Economic warfare drives worsening food insecurity nationwide

• In Yemen, lasting impacts of protracted conflict on livelihoods and the economy are being exacerbated by recent escalation in economic warfare between the major parties to the conflict, largely counteracting positive impacts of the decline in conflict levels following the 2022 truce. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are expected to persist nationwide, with assistance needs peaking in the range of 18.0-18.99 million during the August-September period, prior to the main harvest.
• In rural areas, the favorable March-May first rainy season and stable fuel availability/prices are benefiting the agricultural sector and creating relatively more agricultural job opportunities compared to last year. However, farmers are still struggling with high input costs which limit production capacity. Meanwhile, the ongoing economic slowdown and associated challenges in the construction sector are further limiting income-earning opportunities for millions of casual laborers.
• Across areas controlled by the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA), all WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance has been paused since December 2023, affecting 9.5 million beneficiaries. Despite seasonal improvements in food availability from harvests in late September to November, food from own crop production is limited and insufficient to fill food consumption gaps. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist, with worst outcomes expected in areas where more than 50 percent of the population previously received assistance.
• Millions of households in areas controlled by the internationally-recognized government (IRG) are also expected to face persisting food consumption gaps due to severely poor economic conditions characterized by currency depreciation, high food prices, and lack of income-earning opportunities. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes will remain widespread, with some households expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), particularly those who lack food and income sources and are fully dependent on assistance. 

Benefits of reduced conflict outweighed by economic warfare and reduced assistance levels

In Yemen, two years since the 2022 truce that brought a lasting decline in conflict levels, households have generally not been able to reap benefits in terms of improved food security. This is largely due to a notable decline in the provision of humanitarian food assistance, particularly in SBA areas (Figure 1) where 9.5 million beneficiaries have been impacted by the total pause in WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance since December 2023; however, 3.6 million beneficiaries in IRG areas are also suffering from notable declines in assistance distribution frequency and ration sizes. 

These cuts to assistance have left households increasingly dependent on markets for food. While food prices have declined slightly in SBA-controlled areas over the past year and while the rate of price increase has slowed in IRG-controlled areas, millions of poor households in Yemen are likely unable to fully compensate for assistance cuts given highly limited opportunities for income-earning and high competition for available opportunities.

Prospects for economic conditions and income-earning have worsened further since March, given escalation in economic warfare tactics between the country’s two central banks. Given orders to cease financial transactions with banks in territory held by the opposing party, foreign and domestic money transfers – including for remittances and business transactions – have seen disruptions in May and June. Further retaliatory actions by the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden) could risk import disruptions if major SBA-based traders are restricted from participating in foreign currency auctions due to restrictions on banks or if SBA-based banks are cut off the international financial transactions servers (SWIFT). Even as things stand, economic conditions are likely to deteriorate somewhat in SBA areas amid gradually worsening liquidity shortages. Meanwhile, in IRG areas, the ongoing halt in oil exports due to the ongoing threat of drone strikes is depriving the IRG of its most important source of government revenue; IRG-controlled areas are likely to continue experiencing depreciation of the local currency, food and fuel price increases, a deteriorating business environment, and insufficient provision of essential public services (including electricity). 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are expected to persist nationwide, with assistance needs peaking in the range of 18.0-18.99 million during the August-September period, prior to the main harvest. Following this, food and income associated with the main cereal harvest will contribute to a slight improvement in outcomes in the October to January period. In areas controlled by the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA), areas where more than 50 percent of the population previously received assistance are expected to continue facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, with some households likely in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). 

Learn more

This analysis incorporates available information as of June 14, 2024. Follow these links for additional information: 

• Previous Yemen Food Security Outlook: February to September 2024
• Latest Yemen Key Message Update: May 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology  and approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Yemen has been plagued by civil war since March 2015. Though the conflict is complex, involving a number of actors, the major parties to the conflict are the forces of the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA) (known as Ansar Allah and informally referred to as the Houthis) and the allied forces of the internationally-recognized government (IRG). The SBA controls the most populated areas of northern and western Yemen, including the country’s capital, Amanat al Asimah (Sana’a city), while the IRG controls the rest of the southern and eastern territory, including the IRG’s relocated capital in Aden (Aden city).

Nearly a decade of war has taken an immense toll on the economy and local livelihoods. International business activity and investment have stalled, and the fragmented central banks (one in Sana’a and one in Aden) prevent unified national fiscal and monetary policy. In IRG-controlled areas, where foreign exchange shortages are significant, and government regulation is weak, depreciation of the local currency has persistently driven rising local food prices. Despite a relative calming of the conflict that has been maintained since the truce that spanned April to October 2022, households have been able to only minimally reestablish livelihoods, given persistent poor macroeconomic conditions and recent shocks. Nationwide, prices of food, fuel, and essential goods are above five-year average levels and significantly higher than pre-conflict levels, straining poor households’ limited resources.  

