Syria Context Report

Syria is located in the eastern Mediterranean region of western Asia, where it is bordered by Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east, Jordan to the south, Israel to the southwest, and Lebanon to the west, with a short coastline along the Mediterranean Sea (Figure 1). Syria’s ecology ranges from coastal areas to deserts, resulting in wide ecological variations that shape livelihoods. Rural households heavily engage in agriculture; however, both rural and urban households rely on markets for the bulk of their consumption. In rural areas, the main sources of income for food purchases include crop sales, livestock sales, casual labor, petty trade, self-employment, gifts (including charitable giving such as zakat), remittances, and cash transfers. In urban areas, the main sources of income for food purchases include daily wage labor, formal employment, and/or trading. The main expenditure for both rural and urban households is food; however, other important expenditures include housing, fuel, electricity, health care, telecommunications, water, transportation, education, and debt repayment.

Poor households in Syria are vulnerable to a combination of conflict-related, weather, and economic hazards. The Syrian civil war, which lasted nearly 14 years from 2011 to 2024, resulted in widespread internal displacement, economic collapse, and long-lasting damage to basic public infrastructure and livelihood systems. Although the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 marked the end of large-scale war and led to the formation of a transitional government in March 2025, political fragmentation and insecurity persist, and the cumulative impacts of conflict continue to undermine recovery and regional stability. Prior to the war, Syria’s oil fields served as a central pillar of the national economy, alongside an agricultural sector that supplied domestic markets and exports, complemented by an expanding industrial base and a growing tourism industry. Since 2011, however, conflict-related disruptions and sustained declines in oil production have triggered severe macroeconomic deterioration, undermining all major sectors and reversing years of growth. These dynamics have contributed to a protracted humanitarian crisis, characterized by weakened public service delivery, erosion of livelihood systems, and diminished state capacity. An estimated 7.4 million people remain internally displaced, including approximately 5.2 million living outside formal sites and 2.1 million in 1,736 formally registered sites for internally displaced persons (IDPs), primarily concentrated in Idlib and Aleppo.The extreme poverty rate increased sharply from 11 percent in 2010 to 66 percent in 2024, according to the UN Development Program (UNDP). In the current transitional period, the food security situation in Syria remains concerning. Ongoing economic shocks, alongside protracted internal displacement, persistent internal and cross-border insecurity, and recurrent drought – inclusive of hydrological drought defined by low water levels in the Euphrates River and exacerbated by complex transboundary water management issues – are currently the key drivers of acute food insecurity among poor households countrywide. Areas of concern include Aleppo, Daraa, Deir ez-Zor, Al-Hasakah, Homs, Idlib, Ar-Raqqa, and Rural Damascus.

Syria’s strategic position in western Asia and along the Mediterranean once made it a critical trade nexus linking Mediterranean economies to Mesopotamia and the wider Arab world, as well as connecting Gulf economies with Mediterranean markets and extending connections to European supply chains. Syria is divided into 14 governorates, or muhafazat, which serve as the primary subnational units for governance and administration. The capital city, Damascus, serves as Syria’s political and administrative center. As of January 2025, Ahmed al‑Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) and former leader of Hay’at Tahrir al‑Sham [HTS]), serves as Syria’s interim president, marking the onset of a transitional governance period following the al-Assad regime collapse. Syria remains a unitary state with a republican form of government, and the al-Sharaa-led interim authority is currently drafting a new constitutional framework.

Syria is a member of the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, although its diplomatic relations remain strained due to years of conflict and regional instability. Many countries in the region intervened in the civil war, fueling distrust and rivalry between Syria, its neighbors, and myriad armed groups: the al-Assad regime received support from the Iranian government and its Lebanon- and Iraq-based proxies, while opposition forces were supported at various points by Jordan, Turkey, the Gulf states. 

