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Assistance needs remain very high amidst ongoing conflict and a major cholera outbreak

  • Food Security Outlook
  • Yemen
  • June 2017 - January 2018
Assistance needs remain very high amidst ongoing conflict and a major cholera outbreak

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  • Key Messages
  • National Overview
  • Key Messages
    • Large populations in Yemen continue to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) acute food insecurity, the latter of which is associated with increased acute malnutrition and an increased risk of excess mortality. IDP populations and poor households in conflict zones are likely facing the most severe outcomes.

    • Yemen continues to face a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in a worst-case scenario in which conflict significantly disrupts or halts imports through the ports of Al Hudaydah and Salif, inter-governorate trade becomes significantly disrupted, and humanitarian assistance fails to reach populations most in need. 

    • Despite insecurity and funding limitations, large-scale humanitarian assistance continues to play an important role in preventing more severe levels of food insecurity in many areas. FEWS NET estimates that in Al Hudaydah, Amran, Hajjah, Sa’dah, Sana’a, and Ta’izz governorates, food security outcomes would be at least one phase higher in the absence of current humanitarian assistance provided by WFP.

    • A severe cholera outbreak has expanded to most governorates of Yemen, with more than 185,000 suspected cases identified as of late June. Worst-affected governorates include Sana’a City, Al Hudaydah, Amran, and Hajjah. The outbreak is attributed to poor water, sanitation, and hygiene conditions and could lead to increased mortality, as well as reduced productive capacity for affected households. 

    National Overview

    Current Situation


    Widespread conflict events, including both airstrikes and armed clashes, continue throughout Yemen, particularly in western areas. Areas where conflict has been most severe include Ta’izz, Sa’dah, Hajjah, Marib, Sana’a, Al Jawf, and Al Bayda governorates. Fighting has significantly restricted household livelihoods, disrupted trade, displaced households, and limited humanitarian access.  

    The potential for a military operation seeking to retake Al Hudaydah, and by association Hudaydah and Salif ports, remains very concerning. In late April 2017, coalition aircraft dropped leaflets over Al Hudaydah City warning of an impending military offensive against Houthi/pro-Saleh forces. Media reports also cited military and political officials stating the potential for a military operation to attempt to retake Al Hudaydah. Should this operation unfold, there could be a significant disruption to commercial flows of imported food and fuel through the ports of Al Hudaydah and Salif, particularly if port facilities are damaged. Together, these ports typically represent approximately 70 percent of monthly food imports and 40-50 percent of monthly fuel imports into Yemen. A prolonged disruption of these trade flows would likely significantly limit staple food availability on many markets.

    Macroeconomic conditions

    The ongoing macroeconomic crisis in Yemen is having a significant impact on major government services. Given limited government revenues and shrinking foreign reserves, the Central Bank of Yemen is still not paying most government salaries or providing lines of credit and favorable exchange rates for private food and fuel importers. The official exchange rate remains stable at 250 YER/USD. However, according to the Yemen Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), the parallel exchange rate is currently 355 YER/USD. Rapid field assessments conducted by FEWS NET in April/May 2017 found similar exchange rates, ranging from 345 to 369 YER/USD. These rates are higher than the ones by WFP in March 2017 (330-355 YER/USD) or a year ago in May 2016 (300 YER/USD).


    In a typical year, over 90 percent of cereal supplies in Yemen are imported (FAOSTAT), mostly via commercial marine imports. The financial crisis within the Central Bank of Yemen, along with difficulties accessing currency and lines of credit through private sources, have made it increasingly difficult for the private sector to continue food imports into the country. Port-specific constraints and delays have also made importing more difficult and costly. Starting June 1, 2017, there was an increase in fees for management, fuel, and security at Hudaydah port, which could increase the cost of importing food and humanitarian aid. In addition, importers are facing berthing delays associated with port congestion and ship clearances. Available information on the quantity of maritime imports is varied in terms of type, quality, and consistency. FleetMon ship tracking data suggest the number of bulk carriers, which typically transport most staple cereals, has increased following a sharp decline in late 2016/early 2017, and are now likely in line with levels seen in 2016 (Table 1). Nevertheless, given limitations on port access, financial constraints on importers, and reduced market demand due to low household purchasing power, it is likely that current import levels are below national consumption requirements. 