Although Yemen is overwhelmingly dependent on imports for its staple food supply, agriculture is a vital sector of Yemen’s economy (contributing about 13.7 percent of GDP), and food and cash crop production remains important to rural livelihoods. Most significantly, poor households in both urban and rural areas are generally highly dependent on labor to earn income, and labor opportunities increase seasonally linked to activity throughout agricultural production and marketing chains. Most cultivated land is located in the northern and central highlands, which are among the most densely populated rural areas and are mostly under the control of the SBA. In highland areas, farmers typically produce cereal crops (mostly rainfed and largely for their own consumption) along with vegetables and qat. In lowland areas (the western Tihama Plain and coastal regions), farmers also produce cereal crops (more commonly irrigated by runoff water from the highlands) as well as fruit and vegetables. About 60 percent of cultivated land (mainly in the highlands) is rainfed, with production patterns dictated by two main rainy seasons from March to May and July to September (Figure 2).

In June, the current situation month of this report, farmers in lowland areas have recently concluded the main harvest of fruit(particularly Mango) and farmers across most of the country have recently concluded the spring cereal harvest, providing a slight improvement in access to food and cash income that typically lasts into June. Following this, agricultural activities are generally slowest from June to September, in advance of the country’s main cereal harvest from September/October to December. 

Livestock production remains an important source of income for many families in Yemen. Livestock production improves during the rainy seasons when pasture and water availability increase. Livestock sales typically peak between February and June with the approach of Ramadan and Eid Al Adha and the typical season for Yemeni marriages – events where households slaughter animals (mostly sheep and goats) and increase meat consumption. Livestock sales usually then decline during the dry season from June to September due to the absence of natural pasture and high fodder prices (particularly in lowland areas where natural vegetation is more sparse).

Despite comparatively small shifts in food consumption levels due to seasonal factors throughout the year, the key drivers of acute food insecurity in Yemen—conflict and poor macroeconomic conditions—result in high assistance needs throughout the year. Income-earning opportunities, including from daily labor and petty trade, are highly limited relative to needs. Prices of food and non-food goods—including essential livelihood inputs—have risen over the years, with salaries and wage rates not keeping pace. In this context, humanitarian food assistance has become an important source of food and income for millions of people across Yemen. At peak levels in 2019 and 2021, 12-13 million people were reached monthly with nearly full rations of assistance. However, since the end of 2021, funding shortages have necessitated several iterations of assistance scale-down, including, most recently, a total pause in assistance across SBA areas affecting 9.5 million people, ongoing since December 2023. As such, millions of households in Yemen face highly eroded coping capacity and frequent periods of food consumption gaps.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Conflict: The protracted armed conflict in Yemen has continued into its tenth year. According to data from ACLED, the unofficial ceasefire and decline in conflict levels since the expiration of the April-October 2022 truce has continued; in May 2024, the number of conflict-related events and events targeting civilians stood at similar low rates as in 2023, as did fatalities/civilian fatalities (Figure 3). On May 18, reinforcements by IRG forces were sent to the Hyfan frontline on the border of Ta’izz and Lahij, and renewed military clashes there resulted in six IRG dead. In Ma’rib, escalation of conflict in Harib resulted in six deaths among IRG forces.

Insecurity in the Red Sea continues, characterized by SBA threatening ship traffic and international actors retaliating. According to data from ACLED, from October 2023 to April 2024 SBA forces targeted nearly 80 ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden with 164 missiles and 265 drones, hitting 29 merchant vessels and sinking one of them. The US-led coalition, conducted joint strikes, including 26 airstrikes targeting 372 SBA assets (including 62 drones, 28 drone boats, 151 missiles, and 131 other targets) resulting in 37 casualties and injuries. In January 2024, SBA forces claimed their first attack on a US warship in the Red Sea, which was followed by the first round of US-led strikes on Houthi military assets.

In June, the rate of attacks increased slightly. On June 12, SBA forces used a boat as a weapon for the first time and successfully targeted and seriously damaged a Greek-owned cargo ship. This attack was followed by another on June 13, targeting a Palau-flagged cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden. The SBA has expanded the targeted location of attacks to commercial ships to now include the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. This is anticipated to be reflected in additional freight cost increases starting in June 2024.

Conflict incidents also include violations against humanitarian workers, such as arbitrary detentions by SBA. On June 6, 13 UN staff were arrested in the Yemeni cities of Sana’a, Hudaydah, and Hajjah, at least 11 of when were civil society workers. This has further challenged humanitarian work in SBA areas.