Today, these relationships have shifted toward cautious pragmatism, with regional actors prioritizing trade, refugee management, and security coordination amid Syria’s fragile transition. Transboundary water management remains a critical dimension of this realignment. Disputes over Euphrates and Tigris flows, once intensified by conflict-driven scarcity and damaged infrastructure, have shifted toward renewed talks on water sharing and dam operations, aiming to address chronic regional water shortages alongside broader efforts to stabilize relations. Relations with neighboring Arab states are mixed: while ties with Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan have improved through security coordination and trade discussions, relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remain supportive but cautious, shaped by concerns over border security, refugee flows, and Syria’s political transition and reconstruction. With non-Arab neighbors, Syria’s preliminary rapprochement with Israel has also been characterized by guarded optimism and lingering skepticism about the viability of a bilateral relationship. Meanwhile, Syria’s relationship with Turkey has signaled tentative steps toward de-escalation and cooperation on refugee management and trade.

Syria lies at the eastern edge of the Mediterranean within the Fertile Crescent and exhibits pronounced ecological gradients that shape agricultural potential, water availability, and livelihood systems. Ecological and climatic conditions range from humid coastal belts and mountain zones to semi‑arid steppe and arid desert interiors. These variations shape land use patterns, with rainfed cropping areas and orchards concentrated in coastal and mountain zones, mixed farming and rangelands in the steppe, and pastoral systems dominating the desert.

Seasonal precipitation patterns structure agricultural activity across these zones. Precipitation occurs mainly from October to May, peaking between December and February, and declines sharply from west to east: coastal and mountain zones often exceed 600 millimeters (mm) annually, steppe plains average 250-350 mm, and desert regions receive less than 100 mm (Figure 2). Intense winter storms can trigger flash floods in river valleys and wadis, inundating crops, eroding soils, and contaminating water sources. Summers are hot and dry, increasing evapotranspiration and reliance on irrigation in arid zones, while frequent heatwaves and extreme temperatures strain water resources and heighten crop failure risks. The agricultural calendar closely aligns with seasonal rainfall: staple grains and legumes are planted with the onset of rains and harvested from May to August (Figure 3), while fruit crops are cultivated nearly year-round and cash crops such as cotton and sugar beet, along with vegetables, are harvested between June and November. Hydrology plays a critical role in offsetting climatic constraints, particularly in eastern Syria, where water scarcity has become one of the country’s most pressing challenges. The Euphrates River, flowing from Turkey through Syria into Iraq, and Lake Assad, Syria’s largest reservoir, form the backbone of irrigated agriculture and supply water for domestic and industrial use where rainfall is inadequate. Prolonged drought, declining precipitation, and falling river and reservoir levels have reduced soil moisture and groundwater recharge, undermined irrigation capacity, and forced greater reliance on shallow wells and poorly maintained systems that often fail to meet crop water needs. The situation is compounded by upstream water management in Turkey and Iraq, making transboundary water governance a key factor in Syria’s agricultural resilience. Reduced flows in the Euphrates not only limit agriculture but also strain domestic and industrial water supply.

Seasonal agroclimatic hazards — including drought, flash floods, occasional cold spells, sand and dust storms, heatwaves, and wildfires — can disrupt planting and harvest cycles, degrade soils and pastures, and constrain crop yields. In addition, Syria is exposed to seismic risk, with earthquakes periodically damaging irrigation infrastructure, storage facilities, and rural housing, further disrupting agricultural production and market access. In February 2023, for example, a 7.8-magnitude earthquake killed at least 5,900 people, injured more than 11,200, and displaced thousands, particularly in northern Syria. 

