Political shifts drive uncertainty while Emergency outcomes persist in SBA areas

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected through May. The prolonged impacts of conflict continue to constrain household income sources and contribute to high food prices, limiting households’ capacity to meet their minimum food and non-food needs. While the late 2025 harvests in the highlands have slightly improved household food availability and access, an estimated two in five people still face slight to large food consumption deficits.
• In areas controlled by the Sana'a-based authorities (SBA), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in Al-Hudaydah, Ta'izz, and Hajjah governorates. The destruction of key revenue-generating infrastructure and related trade disruptions have severely affected household access to income. Seaports and factories are only partially functional, and labor demand is severely suppressed.
• In areas controlled by the internationally recognized government (IRG), Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely persist due to economic conflict with the SBA and internal political instability following an offensive by the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council in December. While the first tranche of the financial grant disbursed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in November has helped to stabilize the economy, the regularity of disbursements is now at risk, and political uncertainty is undermining market confidence. 

• If the KSA’s external financial support to the IRG is substantially disrupted or fully suspended, food security conditions in IRG-areas would likely deteriorate. Delayed civil servant salaries, failing public services, and renewed pressure on the value of the Aden-based YER would raise food and non-food prices and erode household purchasing power, reversing the marginal improvements in food security conditions observed since August 2025. Under this scenario, an increase in the number of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would be expected in IRG-areas. The magnitude and duration of this increase would depend on whether alternative financial support is secured.

  This report provides an update to the October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook and November 2025 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of December 25, 2025. 

Ongoing conflict continues to drive acute food insecurity by hindering economic activity, disrupting livelihoods, and pushing living costs beyond the reach of poor households. SBA-controlled areas face declines in government revenue and household income following Israeli airstrikes on key revenue- and employment-generating infrastructure, including seaports and factories. Despite damage to key seaports, food and fuel availability remains stable due to a minimally adequate inflow of imports and enforcement of price controls that prevent price volatility; however, prices of basic staple foods and essential non-food items remain high and unaffordable for many households with low income. Weak macroeconomic conditions and low effective demand persist, constraining household access to food. 

The IRG has experienced significant political changes since early December. The IRG’s executive authority rests with the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), an eight-member body that includes representatives from the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist organization advocating for an independent South Yemen state with the backing of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In early December, the STC launched an offensive on several IRG-controlled governorates, and by mid-December, the STC had likely established de facto control of Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah governorates, while expanding control in Abyan, Lahij, Al-Dhale’e. The STC has maintained control of Socotra, Shabwah, and Aden governorates since 2019. In response, the KSA, a key IRG ally, withdrew forces from Aden and other sites on December 6. As of this report’s publication, available evidence does not indicate a deterioration in food security conditions directly attributable to the STC takeover. However, the political situation remains fragile, and these events introduce uncertainty around the potential for escalating insecurity and macroeconomic challenges, with downstream risks for household access to income and food.

Since the STC offensive and the KSA’s withdrawal, the August economic reforms implemented by the IRG and the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden) are at risk. The KSA had committed to a financial grant of 368 million USD (with the first 90 million USD deposited on November 16) to boost public finances and address the budget deficit, allowing the IRG to resume payments of its fiscal obligations amid declining revenue and depleted foreign currency reserves. However, the status and timing of remaining disbursements are now unclear due to the ongoing political changes. Additionally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced the suspension of operations in Yemen, representing a further setback to the economic reforms that had contributed to the appreciation of the Aden-based YER.

Meanwhile, the interruption of the domestic gas supply has severely affected daily life across several IRG-controlled governorates. Tribes in some governorates, such as Ma’rib, are preventing the release of gas supplies to STC-controlled areas until the STC releases soldiers who were arrested during the recent escalation in Hadhramaut. These shortages have created significant challenges for residents, including disrupting small business activities (e.g., restaurants and bakeries). Public transportation has also been heavily disrupted, further straining households' ability to access income amid rising prices. According to key informants, the price of 20 liter gas cylinders has increased by approximately 10 to 25 percent in Aden Governorate and between 40 and 50 percent in other IRG-controlled governorates since early December, reflecting both constrained supply and a weakening of government oversight of market prices.

Amid heightened political uncertainty and economic constraints, seasonal agricultural activities remain an important – though inadequate – source of food and income for rural households. Agricultural labor demand is currently at seasonally high levels, providing income-generating opportunities for millions of daily wage earners. Households in Sa'adah and Ma'rib governorates are harvesting citrus, while sorghum, millet, sesame, and watermelon harvests continue on the western coast. In Hajjah, Al-Hudaydah, and Ta'izz governorates, farmers are planting millet and maize and preparing land for vegetables and mangoes. However, below-average temperatures have caused some crop losses for small-scale farmers, reducing available labor opportunities in the northern and central highlands. Despite these seasonal agricultural activities, overall labor demand remains constrained, particularly within the construction sector, limiting casual wage opportunities for poor households.