Economy: Already poor macroeconomic conditions are deteriorating and contributing to the poor food security situation in the country. In IRG-controlled areas, the continued halt of oil exports due to the threat of SBA drone strikes on port oil infrastructure, ongoing since October 2022, is further destabilizing the economy. Oil exports previously accounted for 63 percent of the country’s total exports, 70 percent of the country's budgetary resources, and 30 percent of the country’s GDP. The loss of this crucial source of foreign exchange is contributing to further depreciation of the currency, with only eight irregular currency auctions held since the start of the year. In May 2024, the local currency in Aden (the IRG reference market) depreciated by 34 and 76 percent compared to the same time last year and the four-year average, respectively, according to FAO market data. Inflation is worsening, mostly driven by currency depreciation and rising global fuel prices. In June, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) provided a 300 million USD deposit to the CBY-Aden as the fourth installment of a total 1.2 billion USD provided over the past year to support essential obligations of the public budget (such as civil servant salaries and essential public services). However, the deposit covers only a small fraction of total needs and is insufficient to improve macroeconomic indicators. Poor macroeconomic conditions also persist in SBA-controlled areas, where liquidity shortages of local currency have been steadily worsening, given a longstanding ban on new banknotes and the gradual shrinking of the money supply as old banknotes deteriorate. However, due to strict regulations on exchange markets, the local currency has remained stable.

In May, ongoing economic warfare between the IRG and SBA severely escalated when the Aden-based CBY suspended financial transactions with six of the biggest commercial banks in Yemen (which operate in both IRG and SBA areas) due to the banks’ failure to relocate their headquarters from Sana’a to Aden. Following this, the SBA retaliated by ordering all Sana’a-based banks and exchange shops to stop financial transactions with any banks based in IRG areas and without branches in SBA areas (i.e., microfinance banks, exchange shops). These moves have implications for important financial activities, including inflows of foreign exchange and foreign remittances, and internal money transfers between SBA and IRG areas. Following the CBY-Aden’s order to suspend transactions, MoneyGram and Al Ragihi Bank in the KSA stopped transferring money to SBA-controlled areas; this is expected to be reducing inflows of cross-border remittances.

Flooding: According to the Global Shelter Cluster, devastating rains and flooding in Yemen during the first rainy season have affected more than 37,000 people this year. In March, at least nine governorates witnessed moderate to heavy rainfall. Infrastructure was damaged in Lahij, Abyan, and Shabwah. In Ma’rib, government estimates indicate that more than 6,500 IDPs were negatively affected by heavy rainfall and the destruction of temporary shelters. Five people were also reportedly killed by flooding in Ibb.

In April, flooding reportedly killed 12 people and impacted more than 3,000 IDPs, including 1,335 IDP households in Al Abr, Al Mukalla, and Sayun districts in Hadhramaut governorate who experienced full or partial damage to their shelters, non-food items, and food supplies. IDPs in Abyan (458 households), Al Dali’ (423 households), Al Mahrah (258 households), Ma’rib (540 households), Sa’dah (287 households), Shabwah (51 households), and Ta’izz (110 households) faced worsening conditions because of floods and sandstorms. In the south, the flood risks were directly linked to low atmospheric pressure that hit the Persian Gulf and expanded to Yemen. Limited capacity and preparedness compelled the IRG government to appeal for support from international organizations.

Cholera Outbreak: Health officials in IRG areas have reported elevated cholera activity in multiple locations, with more than 59,000 suspected cases reported since January; however, there is a lack of accurate data. Official data collected from IRG areas indicate a total of 9,186 cases (869 confirmed cases) were reported from January through May 24, significantly higher than the 969 cases reported over a similar period in 2023. The majority of cases are in Aden (2,144 cases), followed by Al Dali' (2,092 cases), Lahij (1,833 cases), Ta’izz (1,317 cases), Al Hudaydah (511 cases), Abyan (490 cases), and Ma’rib (324 cases). Official data are not collected in SBA areas, but available reports and anecdotal information suggest that conditions are rapidly deteriorating. In May, the UN reported 40,000 suspected cases and over 160 deaths. 

According to a recent report by Médecins sans Frontières, a surge in the number of people with acute watery diarrhea is occurring in 20 governorates; more than 63,000 cases have been reported in the country as of May 31 according to health authorities. Despite limited testing capacity, more than 2,700 of the tested cases were positive for cholera.

As of May 12, Health Cluster partners have established 18 Diarrhea Treatment Centers (DTCs) and 84 Oral Rehydration Corners (ORCs) to help manage cholera cases, and additional DTCs and ORCs are planned. Nationwide, suspected cases are rising by 500 to 1,000 cases per day and could reach 133,000 to 255,000 cumulative cases by September 2024.

The risk of contracting cholera remains high, especially for IDPs who live in crowded conditions with poor hygiene facilities. Nationwide, children under five are the most affected, increasing the risk of worsening acute malnutrition. Drought and flooding greatly increase the risk of cholera; during droughts, people use available water even if it is contaminated out of sheer necessity, while flooding can spread bacteria and contaminate water sources.