Syria’s demographic profile has been profoundly reshaped by more than a decade of conflict, displacement, and economic decline. As of 2025, the country’s population is estimated at 25.6 million, marked by uneven geographic and age distribution due to the civil war’s impact on large-scale emigration and internal displacement. Conflict dynamics have accelerated pre-existing urbanization trends, and nearly 82 percent of Syrians now live in urban and peri-urban areas, including the major population centers of Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. The remaining 18 percent reside in rural areas, reflecting both conflict-driven displacement away from rural areas and the long-term pull of urban centers. As of 2025, Syria hosts an estimated 7.4 million IDPs, approximately 29 percent of the population. Most IDPs are concentrated in northwest Syria (NWS) — particularly in Aleppo and Idlib — with additional clusters in Hama, Homs, Damascus, and Rural Damascus. In northeast Syria (NES), camps such as Al-Hol and Roj continue to shelter tens of thousands of displaced people.The population structure is predominantly young, which has implications for household resources and labor markets in Syria’s challenging economic context. Approximately 33 percent of the population is under the age of 15, while an estimated 58 percent falls within the working age bracket of 15-64 years. Only approximately 4 percent of the population is aged 65 years or older. Ethnically, Arabs comprise an estimated 90 percent of the population, while Kurds represent the largest minority group. Syria’s population is religiously diverse, though predominantly Muslim: approximately 74 percent of the population identifies as Sunni Muslim, followed by 13 percent Shia Muslim, 10 percent Christian, and 3 percent Druze and Yazidi. Among the Shia Muslim population, the largest ethnoreligious sect is the Alawites, comprising 10 percent of the total population. These demographic patterns are reflected in Syria’s geographic distribution: Sunnis hold a majority in Hama, Homs, Aleppo, and Damascus; Alawites are primarily located along the coast, especially Latakia and Tartus governorates; Christians are dispersed across the country but concentrated in and around major urban centers; the Druze population is centered in As-Suwayda Governorate; and the Yazidis are concentrated in Al-Hasakah.

Overlaying these demographic characteristics is a sharp deterioration in living standards over the past two decades. Poverty has deepened dramatically as prolonged conflict and restrictive sanctions have curtailed economic activity and eroded household incomes. According to a UNDP report, extreme poverty surged from 11 percent in 2010 to 66 percent in 2024 due to conflict, while general poverty¹ climbed from 33 percent in 2010 to 90 percent in 2024 (Figure 4), underscoring the deterioration of Syria’s socioeconomic foundations.

Syria’s livelihood systems can be broadly categorized into urban and rural zones, differentiated by agroclimatological conditions, varying levels of economic activity, and household strategies for accessing food and cash income. These systems capture typical patterns of food and income sources across households within Syria; however, their functionality has been disrupted by conflict, mass displacement, and economic collapse since 2011, compounded by droughts in 2006-2011 and 2021-2025. 

In urban areas, livelihoods typically rely on formal employment, informal labor, trade, and self-employment. In contrast, rural livelihoods are dependent on crop and livestock production, including staple cereals (primarily wheat and barley), vegetables, fruits, and select cash crops, alongside livestock rearing. Rural livelihood patterns are closely linked to Syria’s natural geography and agro-ecological conditions. Crop production is concentrated in northern and western Syria within the Syrian portion of the Fertile Crescent, spanning across the country’s rainfed Mediterranean zone and irrigated zones along the Euphrates River corridor, while nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralism predominates in arid and semi-arid areas (Figure 5). Prior to the civil war, agricultural production played a central role in rural economies as both a source of food and income; however, agricultural productivity has declined sharply due to both drought and conflict since 2006. The production of wheat, the key staple, fell from an average of 4 million metric tons in 2001-2007 to 2.5 million in 2012-2020 to 2.1 million in 2020-2024, and Syria transformed from a net wheat exporter to net wheat importer in 2009. 

Across both urban and rural areas, households typically access food through a combination of market purchases, own production, and — more recently — humanitarian assistance (Figure 6). Even before the conflict, most Syrian households were heavily market-dependent for food, as their own production was generally insufficient to meet minimum household needs. Poor households, with limited access to land and productive assets, have always been more reliant on markets while own production typically serves as a secondary but important food source. In recent years, humanitarian assistance has also become an increasingly important source of food. Income sources vary by livelihood context. In rural areas, households typically earn income (Figure 7) through crop and livestock sales, agricultural and casual labor, self-employment, and petty trade, and transfers such as remittances, gifts, and zakat. Crop and livestock sales are the most important for middle and better-off households, while poorer households rely more heavily on off-own-farm agricultural and casual labor. In urban areas, income is commonly derived from formal employment, daily wage labor, and trade, with poorer households disproportionately dependent on casual, daily wage labor.