    Overland imports of food continue, but exact levels are unknown. Cross-border overland inflows of staple foods and other commodities continue though the Alwadia border crossing with Saudi Arabia and the Shahen and Safrit border crossings with Oman. Key informant interviews FEWS NET conducted in May 2017 suggest the volume of exports from Oman to Yemen has increased compared to 2014. However, the quantity of imports via these channels likely remains a small fraction of overall supply. Major constraints facing these traders include depreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER) and insecurity along trade routes.

    Internal trade 

    Conflict and insecurity has made road access more difficult in Yemen, with FEWS NET rapid assessments in April/May 2017 indicating significant disruptions on most major roads (Figure 2). In addition, the Yemen Logistics Cluster reports indicted in mid-June 2017 that major roads were closed in the southwest (Lahj and Ta’izz governorates), the northwest (Al Jawf, Amran, Hajjah and Sa’dah governorates) and central areas (Al Hudaydah, Al Mahwit, Al Marib, Sanaa and Shabwah governorates). Compared to previous reporting, road access has worsened in Al Jawf, Al Marib, Hajjah, and Sa’dah governorates.

    FEWS NET rapid assessments suggest ongoing insecurity and difficult road access remain constraints on the transport and trade of basic commodities within Yemen. For instance, traders in Ad Dali and Al Bayda reported increasing their dependence on goods entering from the Port of Aden and the Port of Mukalla to replenish their stocks due to the difficulty of transporting goods from Al Hudaydah. Although market functioning varied across the 

    country, the only markets where significant disruptions or minimal activities were reported were in Ta’izz and Al Mahwit governorates (Figure 3).

    Commodity availability on markets

    The availability of basic food commodities improved in June in several markets compared to previous months, according to the June 2017 WFP Market Watch Report. Wheat flour was rated as “widely available” in 10 additional governorates in June, the second best of a five-level classification for commodity availability, and an improvement since May when it was “sparsely available.” The report also indicated that wheat flour was “available” (the best ranking) on approximately 40 percent of monitored markets. FEWS NET rapid assessments in April/May 2017 indicated that wheat flour was considered somewhat scarce in Al Bayda, Al Hudaydah and Sa’dah, somewhat available in Ad Dali, Ibb, Lahj and Ta’izz and available in Abyan, Aden and Al Mahwit in April/May 2017, according to FEWS NET’s rapid assessments (Figure 4).

    Unlike wheat flour, fuel (diesel, gasoline and cooking oil) remains “sparsely available” on all markets assessed by WFP. According to FEWS NET’s April/May rapid assessments, all three fuels (diesel, gasoline, cooking oil) were scarce or somewhat scarce in Al Bayda, Al Hudaydah and Sa’dah and somewhat available in Abyan, Al Mahwit, Ibb and Ta’izz. Diesel and gasoline were somewhat scarce but cooking gas was somewhat available in Ad Dali, Aden and Lahj.

    Fuel prices

    In line with indications of limited availability in many areas, fuel prices at most markets were either stable or on the rise between April and May 2017 and remained above pre-conflict levels (national average: diesel (+43 percent), gasoline (+41 percent) and cooking gas (+81 percent). The highest fuel prices in the country were observed in the following governorates: Ta’izz for diesel and cooking gas and Ibb for gasoline. Fuel prices have been high and volatile in Yemen since March 2015 as a result of the ongoing conflict and reduced imports, and despite low global fuel prices. Increased fuel prices are likely negatively affecting typical livelihood activities, such as agriculture, and contributing to increased prices of food and non-food commodities through higher transportation, milling, irrigation, fishing, drinking water, and electricity costs.

    Wheat flour prices

    Wheat flour prices remain above average across the major markets in Yemen, although prices have been stable in most markets in recent months. In the major import and consumption markets of Al Hudaydah, Aden, and Sana’a City, wheat flour prices are 10 to 30 percent higher than in the months prior to the start of conflict in March 2015, based on WFP price data. Although there are differences in prices levels by governorate, wheat flour prices in almost all governorates continue to closely follow trends observed in the major import and consumption markets, likely reflecting a continued high degree of integration with these markets (Figure 5). The major exception to this trend is wheat flour prices in Al Ma’effer market in Ta’izz governorate, which have remained well above average since the start of conflict. Prices on this market are 40 to 80 percent higher than those found in most other markets in Yemen. Ta’izz continues to be a major center of conflict and insecurity, which is likely significantly disrupting supply and leading to much higher prices than normal. Prices have also been high and volatile on Attaq market in Shabwah governorate. 