Crop production: Cereal production declined significantly after the start of the conflict but has been gradually recovering in recent years (Figure 4). Based on most recent available agricultural statistics, the 2022 annual production estimate of cereals, qat, cash crops, fruits, and vegetables is stable with the previous year, but showed significant improvement over the past four years (respective 70, 30, 8, 20, and 14 percent increases). In 2024, crop production levels are expected to be better than last year. However, farmers continue to face overall high input costs, limiting production capacity. Additionally, some farmers have lost markets due to bans on exports to neighboring countries, with mango farmers among the worst impacted. 

According to the FAO DIEM round 16 report in June 2024, eighty-six percent of surveyed crop producers faced difficulties in crop production during the ongoing season (March to April), the highest proportion compared to previous DIEM rounds. Around 70 percent cited insufficient irrigation or rainwater as a major difficulty and nearly 31 percent cited access to fertilizer. The report also indicated that crop produces faced selling difficulty (56 percent) followed by low demand (36 percent) as markets are generally flooded with food and cereals. 

Livestock production: Currently, high prices of livestock – combined with suppressed household purchasing power – is likely preventing Yemenis from celebrating Eid Al Adha and limit traders’ income. Imported livestock are also expensive due to deterioration of local currency and informal taxes. According to FAO data, the monthly average price of goats (six-month-old) in May in Aden increased by 56 and 82 percent compared to last year and the four-year average, respectively, while in Amanat Al Asimah, prices remained stable.

According to the FAO DIEM round 16 report, the majority of livestock farmers (58 percent) reported a decrease in the number of livestock heads owned in 2024 compared to 2023. The primary causes of the decline were identified as animal deaths (26 percent) and distressed animal sales (45 percent). The primary challenges mentioned were obtaining feed from the market (73 percent), animal illnesses or fatalities (37 percent), pasture access (32 percent), veterinary services (26 percent), and water access. 

Off-own-farm sources of income: Good rainfall during the first rainy season and stable fuel availability and prices are driving an increase in labor opportunities relative to last year in terms of both agricultural labor opportunities and non-agricultural labor opportunities along the supply chain. relative to last year. This is expected to support slightly improved access to income for many poor households. On the other hand, the continuous economic slowdown and the challenges that the construction sector faces are further limiting income-earning opportunities for millions of casual laborers.

Market supplies: According to the Sana’a-based Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) and the Aden-based General Authority for Standardization and Metrology, Yemen imported a total of 1,918,131 MT of basic food commodities via all major sea and land ports from January to April 2024, similar to what was imported during the same time period of 2023 and 2022 (Figure 5). Of the total amount imported from January to April 2024, 71 percent entered through the SBA-controlled western Red Sea ports; this is higher than the share in 2023 by 6 percentage points, likely the result of SBA efforts to re-direct imports through ports under their control. Compared to 2022 when the Ukraine crisis caused disruption to importation supply chains, this share is similar. To date, the Red Sea crisis has not reduced the volumes of food and fuel imported and supplied into the local markets, but it has led to increased freight and insurance costs, which are putting upward pressure on consumer prices.

Household purchasing capacity: According to FAO data, wage rates for casual labor remained stable from April to May in most governorates, and were similar to or higher than last year’s rates. Meanwhile, the cost of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) in May was stable compared to April at levels and was generally slightly higher than last year in IRG-controlled governorates (by an average of 8 percent), driven largely by currency depreciation, and lower than last year in SBA-controlled governorates (by an average of 13 percent). Purchasing power as measured by the terms of trade (a ratio) between casual labor wage rates and the cost of the MFB generally improved somewhat compared to last year, but there is significant variability across governorates, with some areas seeing deteriorating terms of trade. Fuel prices in May were stable compared to the previous month, on average, in both IRG and SBA areas. However, in IRG areas, prices of petroleum and diesel increased by 24 and 23 percent, respectively, compared to the same time last year. In SBA areas, prices of diesel were 11 percent lower than last year, while prices of petroleum were similar. 

In SBA-controlled areas, casual labor wage rates in May were similar to the same time last year (only 3 percent lower) and 9 percent higher than the four-year average, resulting in a 10 percent improvement in purchasing power for casual laborers compared to last year, driven by declining food prices. Across IRG-controlled areas, casual labor wage rates in May were 8 percent higher than last year and 40 percent higher than the four-year average. Given rising wage rates alongside a slowed rate of food price increases, purchasing power for casual laborers in May remained stable on average compared to the same time last year. Moreover, household purchasing capacity remains constrained by limited income-earning opportunities, resulting in underemployment and insufficient income for meeting basic needs. 