Livestock production conditions will likely improve following the October and November 2025 highland harvests due to above-average rainfall, which increased pasture quality and fodder availability. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), fodder prices decreased seasonally by 5 percent between September and October 2025 but remain 10 percent higher than the same period in 2024. This seasonal price decline will likely facilitate household fodder purchases and support improvement in livestock body conditions in the near term; however, a forecasted cold front through December to January may restrict fodder availability and increase livestock disease incidence in the highlands, limiting these gains.

Humanitarian food assistance

• In IRG-controlled areas, WFP began the sixth cycle of general food assistance (GFA) for 2025 in late October, reaching 3.4 million people. In January, WFP will launch a new targeted emergency food assistance (TEFA) program, which will serve 1.6 million people (a 50 percent reduction compared to 2025). Food assistance in SBA-controlled areas has been suspended since September 2025.

Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the Yemen Food Security Outlook from October 2025 to May 2026 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence:

• The STC's takeover of areas previously controlled by other IRG factions will likely alter local resource- and power-sharing agreements with armed tribal and communal groups. The frequency of clashes between STC forces and these militias will likely increase, especially in northern Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah governorates, which previously had minimal STC presence.
• The IRG will continue to face revenue shortages and remain heavily dependent on external financial support to address budget deficits. The KSA had committed to a grant of 368 million USD to support the government in meeting its fiscal responsibilities, including paying government workers' salaries, supporting the YER, and funding public services. However, the STC offensive has likely complicated the status of the KSA grant. So far, economic conditions have largely remained stable, likely attributed to the first tranche of funds (90 million USD) from the KSA in November. Moving forward, the grant will likely be retained, but the timing of future disbursements will likely become irregular due to the proxy confrontation between the KSA and UAE, which contributes to uncertainty in the food security outlook (Annex 1). 

Between December and May, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and worse outcomes are projected countrywide. Ongoing conflict between the SBA and IRG is expected to continue undermining economic activity, sustaining high living costs and constraining household purchasing power amid weak labor markets. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta'izz governorates, driven by extensive damage to critical employment-generating port and factory infrastructure following missile strikes, which have sharply reduced labor demand, disrupted key income sources, and slowed economic recovery. While Ramadan and Eid al-Adha between February and May are expected to relatively alleviate poor households' food insecurity through increased livestock sales and charitable giving (zakat), these seasonal improvements are unlikely to substantially offset the prolonged impacts of conflict and economic instability.

SBA-Controlled Areas

In SBA-controlled areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist, while Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will continue in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta'izz governorates. Years of armed conflict and economic hardships have severely reduced household coping capacity in these areas. The most recent shocks include significant declines in port-related employment, drought impacts on livestock-related income, substantial flood-related damage to productive assets, and the ongoing pause in humanitarian food assistance, which had previously helped to mitigate the size of household food consumption gaps.

Cereal and fruit harvests concluded in December in the highlands, providing short-term food stocks and seasonal income from agricultural labor. However, these improvements are marginal, and many households will still face slight to large food consumption gaps through January. Labor demand decreases seasonally during the winter months, and this decline is being compounded by the prolonged impacts of flooding during the second rainy season, which damaged crops, particularly in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta'izz governorates. As a result, poor households are expected to exhaust their food stocks atypically early and will increasingly rely on market purchases of staple foods. At the same time, poor households also face particularly weak purchasing power in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta'izz due to the loss of port- and trade-related employment opportunities, leading to worse acute food insecurity outcomes compared to other SBA-controlled governorates.

Similar food security dynamics are expected between February and May in lowland and eastern areas. In the eastern plateau, the spring fruit and vegetable harvests, which will be available through April, are expected to be similar to last year's (at levels below the five-year average). Similarly, in coastal areas, the main harvest is expected to be complete in April, but below-average yields are expected. These harvests are crucial for income in lowland and eastern areas. Although income from horticulture sales, livestock sales, labor, and gifts during Ramadan and Eid Al-Adha are expected to slightly alleviate acute food insecurity, the short-term benefits are unlikely to offset the long-term effects of sustained economic decline and rising living costs. Despite expectations of relatively stable food prices under strict controls, household capacity to purchase sufficient food is expected to remain weak.

IRG-Controlled Areas

In IRG-controlled areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are anticipated to persist through at least May, primarily due to both ongoing economic conflict between the IRG and the SBA and new political tensions driven by the STC takeover. While the STC may publicly emphasize an intention to avoid economic harm, a takeover of IRG institutions would almost inevitably generate economic spillovers. Traders' confidence in markets and government institutions has plummeted following the STC takeover, which will likely lead to a moderate-to-large increase in food and non-food commodity prices. The STC will face the same persistent economic barriers as the IRG, namely a lack of revenue collection, poor expenditure management, and weak confidence among traders and financial actors. 