Given the scale and duration of displacement in Syria, livelihood options for IDP households differ from those of non-displaced communities due to constraints such as limited access to productive assets (especially land), uncertain residence status, and weak integration into formal labor markets. As a result, IDPs do not have a distinct or stable livelihood system; rather, their income-earning opportunities generally reflect constrained participation within the broader livelihood systems of the areas in which they reside. In general, IDP households tend to rely on labor-based and transfer-based income sources . A 2020 survey found that the most important income sources for IDP households included unskilled wage labor (25 percent), skilled wage labor (6.5 percent), gifts (14.1 percent), petty trade (10.9 percent), cash assistance (8.7 percent), borrowing (7.6 percent), and remittances (6.5 percent), among others. However, the relative contribution of each income source may vary by settlement context: IDPs residing in camps typically have more limited opportunities and rely more heavily on humanitarian assistance, petty trade, and informal labor, while those integrated into host communities may access a wider range of labor-based and informal income sources. Given high reliance on markets for access to food across both IDP and non-displaced populations, food purchases represent the largest household expenditure. According to a 2024 Rapid Needs Assessment (RNA) conducted by the Assistance Coordinated Unit (ACU) across 13 governorates (inclusive of displaced populations), food accounted for approximately 52 percent of household spending priorities. Other key expenditures typically include fuel, electricity, health care, mobile phone and internet services, water, transportation, education, debt repayment, and other non-food items.

Overall, poor households face heightened vulnerability to a range of protracted shocks and recurrent hazards. Conflict and insecurity, displacement, natural hazards, and conflict-related economic challenges have eroded agricultural productivity, weakened the labor market, and increased reliance on humanitarian assistance and social support networks. These dynamics raise the likelihood that ongoing shocks and future hazards translate into acute food insecurity. Recent surveys suggest the most common coping strategies households employ to mitigate food consumption gaps include cutting expenditures; borrowing and buying food on credit; consuming cheaper, less preferred, or less nutrient-dense foods; engaging in labor migration; and seeking social support in the forms of gifts, charitable giving, and remittances. Asset-based coping strategies such as spending savings and selling household assets are limited due to the depletion of assets over the course of the civil war.

The Syrian Civil War began in March 2011 following Arab Spring protests and a violent crackdown by the government of President Bashar al-Assad. As state repression increased, defectors from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in July 2011, attracting a broad coalition seeking to overthrow al-Assad. Intensified conflict produced numerous armed groups across sectarian lines, including Kurdish and Arab militias, Alawite shabiha aligned with the SAA, and Sunni Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and later the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Territorial control shifted frequently, though the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) eventually captured much of NES, administering it under the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).