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

The provision of humanitarian food assistance remains comparatively low compared to prior recent years. In areas controlled by the SBA, around 9.5 million former assistance beneficiaries remain affected by the pause in WFP’s general food assistance (GFA) program, ongoing since December 2023. Non-WFP partners (e.g., CARE) are trying to provide food assistance but can only reach a small fraction of the population. In IRG-controlled areas, WFP continues to distribute assistance to 3.6 million beneficiaries under the GFA program, but with reduced ration sizes and distribution frequency. In May 2024, WFP reported providing GFA to 1.1 million people (all in IRG-controlled areas), as part of only the second or third cycle of distributions that have reached beneficiaries in 2024. Ration sizes are equivalent to less than 50 percent of a household’s minimum food requirements for one month. According to the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) dashboard, WFP and partners have reached around 3.8 million people nationwide with emergency food assistance in 2024 in May, with the vast majority of those beneficiaries in areas controlled by the IRG.

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Country wide, social support during Eid Al Adha is slightly increasing access to food with the distribution of meat. However, households are also contending with a seasonal increase in non-food expenditures during the holiday. Meanwhile, ongoing economic warfare is driving a decline in both internal and cross-border remittances. This is on top of the gaps faced by households in SBA areas due to the pause in humanitarian assistance and by households in IRG areas due to rising fuel and food prices. Given limited income-earning opportunities country-wide, millions of poor households are unable to bridge food consumption gaps. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes persist across most governorates nationwide, while Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persist in some SBA-controlled areas where a large share of the population (more than 50 percent) has been affected by the assistance pause. Households who typically rely or relied on food assistance as their main food or income source and those heavily reliant on daily wage labor for income are likely experiencing the worst outcomes. 

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions

• Peace negotiations are likely to continue, but with no deal expected during the projection period given the continued lack of trust between parties and continued concerns over demands seen as unpalatable (including the payment of civil servant salaries in SBA areas). 
• The unofficial state of truce is likely to continue to hold during the projection period, with levels of conflict likely to remain similar to current levels. Periods of sporadic localized escalations in fighting will likely continue, particularly impacting frontlines in Al Dali’ and Lahij. No notable shifts in territorial control are expected. However, some uncertainty exists, with the re-escalation of fighting possible in response to escalating economic warfare.
• Missile and drone attacks launched by SBA forces against commercial shipping are likely to continue in the coming months, though at levels significantly below the peaks observed in February/March, as air strikes by the US-led coalition are likely to continue at levels proportional to the severity of SBA attacks.
• Increased freight and insurance costs due to insecurity in the Red Sea will continue to drive elevated import costs.
• Rainfall during Yemen’s second rainy season (July to September) is expected to be above average.

Sub-national assumptions for IRG-controlled areas

• Economic conditions are likely to remain very poor, with no meaningful improvement expected. The prolonged suspension of crude oil exports is expected to continue to drive severe shortages of government revenue and foreign currency. 
• The Aden-based rial (YER) is expected to continue to depreciate, with a ceiling of 1,900 YER/USD. Based on past patterns, the 300 million USD deposit provided by the KSA in June is not expected to prevent continued depreciation.
• Staple food prices are expected to continue to increase and remain above last year’s levels, driven primarily by rising import costs amid the continued depreciation of the YER, as well as by rising global food prices, high freight costs for imported food and fuel, and rising fuel prices. 

Sub-national assumptions for SBA-controlled areas

• Given government price controls and stable fuel prices, staple food prices are expected to increase only slightly overall due to higher shipping freight costs, despite the increase in market demand amid the ongoing pause in assistance. Despite this, staple food prices will likely remain less than or similar to last year’s levels. 
• Given disruptions to money transfers amid the feud between the country’s two central banks, cross-border remittance inflows are likely to be lower than last year.

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumption

• Given ongoing funding shortages amid high needs worldwide, the provision of humanitarian assistance is likely to remain similar to current comparatively low levels. The Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan for 2024 is only 22 percent funded against the total requirement, with the FSAC sector only 8 percent funded, which is 20 percentage points lower compared to the same time in 2023.

Sub-national assumption for IRG Areas

• The provision of humanitarian food assistance is likely to remain similar to current levels, with around 3.6 million beneficiaries being reached on a cyclical basis (around once every two or three months). Each distribution is expected to provide less than 50 percent of a household’s minimum energy requirements for one month. However, WFP is warning of the potential for supply shortages, and additional reductions in assistance levels are possible.

