Livelihoods suffer from deteriorating economic conditions nationwide

• In Yemen, households continue to contend with long-term impacts of the protracted conflict, including very poor macroeconomic conditions. The business environment continues to erode due to currency shortages in areas controlled by the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA) and currency depreciation and inflation in areas controlled by the internationally-recognized government (IRG). Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are expected to persist nationwide, with assistance needs peaking in the range of 18.0-18.99 million during the February-March semi-lean season period in the highlands, prior to the start of the next agricultural season in highland areas.
• Currently in October, the start of the main cereal harvest is providing a boost in seasonal food and income. However, severe flooding in Al Hudaydah and Hajjah during Yemen’s July to September second rainy season has reduced crop production and associated labor opportunities in affected areas. Meanwhile, ongoing economic challenges nationwide are further limiting income-earning opportunities for millions of households.
• Across SBA-controlled areas, humanitarian food assistance provided by WFP has been paused since December 2023, affecting around 9.5 million beneficiaries. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist, with worst outcomes expected in several governorates where more than 50 percent of the population previously received assistance.
• Millions of households in IRG-controlled areas are also expected to face persisting food consumption gaps due to very poor economic conditions characterized by currency depreciation, high food prices, and lack of income-earning opportunities. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes will remain widespread, with some households expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4). 
• Israeli airstrikes damaged key SBA ports in July and September. Food imports declined temporarily but recovered in September. Fuel imports were re-routed through Ras Isa port, but fuel stocks have likely declined. FEWS NET anticipates further strikes, likely on revenue-generating infrastructure, during the projection period.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 15, 2024.

Economic deterioration nationwide is of high concern for acute food insecurity

Although levels of active conflict in Yemen’s frontline areas (Figure 1) have remained comparatively subdued in recent years (since the 2022 truce), incredibly poor economic conditions nationwide are not allowing for recovery of livelihoods outside of agriculture. In IRG-controlled areas, revenue shortages worsened when the SBA began to block the IRG’s oil exports in late 2022. Severe shortages of revenue are preventing authorities from providing essential public services and paying government salaries regularly, while shortages of foreign currency are contributing to ongoing depreciation of the local currency and inflation. In SBA areas, the authorities exert strong control over markets, including by maintaining price caps. However, shortages of hard currency are preventing many Yemenis from accessing their deposits in bank accounts. This is making it even harder for small businesses to operate. In both IRG and SBA areas, labor opportunities are scarce, and prices of basic food items are significantly above pre-conflict levels.

On the other hand, those involved in agricultural livelihoods are largely benefiting from the impacts of above-average rainfall in the July to September second rainy season on crop and livestock production. Currently in October, the main harvest is underway in highland areas. Abundant rainfall supported crop production—which has likely exhibited an improving trend in the past four-to-five years—and this is providing labor opportunities for poor households along the crop production and marking chains. However, above-average rainfall caused severe flooding in many areas of western Yemen, which Al Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Al Jawf worst affected. In areas impacted by severe flooding, crop yields are expected to be lower than last year. 

In SBA areas, the pause in WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance is ongoing and is expected to continue throughout the projection period. In IRG-controlled areas, the number of assistance beneficiaries is being reduced from around 3.6 million to around 2.8 million. While rations are being increased for the remaining 2.8 million beneficiaries, assistance will not provide more than 50 percent of minimum energy requirements. Amid scarce income-earning opportunities, out-of-reach food prices (especially in IRG areas), and insufficient humanitarian assistance, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are likely ongoing at the area level, with some households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. FEWS NET also continues to expect that Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing in several SBA-controlled governorates (Al Hudaydah, Hajjah, Al Jawf, and Ta’izz), where more than 50 percent of the population received assistance prior to the WFP GFA pause and where the impacts of recent flooding and/or conflict have been comparatively more severe. 

Israeli airstrikes struck key SBA ports in July and September

• Following a temporary decline in food imports through Al Hudaydah port in July and August, food import levels were normal in September. Fuel imports were re-routed from Al Hudaydah to As Saleef seaport and have continued at normal levels overall. FEWS NET’s analysis is that food and fuel imports into SBA areas are continuing normally. However, FEWS NET expects that fuel stocks are now lower given that fuel storage infrastructure was damaged in both airstrikes.
• FEWS NET anticipates that further Israeli airstrikes will target SBA oil infrastructure, other revenue-generating infrastructure, and/or energy infrastructure during the projection period. In the most likely scenario defined for this report, it is assumed that the airstrikes will not cause a meaningful decline in import levels, but significant uncertainty exists. (See “Events that may change projected acute food insecurity outcomes” table below for discussion of the likely impacts of strikes on As Saleef, Al Hudaydah, and Ras Isa ports).

Yemen has been plagued by civil war since March 2015. Though the conflict is complex, involving a number of actors, the major parties to the conflict are the forces of the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA, known as Ansar Allah and informally referred to as the Houthis) and the allied forces of the internationally recognized government (IRG). The SBA controls the most populated areas of northern and western Yemen, including the country’s capital, Amanat al Asimah (Sana’a city), while the IRG controls the rest of the southern and eastern territory, including the IRG’s relocated capital in Aden (Aden city).

Nearly a decade of war has taken an immense toll on the economy and local livelihoods. International business activity and investment have stalled, and the fragmented central banks (one in Sana’a and one in Aden) prevent unified national fiscal and monetary policy. Despite a relative calming of the conflict since the truce that spanned from April to October 2022, households have been able to only minimally reestablish livelihoods, given persistent poor macroeconomic conditions and recent shocks. Nationwide, prices of food, fuel, and essential goods are above five-year average levels and significantly higher than pre-conflict levels, straining poor households’ limited resources. In IRG-controlled areas, where foreign exchange shortages are significant and government regulation is weak, depreciation of the local currency has persistently driven rising local food prices.