From 2012 onward, foreign governments backed different factions. Iran deployed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Shia militias beginning in 2012 to support SAA offensives. The U.S., Gulf States, and Turkey supported anti-Assad groups, while Iran and Hezbollah reinforced the al-Assad regime. The U.S. backed “moderate” factions, including the FSA; however, many FSA groups were later defeated or absorbed by violent extremist organizations. A large coalition of Western and Arab countries also backed an SDF-led offensive to combat ISIS, which declared a caliphate in 2014 after capturing nearly a third of the country’s territory. Russia’s 2015 intervention marked a turning point in the war against al-Assad: its airpower, coupled with a Hezbollah-led ground offensive, enabled the SAA to retake Aleppo in 2016. From 2017-2020, Russia helped the SAA consolidate control, targeting rebel strongholds in Idlib, northern Hama, northern Homs, the eastern Ghouta in Rural Damascus, Daraa, and Quneitra. After Jabhat al-Nusra dissolved in 2016, its remnants regrouped as HTS in 2017 under Ahmed al-Sharaa. Meanwhile, the SDF-led offensive gradually recaptured lands seized by ISIS, resulting in the end of the group’s territorial control by 2019, though ISIS continued to operate as an insurgent network. A 2020 ceasefire froze frontlines and until December 2024, al-Assad controlled most of Syria except AANES, northern border areas held by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), HTS-held Idlib, and the U.S.-protected al-Tanf zone. On November 27, 2024, HTS-led forces with SNA support launched a surprise assault on SAA forces in western Aleppo. The SAA rapidly collapsed as an emboldened HTS advanced south toward Damascus. After rebels seized the capital on December 8, the al-Assad regime came to an end as Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow and al-Sharaa became the de facto leader of Syria. In March 2025, al-Sharaa announced the formation of a Syrian transitional government, initially pledging to draft a new constitution within six months; however, al-Sharaa later stated it could take up to three years, with elections potentially delayed for four years. Periodic escalations in fighting driven by unresolved political grievances continue to hinder Syria’s recovery after nearly 14 years of war. In 2025, the Israel Defense Forces advanced into the buffer zone near the Golan Heights and conducted more than 600 strikes across Syrian territory. Fighting erupted between Druze and Bedouin groups in As-Suwayda in mid-2025, resulting in massacres that displaced 192,000 people. In NWS, reprisal attacks, including summary executions against the Alawite community, to which the al-Assad family belongs, prompted the formation of Assadist militias, fueling further cycles of violence. A U.S.-brokered October 2025 deal between the transitional government and the SDF laid the groundwork for the latter’s integration into the Syrian military, though sporadic clashes continue. ISIS has capitalized on this dysfunction and the resultant security vacuum to intensify reconstitution efforts.

Though levels of fighting remain well below those at the war’s peak, persistent insecurity and sectarian rivalry threaten a peaceful transition and increase the likelihood of renewed conflict. Localized fighting has resulted in additional displacement, infrastructure damage, and disruptions to livelihood activities while unexploded ordnance in agricultural and grazing zones inhibits harvesting and planting. Unresolved questions about the country’s political transition deter investors from funding reconstruction efforts, delaying economic recovery. The country’s fragmented and highly contentious governance landscape, with multiple sub-national administrations exercising control over different territories (Figure 8), creates administrative barriers and access constraints that continue to hinder humanitarian assistance. 

Syria’s macroeconomic environment remains fragile in the post-civil war period, shaped by the effects of prolonged conflict, institutional erosion, and limited reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. While agriculture continues to serve as an economic pillar, its performance has been undermined by fuel shortages, border closures, and limited access to imported inputs. These challenges reflect broader structural weaknesses across the economy, as key productive sectors — including manufacturing, energy, and tourism — have sharply contracted since 2011. Since the onset of the civil war, the country has shifted from being a net oil exporter to a net importer, weakening external balances and fiscal capacity.

Macroeconomic instability has led to extreme currency depreciation, which has become a primary transmission channel through which economic shocks impact food markets and household purchasing power. Exchange rate pressures intensified from 2020 and became severe in 2023. In 2023, the Syrian pound (SYP) lost nearly 60 percent of its value on the parallel market, followed by a cumulative depreciation of 94 percent by February 2024. In response, and constrained by limited foreign currency reserves, the Central Bank implemented a series of devaluations in 2023 to narrow the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates (Figure 9). Despite these measures, exchange rate volatility persisted into 2025. In addition, a heavy reliance on cash in the Syrian economy, combined with a banknote shortage and underdeveloped e-payment services, has resulted in a cash liquidity challenge. Amid continued instability of the SYP, the USD and Turkish Lira (TRY) are often used for large transactions, with the TRY widely adopted in northern Syria. In late December, the transitional government announced that new banknotes would be issued on January 1, 2026 for the new Syrian Arab Republic pound (100 SYP will be worth 1 new Syrian pound) with both currencies in circulation during a 90 day transition period. Some analysts have raised concerns that the transition could trigger rising inflation.