    Income sources

    Household access to income remains significantly reduced across much of Yemen, which continues to be a major constraint on household purchasing power (Table 2). According to FAO, agricultural activities employ more than 50 percent of the workforce in the country. Despite above-average rainfall in 2016, total cereal production in Yemen in 2016 was estimated to be 11 percent below the previous year’s harvest and 37 percent below the five-year average due to the high cost and scarcity of agricultural inputs (including fuel and water) and limited access to land in conflict zones. This likely contributed to below-average labor demand and income for poor households.  

    This year’s first rainy season (March-May) started on time, but rainfall was below average in March and April in the northern and central highlands, which are responsible for most of the cereal production. However, rainfall was above average in May and according to the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), vegetation levels are currently close to or slightly above average in many areas in western Yemen (Figure 6). Although cropping conditions may be close to normal for planted crops, overall planting is likely less than normal. As a result, it is expected that poor households’ income from agricultural labor is likely below average in 2017.

    The collapse of disease control services as well as limited access to animal feed are among the major constraints facing livestock production in Yemen, which, according to FAO, decreased by more than 35 percent in 2016 compared to the pre-crisis period and is the main livelihood for many of Yemen’s rural poor households. Many livestock holders have also been forced to sell more livestock than usual to cover family basic needs.

    Household income from other sources remain below average. For example, public sector salaries and pensions are still not being paid to most people and fishing activities continue to be disrupted along the Red Sea coast. In addition, income from remittances remains constrained due to the closure of some money transfer offices, the lack of foreign currency available, and limitations placed by banks or offices on the amount of cash that can be transferred.

    Food sources

    FEWS NET rapid assessments in April/May continue to indicate that market purchases using cash or credit continue to be important food sources for surveyed households, although the proportion of total food coming from cash purchases has declined since 2014. Meanwhile, humanitarian assistance and assistance from family, friends, and neighbors have emerged as more important food sources over the past year for surveyed households in many governorates.


     As of June 1, 2017, the Task Force on Population Movement (TFPM) reports there are approximately 1,980,510 conflict-related internally displaced persons (IDPs) residing in Yemen, with the highest number of IDPs in Hajjah (19 percent) and Ta’izz (14 percent). Approximately 75 percent of the internally displaced originate from Ta’izz, Hajjah, Saada, and Sana’a City. The largest increases in the number of conflict-related IDPs since April 1 were recorded in Sana’a City (+5,688), Aden (+3,642), and Marib (+3,096), while the largest decreases were in Ta’izz (-21,852), Hajjah (-5,544), and Al Hudaydah (-5,118). The largest increases in the number of returnees were recorded in Ta’izz (+21,942), Sana’a City (+10,170), and Dhamar (5,484).

    Humanitarian assistance

    Large-scale humanitarian assistance continues to play an important role in reducing the severity of food security outcomes within Yemen. Prior to May 2017, WFP was targeting approximately 5-7 million people with humanitarian assistance every two months, with rations covering approximately one-third of monthly kcal needs. Starting in May 2017, WFP began to transition to a new prioritization plan in an effort to target households most in need more frequently and with larger ration sizes. The map below indicates WFP’s prioritization for assistance by district (Figure 8). In May 2017, WFP provided assistance to approximately 4.4 million people, with 2.3 million people receiving full rations and 2.1 million people receiving 60% rations. In June, the total number of beneficiaries increased to approximately 5.3 million people. In effect, the overall number of beneficiaries is moderately lower than in previous months (including when the EFSNA was conducted in November 2016), but the per-beneficiary ration size has increased substantially.

    As of mid-June 2017, the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) reported the 2017 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan was only 20 percent funded at approximately 214.9 million USD. WFP also reports that constraints such as funding, delays at Al Hudaydah port and with security clearances, particularly for trucks traveling to Marib and Al Jawf governorates in May, have limited their operations. Some delays in distributions have been reported due to funding limitations and erratic supply of assistance commodities. Focus group discussions OCHA conducted suggest humanitarian access is extremely difficult or there are high levels of access constraints in 16 percent of Yemen’s districts. Together, the population of these districts is approximately 2.7 million people, with more than 350,000 IDPs (59,430 households) and an additional 100,000 returnees. More than 76 percent of these districts were in the conflict-affected governorates of Ta’izz, Sa’dah, Marib, Al Bayda, Hajjah, and Al Jawf.

    WFP mVAM surveys[1]

    Between March and May 2017, WFP’s mobile Vulnerability and Assessment Mapping (mVAM) surveys found that, on average, more than 20 percent of households reported “poor” Food Consumption Scores in 14 governorates (Abyan, Al Bayda, Ad Dali, Al Jawf, Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahj, Marib, Raymah, Sanaa, Shabwah, Ta’izz). WFP’s mVAM reports have consistently indicated that a higher proportion of IDP respondents report poor food consumption in comparison to non-displaced populations.