Although Yemen is overwhelmingly dependent on imports for its staple food supply, agriculture is a vital sector of Yemen’s economy (contributing about 13.7 percent of GDP), and food and cash crop production remains important to rural livelihoods. Most significantly, poor households in both urban and rural areas are generally highly dependent on labor to earn income, and labor opportunities linked to agricultural production and marketing chains increase seasonally. Most cultivated land is in the northern and central highlands, which are among the most densely populated rural areas and are mostly under the control of the SBA. In highland areas, farmers typically produce cereal crops (mostly rainfed and largely for their own consumption), along with vegetables and qat. In lowland areas (the western Tihama Plain and coastal regions), farmers also produce cereal crops (more commonly irrigated by runoff water from the highlands) as well as fruit and vegetables. About 60 percent of cultivated land (mainly in the highlands) is rainfed, with production patterns dictated by two main rainy seasons from March to May and July to September (Figure 2).

In October, the current situation month of this report, the country’s main cereal harvest (October to December) is underway in many areas. This provides poor households with some seasonal labor opportunities along crop production and marketing chains and also provides farming households with a seasonal increase in food and cash income from crop production and sales. 

Livestock production remains an important source of income for many families in Yemen. Livestock production improves during the rainy seasons when pasture and water availability increase. Livestock sales typically peak between February and June with the approach of Ramadan and Eid Al Adha and the typical season for Yemeni marriages—events when households slaughter animals (mostly sheep and goats) and increase meat consumption. 

During the Ramadan and Eid period from March to May, many households typically experience a temporary seasonal increase in food and income associated with zakat in the form of food and cash assistance. Households that own livestock typically experience a seasonal increase in livestock sales.

Despite comparatively small shifts in food consumption levels due to seasonal factors, the key drivers of acute food insecurity in Yemen—conflict and poor macroeconomic conditions—result in high assistance needs throughout the year. Income-earning opportunities, including from daily labor and petty trade, are highly limited relative to needs. Prices of food and non-food goods—including essential livelihood inputs—have risen over the years, with salaries and wage rates not keeping pace. In this context, humanitarian food assistance had become an important source of food and income for millions of people across Yemen. At peak levels in 2019 and 2021, 12 to 13 million people were reached monthly with nearly full rations of assistance. However, assistance has been scaled down several times since the end of 2021 due to funding shortages, including, most recently, a total pause in assistance across SBA areas affecting 9.5 million people, ongoing since December 2023. As such, millions of households in Yemen face highly eroded coping capacity and frequent periods of food consumption gaps.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Food Security Outlook: June 2024
• Latest Key Message Update: September 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section. 

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Conflict: 

Conflict levels have significantly declined in the period of informal ceasefire that followed the April to October 2022 truce, although irregular shelling and other incidents continue in frontlines areas, including in Lahij, Ma’rib Shabwah, Ta’izz, Al Dali’, and Al Jawf governorates. In September 2024, levels of conflict increased relative to the previous month (Figure 3), associated with airstrikes (including an Israeli airstrike on Al Hudaydah and US and UK coalition airstrikes on multiple cities, including in Al Hudaydah, Ta’izz, Ibb, Sa’dah, and Ma’rib), renewed shelling and clashes on the Lahij and Al Dali’ fronts, and violence accompanying the September 26 (Revolution Day) celebrations in Sana'a and Ibb. According to data from ACLED, total conflict events increased in September by 39 percent compared to the previous month but remained 5 percent below levels recorded at the same time last year and 57 percent below the five-year average. Overall fatalities in Yemen have also increased by 126 percent compared to the prior month and 70 percent compared to the same time last year but remain 65 percent below the five-year average. Meanwhile, the number of events targeting civilians in September increased not only compared to the previous month (by 67 percent), but also compared to last year (by 73 percent) and the five-year average (by 84 percent). Associated civilian fatalities in September have also increased by 43 and 54 percent compared to the previous month and the same time last year but are 17 percent below the five-year average. 

FEWS NET previously reported on Israeli airstrikes in July and September 2024 that targeted key seaports in Al Hudaydah governorate. The July airstrikes damaged fuel storage infrastructure at Al Hudaydah seaport, while the September airstrikes primarily damaged fuel storage infrastructure at Ras Isa seaport, along with two of the governorate’s main power stations. 

The SBA continues to target commercial vessels in the Red Sea. As a result, shipping insurance and freight rates continued to rise throughout 2024, increasing importation costs. In September 2024 alone, insurance rates more than doubled, rising from 0.7 percent to 2.0 percent of a shipment’s value. Freight rates also surged in 2024, peaking in July 2024; however, by mid-October, rates had declined to levels seen in May amid oversupply.

In southern Yemen, conflict between Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and IRG-allied forces is contributing to insecurity outside of frontline areas. In September 2024, clashes between IRG forces and members of AQAP in Abyan killed a soldier. Prior to this, more than 20 soldiers were killed or wounded in an AQAP suicide attack in August. Tribal tensions add yet another layer of conflict across Yemen; for instance, clashes occurred in September between national forces and armed tribal groups in Al Waizih district in Ta’izz and in Markhah in Shabwah.

According to a September 2024 report by Rights Radar on violations committed against farmers and pastoralists during the war, thousands of civilian farmers, peasants, and livestock herders have died (1,021) or been injured (1,078) since the start of the crisis; 346 deaths and 494 injuries were caused by landmines while grazing livestock or while on or near farms. 

Macroeconomic conditions: 

Macroeconomic conditions in Yemen remain incredibly poor. According to the World Bank, Yemen’s GDP is expected to contract by 1 percent overall in 2024. This follows an estimated contraction of 54 percent—a loss of over half of prior economic output—between 2015 and 2023. While the economy showed some signs of recovery in 2022, gains were quickly eroded given the economic impacts of the SBA’s blockade of IRG oil exports, internal economic conflict, and tensions in the Red Sea. 

In IRG areas, oil exports (which prior to the conflict accounted for 63 percent of the country’s exports and 70 percent of budgetary resources) have remained suspended since late 2022 due to the SBA’s ongoing blockade. The IRG’s customs revenue also declined notably in 2023 as the SBA enacted policies that forced the redirection of a majority of non-food shipments to SBA-controlled seaports. As a result of these factors, the IRG is facing significant shortages of revenue and foreign currency. Tensions among leadership and poor control over financial institutions in IRG areas are exacerbating macroeconomic issues, which include ongoing depreciation of the local currency, inflation, a deteriorating business environment, worsening delays in monthly salary payments for civil servants, and worsening provision of public services. Higher prices of goods and increasingly constrained income-earning are reducing the already low purchasing capacity of many households. Due to the government’s inability to cover the cost of fuel for operating power stations, citizens face power outages of around 18-20 hours per day despite lower demand associated with the onset of winter. 