Cereal markets are central to Syria’s food security, particularly given wheat’s role as the primary staple and the state’s long-standing involvement in bread supply. What is predominantly consumed in the form of pita bread, and subsidized pita was long distributed through government-regulated bakeries (subsidies were removed in early 2025). Barley also plays a significant role in cereal availability, while rice and bulgur are secondary staples. Over the past decade, wheat production (Figure 10) has fallen by more than 50 percent compared to the pre-war norms of approximately 4 million metric tons. Projections for 2025 indicate that output will likely fall to less than half of typical pre-war output, comparable to the very low levels recorded in 2016–2018. Meanwhile, barley production has been highly volatile, reflecting sensitivity to weather, conflict, and input costs. Following an exceptionally poor 2018 season, barley production surged to an estimated 1.99 million tons in 2019 (roughly double the recent average) due primarily to favorable rainfall. However, this recovery was short-lived, and production has averaged around 1.0 million tons over the past five years. In Marketing Year (MY) 2025/26, the U.S. Department of Agriculture projects barley production will reach just 350,000 tons, which is approximately 65 percent below the recent five-year average, due to drought, extreme heat, insecurity, and high input costs. Increasing reliance on irrigated production has further heightened exposure to fuel scarcity and damaged irrigation infrastructure.

As domestic production weakened, Syria has transitioned from relative self-sufficiency in wheat to structural dependence on imports. Domestic production satisfied an average of 59 percent of national wheat consumption between MY 2020/21 and 2024/25; however, the FAO projects a self-sufficiency ratio of just 29 percent in MY 2025/26, necessitating an import requirement forecast to be 70 percent above the five-year average. As of December 2025, a state-run grain purchaser has secured contracts for just 1.13 million tons of wheat imports, primarily from Ukraine, Romania, and Russia. Despite some easing of sanctions in May 2025, limited access to hard currency remains a binding constraint on Syria’s ability to finance these import needs, increasing the risk of supply shortfalls and upward pressure on bread prices.

Given fiscal constraints, Syrian authorities resorted to raising the price of subsidized bread nearly tenfold in mid-December 2024 before removing the subsidies entirely in the following months as part of broader fiscal austerity measures. The removal of subsidies, combined with low domestic wheat production, constrained import financing capacity, and the impacts of historic drought on 2025 output, has sharply reduced the state’s capacity to buffer domestic supply shocks, shifting a greater share of price risk onto households and markets. In response to mounting economic pressures and rising food costs, the transitional government announced a 200 percent salary increase for public sector employees and pensioners.

There are several critical information gaps that constrain a comprehensive, national-level markets and trade analysis of Syria. Recent analyses of  wheat supply chain dynamics  remain concentrated in NES. Few data sources provide multi-year agricultural or market performance metrics, and none provide disaggregated international trade data for staple foods. While price differences across governorates are documented in WFP monitoring, available sources do not describe drivers of market segmentation, including informal trade routes, transport constraints, or conflict-related movement restrictions. These gaps necessitate cautious interpretation of available information on market signals and triangulation across data sources to establish national trends.

