peak seasonal demand period.

SBA-controlled areas: 

• Notwithstanding the SBA’s announcement of a pause in hostilities, SBA forces are expected to continue sporadic missile and drone attacks against Israel, particularly in reaction to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacks in August and September 2025, with retaliatory strikes by the IDF subsequently expected. Based on the patterns of recent strikes between July and September 2025, it is highly probable that future Israeli operations will focus on critical infrastructure, significant revenue-generating assets, energy facilities, and high-ranking SBA leaders. 
• Airstrike damage to the Red Sea ports' infrastructure in SBA-controlled areas has hindered key revenue-generating assets and significantly reduced imports. Import volumes are expected to remain below normal and similar to current levels, given the time required to repair the damaged ports. While food and fuel availability is anticipated to remain adequate in SBA markets, localized short-term shortages between October and January are likely due to the decline in import levels, compounded by offloading and shipping delays. The impacts on Red Sea ports have resulted in a reduction in labor opportunities, worsening the already weak labor market.
• Demand for daily non-agricultural/casual wage labor is expected to atypically decline given the weakening small business environment due to the SBA's ongoing restrictions on small traders, fixed price controls, and high operating costs, compounded by the SBA’s ban of goods and commodities coming from the U.S.. The recent ban is expected to further reduce the availability of income-earning opportunities. However, the daily wage rate is not expected to drop further, given it has already declined to the bare minimum that workers are willing to accept. Currently, laborers need to work 9-10 days to cover the cost of the MFB.
• Vector- and waterborne diseases (such as cholera, malaria, and dengue) are already increasing, and are expected to rise further through January, particularly in areas densely populated with IDPs and severely affected by floods. While disease outbreaks have been observed countrywide, SBA-controlled areas are facing higher disease prevalence due to the lower availability of health services, particularly from humanitarian partners, and the SBA’s ban on vaccinations. 

IRG-controlled areas: 

• The suspension of crude oil exports and related loss of revenue is expected to persist due to the ongoing economic conflict between the SBA and IRG. Economic reforms by the IRG, including regulations on the sale of hard currency, have eliminated illegal channels for transferring hard currency to SBA-controlled areas and resulted in a hard currency shortage and additional pressure on the SBA economy. The SBA has threatened to retaliate by targeting IRG ports, banks, and airports if their revenue continues to decline.
• Saudi Arabia’s recent announcement of a new financial grant of 1.38 billion SAR (approximately 368 million USD) is expected to be deposited into the CBY-Aden in several installments and under direct monitoring of the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen, though delays are expected to result in a slow pace of disbursements. The funds are expected to support the government in meeting its urgent fiscal responsibilities, such as civil servant salaries and purchasing fuel for power stations, and contribute to stabilizing the value of the YER amid ongoing economic reforms. However, the grant is not expected to improve the economic outlook, given the limited size of the grant relative to the government’s fiscal deficit.
• The value of the Aden-based YER is expected to remain stable, supported by the economic and financial reforms implemented by the CBY-Aden and the IRG. However, local revenue shortages persist, and oil exports remain suspended. The primary factors that will maintain the stability of the YER are strict monetary controls and targeted interventions, rather than underlying economic improvements.
• Staple food prices are expected to decline atypically from February onward due to new policies established by the IRG’s National Committee, inclusive of price control measures. In August 2025, the IRG started to allow traders to import key food and non-food items using a subsidized exchange rate, lowering import costs. Prices currently remain high due to high import costs, as traders previously imported goods at higher exchange rates. However, when goods arrive on the market between February and May, prices are expected to fall, contingent on whether the committee adopts measures to ensure that traders pass along savings to consumers.
• Demand for off-own-farm casual labor is expected to decline compared to last year and remain below pre-conflict levels, as the IRG does not have sufficient revenue to invest in public projects that would create income-earning opportunities.