According to FAO data, the monthly average value of the Aden-based rial remained stable relative to the USD from August to September, averaging 1,900 YER/USD in September. However, as of September, the currency had lost 32 percent of its value relative to the same time last year and 71 percent compared to the four-year average. In October, the trend of depreciation has continued. As of October 26, 2024, the exchange rate had reached 2,035 YER/USD. The Central Bank of Yemen in Aden continues to hold public currency auctions irregularly, with the most recent auction on October 28 selling 62 percent of the offered 30 million USD.

According to FAO data, the average price of the minimum food basket (MFB) in Aden (the main reference market in IRG areas) increased only slightly (by 3 percent) in September compared to the previous month (Figure 4); however, the cost of the MFB has increased by 18 percent since January 2024. In September, the cost of the MFB was 11 percent higher than at the same time last year and 47 percent higher than the four-year average. The main driver of rising food prices is the depreciation of the local currency, through both direct impacts on the cost of food (as most of the food supply is imported) and through indirect impacts via higher imported fuel prices (which impact domestic transportation and processing costs). Average official prices for diesel and petrol were stable in September compared to the previous month, according to FAO data, but 5 and 27 percent higher, respectively, than last year’s levels and 68 and 93 percent higher, respectively, compared to the four-year average.

Notably, prices of locally imported vegetables have significantly increased in IRG-controlled areas in recent months. Since 2022, seasonal increases in vegetable prices such as tomatoes, potatoes, and onions have been abnormally large, and moreso each year. This is largely attributable to depreciation of the local currency in IRG-controlled areas, given that foreign currency is required for trade amid fragmentation of the domestic currency. These price increases are of concern as poor households commonly cook with these vegetables in most basic dishes. According to data from FAO, prices of tomatoes in Aden increased from August to September by an average of 16 percent across IRG areas, reaching levels more than double those at the same time last year. More recently in October, key informants report that prices in Aden reached 3,500 YER/kg for tomatoes, 2,000 YER/kg for potatoes, and 2,500 YER/kg for onions; these prices are 40 to 50 percent higher than FAO’s September monthly average prices, though trends are only indicative due to differing data collection methodology). 

In SBA areas, shortages of hard currency persist. Banks are increasingly unable to meet their clients’ needs. Some banks are fully preventing withdrawals from bank accounts, and others are imposing withdrawal limits. Currency shortages are attributed to the deterioration of old bank notes over time, in combination with the SBA’s longstanding ban on newly printed bank notes. The SBA also continues to intensify efforts to increase revenue generation, including by increasingly restricting trade of goods originating in IRG areas or imported through IRG-controlled ports, as well as by taxing and restricting other business activities with the aim of exerting greater control over revenue flows. With the exception of increased import flows through SBA-controlled seaports, these circumstances are all contributing to worsening of the business environment in SBA areas. Currency shortages are impeding business operations and reducing consumers’ ability to pay for goods and services, while SBA restrictions are further impeding business and trade operations as well as reducing profits. 

The value of the Sana’a-based rial has remained stable compared to last month and last year and has appreciated by 7 percent compared to the four-year average. The SBA exert tight control over the exchange market, as well as on food and fuel prices in areas under their control. As a result, prices of food and fuel remain stable overall, but at levels higher than in previous years. According to FAO data, the average price of the MFB in Amanat Al Asimah (Sana’a city, the main reference market in SBA areas) was stable in September compared to last month and last year and only slightly higher (by 4 percent) than the four-year average (Figure 5). Meanwhile, official diesel prices remained stable compared to the previous month but were 6 percent higher than prices at the same time last year and the four-year average.  

Flooding: 

Rainfall during Yemen’s July to September second rainy season exceeded expectations, with cumulative rainfall surpassing 145 percent of normal levels across most of the country, according to modeling using remote sensing data. The tremendous rainfall resulted in widespread flooding across Yemen between July and August, with significant localized impacts. 

According to FAO reporting, over 560,000 people were directly impacted by flooding in August, including 120 deaths. Flooding caused livestock deaths and extensive damage to homes, crop/fruit-bearing agricultural lands, and infrastructure such as health centers, schools, and roads. In Al Hudaydah and Al Mahwit (particularly Malhan district), over 40 people died, numerous homes were destroyed, and 215 families were displaced. The flooding has also increased the risk of landmine casualties (due to landmine transmission in floodwaters) as well as the risk of cholera, malaria, and dengue fever, given damage to infrastructure, contamination of water sources amid limited control measures, and the fragile health/WASH infrastructure.

Crop production: 

Crop production is expected to have improved somewhat in the past five years, given declining conflict levels and improvements in fuel availability in SBA areas; however, crop production remains significantly below pre-conflict levels. In September and October, the main harvest of cereals has started in many highland areas, while the summer short harvest of sorghum is ongoing in the Red Sea and Tihamah Plain agroecological zone. 

Above-average rainfall in July and August 2024 is likely to boost crop yields in areas unaffected by floods. However, flooding has also resulted in extensive damage to arable land, infrastructure, and water sources. These impacts will likely lead to a decline in seasonal food production in severely affected areas. According to an August 2024 assessment by FAO, around 98,726 hectares of agricultural land (including herbaceous crops, shrub crops, orchards, and date palms) were impacted, with Al Hudaydah and Hajjah the most affected (Figure 6). According to a joint FSAC assessment in Hajjah in August, over 3,500 smallholder farmers were impacted, and 400 hectares of arable land have been extensively damaged, including vital tomato, coffee, fruit, vegetable, and sorghum fields. 

Livestock production: 

Livestock-rearing is an important source of livelihoods for many families across Yemen despite challenges posed by the protracted conflict, poor macroeconomic conditions, weather shocks, diseases and lack of veterinary services, and illicit taxes. According to FAO DIEM mobile phone survey data, 59 percent of livestock owners surveyed in June 2024 reported reductions in livestock numbers compared to the previous year, primarily due to distressed animal sales and animal deaths. 

The above-average rainfall in the second rainy season has supported widespread improvements in pasture and water resources for livestock. However, according to FAO’s August assessment, the recent flooding could have affected up to 279,400 small ruminants (175,341 sheep and 104,059 goats), with Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, and Hajjah the most impacted (Figure 7).