    On average during the months of March, April, and May 2017, between 23 and 66 percent of respondents in all governorates were engaging severe coping, based on reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) data. The governorates where the highest percentages of households reported engaging in severe coping were Hajjah, Dhamar, and Amran. The lowest percentage was reported in Al Mahrah. In general, WFP’s mVAM data suggest food security outcomes are stable compared to previous months, and similar to or worse than last year’s levels in most governorates.

    Cholera outbreak

    A major cholera outbreak continues in Yemen, with WHO reporting more than 185,000 suspected cases by late June 2017. The largest numbers of cases of been reported in Sana’a City, Al Hudaydah, Amran, and Hajjah governorates. The ongoing conflict continues to limit access to health services and clean water in many areas, with negative implications for health and nutrition. Major constraints on healthcare and response include interrupted pay for health and sanitation workers, poor availability of imported medical supplies, poor access to safe drinking water, and irregular waste/garbage collection. These health, water, and sanitation issues have likely contributed to the recent upsurge in the cholera outbreak, which led the health ministry to declare a state of emergency in Sanaa City on May 15.

    Nutrition and mortality

    Two SMART surveys were conducted in Ibb and Shabwah governorates in early 2017. The SMART survey conducted in Ibb from March 25-April 6, 2017 found a global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence, based on weight-for-height z-scores, of 5.6 percent (95 percent CI: 3.4-9.0) in the Western Highlands and 3.9 percent (95 percent CI: 2.3-6.4) in the Eastern Highlands. These findings are not significantly different from those of the EFSNA conducted in 2016 and the previous SMART conducted in Ibb in December 2012. Although the survey excluded some villages in the districts of Al Udayn, Al Sabra, and Ba’dan due to ongoing conflict, the excluded populations did not exceed 0.3 percent and 0.4 percent of the total populations in the Western Highlands and the Eastern Highlands, respectively. Using a recall period of 98 days in the Western Highlands and 105 days in the Eastern Highlands, the crude death rate was 0.48/10,000/day (95% CI 0.30 – 0.77) and 0.17/10,000/day (95% CI 0.09 – 0.33) in the Western Highlands and the Eastern Highlands, respectively. The under-five death rate was 0.70/10,000/day (95% CI 0.27 – 1.81) in the Western Highlands, while no under-five deaths were reported in the Eastern Highlands.

    The SMART survey conducted in Shabwah between January 14-26, 2017 found a GAM prevalence, based on weight-for-height Z-scores, of 6.2 percent in Shabwah’s Plateau Zone and 8.5 percent in Shabwah’s Lowland and Coastal Zone, respectively, with no significant difference between the two zones. These findings are in line with those reported in the 2014 CFSS. However, the January 2017 survey excludes four districts (Usaylan, Ain, Bayhan, and Merkhah Al Ulyah), where conflict was ongoing and food insecurity outcomes may be worse. Using a recall period of 90 days, the crude death rate found in the Plateau Zone was 0.16/10,000/day (95% CI 0.07 – 0.34) and in the Lowland and Coastal Zone 0.24/10,000/day (95% CI 0.11 – 0.53). The under-five death rate was not reported.


    The most likely scenario for the June 2017 to January 2018 period is based on the following national level assumptions:

    • Conflict
      • FEWS NET assumes that fighting and airstrikes will continue at current levels, which will maintain IDP population at high levels, similar to those currently being reported. Areas with the highest concentrations of returnees are most likely to remain the same.
    • Economy
    • Central Bank: The Central Bank’s current split in management will continue. The Central Bank will also not receive any major funding from external donors and will not provide credit to the private sector for food importation during the scenario period.
    • Oil exports: Oil exports will not return to pre-conflict levels during the scenario period.
    • Foreign reserves: Given the assumptions of significantly reduced oil exports and no additional funding from external donors, foreign reserves within the country will continue to decline compared to current levels.
    • Exchange rate: Given the decline in foreign reserves, the Central Bank is not expected to be able to maintain the official exchange rate at its current levels. Consequently, a moderate depreciation of the Yemeni rial against the US dollar on both official and parallel markets is expected.
    • Liquidity constraints: Liquidity constraints at banks within Yemen will continue and will limit general economic activities and complicate import activities.
    • Imports: Cargo will continue arriving into Al Hudaydah, Salif, and Aden ports. Cargo arriving into Al Mokha and Al Mukalla port will remain limited. While large traders will continue to find alternative methods of accessing foreign currency to continue operations, import levels will likely remain volatile and transaction costs associated with these imports will increase. Informal food flows across land borders will also continue at status quo levels but their transport into the western areas of Yemen will remain difficult due to civil insecurity.
    • Government salaries, pensions and the Social Welfare Fund: Similar to the current situation, many government employees will continue not to receive salaries or pensions due to the Central Bank’s lack of adequate financial resources. Similarly, the Social Welfare Fund will not start up again during the scenario period.
    • Internal trade flows: Active fighting, damaged transportation infrastructure, high fuel prices, and additional security and transaction costs (ex. commissions at checkpoints) will continue to limit food trade flows within the country. In the absence of additional information about the evolution of conflict, FEWS NET assumes that areas where trade flows will be particularly constrained will be the same areas where roads are currently closed, as shown by the Logistics Cluster’s most recent access constraint map.
    • Market demand: Demand from consumers will remain atypically low during the scenario period due to weak household purchasing power caused by below-average incomes.
    • Wheat flour prices: Given the volatile wheat import levels and increasing transaction costs for traders/importers, prices are expected to remain stable but high during the Ramadan through Eid el Adha period, and start declining from November as demand wanes after the end of the religious festivities. However, prices are expected to remain above their respective last year and above the recent five-year average. Price increases will be largest in conflict zones (ex. Ta’izz governorate).
    • Fuel prices: Given a tightening of supply and increased transaction costs for fuel imports, FEWS NET anticipates that fuel prices will remain high and volatile. Fuel prices and availability on the market will mostly be affected by conflict and import levels as domestic fuel production is likely to be able to meet only a third of domestic needs.
    • Agricultural production: Although the seasonality of agricultural production varies depending on the zone in Yemen, land preparation and planting activities of cereal crops mostly end in June, but may continue in the Central and Eastern Wadi zone and the Western Central Highland Coffee, Qat, Sorghum and Livestock zone from July to November. Key harvest periods take place between July and September in the Central Highlands and Eastern Plateau zones. Meanwhile, in southern upland and coastal areas, harvests occur in October/November. The second rainy season (July to September) is expected to start on time and be average to below average in terms of total cumulative rainfall. Production will likely be below average due to a lack of availability and/or access to inputs and limited access to fields in conflict zones. Related agricultural labor opportunities will also be atypically low. Qat production, however, will continue to be generally average. Locusts may be present in coastal Red Sea areas and near Aden (FAO) but will cause minimal damage, while Fall Armyworm (FAW) is not expected to pose a significant risk to agricultural production.
    • Remittances: Although some remittance service offices will remain open in most urban areas, significant difficulties (ex. delays, closed offices, lack of liquidity) will limit households’ access to remittances from abroad, resulting in below-average incomes from this source.
    • Fishing: Based on seasonality information provided by the World Bank/FAO, fishing activities along Red Sea coastal areas and on the Gulf of Aden coast will continue through September, but will remain well below average due to reduced fishing assets, high fuel prices, and civil insecurity.
    • Livestock sales: From June to September, income from livestock sales may increase due to higher demand and prices as the two major Muslim holidays occur during this time. Despite these relatively higher prices, reduced livestock assets caused by several years of food insecurity will limit household income from this source. Income from livestock sales will likely be below average between October and January.
    • Incomes from other sources: The deteriorating macroeconomic situation and conflict will disrupt household livelihoods across much of the country, resulting in below-average household incomes. The largest declines in incomes will be among IDP populations and households residing in intense conflict zones, such as Ta’izz.
    • Cholera: The cholera outbreak is expected to continue to grow particularly with the coming rainy season starting in July, and poor water, sanitation, and hygiene conditions in local communities. The spread of the outbreak could lead to increased mortality, as well as reduced productive capacity for affected households. IDPs are particularly at risk due to insufficient food, lack of clean water, and poor hygiene services.
    • Humanitarian assistance: FEWS NET assumes that WFP’s humanitarian assistance will continue at current levels until the end of August 2017. However, given uncertainty with regard to assistance funding after August, no humanitarian assistance is assumed between September 2017 and January 2018.

    Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

    The ongoing food security emergency in western Yemen is likely to continue to drive very high assistance needs through at least January 2018. The deteriorating macroeconomic situation and the persistence of conflict will continue to disrupt household livelihoods, limiting purchasing power and access to food. While harvests during the scenario period will provide some rural households with small food stocks, these stocks are not expected to have major impacts on food security outcomes given the small-scale nature of cereal production in Yemen and the fact that these harvests will be below average. Household food access will likely further be constrained by high and increasing food prices. Price increases are likely to be largest in conflict zones (ex. Ta’izz governorate) and at markets that rely on Al Hudaydah as a source market. Meanwhile, recent changes in the ration sizes and number of beneficiaries targeted with assistance is likely to influence IPC area classification of outcomes for some governorates. For example, Al Bayda is now classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3!) due to increases in assistance, while Lahij is facing classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) at the area level, even though humanitarian assistance does continue to mitigate acute food insecurity among some populations.

    Governorates where humanitarian assistance is playing a key role in preventing worse food security outcomes (including Al Hudaydah, Amran, Hajjah, Sa’dah, Sanaa, and Ta’izz) will likely deteriorate into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the absence of continued assistance between September 2017 and January 2018. IDP populations and poor households in conflict zones will likely continue to face the most severe food security outcomes. Given expected food consumption gaps during the scenario period, acute malnutrition is expected to rise and remain above seasonally normal levels across much of the country, and there is an increased risk of excess mortality due to both food consumption gaps and cholera. Given lower impacts of the conflict on household livelihoods in the governorates of Al Mahrah and Hadramout compared to western areas, FEWS NET estimates that poor households in these two governorates will likely continue to be able to minimally meet their basic food needs but may not be able to afford essential non-food expenditures, in line with Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.


     [1] Please note that cell phone based surveys are likely biased towards better-off and urban populations who have access to cell phones. These biases should be kept in mind when comparing these survey results with in-person representative household surveys conducted prior to the conflict.


    For more information on the outlook for specific areas of concern, please click the download button at the top of the page for the full report.


    Figures Current food security outcomes, June 2017

    Figure 1

    Current food security outcomes, June 2017

    Source: FEWS NET

    Seasonal Calendar for a Typical Year

    Figure 2

    Seasonal Calendar for a Typical Year

    Source: FEWS NET

    Table 1. Currently available data on food imports and bulk ship arrivals into Yemen

    Figure 3

    Table 1. Currently available data on food imports and bulk ship arrivals into Yemen

    Source: FleetMon, UNVIM, UN COMTRADE, Yemen Logistics Cluster

    Figure 1. Number of bulk carrier arrivals per month (includes multiple arrivals for some vessels)

    Figure 4

    Figure 1. Number of bulk carrier arrivals per month (includes multiple arrivals for some vessels)

    Source: FleetMon, UNVIM

    Figure 2. Status of marketing corridors, April/May 2017

    Figure 5

    Figure 2. Status of marketing corridors, April/May 2017

    Source: FEWS NET Rapid Assessments

    Figure 3. Status of market functioning, April/May 2017

    Figure 6

    Figure 3. Status of market functioning, April/May 2017

    Source: FEWS NET Rapid Assessments

    Figure 4. Wheat flour availability on local markets, April/May 2017

    Figure 7

    Figure 4. Wheat flour availability on local markets, April/May 2017

    Source: FEWS NET Rapid Assessments

    Figure 5. Retail wheat flour prices (YER/kg) in major governorate markets across Yemen, September 2014-May 2017

    Figure 8

    Figure 5. Retail wheat flour prices (YER/kg) in major governorate markets across Yemen, September 2014-May 2017

    Source: WFP

    Table 2. Key informant estimated average change in income, by governorate

    Figure 9

    Table 2. Key informant estimated average change in income, by governorate

    Source: FEWS NET Rapid Assessments

    Figure 6. Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) anomaly, May 21-31, 2017

    Figure 10

    Figure 6. Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) anomaly, May 21-31, 2017

    Source: USGS/FEWS NET

    Figure 7. Number of conflict IDPs by district, as of June 1, 2017

    Figure 11

    Figure 7. Number of conflict IDPs by district, as of June 1, 2017

    Source: Task Force on Population Movement

    Figure 8. WFP EMOP Priority Districts

    Figure 12

    Figure 8. WFP EMOP Priority Districts

    Source: WFP

    Figure 9. Percent of governorate population receiving WFP humanitarian asssistance, May-June 2017 average

    Figure 13

    Figure 9. Percent of governorate population receiving WFP humanitarian asssistance, May-June 2017 average

    Source: WFP

    To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. Learn more here.

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