Humanitarian food assistance

Based on information provided by WFP, the current pause on food assistance delivery to SBA-controlled areas is expected to remain in place until further notice. In IRG-controlled areas, WFP is expected to continue distributing food assistance in two-month cycles, reaching 3.4 million people in the final, sixth cycle of 2025 in November-December. Rations are expected to provide around 40 percent of a household’s daily minimum caloric needs on average over two months. Low levels of humanitarian assistance funding in 2025 suggest a decline in beneficiaries is likely in 2026. This scenario assumes that districts with the worst food security outcomes will be prioritized for food assistance in 2026. 

The scale and severity of acute food insecurity is projected to remain high across Yemen through May. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to remain widespread, and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz governorates. Across the country, the households most likely to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) include those with minimal access to income sources and those severely affected by recent floods and with limited or no access to humanitarian assistance. IDPs, who represent between 10 and 14 percent of Yemen’s population, are also at risk. In Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz, household food and income has been the most severely disrupted by the loss of port- and trade-related jobs; the March-July drought, which led to a decline in livestock holdings and related income, a primary source of income particularly in Hajjah and Al-Hudaydah; and subsequent flooding in late 2025.

The population in need of food assistance is expected to decline relative to the 15.0-15.99 million peak assessed in October, but food assistance needs are still expected to range as high as 13.0-13.99 million people (35-40 percent of the population) between November and May. Household food availability and income are expected to seasonally improve from October to January due to the main cereal and citrus fruit harvests in the highlands (October-November) and the main cereal harvest and vegetable cultivation season in the lowlands (December-January). From February to May, food and income availability are expected to temporarily improve with the start of Ramadan in mid-February. In May, during Eid al-Adha, livestock sales typically increase, providing additional income through market channels.

SBA-controlled areas 

Most areas under SBA control are expected to sustain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes while Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta'izz. After years of conflict and economic crisis that have eroded household coping capacity, the coastal governorates have been most affected by new shocks this year, including a sharp reduction in seaport-related livelihood activities, the impacts of drought on livestock-related income, and a high concentration of flood-related damage to productive assets. Poor households in these three governorates had become highly dependent on humanitarian food assistance, having received support during the last two rounds of the Transitional Emergency Food Assistance (TEFA) program. In the absence of food assistance due to the impacts of SBA hostilities on humanitarian operations, many poor households in these areas will face large food consumption gaps. 

Access to food and income in SBA-controlled areas is expected to improve modestly between October and January as the main cereal and fruit harvests provide short-term food stocks and agricultural labor opportunities, but a substantial share of the population will continue to face food consumption gaps. Flooding during the second rainy season damaged crops and reduced labor demand, particularly in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta'izz. As a result, poor households in flood-affected areas are expected to deplete their limited harvest stocks one month early, from January to December, increasing market dependence for staple foods. A reduction in agricultural labor demand due to flooding and the loss of livelihoods from seaport destruction will simultaneously severely limit household purchasing power in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta'izz, resulting in worse outcomes than in other SBA-controlled governorates.

Between February and May, poor households’ cereal stocks will be limited; meanwhile, the fruit and vegetable harvests are expected to be similar to the previous year but below the five-year average, and this is an important source of income in lowland areas. Across the population, income from horticulture sales and labor will most likely contribute to a decline in the population in need. However, short-term gains from these food and income sources will not offset the cumulative impacts of prolonged economic contraction and high living costs. While food prices are expected to remain relatively stable under strict price controls, real purchasing power will remain critically low, and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes will persist among the poorest households.