Off-own-farm sources of income: 

Ongoing harvesting is increasing access to income from agricultural labor in many highland areas and in the Tihamah plain, as well as from unskilled labor along the crop marketing chains nationwide. On average across SBA-controlled areas, wage rates for agricultural labor remained stable in September at levels similar to last year and 9 percent above the four-year average; wage rates for unskilled laborers remained stable at levels similar to last year and 7 percent above the four-year average. Meanwhile, in IRG-controlled areas, wage rates have been generally rising in an atmosphere of significant general inflation. On average across IRG-controlled areas, wage rates for agricultural laborers in September reached levels 12 percent higher than last year and 38 percent above the four-year average; wage rates for unskilled laborers reached levels 11 percent higher than last year and 41 percent above the four-year average.

In both SBA and IRG areas, daily wage labor is among the most important sources of income for poor households. However, the labor market is very poor following many years of conflict and economic decline. Labor opportunities are generally very scarce. In highland areas that have started harvesting, the above-average rainfall during the second rainy season is likely supporting crop yields, providing poor households with opportunities for income-earning at levels similar to recent years; however, households in flood-affected areas are expected to be facing atypically low labor demand and below-normal income. Additionally, in October, the start of seasonal fishing activities along the Red Sea coast is likely to provide fishing-dependent households with an increase in access to food and income at levels similar to 2023 but below 2022, given the rising insecurity in the Red Sea.

In SBA areas, the worsening business environment is further restricting income-earning opportunities, particularly impacting small businesses and petty traders. Meanwhile, in IRG areas, the persistent economic slowdown is limiting labor opportunities. Impacts are particularly significant in the construction sector (upon which the majority of urban casual laborers depend), given restrictions on construction activities in some IRG areas—including Aden—and on producers and sellers of building materials in Aden. 

Market supplies: 

In IRG areas, import volumes of key staple foods, including wheat flour, wheat grains, sugar, rice, and cooking oil, totaled 884,934 MT between January and July 2024 (the month of most recent data available to FEWS NET), according to the Aden-based General Authority for Standardization and Metrology. This represents a 9 percent decline compared to the same period in 2023 (Figure 8), linked to the rerouting of imports from Aden to SBA-controlled ports. Meanwhile, according to the Sana’a-based Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), the total imported through all SBA ports between January and September 2024 reached 2,994,692 MT, a 14 percent increase compared to the same period of last year.

Following the July airstrikes by Israel on the port of Al Hudaydah, food imports initially declined not only in July (by 53 percent relative to June) but also in August 2024 (by 23 percent relative to July). However, food imports returned to normal levels in September, with the dip likely attributable to temporary delays and disruptions after the strikes. Available information following the September airstrikes does not provide any cause for concern for damage to infrastructure necessary for food importation, though close monitoring is required.

The July airstrikes damaged fuel storage infrastructure and caused fuel stock losses at Al Hudaydah seaport. Fuel importation data from the Sana’a-based MTI indicates that no fuel was imported through Al Hudaydah port in August. However, the volume of imported fuel through Ras Isa seaport significantly increased August 2024 (reaching 219,684 MT, 51 percent higher than July and 48 percent higher than June), more than compensating for the decline through Al Hudaydah port (Figure 9). Following this, in September, fuel import volumes through Ras Isa were similar to August levels. More recently, in the late September airstrikes, three of the four oil tanks at Ras Isa were damaged; though the tanks had been recently emptied, storage capacity was consequently reduced. Traders may have shifted a portion of their stocks to inland storage facilities, though information is not available to assess this. Overall, FEWS NET anticipates that fuel stock levels in SBA areas have likely been reduced as a result. This is likely resulting in additional importation and operating costs for traders, as fuel is likely being imported in smaller batches and transported to markets more quickly, complicating supply chain logistics. 

Household purchasing capacity: 

In both IRG and SBA areas, demand for labor remains significantly constrained amid the economic downturn, and there is high competition for the limited available opportunities. This remains the main constraint to poor households’ purchasing capacity, independent of some slight improvements in the terms of trade (a ratio) between labor wage rates and food prices. 

On average across IRG areas, the terms of trade between casual labor wage rates and the cost of the MFB remained stable in September 2024 compared to the prior month but were 6 percent lower compared to the same time last year and 10 percent below the four-year average. This worsening purchasing power was driven by rising food prices that outpaced slight improvements in wage rates. However, variability exists across governorates; in some IRG-controlled governorates, terms of trade in September 2024 have declined by as much as 7 to 17 percent over the past year and are as much as 5 to 31 percent below the four-year average (Figure 10). Terms of trade are farthest below the four-year average in Aden, Hadhramaut, and Shabwah.

Humanitarian food assistance—defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher)—may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable. 

IRG areas

In IRG areas, funding gaps and food stock shortages continue to result in reduced assistance distribution frequency and reduced ration sizes per distribution relative to the approximate 80 percent rations that were distributed monthly in 2021. In 2024, the WFP has completed two cycles of general food assistance (GFA) distribution in IRG-controlled areas, targeting 3.6 million people per cycle with approximately 40 percent rations per distribution, in addition to concluding two carry-over cycles from 2023. The third cycle of 2024 started in September and is ongoing. 

SBA areas

In SBA areas, the pause in WFP-provided GFA for around 9.5 million beneficiaries is ongoing since December 2023. However, in August and September, WFP reportedly targeted 1.4 million people in 34 districts with Rapid Emergency Response distributions. Negotiations around beneficiary registration and retargeting that would allow the full resumption of GFA are ongoing between WFP and SBA officials.

According to the September FSAC newsletter, 801,500 individuals received emergency food assistance in August, including 502,00 in SBA areas and 299,300 in IRG areas (Figure 11). This represents a significant decrease compared to the same time last year (prior to the pause in SBA areas), when 3.6 million individuals were reached (Figure 12). Additionally, only 39 percent of the total target population for the year had received emergency food assistance as of August 2024, a significant decrease from the 97 percent that had been reached by the same time last year. Ongoing funding gaps continue to prevent humanitarian partners from meeting their targets.