Given these limitations, NES emerges as the primary source of detailed market information, and its governance and supply dynamics may provide insight into broader national patterns. In NES, government and de facto-authority interventions play a central role in shaping domestic supply. For example, the Local Self-Administration (LSA) — the decentralized, community-level governance structures operating under NES’s AANES administration — exerts substantial control over key market functions, including setting prices and regulating international wheat trading. Many farmers operate under exclusive procurement contracts with the LSA, which support supply management but limit their profit margins and market power. The LSA and humanitarian actors supply bakeries with subsidized flour, helping stabilize consumer access to bread; however, many bakeries are operating below capacity due to infrastructure damage, limited flour allocations, limited storage capacity, and recurrent power and water supply disruptions. Across NES, available evidence shows the wheat-flour-bread value chain relies on a combination of locally produced and imported flour. Public and private mills supply around 70 percent of locally milled flour, and NES-based traders supply the remaining 30 percent. Imported flour is sourced through NES-based traders who account for 40 percent of imported flour; importers who contribute 34 percent; and self-importation, which accounts for 26 percent. Recent government measures affecting production inputs, most notably a sharp increase in electricity tariffs from 10 SYP/kWh to as high as 1,800 SYP/kWh, are also expected to elevate operational and transportation costs across staple food supply chains.

Evidence from NES also demonstrates that trade and price dynamics for wheat grain and flour are shaped by multiple constraints, including fluctuating exchange rates, delayed invoice processing, higher transportation and labor costs, limited storage capacity, weather-related factors, border closures, taxes and high import-related costs, and security conditions. Border closures, in particular, are reported to increase demand and raise both buying and selling prices for grains and flour. In 2023, when the value chain study was completed, 80-90 percent of transactions across the wheat value chain were conducted in cash (primarily in USD, with limited use of credit), reflecting market and currency risk. Seasonal price fluctuations are a defining feature of wheat markets, with prices for local and imported wheat peaking between November and January due to increased demand during the planting season and reaching their lowest levels during the June-July harvest period, though these patterns can be distorted by production shortfalls.

Food security and nutrition outcomes in Syria reflect the combined effects of prolonged conflict and displacement, poor macroeconomic conditions, and environmental shocks that continue to constrain agricultural production, market functionality, and the provision of basic water, sanitation, and health services. While levels of active conflict have declined since the end of the civil war in 2024, the cumulative impacts of compounding shocks continue to result in a high risk of acute food insecurity for large segments of the population in the post-civil war context. Key areas of concern are Idlib and Aleppo in NWS, where protracted displacement, returnee influxes, and limited market access drive insecurity; Deir ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa and Al-Hasakah in NES, where drought and economic isolation have undermined crop production and pastoral livelihoods; and Daraa, Homs, and Rural Damascus, where high return movements, salary delays, and water scarcity limit access to food and income sources.

Poor households’ food availability remains constrained by reduced agricultural production, as years of conflict and severe, multi-year droughts have eroded rural livelihoods traditionally reliant on wheat, barley, vegetables, and small ruminants. Displacement is also a key limiting factor, as millions of people have lost access to their land and livestock and face barriers to re-claiming their land. These shocks have compounded longer-term environmental degradation and weakened household coping capacity, leaving agricultural communities increasingly vulnerable to future rainfall deficits. At the same time, production costs have surged, marked by the tripling of fertilizer prices and cuts to fuel subsidies. Escalating costs have forced farmers to scale back area planted and lowered crop yields, further contributing to reductions in domestic food production.

At the same time, poor households’ access to food is severely constrained by macroeconomic deterioration and market disruptions. According to WFP’s August 2025 Market Price Bulletin, the cost of living — measured by the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB)² — rose by 6 percent month-on-month to reach 2,000,000 SYP, driven primarily by increased prices for tubers, vegetables, eggs, and vegetable oil. This increase follows earlier trends: by January 2024, the food component of the MEB had risen by up to 122 percent compared to the preceding year and to more than four times its level two years earlier, while wages stagnated. By October 2024, the minimum wage covered only 10-16 percent of the MEB, and even after a 200 percent increase in July 2025, minimum wage covered only 36 percent of the total MEB and 57 percent of the food component by August 2025. Rising imported food and fuel costs, exacerbated by exchange-rate volatility, continue to widen the affordability gap, particularly for urban households and IDP who rely the most heavily on markets.