Sub-national assumption for SBA Areas

• Given ongoing challenging negotiations between WFP and SBA authorities, as well as the fact that restarting assistance distribution supply chains will take several months, WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance to SBA areas is likely to remain paused throughout the majority of the projection period.¹

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

SBA-controlled areas: From June to September, rural households in the northern and central highlands are expected to experience seasonally lower access to food and income due to the semi-lean season; however, the harvest of grapes in the northern highlands will provide some opportunities for agricultural and non-agricultural labor opportunities between July and August. Meanwhile, households in lowland areas – particularly in the Tehama Plain – are expected to face reduced access to food and income due to the agricultural off-season and associated decline in income-earning opportunities. From October to January, the availability of food and income is expected to increase area-wide as the main cereal harvest starts and the fruit (especially citrus) production season in the highlands approaches. Crop production is anticipated to be favorable and better than last year, supported by above-average rainfall during Yemen’s second rainy season. Additionally, agricultural activities in SBA-controlled areas are likely to benefit from comparatively lower fuel prices. However, the expectation of worsening economic conditions is unlikely to allow households to fully benefit from the seasonal improvements. 

Generally, the recent escalation of economic conflict between the IRG and SBA is expected to worsen acute food insecurity. The monetary and financial actions taken by the CBY-Aden are likely to exacerbate the SBA’s ongoing liquidity problem, making it difficult for small traders to access foreign currency and the necessary resources for their businesses. Furthermore, the disruptions to financial activities are expected to have a negative impact on the overall business environment, reducing job opportunities for millions of households. As a result, further constraints on income-generation are expected to limit financial access to food and further diminish the already strained purchasing power of millions of households. Given this and the expected continuation of the pause in WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance, millions of households in SBA areas will face food consumption gaps. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist until January 2025. Some worst-affected households will likely face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes, with the greatest concern for households whose primary source of food was humanitarian assistance prior to the pause. However, in the October to January period, seasonal improvements from late September to November associated with the main harvest will slightly reduce the number of households facing consumption gaps and severe outcomes.

IRG-controlled areas: In the lowland and coastal areas, a seasonal decrease in food and income from June to September is generally expected during the agricultural off-season. However, the citrus (lemon) and flower (fol) harvests are predicted to provide some income-earning opportunities for daily wage laborers; for example, agricultural labor opportunities in Lahij, Abyan, and Hadhramaut are generally associated with the citrus harvests. From October to January, food availability and income-earning opportunities are expected to increase seasonally during the main harvest season. 

Throughout the projection period, government revenue shortages and deteriorating economic conditions are expected to exacerbate already limited household purchasing capacity. Although wage rates are expected to rise in many areas due to inflation, the real value of labor wages is likely to remain stable or decrease given expectations for rising food prices, reducing the purchasing power of many households. Meanwhile, the salaries of government employees have not been adjusted for inflation since the start of the conflict, and the majority are currently unable to afford even 50 percent of the cost of the MFB with their monthly earnings. Given this, alongside further disruptions to economic activity due to the feud between the central banks as well as continued low levels of humanitarian food assistance, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are likely to persist at the governorate level throughout the projection period despite seasonal improvements from late September to November alongside the main harvest. The most vulnerable households – including those who lack sources of income and are fully dependent on assistance – are expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

Sub-national: SBA-controlled areas

Event: The feud between the country’s two central banks further escalates

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes:  If the CBY-Aden takes further retaliatory actions, the most likely and consequential include suspending internal transfers and restricting access to financial services, including the SWIFT servers which are essential for foreign transfers. Other possible retaliatory actions against SBA banks include the suspending of licenses, imposing of fines, and rescinding of all privileges related to public currency auctions and documentary credits. 

If the CBY-Aden restricts access to public currency auctions for banks that violate its rules and regulations, traders in SBA-controlled areas would likely face restricted access to hard currency required for food and fuel imports. Any disruption to imports would likely result in reduced availability of basic food commodities across SBA-controlled governorates and would be expected to lead to a hike in basic food commodities prices. 

Import disruption and a price hike would likely aggravate the situation, further preventing hundreds of thousands of households from accessing their minimum food needs and increasing the consumption gaps. Given the exhausted livelihoods and food coping strategies, the number of households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes – particularly IDPs and former WFP food assistance beneficiaries – would likely increase.

Event: Imports through Red Sea ports are substantially restricted

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Food and fuel prices would likely rise as market actors respond to anticipated future supply reduction. In the medium term (four to six months), if prolonged, a significant reduction in commercial imports would be expected to manifest in reduced food and fuel availability in many SBA-controlled areas of the country as stocks in Yemen (expected to be equivalent to around three months of needs) are depleted. This would result in further food and fuel price increases and would be expected to result in an increase in the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes – as well as an increase in the severity of acute food insecurity among these households – as households’ purchasing power reduces. Area-level deterioration to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would be possible in additional areas where food availability is significantly reduced for a prolonged period, with an increasing number of households likely to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). 