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

SBA-controlled areas

In SBA-controlled areas, Acute food insecurity remains widespread and severe overall despite seasonal improvements from the ongoing cereal harvest in the SBA highlands and improvements in livestock body conditions from above-average vegetation and pasture availability. Declining business activity and increased taxes imposed by the authorities on imported non-food commodities are severely restricting income-earning opportunities, particularly impacting small businesses and petty trade. As most poor households are highly dependent on markets for food, the worsening environment for income-earning is likely increasingly constraining access to food despite improvements in terms of trade. Additionally, households that were most affected by floods during the second rainy season—including many displaced families—are still struggling not only with reduced incomes but also with expenses related to recovery from flooding damage. 

Given already diminished coping capacity and the ongoing WFP humanitarian assistance pause, many poor households are engaging in damaging food consumption-based coping strategies, such as reducing the size and frequency of meals. Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely ongoing at the area level, with some households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. FEWS NET also continues to expect that Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing in several governorates (Al Hudaydah, Hajjah, Al Jawf, and Ta’izz), where more than 50 percent of the population received assistance prior to the WFP GFA pause and where the impacts of recent flooding and/or conflict have been comparatively more severe. However, in some governorates where FEWS NET previously anticipated Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes (Sa’dah, Amran, and Al Mahwit), FEWS NET now expects Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes at the area level, though with a substantial share of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This is due to favorable seasonal improvements during the main harvest season, better-than-anticipated seasonal improvements in livestock production in areas that benefited from above-average rainfall, as well as improvements in terms of trade. However, it should be noted that food security among households outside of those with livelihoods linked to the agricultural sector has likely worsened. 

In Al Hudaydah and Hajjah, particularly severe impacts of flooding are contributing to an increase in the population expected to be facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes—including in IDP camps in Hajjah—as well as persisting high levels of acute malnutrition attributable to both food and non-food factors. Poor sanitation, health infrastructure, and the spread of waterborne diseases, including cholera, are further exacerbating both acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition outcomes.

IRG-controlled areas

In IRG-controlled areas, acute food insecurity conditions have worsened. The deteriorating economy is severely limiting income-earning opportunities. Ongoing severe shortages of government revenue have limited the government's ability to fund essential services, including electricity, and pay civil servants’ salaries. Driven by ongoing currency depreciation, prices have risen rapidly for food and non-food commodities (including locally produced vegetables, which are essential for meal preparation), further diminishing household purchasing power and access to food. Insufficient income and rising prices have left many unable to meet their basic needs, and humanitarian assistance is insufficient to mitigate all food consumption gaps with greatest concern for daily wage earners and IDPs without assistance. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes persist at the governorate level. The most vulnerable households without any sources of income are facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions

• The unofficial state of truce is likely to continue to hold during the projection period. Fighting in the main frontline areas in Ta’izz, Ma’rib, Shabwah, Al Jawf, and Al Dali’ is expected to remain at current depressed levels or potentially slightly decrease.
• Nationally, macroeconomic conditions are anticipated to remain very poor. According to the World Bank, Yemen's GDP is projected to contract by 1 percent in 2024; overall, stagnation or slight contraction is expected during the projection period through May 2025, and opportunities for income-earning will remain severely limited. 
• Cereal crop production in the main harvest (September/October to December/January) is expected to be similar to last year at the national level given positive impacts of above-average rainfall on yields in some areas, but damage to crops in others. However, in areas severely affected by floods, such as Al Hudaydah and Hajjah, cereal crop production is anticipated to be slightly lower than last year. 
• Despite expectations for ENSO Neutral conditions in the March to May period, below-average cumulative rainfall is most likely in Yemen’s March to May 2025 first rainy season. However, uncertainty exists given the long lead time of the forecast. The start of the next season’s agricultural activities around late March/April will provide a seasonal increase in labor opportunities. 
• Harvesting of qat is expected year-round in higher-elevation areas, though with a seasonal decline expected from around December to March. Qat production is expected to be near average, given prioritization of this cash crop. 
• Opportunities for agricultural labor are expected to be slightly higher than the last year level given above-average rainfall during the second season that benefited fruit production and vegetable cultivation activities. However, in areas severely affected by flooding, opportunities for agricultural labor will likely be lower than last year. Despite the increasing trend in crop production in recent years, the total availability of labor opportunities is expected to remain similar to the previous year throughout the projection period, due to the forecast of below-average rainfall in the first rainy season.
• In highland areas, the cereal and fruit harvests starting in September and October will provide increased labor opportunities through January, while land preparation in March will provide some agricultural work following the February/March off-season. In lowland areas (coastal and inland), opportunities for labor will seasonally increase around November, alongside the main cereal harvest and fruit and vegetable production seasons and will remain at seasonally high levels throughout the projection period. 
• Increased militarization and insecurity are expected to further impede fishing activities in the Red Sea. Consequently, seasonal income from fishing from October to April is expected to be lower than last year. Meanwhile, fishing activities along the Aden cost are likely to remain near current levels amid persistent security challenges including movement restrictions and high related costs. In these areas, seasonal income from fishing from October to May is expected to be higher than in the previous year due to the continuous inflation, but real income will be lower than the previous year. 
• A seasonal increase in sales of livestock and meat products is anticipated to support access to income for livestock owners between February and May 2025 due to high demand during Ramadan and Eid. 