 Conflict and insecurity dynamics have also undermined market food availability and financial access to food by reducing the number of open trading days, causing localized market closures, and driving price volatility for staple commodities such as bread, sugar, rice, and vegetable oil. These disruptions have also depressed demand for agricultural labor, limiting income-earning opportunities and eroding purchasing power. Many poor households, but especially those that remain displaced, also face additional barriers to effective food utilization, including insecure shelter, limited cooking facilities, and restricted mobility.

Together, these constraints have left millions of people unable to access sufficient and diverse foods, deepening reliance on humanitarian food assistance and increasing the risk of malnutrition. Poor households frequently attempt to manage food consumption shortfalls through coping strategies that reduce overall welfare, including by prioritizing food over other essential needs, relying more heavily on informal credit and social networks, and compromising dietary quality. The scope for asset-based coping has narrowed substantially following years of depletion, leaving poor households with limited buffers against new shocks.

Poor food consumption is one of several drivers of acute malnutrition in Syria: only one in 10 children aged 6-23 months meets the Minimum Acceptable Diet (MAD). Additionally, at least one in four children is anemic, and exclusive breastfeeding rates in parts of northern Syria are below 30 percent. These challenges are compounded by limited access to health and nutrition services along with poor hygiene and sanitation practices and a worsening drought and water crisis. 

Based on available data, the prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM), measured by weight-for-height z-score (WHZ), in Syria from 2000 to the present has largely remained within the range of <5.0 percent (considered Acceptable under WHO threshold and associated with Minimal [IPC Phase 1]) to 5.0-9.9 percent (Alert under WHO thresholds and associated with Stressed [IPC Phase 2]). However, the available data are derived from different methodologies and vary in geographic coverage, with data collection at times disrupted by the prolonged civil war. As a result, the figures are not always directly comparable.

Prior to the outbreak of the civil war, Multiple Indicator Cluster (MIC) surveys found a GAM (WHZ) prevalence of between 3.5 and 9.3 percent³. By 2019, available reporting from WHO and OCHA suggested the national GAM (WHZ) was as low as 1.7 percent, although the survey underpinning this quoted figure could not be found. In 2021, 2022, and 2023, subnational SMART and SENS surveys focused on local and displaced populations in NWS's Idlib and Aleppo governorates found a GAM WHZ prevalence between 2.5 and 4.4 percent. Most recently, in 2024, the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) reported malnutrition was at Alert levels in Rural Damascus, Idlib, Ar-Raqqa, and Quneitra, while the GAM prevalence reached 10.0 percent in Latakia; however, the HNO did not indicate whether this conclusion is based on survey data or an analysis of contributing factors.

It is difficult to determine whether these figures reflect actual trends in nutritional status across Syria in recent years. The exception to this is in NWS where there is a clear trend of deterioration in the nutrition situation between 2019 and 2023: from 0.7 percent GAM WHZ (0.4-1.3 95% CI) in 2019 to around 4 percent (Aleppo – 4.4 percent [3.1-6.1 95% CI]; Idlib – 3.8 percent [2.7-5.2 95% CI]) in 2023, with a statistically significant change between 2019 (0.7 percent GAM WHZ [0.4-1.3 95% CI]) and 2021 (2.5 percent [1.3-4.5 95% CI]). Challenges with determining nutrition trends beyond the above select years in NWS stem in part from limited access to underlying nutrition data for several estimates, which would provide greater detail on geographic coverage, access constraints, and other contextual factors that should be considered when interpreting the findings. Despite these limitations, it is considered likely that SMART and SENS surveys conducted during the war primarily captured accessible populations, while the most severely affected populations may have remained inaccessible to survey teams. Lastly, pre-conflict estimates relied on different sampling frames, cluster selection, and household selection methodologies, and some used the older NCHS/WHO growth reference (1977) rather than the current WHO Growth Standards (2006). While clear trends are difficult to establish, nutritional status in much of Syria in recent years has likely remained below the Serious threshold (≥10.0 percent) associated with Crisis (IPC Phase 3).