However, the degree of these impacts depends on the extent to which imports can be re-routed through alternative seaports. In particular, Aden seaport – the largest port in IRG-controlled areas – is expected to be able to absorb some of the imports that previously entered through the Red Sea ports. However, re-routing imports would take time and the full extent of imports that previously entered through the Red Sea ports would likely not be absorbed through other ports, due to limited alternative port capacity as well as the higher costs associated with adjusting importation supply chains and domestic trade routes to bring essential commodities to areas more distant from Aden seaport. 

Al Jawf governorate (Figure 6)

Reason for selecting this area: There are multiple areas of high concern in Yemen. FEWS NET has selected Al Jawf governorate as the featured area of concern for this report due to the large share of the population that has been affected by the pause in humanitarian food assistance throughout SBA areas, ongoing since late 2023.

Al Jawf governorate is located in northern Yemen, bordering Saudi Arabia (Figure 6). The majority of the population of around 633,160 live in the west of the governorate, primarily in the eleven districts under SBA administration. Khabb wa ash Sha’af district – under IRG administration – is the largest district in terms of geographical area and is mostly desert. Approximately 26 percent of the population are IDPs; according to the Camp Coordination Camp Management cluster, a total 15,773 recorded households (and likely more that have not been recorded)are hosted in 171 displacement sites across the governorate’s 12 districts. Khabb wa ash Sha’af is currently hosting the largest share of IDPs. The majority of displacement over the years has been due to conflict in Al Jawf governorate and surrounding areas.

Al Jawf is comprised of three livelihood zones: the Western Central Highland Wheat, Sorghum, Qat, and Livestock zone (YE13) in the west; the Northern and Eastern Desert Pastoral zone (YE08) in the center and east; and the small Central and Eastern Wadi Palm, Wheat, Vegetable and Livestock zone (YE04) located in the middle of the Desert Pastoral zone. Crop production is an important livelihood activity in western areas. The most widely produced crop is wheat (a critical staple grain), with other crops including sorghum, maize, and millet, as well as vegetables and fruit. Livestock production – particularly goats, sheep, and camels – is also important in all rural livelihood zones, particularly in the eastern pastoral areas.

Of the 200,000 hectares of arable land, only 93,000 are currently utilized for rainfed and irrigated cultivation. Agricultural production has likely expanded in recent years. In 2023, wheat production reportedly increased by around 70 percent from 2022, attributed to the provision of irrigation systems, the good rainy season, increased fuel availability and declining conflict levels. Still, production remains constrained by high costs of inputs, limited purchasing power among the population, and landmines.

Although Al Jawf is one of the largest wheat-producing areas in the country, production is insufficient to cover the population’s consumption needs. According to the Sana’a-based Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), the population’s total annual wheat grain consumption requirements are estimated at 84,834 MT in 2024, or 122 kg per capita. Meanwhile, local wheat production in the 2023/24 season – harvested in March/April 2024 – is estimated at around 26,000 MT, or only around 30 percent of consumption requirements.  As such, households will remain heavily reliant on the market for imported wheat, especially outside of the harvest months (March/April).

People of the governorate rely on different sources of income. According the 2021 Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment, 76 percent of total households surveyed reported an off-own-farm source of income as their primary income source: around 36 percent reported non-agricultural labor, around 8 percent reported agricultural labor, around 14 percent reported humanitarian assistance, and around 8 percent reported handicrafts. Meanwhile, on-own-farm activities provided the primary source of income for 24 percent of total households surveyed: livestock sales was reported as the top source by around 21 percent of households, with around 3 percent reporting sales of qat and other crops. Displaced households primarily seek out casual daily wage labor as the work does not require high skill levels; as a result, the high IDP population is driving high competition for available opportunities. The ongoing economic tension between the two central banks, which has led to a shortage of local currency, has affected the general business environment, according to qualitative data gathered by key informants.

Local farmers face constrained profits due to high agricultural input prices, the absence of a national marketing strategy and supportive policies, and recent restrictions and controls imposed by the authorities. For example, during the last crop production season (June to September 2023), prices of tomatoes were suppressed due to marketing constraints and the closure of KSA neighboring markets where farmers used to sell their crops, causing profit losses. Similarly, date farmers were not allowed to sell dates in the market during the previous season, but were instead forced to sell their crops to a local company for a fixed price regardless of high production costs, leading to an increase in supplies and a decrease in prices in local markets. 