Sub-national assumptions for SBA-controlled areas

• SBA missile and drone attacks targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are anticipated to persist, particularly focusing on vessels associated with Israel, the US, and the UK. These attacks are expected to occur at levels similar to those observed in the summer of 2024 and below the peaks recorded in February and March. Retaliatory airstrikes by the US- and UK-led coalition are expected to continue near current levels and are expected to largely target sites of military importance.
• Cross-border shelling along the Yemeni-Saudi border, notably in Sa’dah governorate, is expected to remain at current minimal levels, as SBA forces are likely to continue to deprioritize cross-border strikes, focusing on the maritime theater and diplomatic negotiations.
• SBA forces are expected to continue sporadic missile and drone attacks against Israel, particularly in reaction to significant events in the Middle East and reports of civilian casualties from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). However, the frequency of these attacks is expected to remain limited, given that retaliatory IDF strikes, which often target oil infrastructure, will to some extent serve as a deterrent. 
• Retaliatory strikes by the IDF are expected in response to SBA missile and drone attacks. Based on the patterns of recent strikes in July and September and expert conflict analysis, it is considered most likely that future Israeli strikes will similarly target oil infrastructure, other revenue-generating infrastructure, and/or energy infrastructure. 
• In the most likely scenario, it is assumed that food and fuel imports will continue at normal levels throughout the projection period despite the likelihood of additional airstrikes, given the wide variety of possible outcomes and the inability to precisely predict locations and severity of future strikes such that, overall, the probability of food imports continuing normally is higher than the probably of a meaningful decline. However, significant uncertainty exists. (See “Events that may change projected acute food insecurity outcomes” table below). 
  • Given damaged fuel storage infrastructure at both Al Hudaydah and Ras Isa as well as the desire to minimize the risk of losses in the event of future strikes, traders are expected to import fuel in smaller quantities relative to what is typical. It is likely that fuel will be offloaded directly into trucks, as has been the recent pattern. Fuel is expected to remain available in SBA markets. However, fuel stock levels are expected to remain reduced overall. This renders the fuel supply vulnerable to global supply and price shocks. (See “Events that may change projected acute food insecurity outcomes” table below.)
• Given expectations for continued insecurity in the Red Sea, shipping insurance rates are likely to continue to rise, with insurers becoming increasingly selective about underwriting. However, freight rates will likely continue declining. Importation costs will likely continue rising overall, driven by rising insurance rates.
• Hard currency shortages are expected to persist in SBA areas, preventing many people from easily accessing their bank deposits. This is likely to further erode the small business environment. The exchange rate is likely to remain stable or potentially further appreciate given shortages of local currency and strict controls on the exchange rate market by local authorities.
• Staple food prices are expected to remain generally stable throughout the outlook period due to consistent market supplies of food and fuel, a stable or appreciating exchange rate, and effective price caps and controls by local authorities. According to FEWS NET price projections, prices of imported wheat flour in the SBA reference market of Amanat Al-Asimah (Sana’a city) – which averaged 350 YER/kg in September 2024 – are anticipated to remain generally stable at levels similar to last year and well within the modeled lower and upper boundaries of 229 YER/kg and 471 YER/kg, respectively.

Sub-national assumptions for IRG-controlled areas

• The suspension of crude oil exports is expected to continue throughout the projection period given that the distribution of associated revenue remains a highly contentious issue that is unlikely to be resolved soon. Additionally, the ongoing civil unrest and local demands surrounding oil revenues in Hadhramaut and Shabwah present further challenges that likely take time to address, even if an agreement is reached between the IRG and the SBA.
• Given expectations for the continued loss of revenue from oil exports and customs duties, inflows of revenue and foreign exchange are likely to remain similar to current reduced levels. This will contribute to ongoing gaps in the public budget and worsening economic conditions. The Aden-based rial is expected to continue to depreciate, likely surpassing 2,400-2,500 YER/USD by May 2025. Pensions and civil servant salary payments will likely continue to be subject to worsened delays. 
• Staple food prices are expected to continue to increase and remain above last year’s levels, driven primarily by rising importation costs (due to continued depreciation of the local currency as well as high freight and insurance costs) and rising transportation costs (due to rising fuel prices in local markets). According to FEWS NET price projections, prices of imported wheat flour in the IRG reference market of Aden—which averaged 1,058 YER/kg in September 2024—are anticipated to increase but remain below the modeled upper boundary of 1,288 YER/kg.
• Power outages are likely to gradually reduce with the onset of winter due to reduced demand for electricity. Power outages will likely increase again at the start of summer (around April 2025) when electricity demand increases again.

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumption:

• Given ongoing funding shortages amid high needs worldwide, the provision of humanitarian assistance is likely to remain similar to current comparatively low levels. 

Sub-national assumption for SBA areas:

• Given the ongoing status of negotiations and previous patterns illustrating that reaching an agreement is likely to take a long time, FEWS NET anticipates that the pause in WFP-provided emergency humanitarian food assistance will most likely continue throughout at least the majority of the projection period. Due to the absence of planned, funded, and likely additional one-off assistance distributions, FEWS NET does assume any additional one-off distributions as part of the most likely scenario. However, any additional one-off distributions are likely to be limited in scale and are unlikely to change projected outcomes at the area level.

Sub-national assumption for IRG areas:

• According to plans provided by WFP as published in the October 2024 IPC report, the number of beneficiaries of WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance under the GFA program will be reduced from around 3.6 million to around 2.8 million. For the 2.8 million remaining beneficiary households, ration sizes will increase to provide an estimated average of around 40-50 percent of minimum kilocalorie needs (up from around 17 percent); however, deliveries are expected to be irregular, and ration sizes will likely vary, with the potential for lower-than-anticipated distribution frequency and ration sizes.

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

SBA controlled-areas

Seasonal availability of food and income is expected to provide slight support to food consumption for much of the projection period. In highland areas, availability of food and income is expected to improve temporarily with the cereal and citrus fruit harvests, which occur from September/October to December/January. The period from February to May is largely an agricultural off-season in the highland areas, during which access to seasonal food sources and income is expected to decline, although some agricultural activities are expected to resume in April and May, providing some labor opportunities. In the lowlands, the harvests of cereals (November to January) and production of vegetables and fruit (particularly mangoes) (January to May) are expected to provide some income through crop sales and daily wage labor throughout the projection period. Overall, however, local cereal production is limited and will be insufficient to meet households’ needs, particularly in areas worst impacted by floods. Consequently, many poor households will remain market dependent in a context of out-of-reach prices for food and essential non-food commodities. Given the limited income opportunities and above-average food prices, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are anticipated throughout the projection period, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes expected to persist in Al Hudaydah, Hajjah, Al Jawf and Ta’izz.

IRG-controlled areas

During the projection period, acute food insecurity is expected to remain high due to further inflation and constrained income-earning. Although some seasonal improvement in food availability and income is expected with the November to December cereal harvest and the planting and harvesting of fruits and vegetables such as mangoes, this will be insufficient for households to meet their needs amid the rising food prices. Farmers’ profits are also likely to remain below last year's levels due to rising production costs driven by the general inflation as well as low purchasing power among the general population. Millions of households are expected to continue facing food consumption gaps. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected to persist at the governorate level. A growing number of households will likely face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, with greatest concern for daily wage earners, IDPs without assistance, and government employees. While some beneficiary households in IRG areas will likely experience improvement to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes given the increased rations, this is expected to be insufficient to improve area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes amid the impacts of poor economic conditions and highly constrained income-earning opportunities, as well as the expectation that a more limited number of households that lose assistance will likely deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence. 