The first tranche of the KSA grant (90 million USD in November) has been a key factor in supporting the stability of the IRG economy amid the STC’s offensive. The first tranche of funding helped pay civil servant salaries and provided revenue to maintain essential public services, such as electricity and transportation. However, while it is expected that the grant will continue, payments will likely become irregular or delayed. As the conflict progresses, the IRG will face increasing economic risk with delays or irregular payments of the grant disbursement, which is expected to result in a reduction in household purchasing power, increase in food prices, and insufficient revenue to pay civil servant salaries and public services. Any deterioration associated with irregular or delayed financial infusions from the KSA may cause an increase in households facing widening food consumption gaps. There remains an alternative possibility that KSA cancels the grant, dependent on how events unfold in southern Yemen (Annex 1).

Furthermore, clashes between STC forces and tribal and communal militias – especially in northern Hadramaut and Al-Mahrah governorates – are expected to disrupt household access to food and income. Such conflict incidents will particularly affect livestock-dependent households, as movement to natural pastures is vulnerable to restrictions. The number of internally displaced persons in northern Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah will also likely increase, and if livestock owners are displaced, they may resort to selling off their livestock at lower prices or lose access to their livestock entirely. Additionally, conflict will disrupt local businesses and reduce cross-border travel to KSA for casual labor opportunities, further constraining income-generating opportunities and household purchasing power.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

IRG-Controlled Areas

The financial grant from Saudi Arabia is suspended, but the United Arab Emirates steps in

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes:

Amid the offensive launched by the STC and the subsequent withdrawal of KSA forces, the status of the financial injection is uncertain. If the financial grant from KSA is reduced or discontinued, the IRG would likely face an immediate financing gap. This would constrain the government's ability to pay salaries and finance essential services while also weakening foreign exchange buffers and market confidence. Likely macroeconomic outcomes would include renewed depreciation pressure on the YER, rising inflation (particularly for food and fuel), reduced import capacity, and a decline in real income that would increase food insecurity. While the severity and timing of impacts would depend on whether alternative external support is mobilized, effects could begin as early as the first missing salary or service financing cycle and intensify over subsequent months in the absence of replacement funding.

Without continued financial injections from KSA, the IRG (and specifically the STC) will face significant challenges in maintaining public services and paying government salaries. Between 20-25 percent of individuals in IRG-areas are government workers, and salary payments for government workers had already been delayed by five months prior to the first tranche of the financial injection. However, the first tranche only covered about two months' worth of salary payments, leaving limited fiscal space to maneuver. 

If disbursements are suspended, reduced public spending and unpaid salaries would likely constrain electricity provision and reduce or halt business operations, including workshops, factories, and small businesses that all depend on electricity. As a result, income-generating opportunities would decline. The likelihood of broad public unrest would sharply increase; in July 2025, large-scale protests erupted in Hadhramaut due to persistent electricity outages and economic grievances. 

If the UAE (as the main backer of the STC) pledges an alternative financial infusion, food security conditions would still likely deteriorate in the short term (over approximately two to three months), as it would take time for a grant to be established and for deposits to begin. However, food security conditions could stabilize once a potential UAE grant begins to take effect. A temporary increase the number of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would be expected, and some households would likely deteriorate into Emergency (IPC Phase 4), before conditions stabilize. However, governorate-level outcomes would most likely remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with fewer than 20 percent of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The Aden-based YER begins to depreciate in the absence of a financial grant or due to other factors 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes:

The recent stability of the YER likely reflects a combination of external support, particularly the KSA’s financial support channeled through CBY-Aden, and residual market confidence following the reform measures implemented in late-July to early-August 2025 that temporarily strengthened the Aden-based YER. Active exchange rate management and tighter oversight of currency markets may also be contributing to this relative calm. However, this stability remains fragile and conditional. Key destabilizing factors include a reduction or discontinuation of external inflows, which would constrain foreign exchange availability and weaken market confidence; inability to pay public sector salaries or meet other government obligations; short-term policy responses, including expensive borrowing, unorthodox financing, or monetization, that may ease liquidity pressures temporarily but accelerate currency depreciation and inflation; and any security escalation that raises import and insurance costs, thereby increasing immediate demand for USD. Impacts could begin as early as the first missed salary or financing cycle, with compounding effects over subsequent months if corrective measures are not taken.

Most households rely on market purchases for food, and while recent economic reforms and price controls have somewhat alleviated the affordability crisis, households would face widening food consumption gaps if the value of the YER depreciates again. Food prices would likely increase, which would erase the marginal improvements in household purchasing power observed since August. Traders would likely try to increase prices to drive up profits, adding additional constraints on millions of households that already lack access to income-generating opportunities. 

The degree to which the YER depreciates and the speed at which its value falls will determine the extent of the impact on acute food insecurity outcomes. If the value of the YER falls to pre-August 2025 levels, an increase in the share of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would likely occur but remain below 20 percent at the governorate level, and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would remain the most likely area-level outcome. However, if the value of the YER falls more sharply within a rapid timeframe and drives food prices to new record highs, area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would be possible.

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.