In 2023, more than 50 percent of the population of Al Jawf received regular humanitarian food assistance, according to data from FSAC. Furthermore, humanitarian food assistance was considered the main source of food for around 18 percent of households in Al Jawf. As such, the pause in WFP-provided assistance in SBA-controlled areas has therefore impacted household food consumption, as poor and very poor households struggle to purchase foods from the market in the absence of assistance. A WFP assessment conducted between November 2023 and February 2024 reported that households were experiencing severe food deprivation; “Al Bayda, Al Jawf, and Hajjah had the highest prevalence of poor food consumption among ex-beneficiaries” with “more than half of the sample population (….) in Al Jawf facing poor food consumption.” The assessment also indicated that the reduced coping strategy index (rCSI) indicator of food consumption worsened following the assistance pause, driving increased adoption of negative food-based coping strategies. Prior to the pause, FAO High Frequency Monitoring in January-February 2023 highlighted that Al Jawf already had a high prevalence of food insecurity, hunger, and inadequate diets, and that the “percentage of households often resorting to food-consumption based coping strategies is higher than the national average 42.8 percent.” According to data from FSAC, in March 2024, only 6,700 individuals were reached with regular food assistance, compared to 298,928 beneficiaries reached in September 2023, two months before the pause.

Wheat flour and other basic food commodities are currently available and supply is stable in Al Jawf's rural and urban markets, supported by the high volumes of wheat imported through the SBA-controlled Red Sea ports. In both urban and rural areas, there has been an increase in demand for wheat flour and rice over the last three months, as well as a general increase in the quantities of essential commodities that households purchase. This can be attributed to the interruption of food aid which has increased market demand for staple food items. Despite the high demand, strict price controls enforced by SBA authorities have generally supported the stable prices of food commodities, but poor and very poor households are still struggling with constrained purchasing capacity. According to WFP, the average cost of the MFB in April 2024 in Al Jawf was 7,641 YER/person; this is similar to the same time last year (2 percent lower). According to data from WFP, in March 2024, prices of staple wheat flour were stable compared to the previous month, but 18 and 8 percent less than last year and the five-year average, respectively; prices of cooking oil were also stable compared to the previous month but significantly higher, by 19 and 54 percent, compared to the same time last year and the five-year average, respectively; prices of sugar prices were stable compared to the previous month and the same time last year but higher by 14 percent compared to the five-year average. Meanwhile, prices of diesel were stable compared to the previous month but were 17 and 12 percent less than last year and the five-year average, respectively. With the ongoing economic slowdown and high competition for limited income opportunities, the potential to earn enough income to cover the full cost of the MFB is unlikely, especially among IDPs, as they face higher competition for daily wage labor opportunities than host households.

The impacts of the October 2022 truce continue to contribute to significantly lower levels of conflict. According to ACLED, there were six conflict-related events recorded in May 2024, 40, 89, and 82 percent less compared to May 2023, May 2022 immediately before the truce, and the long-term average, respectively; similar decreases are reported in the number of events targeting civilians. In May 2024 there were only 6 fatalities recorded, 65 and 96 percent lower than in May 2023 and May 2022 before the truce/long-term average, respectively. Despite these decreases, Al Jawf is still impacted by the protracted conflict which has impacted livelihoods and food access.

Land mines continue to contribute to acute food insecurity in Al Jawf by limiting access to safe land cultivation by the population, the majority of which relies upon agricultural activities for their livelihoods. In 2022, reported human rights violations caused by landmines across the different districts of Al Jawf reached 101 incidents, resulting in 67 injuries and 34 fatalities. Based on available reports, in 2020 around 957 mines and explosive devices planted in Khub Al-Sha`f have been destroyed following minesweeping activities, but the potential risk of landmines in the remaining 11 districts under the control of SBA is unclear and minesweeping has not occurred. The districts of  Khub, Al-Sha`af, Al-Ghail, Al-Maslub, Al Hazm, and Al-Matoun are likely to be the most impacted by the landmine network in the governorate. Another critical risk associated with flooding is the possibility of waters drifting and shifting the landmines from contaminated areas to areas where people normally live.

Due to the overall poor macroeconomic conditions and shocks, the continued pause of HFA, and limited livelihood and income-earning opportunities, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persist at the governorate level, with worst-affected households likely facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes. Throughout the projection period:

• Overall levels of conflict are expected to remain near current low levels. Re-escalation of ground fighting and shelling along the Al Jawf border with the KSA and Khabb wa ash Sha’af is not anticipated.
• Food import levels are expected to remain stable. Staple food prices are likely to remain stable between June and September. However, a slight increase in prices is likely from October 2024 to January 2025 due to the anticipated hard currency shortages as a result of the economic warfare between the country’s central banks.
  • Wheat flour prices in the Al Hazm urban reference market are expected to remain stable through September and then increase only slightly between October and January, by 2 to 5 percent. Overall, wheat flour prices are likely to remain within the projected boundaries of 347 to 440 YER/kg.
• Agricultural labor income is likely to remain at current levels through September due to the agricultural off-season. Labor income is expected to increase between October and January due to cereal and vegetable land preparation and cultivation.
• Livestock production and sales are likely to decline following their typical peak during Eid Al Adha in June and will persist at these reduced levels throughout the projection period.

Given expectations for the evolution of food and income, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to persist throughout the projection period, despite some improvement in the October to January period alongside food and income from agricultural activities.