IRG-controlled areas 

In IRG-controlled areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through at least May, driven by the impacts of economic conflict. The IRG's monetary and fiscal reforms have stabilized the Aden-based YER and modestly reduced food prices, supporting slight improvements in market access and household purchasing power. However, these gains are marginal. Public revenue remains insufficient to pay civil servant salaries regularly, labor demand is weak, and essential public services continue to deteriorate, limiting meaningful livelihood activity and household income to purchase food. Furthermore, in addition to imports, the IRG heavily relies on domestically produced cereal and horticulture harvests from SBA-controlled areas, and these harvests will be insufficient to meet total demand. Supplies will first be purchased by traders in SBA-areas, with any remaining grains and produce then going to IRG-controlled areas. Similar to the previous year, the supply is expected to fall short, contributing to high prices. Food prices, though stable, will remain well above the five-year average, and most poor households will continue to depend on income from limited wage labor to purchase food.

Humanitarian food assistance is expected to target the poorest, displaced, and flood-affected households. However, a proportion of these households will most likely face difficulty meeting the remaining 60 percent of their minimum food needs on their own or will have reduced access to assistance, based on the likelihood that WFP will have to reduce the number of beneficiaries in 2026 due to funding gaps. As a result, pockets of households are expected to periodically experience large food consumption gaps indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4). 

• Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future.
• FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.
• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advanced information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

IRG-controlled areas

Weak price monitoring by IRG authorities could lead to price hikes by traders.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: FEWS NET's expectation of stable prices for basic food commodities in IRG-controlled areas depends on the stability of the local currency and the IRG’s enforcement of new price controls by authorities following the reforms implemented in August. Should the recently announced economic reform measures not succeed, especially the redeposit of local revenue into the CBY-Aden treasury, the economic situation could deteriorate further. This would limit the National Committee, responsible for overseeing import operations, from providing traders with the necessary foreign currency. As a result, food prices would likely increase, erasing the recent marginal gains in household purchasing power since August. Additionally, should price monitoring by the Ministry of Industry and Trade weaken, traders would likely increase prices for basic food items to compensate for reduced profit margins and ongoing operational challenges. Price increases would further constrain food access for millions of households already facing financial hardship, due to ongoing delays in government employees' salary payments and a lack of basic services. The resultant effects on households’ financial access to food would likely lead to an increase in the number of households experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. IDPs and households without stable income sources would be most vulnerable to these deteriorating conditions.

SBA-controlled areas

Downstream impacts from unrepaired Red Sea port damage could worsen artificial price stability and supply of food and fuel commodities.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The Red Sea ports serve as the primary entry point for imported food commodities, including wheat grains, into SBA areas. Throughout 2025, Israeli airstrikes have caused significant damage to the port's infrastructure, resulting in a sharp decline in operational capacity. Repairing the damage could take months, depending on the severity of the destruction and the SBA’s ability to recover. If the SBA is unable to repair damage to Red Sea ports, the effectiveness of the SBA's price control efforts would weaken and traders' stockpiled inventories (which are expected to offset supply gaps in the most likely scenario) would deplete more rapidly. Insufficient offloading capacity could cause delays and a month-to-month decline in food and fuel imports, significantly depleting traders' stocks. Food shortages and/or price increases would likely occur. Since Red Sea port imports are a major revenue source for the SBA, the expected sharp drop in import revenue would also trigger increased illegal taxation, further worsen the business environment, and constrain an already weak labor market. The combination of rising prices, diminishing income-earning opportunities, and the ongoing pause in food assistance would likely restrict food access for millions of households beyond the levels currently anticipated, driving more households into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and worse outcomes, particularly IDPs and those without income sources. 

Al-Hudaydah governorate is a national economic artery not just for SBA-controlled areas, but for all of Yemen. Strikes on key seaports in 2025, namely Al-Hudaydah, As-Salif, and Ras Issa, destroyed key infrastructure, resulting in the loss of income-earning opportunities and a collapse in revenue. Downstream impacts of these airstrikes include a sharp reduction in commerce, additional fiscal pressure on SBA-controlled areas, and heightened strain on already fragile market dynamics and humanitarian logistics.