Sub-national: SBA-controlled areas

Israeli airstrikes significantly damage importation infrastructure in As Saleef port 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: As Saleef port in Al Hudaydah governorate is currently the main point of entry for the imported wheat grain that supplies staple wheat to SBA areas. Should these trade flows be disrupted, the SBA would be forced to redirect imports through other ports. This would likely require traders to import sacks of wheat flour, which would be significantly more expensive than the current process of importing wheat for milling and storage in silos in As Saleef. Imports of wheat would likely decline, and prices would likely increase as the SBA raises price caps over time. These price increases would further constrain food access for millions of households. The number of households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would increase widely, with an increase in the number of households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes (particularly amongst IDPs and households without income sources). 

Israeli airstrikes significantly damage importation infrastructure in Al Hudaydah port

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Al Hudaydah is currently the main point of entry for most key imported staple foods aside from wheat grain (rice, cooking oil, milk, and sugar) that supply SBA areas. Should these trade flows be disrupted, shortages in food availability are likely in most SBA markets given insufficient infrastructure at other ports to absorb the import flows. Prices of basic food commodities would also likely increase as the SBA raises price caps in stages. The number of households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would increase widely. 

Israeli airstrikes significantly damage importation infrastructure in Ras Isa port

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Since the Israeli airstrike on Al Hudaydah port in July 2024, Ras Isa port in Al Hudaydah governorate has remained the only point of entry for the fuel that supplies SBA areas. Should these trade flows be disrupted, fuel import levels would likely decline. Because fuel stocks are expected to be low in the aftermath of the July and September strikes, fuel shortages are likely in the subsequent weeks and months. Households and traders would likely face increasingly higher unofficial prices for fuel on the parallel market, similar to what was the case during the period of fuel shortages that preceded eased importation restrictions in 2021. This would likely further erode the business environment due to increased operating costs, with those who depend on fuel for their livelihoods—such as those in the agriculture, transportation, and food processing sectors—most directly impacted. Repairing damage to the port would likely take months, depending on the severity of damage and the SBA’s capacity to recover. During any period of shortages, the further erosion of livelihoods and income-earning opportunities would likely drive an increasing number of households to face widening food consumption gaps and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes.       

The global fuel market experiences a supply shock

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Given the expectation that fuel stocks in SBA areas are low in the aftermath of the July and September Israeli airstrikes, a global fuel supply shock would likely be easily transmitted into markets in SBA areas. Specifically, if fuel importers are unable to source fuel from their regular international suppliers, importation supply chains would need time to adapt. Monthly fuel import levels would likely decline for a period of two to three months as this occurs. Given the likelihood of insufficient stocks to supply markets in the intermediary period, shortages would be likely in SBA markets during any period of reduced fuel importation. Prices would likely rise quickly for fuel being sold on the parallel market. This would further impede business and livelihood activities, with those who depend on fuel for their livelihoods—such as those in the agriculture, transportation, and food processing sectors—most impacted. In addition, a slight increase in food prices would be likely. Purchasing power among households would decline, and an increasing number would be likely to face food consumption gaps and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes until importation supply chains adjust and the domestic fuel supply stabilizes. 

Al Hudaydah governorate

Reason for selecting this area: There are many areas of high concern in Yemen. FEWS NET has selected Al Hudaydah governorate to highlight in this report given ongoing conflict in frontline areas, recent Israeli airstrikes, and severe flooding in August. 

Al Hudaydah governorate is located along the Red Sea coast (Figure 13). Of a population of over 3.4 million people, an estimated 409,430 are IDPs, according to OCHA. The majority of districts (24) are under SBA control; two in the south are under IRG control. The governorate is one of the main entry points of food import in Yemen; as of 2019, 70 percent of Yemen's commercial food imports entered through Al Hudaydah, As Saleef, and Ras Isa ports.

Agriculture is significant for the governorate’s economy and livelihoods. Al Hudaydah is the top crop-producing governorate of Yemen, contributing up to 28.6 percent of the country’s total crop production in past years. Associated labor along crop production and marketing chains provides the majority of income-earning opportunities for households. Other important livelihood activities in various parts of the governorate include livestock-rearing, fishing, beekeeping, and local factory labor. In September and October, the start of the cereal harvest of sorghum and millet is providing a vital boost in demand for agricultural labor. However, the severe flooding in August is likely reducing harvesting activity and associated agricultural labor opportunities in affected areas. Overall, income-earning opportunities remain highly limited given years of economic deterioration, and slight seasonal improvements are only temporary.

Ground conflict characterized by irregular armed clashes and shelling persists in the frontline areas in the southern part of Al Hudaydah along the borders of Hays and Al Khawkhah. According to data from ACLED, conflict incidents and civilian fatalities are generally occurring at much lower levels relative to the pre-truce period. However, ongoing conflict continues to drive population displacement. According to IOM DTM data, 161 households were displaced from Al Hudaydah in August 2024 due to conflict, economic shocks, and flooding. Meanwhile, worsening insecurity in the Red Sea is impacting thousands of fishing households (with some news reports placing this figure around 200,000) as well as numerous others working along the supply and marketing chains. Many fishermen have been forced to relocate to other waters in southern Yemen, including in Ta’izz, Aden, and Mukallah, incurring additional personal risk and additional costs. Others have postponed fishing activities even at the risk of starvation, especially after eight fishermen were found killed in Al Khawkhah district in early 2024. 