These ports collectively facilitate approximately 70 percent of commercial imports into SBA-controlled areas of Yemen, making them critical entry points for essential commodities, such as food and fuel. Al-Hudaydah seaport serves as a crucial entry point for humanitarian and commercial goods, including rice, grain, and flour; petroleum and fuel; and metals, hardware, timber, building materials, and machinery. As-Salif seaport specializes in handling dry bulk cargo, particularly bulk grain imports and bulk salt exports. Ras Issa hosts the petroleum products reception facility and primarily handles fuel imports. Between 2022 and 2024, the three ports generated an estimated 5.5 billion USD in revenue from imports, underscoring their economic importance to the country.

Between July 2024 and May 2025, strikes on SBA-controlled areas caused significant damage to seaports, resulting in an estimated loss of 1.4 billion USD. Al-Hudaydah seaport was partially restored following airstrikes in 2024, but subsequent airstrikes on July 7, 2025, caused additional damage; operations resumed at a significantly reduced capacity. While U.S. airstrikes concluded on May 6, 2025, SBA forces have continued and intensified attacks on Israeli-linked commercial vessels in the Red Sea, resulting in the sinking of two ships and triggering another wave of airstrikes in September 2025 that targeted Al-Hudaydah seaport. The three seaports are operating at approximately 25 percent of their capacity due to severe infrastructure damage.

The strikes on July 7, 2025, were particularly damaging. Israel launched heavy airstrikes on all three Red Sea ports in Al-Hudaydah governorate (Al-Hudaydah, Ras Issa, and As-Salif), as well as the Ras Qantib power plant and the Bajil cement factory. The strikes caused extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, reduced import capacity, and disrupted trade flows, leading to prolonged electricity blackouts and reduced operational capacity across multiple industries.

Between January and September 2025, fuel and food imports declined by 26 percent and 23 percent, respectively, in SBA-controlled areas compared to the same period in 2024. The reduction in imports is attributed to U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, sanctions, and the FTO designation of Houthi-led authorities. Despite these declines, food and fuel have remained adequately available in markets at relatively stable prices through September 2025 due to low effective demand and SBA-imposed price controls.

Logistical barriers further constrain port operations, including mandatory U.N. Verification and Inspection Mechanism clearance requirements for incoming vessels and a U.S.-imposed ban on fuel imports through Al-Hudaydah governorate ports that has been in effect since April 2025. These operational constraints have reduced the volume of essential commodities entering Yemen, adding additional strain to the supply chain.

The destruction of seaports and key infrastructure, including plants and factories, has severely weakened the labor market and eliminated employment across multiple sectors. The Bajil cement factory, a key economic asset in SBA-controlled territory valued at over 400 million USD, was severely damaged in the strikes, resulting in the loss of employment for more than 1,250 workers. The Amran facility (while located in Amran governorate, individuals from Al Hudaydah work in this facility) alone employed approximately 1,500 workers, while more than 10,000 families depended indirectly on these factories through logistics and supply chain-related jobs. Although recent formal employment data for Red Sea ports is unavailable, local reports indicate that over 3,500 workers have been affected at Al-Hudaydah port alone. The loss of primary income sources for thousands of families has diminished household purchasing power, resulting in a sharp reduction in their ability to access food in markets, even when food and non-food commodities remain available.

The destruction of critical seaports and revenue-generating facilities is expected to continue to have significant cascading impacts. The reduction in port capacities will likely threaten supply chain sustainability and strain markets. While prices remain stable under stringent SBA price controls and trader surpluses, prolonged import disruptions would undermine the sustainability of SBA-imposed price controls, as the SBA already faces hard currency shortages and declining revenue. The sharp reduction in seaport-related livelihood opportunities has cut a key source of income for households, driving reduced household purchasing capacity. If the repair and recovery of seaports takes longer than currently anticipated in the most likely scenario, then the compounding impacts of lost jobs, reduced harvests from flooding, and a weak labor market will further push households into worsening a food security situation and sharply decrease their ability to access food.