The August 2024 flooding impacted 20 districts of Al Hudaydah, affecting 12,798 families, displacing over 2,000 people, causing over 100 fatalities, damaging infrastructure, homes, and IDP camps, and impacting cropping and livestock activities. Up to 12 percent of farmland (77,362 ha) and 6 percent of small ruminants (106,361) in the governorate were potentially impacted, according to FAO’s August assessment. As a result, crop production and agricultural labor opportunities are likely to be below last year’s levels in areas that were impacted. Additionally, given farmers’ limited financial capacity and lack of government support, the damage and losses this season will likely impact the next season as well, as farmers will likely struggle to repair damage and afford production inputs such as seeds. Furthermore, many farmers are likely to face reduced access to their lands due to the risk of landmine and ERW migration. On the other hand, the SBA has reportedly recently launched large-scale initiatives to cultivate new land area (more than 100,000 hectares of mostly desert and sand dunes) in the aftermath of the rainy season as part of a broader plan to significantly increase support to the agricultural sector; however, the success of these efforts remains to be seen, given that significantly above-average rainfall conditions this past season are unlikely to be repeated in the coming seasons.

Food prices have been stable following the airstrikes, with any potential price speculation averted given price caps and strict controls by local authorities. According to data from FAO, prices of staple wheat flour remained stable in September 2024 compared to the previous month at levels 9 percent lower than at the same time last year and 12 percent below the four-year average. The cost of the MFB was also stable compared to the previous month, at levels 9 and 5 percent lower than last year and the four-year average, respectively. Though slight declines in prices over the past year are a positive factor, improvements have been very slight. Food prices remain significantly above pre-crisis levels, and food access continues to be constrained for poor and very poor households in the governorate due to limited income-earning opportunities and high competition in the labor market. 

Fuel prices have also remained stable since the beginning of the year, following a slight increase in late 2023. As of August 2024, official prices of petroleum were 6 percent higher than at the same time last year and 7 percent higher than the four-year average, according to data from FAO. Official prices of diesel were 6 percent higher than at the same time last year but 5 percent lower than the four-year average.

In September 2024, terms of trade for unskilled laborers (calculated as the ratio between a day’s wages and the cost of the MFB) were 15 percent higher than at the same time last year, and 16 percent higher than the four-year average. This improvement has been driven by both rising wage rates and declining food prices. Terms of trade for agricultural laborers have improved even more substantially, driven by greater wage rate increases (though wage rates remain well below those of unskilled laborers). As of September, terms of trade for agricultural laborers were 37 percent higher than at the same time last year and 22 percent higher than the four-year average. Unfortunately, given worsening economic conditions impacting business and income-earning opportunities, as well as the pause in WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance ongoing since December 2023, it is unlikely that wage laborers have meaningfully benefited from the improved terms of trade. It is estimated that working five full days per month may be attainable for laborers, while working as many as ten full days is quite challenging. At September 2024 wage rates and prices, an unskilled laborer working for five full days would be able to cover only 50 percent of the cost of the MFB. Meanwhile, an agricultural laborer working five full days would be able to cover only 38 percent of the cost of the MFB.

Al Hudaydah governorate has been significantly impacted by the pause of WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance that began in December 2023. Prior to the pause, more than 50 percent of the governorate’s population is estimated to have been receiving regular distributions of humanitarian food assistance. According to data from FSAC, an average of 55,427 households were reached monthly with emergency food assistance between June and August 2024, representing 6 percent of the total population in the governate. This was 51 percent less than the average reached between March and May 2024, and 89 percent less than the monthly average reached between September and November 2023 (immediately before the pause). In May, WFP concluded a one-off pilot food distribution in eight districts of Hajjah and Al Hudaydah aiming to assess the impact of the pause and reached 663,635 people with a food basket providing 984 kilocalories per person per day for a 30-day period (around a 45 percent ration); information on the number and locations of beneficiaries in Al Hudaydah is not available. A WFP assessment of the impacts of the pilot found that the share of households reporting poor food consumption among the assisted population dropped from 41 percent in February to 22 percent in May 2024 immediately after the one-off food distribution. More recently, in August and September, the WFP targeted 1.4 million people in 34 districts with Rapid Emergency Response distributions; some of these districts were in Al Hudaydah, though information on the number and locations of beneficiaries is not available.

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are currently expected at the governorate level due to severely limited livelihood and income-earning opportunities following years of economic decline, recently exacerbated by impacts of the ongoing insecurity in the Red Sea, shocks including recent flooding, and the continued pause of WFP-provided assistance. 

Throughout the projection period:

• Through May 2025, ground fighting is expected to remain at current low levels or potentially slightly decrease along the main frontline areas in the districts of Hays and Al Khawkhah.
• Insecurity in the Red Sea and expected accompanying militarization will continue to disrupt fishing activities.
• The main cereal harvesting season (November/December) is expected to lead to temporary seasonal improvements in access to food and income. However, in areas most impacted by recent flooding, crop production and associated income-earning will likely be below last year’s levels. 
• Given comparatively more severe flood impacts in Al Hudaydah, production of cash crops including vegetables and mangoes is expected to be slightly lower than last year's levels.
• Government-supported initiatives to increase the area planted are unlikely to increase production during the projection period, given farmers’ limited capacity and limited chances to irrigate these areas in the coming rainy season amid forecast below-average rainfall. 
• The availability of agricultural labor opportunities is expected to be slightly below last year's levels. The November/December cereals harvest is expected to be below last year’s levels. 
• Opportunities for unskilled labor, self-employment, and petty trade are likely to further decline slightly, given expectations for persistent poor economic conditions and poor business environment in addition to the impacts of recent floods on livelihoods (which will likely take time to repair given current low levels of livelihood interventions and recovery support).
• Wheat flour prices in SBA markets are anticipated to remain generally stable throughout the outlook period given SBA price controls. 

The cereal harvest and vegetable cultivation season from October to January is expected to slightly improve food access and income for poor households. Subsequently, the mango harvest from March to May will provide a slight seasonal boost in access to food and income, though improvements will be lower than last year given damage due to flooding. Also in the March to May period, households will experience some temporary improvements during Ramadan when social support is expected to increase. However, these improvements will not be sufficient to compensate for the gaps left by recent floods, which have hindered many farmers' ability to recover quickly. Additionally, the levels of livelihood assistance and response are low, and better-off households are increasingly unable to provide social support during Ramadan as the number of people in need rises. Given the overall trend of declining social support and limited income-earning opportunities, poor households are likely to exhaust their food stocks and resources obtained during Ramadan and the recent cereal harvest. Their coping capacities have been severely eroded, and they have limited ability to purchase food on credit. Consequently, Emergency outcomes (IPC Phase 4) are expected to persist during the projection period.